THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Thursday, March 2, 1995 TAG: 9503020022
SECTION: FRONT PAGE: A12 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: Editorial
LENGTH: Medium: 53 lines
U.S. troops waded ashore in Somalia in December of 1992. The mission was humanitarian - to deliver supplies to fight hunger in a country racked by civil anarchy and famine. Now troops are back to cover the extrication of a U.N. peacekeeping force from a country still caught in a crossfire of competing warlords.
The Somalian adventure has seemed misbegotten from the outset. It has also provided an object lesson in the limits to peacekeeping and the pitfalls of compassion.
The TV pictures of starving Somalis were horrific and moved President Bush to take action. Surely the world had a responsibility to try to alleviate the suffering. But the mission was often viewed as an invasion in Somalia. Those trying to save lives had their own put at risk.
The confusion only deepened as mission creep set in. There came a point where it was unclear if we were peacekeeping or nation building, policing or picking winners. Somehow, under President Clinton, we had gone from protecting the delivery of supplies to chasing warlords. Men died, we backed off, and a good deed wound up leaving a bad taste in the mouth.
If there are lessons, they concern the need for clarity when undertaking any foreign endeavors. We were naive getting in and unprepared for what we found. Confronted with a chaotic reality, we improvised without an apparent plan.
Part of the problem was deciphering whose mission it was. Our troops got enmeshed in a U.N. operation and it became even less clear who was in charge or what the goals were.
This isn't to say the United States should foreswear all humanitarian missions or refuse to collaborate with the United Nations or allies. But next time, and there will be a next time, we must know clearly what we intend to accomplish, how we intend to achieve it and what to do when the unforeseen arises - as it so often does.
And we must recognize the limits of power. It is possible for U.S. troops to fight an enemy and prevail, to take territory and defend it. It is far less clear that U.S. troops can impose order on feuding populations or persuade factions who have long despised each other to beat their swords into plowshares.
The military can't compel others to embrace civilized behavior or adopt humanitarian principles. Ultimately, soldiers have no business being asked to perform statecraft. Maybe Boutros Boutros-Ghali didn't know that, but the commander in chief should have. by CNB