THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1996, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Thursday, April 4, 1996 TAG: 9604040321
SECTION: FRONT PAGE: A1 EDITION: FINAL
SOURCE: BY MIKE MATHER, STAFF WRITER
DATELINE: CHESAPEAKE LENGTH: Long : 141 lines
The two Chesapeake firefighters who died trapped in a burning auto-parts store March 18 pleaded to be rescued while their partner on a fire truck called for water. The water never arrived, and a rescue was not organized.
Although Fire Chief Michael Bolac publicly praised the ``heroic rescue efforts'' at funeral services, a Fire Department audio tape shows no one acted when firefighters Frank Young and John Hudgins Jr. called for help.
A Fire Department inquiry into the deaths isn't finished, but Division Chief Thomas Cooke said investigators are examining several problems:
The dozens of firefighters eventually summoned to the shopping center were plagued by ineffective radio communication. The Chesapeake Fire Department uses a radio system with only two channels - a strong main channel and a weaker line-of-sight channel. The person who keys the radio first takes over the frequency, and no one can interrupt until the frequency is free. The number of firefighters and rescue workers at the shopping center overwhelmed the system.
The crew assigned to Engine 1 was supposed to run a water line from a hydrant to Engine 3 - Young's and Hudgins' engine - but that never happened. Engine 3 never got water and Engine 1 never answered numerous radio calls. The billowing fire nearly scorched the defenseless Engine 3.
Water lines were slow to reach the building's front as well. The fire raged several minutes - and possibly as long as 20 minutes - before the main hoses were ready.
Young and Hudgins called for help on their radios, but no one acted. The transmission was difficult to hear, but at least one battalion chief understood it. The chief repeated that men were trapped inside the building, but no one moved to help them.
Neither the on-scene commanders nor the third member of the Engine 3 crew noticed Young and Hudgins were missing until long after they were dead.
Cooke said it's not clear if any of the problems contributed to the men's deaths. He said evidence so far makes him think the men died quickly and before the operation began unraveling.
Cooke said a Fire Department report on the fatalities could be completed by Friday, but he said it won't conclude with finger-pointing. Rather, he said, the report will lay out the mistakes so firefighters can learn from them.
``It would dishonor the lives lost if we didn't do everything to prevent this in the future,'' Cooke said.
Investigators are studying the transcript of radio transmissions to reconstruct what happened. The tape only depicts radio traffic on one channel. Face-to-face orders and conversations on the second channel aren't recorded.
There was no fire visible when Engine 3 first arrived at 11:34 a.m. No one knew it then, but the flames were hiding in a narrow space between the store's ceiling and the building's roof. The fire was chewing through the aging wooden trusses, and it was spreading fast.
Soon, the fire would fill the space. And then, starving for oxygen, it would push through the roof.
At 11:47 a.m., that was happening. The operation began falling apart.
Young and Hudgins were calling for help, but no one at the shopping center seemed to understand their transmissions.
``Engine 3 to Battalion 2!'' Hudgins screamed, his panicked voice muffled by his air mask.
``Go ahead,'' the battalion chief responded.
``I got (unintelligible) and myself inside, and can't get out!''
``I can't understand you,'' the chief said.
``Please, get some water (unintelligible) inside and get us out of here!''
Hudgins and Young are never heard from again.
One person did understand the transmissions. The Battalion 1 chief twice said into his radio that he heard the trapped men. No one acknowledged him.
By 11:50 a.m., Engine 3 had run out of water.
Herbert Myers, Engine 3's third crew member, didn't know his partners were in trouble, and assumed they were still fighting the fire.
``Captain,'' Myers called. ``These (unintelligible) interior attack to try to hold the fire in check. Engine 3 to Engine 1, I need water as soon as you can get it to me.''
Engine 1 never answered.
A few seconds later, the trucks in front had run out of water, too.
Each of the several Chesapeake fire engines carried about 500 gallons of water in its belly. The water didn't last long, only a few minutes. Without a hydrant hookup, the crews couldn't fight the fire.
``We have full involvement on the front of this building, and I have no water whatsoever in the front,'' a chief told headquarters.
``Chief,'' a firefighter called. ``We have to move Engine 3. We haven't had water and the fire is blowing right over us.''
``You in the back?''
``I'm saying the fire is blowing directly over the engine. We're having to move it and the lines are not effective.''
The Battalion 2 chief called headquarters. It was 11:54 a.m. - seven minutes after Hudgins' last transmission.
``We got men on the inside from Engine 3 and the lines have been burned. I do not know their status and we don't have water to go in after them.''
The men inside, investigators believe now, were already dead.
No one knows exactly what happened.
Cooke said it appears part of the roof collapsed near the rear of the building, blocking the back door. That may have severed the firefighters' hose. They called for help and began moving to the front door. But the rest of the roof fell before they could make it.
Other firefighters aren't sure of that account.
Several from Norfolk and Virginia Beach - called to help that day - said the men were first trapped by falling debris, maybe a bulky shelf. That's when the men radioed for help. Some said there may have been time to rescue the trapped men. All said the operation was poorly organized.
Several Chesapeake firefighters declined to speculate. They said they would be fired if they talked about the case.
At 11:56 a.m., 22 minutes after Engine 3 arrived at the fire, the truck still had no water.
``We've got a supply line going out reverse lay, but we've never gotten water on it, so we've got dead lines,'' a firefighter said.
``Engine 1, are you at the hydrant?'' another asked.
Again, Engine 1 did not answer.
``Engine 3 to Engine 1,'' Myers called. There was no answer. ``Engine 3 to Engine 1, I need some water. Now.''
There was no answer.
The Battalion 2 chief called headquarters.
``We've got radio problems,'' he said. ``I have a possibility of (unintelligible) in the ceiling. Battalion 2 to (unintelligible), there is no water supply in the back of this building. Engine 1 went to lay a line to the hydrant and we don't know what they are doing.''
``Engine 3 to Engine 1,'' Myers called again. There was no answer. ``Engine 3 to Engine 14.''
Again, no answer.
At 12:01 p.m., Myers made his final plea.
``Engine 3 to Battalion 2. Chief, I need water on the supply line here in the rear of the building.''
``Alright. Stand tight.''
Finally, at 12:04 p.m. - 30 minutes after Engine 3 arrived - a firefighter called: ``They've located a hydrant and are hooking it up now. In a couple of minutes, we'll have water.''
By this time, Engine 3 had moved away from the building and was taken out of action. It never got water.
Some time later, the bodies of Engine 3 crew members Hudgins and Young were found side-by-side in the smoldering debris. ILLUSTRATION: Research by MIKE MATHER, graphic by JOHN CORBITT/The
Virginian-Pilot
WHAT WENT WRONG
[For complete graphic, please see microfilm]
KEYWORDS: FIRES FATALITIES INVESTIGATION by CNB