THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1997, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Sunday, February 16, 1997 TAG: 9702140036
SECTION: COMMENTARY PAGE: J4 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: OPINION
SOURCE: By THOMAS G. McINERNEY and STANLEY A. WEISS
LENGTH: 85 lines
In the business world, battle is a metaphor; in the military, it's the mission. That's why the business of reinventing the Pentagon is a must.
The downsizing of U.S. defense over the past decade has been well-publicized - spending has fallen nearly 40 percent since 1985. What's drawn less public notice is that fewer dollars are being spent on post-Cold War fighting capability (or ``tooth,'' in military shorthand) and more and more on bloated Cold War support functions (or ``tail'').
Historically, war-fighting strength to support, or tooth to tail, stood in roughly equal balance, 50-50. Today, tooth to tail has become tail to tooth, with 70 percent of defense resources devoted to support functions and just 30 percent to war-fighting - and falling.
Even that fact understates the extent of our challenge. As the Information Age continues to remake the world's militaries, even the old 50-50 ration is out of whack. War planners looking at the quantum-leap potential of information technology should be aiming to take the ratio to 70-30 the other way.
How do we correct the current imbalance? Congress and the president could throw money at the problem. According to some estimates, that could be as much as $60 billion to $80 billion per year to fund new weapons and technology the services say they need to win on the battlefield of the future. Another alternative is to downsize our commitments to balance our downsized defenses. But in a world where hot spots can flare from any point on the compass, shrinking our commitments to fit a smaller force is neither palatable nor prudent.
There is, however, a third way to respond to coming crisis: Run the military like a business. The objective here is not about spending more or spending less but spending better.
We offer five ways to reinvent the Pentagon, already tested by industry:
1. Privatize where possible: Many activities handled by the Pentagon at present have little or nothing to do with the military's mission. Even weapons maintenance need not be done by uniformed personnel. Expect Congress to resist, but privatizing depots and outsourcing maintenance work would save at least $15 billion a year, according to the Pentagon's own estimate.
2. Outsource where the private sector has built a better mousetrap: We all know the U.S. military has an Army, Navy, Air Force and Marines; are we equally aware that the U.S. military also runs its own travel agency and real estate empire even as it serves as bursar and landlord? The Pentagon spends $8.50 to process a paycheck; a private-sector payroll specialist could do the job for $1. As for travel, in 1993 the Pentagon spent $1 billion to process $3.5 billion in travel expenses. Inefficiencies like these are luxuries we can no longer afford.
3. Reduce inventory to cut costs: U.S. forces need to abandon the un-affordable ``just-in-case'' mentality and borrow from the ``just-in-time'' inventory practices being perfected in our private sector. In a world where we expect pizzas to arrive in a half-hour and air freight overnight, the private sector has capabilities the Pentagon can't afford not to tap.
4. Downsize the civilian defense work force: In the past six years, we've cut the number of Army divisions from 18 to 10, active fighter wings from 24 to 13, and ballistic-missile subs from 34 to 14. Yet there are 640,000 military and defense positions engaged in essentially non-war-fighting, commercial activities, costing $45 billion a year. As a stand-alone company, this behemoth would come in right behind Wal-Mart and General Motors in terms of total work force. Many of these positions could be cut or outsourced. Nor should management be exempt from the ax. Since 1980, we've seen an increase in the Pentagon's senior civilian leadership of 25 percent. Never before have so many costing so much managed so few.
5. Bring back the Base Closing Commission: Legislation that created the first Base Closure and Realignment Commission (BRAC) lapsed before its work was complete. Four rounds of closings and consolidations will reap $6 billion in annual savings but only 22 percent of all bases have been eliminated. Stopping now means leaving too many obsolete bases in service and losing out on billions of dollars in savings. Bring back BRAC.
Finally, there must be a systematic effort to realize these potential gains. To this end, we propose a private-sector-led ``Tail-to-Tooth Commission.'' The inverted name is intentional, to tell the public at a glance that we've witnessed a dangerous reversal in the resources we devote to our national defense.
When our work is done, we can reverse the name in our wrap-up report, having restored the military resources to the ratio the U.S. needs to defend our interests and ideals in the 21st century. MEMO: Lt. Gen. Thomas G. McInerney (U.S. Air Force, ret.) is president
and CEO and Stanley A. Weiss is founder and chairman of Business
Executives for National Security, an organization of U.S. business
leaders.