Henner Barthel
Kevin M. Carragee (Eds.)

Communication and Political Change

SPRECHEN & VERSTEHEN
Schriften zur Kommunikationstheorie und Kommunikationspädagogik



Band 20

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»Verstehen und Sprechen
sind nur verschiedenartige Wirkungen
der nämlichen Sprachkraft.«

Wilhelm von Humboldt (1827)

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Herausgegeben von Hellmut K. Geißner
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Preface

As the founder and the chief-editor of the series "Sprechen und Verstehen" ("Speaking and Comprehending"), I am very pleased about the publication of volume 20 in 2004.

This volume brings new papers presented at an International Colloquium on Communication into the public arena. These colloquia – founded in 1968 by Fred L. Casmir (USA) and Hellmut K. Geißner (Germany) – are from that time the sole forum for the exchange of ideas between American and European communication scholars.

This ongoing transcultural dialogue had encouraged me to change the series' subtitle from "Schriften zu Sprechwissenschaft und Sprecherziehung" to "Contributions to Communication Theory and Communication Pedagogy." This change corresponds with worldwide developments in our discipline.

This means communication has been the main topic of all the authors since the first volume, whether it may be rhetorical or philosophical, cultural or intercultural, empirical or hermeneutical, face-to-face or mediated.

I do hope the series will be a further a source of internal as well as international scholarly cooperation.

Finally, I want to thank the publisher, who integrated "Sprechen und Verstehen" in the program of Röhrig Universitätsverlag.

Hellmut K. Geißner

Lausanne, Switzerland

Preface

This book contains papers presented to the International Colloquium on Communication, which took place in Berlin, Germany in July of 2002.

The Berlin colloquium represented a continuation of scholarly exchanges between communication researchers from Europe and the United States. Founded more than thirty years ago through the collaborative efforts of the Speech Communication Association and the Gesellschaft für Sprechwissenschaft und Sprecherziehung, the International Colloquium on Communication is a consortium of European and American professors of communication. The colloquium meets biennially, alternating between Europe and the United States for conference locations. Recent meetings have been held in Boston, Massachusetts (2000), Budapest, Hungary (1998), San Francisco, California (1996) and Jyväskylä, Finland (1994).

Each conference is dedicated to a research issue relating to communication. Papers represent many research perspectives and the colloquium brings together scholars from different areas of the discipline to share ideas on the common theme of the conference.

The Berlin conference theme, "Communication and Political Change," provided an opportunity to examine the relationship between forms of communication and the dynamics of political change. Participants explored the conditions and contexts in which communication contributes to or hinders political change. The chapters included within this volume analyze the relationship between communication and political change within particular historical, cultural and social contexts. These contextual analyses demonstrate the complex role communication plays in helping to produce or prevent political change.

The chapters explore multiple forms of communication, including interpersonal, organizational and mediated communication. Similarly, they draw attention to diverse historical and cultural settings, including contemporary Europe and the United States, eighteenth century France and Britain, Germany of the 1930s, 1940s and 1980s, and contemporary Afghanistan. In their discussion of the relationship between communication and political change, the authors raise diverse issues an concepts: political rhetoric, civil society, cultural rituals, social movements and political activists, the Internet, social capital, cultural identity, political marketing, and taboos. The chapters, then, provide a representative example of the diverse issues that animate current communication scholarship in the United States and Europe.

The contributions by Henner Barthel, Kevin M. Carragee and Herman Cohen examine the relationship between communication and political change in specific historical contexts. Barthel analyzes the communication patterns that dominated the Central Round Table of the German Democratic Republic, a forum for political communication during the political transformation of East Germany in 1989 and 1990. He documents the achievements of the round table in helping secure peaceful democratic change, while also noting its limitations as a forum for democratic debate. Kevin M. Carragee evaluates the relationship between social movements, the news media and political change. He concludes that the news media in the United States have played a role at particular historical moments in producing progressive political and social change, a dynamic sometimes neglected by researchers within cultural studies who stress the news media's role in maintaining the legitimacy of powerful institutions. Herman Cohen shifts the historical focus to the eighteenth century by evaluating how Enlightenment writers and philosophers defined the relationship between rhetoric, culture and democracy. His discussion is particularly

sensitive to how writers in Britain and France held different perspectives on the interaction between communication, independence and freedom.

While the chapters by Hartwig Eckert, Elizabeth Fine and Hellmut Geißner vary considerably in their focus, they share a common concern with communication and the character of political culture. Employing examples from the Federal Republic of Germany, Eckert laments the absence of broad public participation in political decision-making concerning major issues, including the proper degree of European integration and the abolition of the Deutschmark. His linguistic analysis highlights the impoverished nature of political discourse in Germany. Elizabeth Fine, in contrast, examines the Internet rhetoric of the Revolutionary Association of the Woman of Afghanistan (RAWA), devoting attention to the structure, content and style of this group's web site. She underscores the rhetorical dilemmas confronting RAWA given its critique of Islamic fundamentalism, its commitment to feminism, and the harsh ton of its attacks on its adversaries. These dilemmas are exacerbated by the fact that its web site reaches multiple audience with profoundly different political perspectives and historical experiences. Geißner highlights the reciprocal relationship between rhetoric and politics. He emphasizes the need to critically examine both formal political rhetoric (speeches, for example) and conversational rhetorics. In doing so, he repeatedly focuses attention on the need to expand democratic discourse.

The contributions of Tim Hegstrom and Jaakko Lehtonen explore communication and democratic practices, while Annette Mönnich examines business communication and socio-cultural change. Hegstrom provides a detailed analysis of the relationship between organizational communication and political change in developing nations. His particular focus concerns the degree to which the communicative practices of transnational organizations, including a commitment to stakeholder voice

and human rights, can foster progressive political change in the developing world. Lehtonen explores the declining political participation and civic engagement in Western consumer-oriented societies. His analysis is informed by past scholarship on civic engagement and social capital, including Robert Putnam's influential book Bowling Alone. Lehtonen also underscores the increasing power of corporations in shaping public discourse and in influencing political decision-making. All of these developments, in his view, threaten civil society. Mönnich discusses how social and political change can modify corporate practices, including the external communication of corporations to their publics. She also highlights how changes in values within German society have transformed the internal communication of some German corporations. She concludes her essay by contending that these social processes indicate the need to revise communication training.

In their essays, Gene Michaud, Dorota Piontek and Bernd Schwandt examine how societies experience and respond to political and social change. Michaud explores the Super Bowl, an American sporting event, as a cultural ritual that reinforces values and meanings associated with those holding political and economic power in the United States. He focuses on the first Super Bowl played and televised after the events of 11 September 2001 and how this mediated event, by celebrating both American military power and American consumer culture, represented a response to the anxiety and fears produced by the crisis of 11 September. Piontek analyzes the beginning and evolution of political marketing in Poland in the post-communist period. Her examination remains sensitive to how political marketing in Poland corresponds to and differs from this form of marketing in other Western democratic societies. In contrast to the broad societal focus of the essays by Michaud and Piontek, Schwandt examines a particular cultural context: the teaching of communication to students in the

former East Germany. This specific focus, however, allows Schwandt to document how communicative practices and patterns of East Germans 'Ossies' and West Germans 'Wessies' differ.

Stanley Rich's essay examines the political activism of Dorothy Day, an American Roman Catholic who sought extensive social and political reform. Rich documents Day's wide-ranging activism, while also placing her within the broader context of American politics and the Roman Catholic Church in the United States.

The contribution of Gary Selnow echoes many of the concerns advanced by Jaakko Lehtonen. Like Lehtonen, Selnow laments the decline of political and civic engagement in Western societies. He contends that political discourse in the United States is dominated increasingly by political elites, and he expresses concern that new communication technologies, like e-mail and the Internet, have not broadened public involvement in the political process.

Edith Slembek examines a significant and intriguing issue: the role of taboos in a society and how challenges to taboos often represent broader social or political developments. Her essay indicates that researchers need to examine the social character and consequences of taboos. For example, who is helped by or harmed by a taboo?

Semira Soraya-Kandan explores issues relating to group and cultural indentity in her analysis of a regional cultural association representing immigrants in Germany. Her essay examines both the internal tensions within this group and the tension she felt as a researcher and participant in the group. The analysis, then, is self-reflexive, highlighting the complexity of the research process itself.

The volume concludes with an essay by Donald Williams examining the content, tone and style of textbooks used in southern schools of the Confederate States of America during the American Civil War. Williams

provides an extensive analysis of these textbooks, highlighting, for example, how they defended the institution of slavery.

By the way the authors are responsible for their contributions.

This book and the colloquium that preceded it benefitted from the collaborative work of many individuals. We thank the Department of Communication and Journalism at Suffolk University and its chairperson, Professor Robert Rosenthal. Our thanks also to the administrative assistants in the department, Mary Ann Landry and Ruth Hegarty, and to Ellen M. McCrave. We thank the Checkpoint Charlie Stiftung (Berlin-USA-Foundation) for its support of this volume. We also appreciate the assistance of Kirstin Gerau, Bärbel Ruzika and Eva Stabenow in preparing the book.

We end this preface by thanking our colleagues who participated in the Berlin conference and who enriched our understanding of the relationship between communication and political change.

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Political Change – Without Rhetorical Consequences?

The relationship between rhetoric and politics is manifold and reciprocal. Basically, a safe assumption would seem to be that the number of various rhetorical modes is equal to the number of types of political organizations. On closer examination, however, this assumption looks more like fantasy than reality, for not every political change has rhetorical consequences. What is to blame for this perception? A superficial understanding of politics or an inadequate conception of rhetoric? Inadequate indeed if the conception is based entirely on the rhetoric of speeches, of oration per se, and ignores the "rhetoric of discussion and debate." As far as possible within this paper, I propose to attempt an answer to this question, relying in particular on examples from modern and recent German history.

The study of political change need not focus exclusively on the form of government. In his treatise, On Rhetoric, Aristotle (1365b) distinguished among "four forms: democracy, oligarchy, aristocracy and monarchy". Here, in contrast to the extensive treatment of this subject in The Republic (Politeia), he simply associates each form directly with one of three social groups: the common people, the owners of property, or the educated keepers of the law. Monarchy undergoes a further subdivision between the law-based rule of a "kingdom" and the unlimited power of "tyranny." Further, he stresses the importance of knowing the mores, laws and advantages that serve the aims of each form of government, because only from this point of view can the appropriate "means of persuasion" be

found. He considers this "means of persuasion" the central point of rhetoric and defines it as "the faculty that apprehends the possible means of persuasion in any given case" (1355b).

A speaker who wants to persuade must speak in the presence of others. Thus the aim, the "*telos*," of a speech lies in the effect that it has on the listeners. Aristotle says as much. To the three elements of speaker, subject of the speech, and the person to whom the speech is addressed, he adds the following key theoretical refinement: "and the speech's end in view is the person to whom the speech is addressed, i.e. the listener" (1358b). When he says, "The intention aims for the purpose" (1366a), then, the purpose rests with the listener, and thus he is consistent in letting the listeners decide the genre of the speech.

Aristotle identifies three possible roles or functions for the listeners as members of the popular assembly: to advise on what is to be done, to determine what has happened or to weigh the appropriateness of what has been said. "From this there must follow three genres of address: the advisory, the juridical and the (so-called) 'oratorical showpiece.' The juridical genre (*genos dikanikon / genus iudicale*) concerns prosecution and defense under the law. The epideictic genre (*genos epideiktikon / genus demonstrativum*) concerns praise and blame according to the aesthetics of everyday custom (cf. Walker 2000). And the deliberative genre (*genos symbouleutikon / genus deliberativum*) concerns advising to pursue or avoid a course of action according to personal conviction, "for one or the other of these is always the aim of those who either counsel privately or take the floor in the popular assembly." Counsel may therefore be imparted not only in a public address, but also in a conversation. Unlike a formal speech, a conversation allows the *symbouleuesthai* – mutual consultation – to be carried out immediately. This is shown, for example, by the Sicilian "Bouleuteria" that have been preserved.

Referring to a comment by Socrates in the Phaidros, (261a), Quintilian concludes that "rhetoric exists not only in trials and popular assemblies, but also in private and public life-situations" (2, 21, 4). Already in the pre-Socratic *dissoi logoi* the following injunction is to be found: A man "must simply be able to conduct a conversation" (*brachu dialegesthai*) and "speak in public" (*damagorein*). The Sophists of Asia Minor practiced both and, in contrast to the dogmatic value system of the aristocracy, pursued the truth in public exercise of "point and counterpoint." In the play of diction and contradiction, argument is born, which, as a search for the truth, "sets science itself in motion" (Tenbruck 1976). Thus very early there is, besides the rhetoric of the formal address, also a rhetoric of conversation; even Socrates was a conversational rhetorician.

In the Sophistical Refutations Aristotle names four kinds of conversation: didactic, dialectic, investigative and eristic, mentioning that he has treated the apodictic elsewhere. Because he draws dialectical conclusions even from probable premises, he recognizes not only the "bad" *doxai* of the eristicians, but also – as he argues in the Topics – the "good" premises of the reasoned thinkers (cf. Toulmin 1986). Two centuries later Cicero distinguishes between the conversational forms of "*sermones*" and "*disputationes,*" both of which are trumped by "*contentio:*" vigorous dispute. Diogenes Laertes, in the 3rd century A.D., identifies fourteen genres of dialogue. To sum up then, despite various approaches to a rhetoric of conversation, no thorough-going *techne* of conversational rhetoric seems to have been developed in the ancient world, at least according to the available sources, which, it must be pointed out, have suffered the loss of the writings on sophistical doctrine (Geißner 1996b).

In the centuries since then the forms of government have changed. New forms have arisen, not only forms based on seizing and maintaining control of the state, but also on actions directed by multilateral interests. These

narrower or broader concepts of the political have their matching narrower or broader concepts of the rhetorical. There is no single, definitive rhetoric, just as there is no single, definitive politics; both concepts are contingent on historical process. True, many fantasize a "natural" connection between democracy and rhetoric, but rhetoric exists even under tyrannical forms of government (Steinbrink 1976, 287), and besides: Is there not in democracy as well an "invisible but effective tyranny?" (Deetz 1990). Apart from the three basic models developed in the Agora and the Forum, other, local forms have been developed that serve specific purposes of specific interest groups in specific places – situations in which the juridical model would not be appropriate: ecclesiastical pronouncements [e.g. papal bulls and encyclicals]; didactics ["disdaskalia"]; parliamentary rhetoric; military rhetoric; economic, industrial and organizational rhetoric; the rhetoric of publishing and the media; the "electronic rhetoric" of the Internet. (Selnow 1998; Welch 1999). This list alone might indicate a change in the conception of rhetoric. Then there is the speech of the powerful and the princes, courtiers and officials who are beholden to them: the situationally powerful agents. They have – by whatever legitimacy – the right to speak and to oblige others at least to answer (for example in hearings, interrogations, (cross-)examinations, oaths), if not to obey. Here, in such situations, the asymmetrical rhetoric of the oration holds its place down to the present day. But already in Cicero one finds symmetrical conversations everywhere in aristocratic circles, and in the universities of the Middle Ages there are disputations between the clerics, the formal structure of which, as *ars colloquendi* or *ars disputandi*, gradually finds its way into the knights' academies and from there into the schools for the upper classes, so that the pupils could be prepared for the duties of their "higher calling." Basically it was a matter of exclusive conversational processes for members of the lettered elite (cf. Geißner 1998).

Not until the 18th century did a "rhetoric of conversation" develop among the "enlightened" bourgeoisie (Fauser 1999). Its precepts were intended to promote the development of "free sociability." The defeudalization in the years immediately after the French Revolution radically changed this – after all – still feudal conversational ideal. (Salons in Berlin, women's romanticism in Jena. More and more emancipated citizens, men and women of the bourgeoisie, wanted to join the conversation.) The political participation that found its rhetorical voice in the period leading up to the revolutions of the 1848 could not be stifled by the feudal reaction that came afterward. The fourth estate was becoming ever more involved in the discussion, building labor associations and socialist parties.

Only after the founding of the Second German Empire in the beginning of 1871 did the political parties really begin to compete and negotiate directly with each other, both inside and outside Parliament, but this confrontation and encounter was no longer exclusively between persons of distinction but now also among the "common people." The Kaiser's attitude toward his parliament was revealed in the following statement: "It is all the same to me whether it is red, black or yellow monkeys hopping around in the Reichstag-cage." After the dismissal of Bismarck, careless remarks from the throne got the Kaiser and his "Volk" deeper and deeper into international trouble, which finally came to an end with the German defeat in World War I.

In 1918 the discussions in the worker- and soldier-councils of several German cities were the first steps toward the Weimar Republic. To be sure, not only the more conservative German National and Liberal Parties had orators – the Social Democrats and the Spartacus-Federation too had their designated public speakers, but many people felt encouraged by the liberation from the command-and-obey ethos (of the Wilhelmine era) and

new voices started to be heard in the meetings and to join the debates. In many groups, the rhetorical pendulum swung from the speech to the conversation, even if this could not be called a general trend. Women too were involved in large numbers, having finally gained the right to vote under the new constitution. Besides the women who became famous as speakers, thousands of others were vocal in federations and associations, discussing the foundation of their work and its public acknowledgment. Already at the turn of the century there had been experiments in secondary schools based on conversations between students and meant to involve them in running the schools' administration. The influence of John Dewey's pedagogy was unmistakable here. Now, in the schools of the Weimar Republic, debates were considered a necessary preparation for political participation. (Schönbrunn 1930, 24-29)

Political parties, the women's movement and pedagogy are only three examples of social contexts in which conversation became more important than speeches. When there is no longer anyone declaring a unity "from above" and imposing it with force, when this counterfeit unity crumbles, then suppressed interests, needs and wishes show themselves, especially the interests of the heretofore oppressed. This manifests itself wherever various interests encounter each other, where an issue is contested and a common course of action must be forged. Here people must talk to each other if they wish to avoid violence. In such situations they should attempt "to awaken a willingness for cooperation, to create a will for it, so that cooperative action can be taken" (Geißner 1979, 23 and 1996, 400).

These words stake out the realm of processes of "rhetorical communication," a concept that subsumes conversational and oratorical rhetoric. Conversational rhetoric consists of dialogical forms that manifest in real-time spoken exchanges toward the goal of transforming social conditions through cooperative activity. The forms of oratorical rhetoric, on

the other hand, are only implicitly dialogical because they are inherently one-sided. Although oratorical rhetoric has received and continues to receive much more scholarly attention, conversational rhetoric wins hands down when it comes to quantity and quality of material, especially in mass democracies, where the consultation and deliberation predominate.

After the First World War, despite the Treaty of Versailles, the economic crisis, political murders by reactionary groups (der Freikorps) and a clandestine arms build-up, a relationship between conversation and democracy did start to develop, however, tentatively. But the beginnings were undermined by increasing unemployment and manipulations by the interests of capital, and finally smashed by the radically oratorical party that came to power. This party's leader had early, already as an "educational officer" for the National Socialists, staked his career on rhetorical agitation. He developed a style of speaking whose potent innovation was to combine the proletarian and the military forms of appeal. Imprisoned after the failed coup of 1923 in Munich, he wrote the following: "The force that has unleashed the great religious and political upheavals has been since time immemorial the spellbinding power of the spoken word. The broad masses of a people are subject only to the power of speech." (Mein Kampf, 116; cf. Burke 1941). The movement he founded was "in its essence and according to its inner organization antiparliamentarian" (378). Thus, the party set up "public speaking schools" in which thousands of propagandists were trained (cf. Bytwerk 1981). They pursued a two-pronged aim: to win over volkish comrades for the idea of National Socialism, and to demonize the unrooted riffraff and internationalist Jews. After they seized power in 1933, there was just one more occasion when public contradiction was allowed, the plebiscite for the "enabling law." Once the first concentration camps were set up, nay-sayers were not only silenced but, eventually, killed off. It may have been

that before and even during the Second World War the top political cadres, the leading industrialists, the bishops and abbes and the general staffs of the military had their collegial discussions – in the closed system of the Third Reich there was nothing for common people to discuss. It was obligatory for everyone to listen to Hitler's addresses, and when he had finished, to intone in chorus: "Leader command, we will follow you." The "power of the speech" feeds on the "powerlessness of the bound listeners" (Geißner 1973). Thus the command-machine rolled on unobstructed into "total war" and (apart from resistance groups) into the Holocaust.

Already in 1933 a German teacher had written: "discussion is a form of movement within civil society. It is the search for compromise; the National Socialist recognizes no opposition, only the people and its enemies, and therefore knows neither discussion nor compromise" (H. E. Günther). After the end of the war, a reeducation began, often already in the Western POW camps. This education tried to establish (reestablish?) the consciousness and experience of the relationship between "freedom of opinion and democracy." It took a while for it to sink in that things like "discussion and debate" actually exist. It had to be learned, whether anew or for the first time, that people can talk about their problems, solicit the opinions of others and come to a consensus concerning what might be the best solution. It had to be learned that disputes need not end in violence or be referred to a higher authority, but that people could use evidence and argument to resolve things themselves. And people had to learn not only to express themselves in writing, but to "speak up" which is not a permanent attribute acquired in a one-time act, but a situation-dependent process.

To say "they had to learn to speak up," raises the question of just who was able to do this, along with the related question: For what reason might someone or some group not be able to learn this, or not be allowed to learn

it? Has there been any change in this situation, or is "Encouragement toward Freedom" still necessary? (Geißner 1990)

These questions, and others like them, are resurfacing in view of the very different political development after 1945 in East Germany which, judged from today's point of view, could be described as the failed attempt to build a "socialistic people's democracy." As late as 1976 the program of the only official party, the SED, contained the following article of faith: "Under the leadership of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany a foundational turn toward Socialism was accomplished in the German Democratic Republic [...] In socialism the scientific world view of the working class, Marxism-Leninism, is the ruling ideology." As the "revolutionary avant-garde of the proletariat" the party is, as a centralized organization, shaped by the "operational mode of mechanized heavy industry." According to Lenin, the decisive rhetorical means of persuasion are not discussion but rather "agitation and propaganda." They include "as forms of rhetorical, party-sponsored communication in the GDR those communicative processes carried out under party mandate in businesses, institutions and organizations, as well as in residential areas for the purpose of explaining, justifying or implementing political measures and to inculcate [implant] official party doctrine and ideology in the 'socialist consciousness' of the people" (Beck 1991, 138).

Here also, as is so often the case in closed systems, a double strategy is pursued: "propagation of Marxism-Leninism" and an "uncompromisingly aggressive struggle against bourgeois and revisionist ideology" (Methodology of Political Education, 7). Speeches from the State Council and pseudo-conversations between agitators and propagandists predominate. The crux of their methodology is, according to the URANIA Guidelines for Presenters:

- a class-conscious approach to every problem as the decisive element in socialist processes of education and persuasion
- confirmation and deepening of basic socialist convictions
- representation of the advantages and values of socialism in contrast to capitalism and imperialism (Ernst 1985, 14).

They are pseudo-conversations because they are staged: "People are set up to speak." In this "propagandist explanatory conversation [...] there is no deviation, no compromise," the leader must "adhere to the line." These guidelines are taken further in an Introduction to Socialist Rhetoric: "In bourgeois society debate is a form of speaking characterized by diametrically opposed positions. [...] Debate in this form is no longer possible in a socialist community, because we have attained the political-moral unity of the human being. The insuperable antagonisms of class opposition have been overcome..." (Kurka 1970, 325f.).

These assumptions were contradicted by subsequent historical events. People gathered in subversive discussion groups to consider alternative directions, until they began with the demonstrative rhetoric of silent processions and then moved on to speech choirs in order to ply their resistance to the dogmatic system. An attempt was made to save something of what was experienced in the "subversive," conversational rhetoric of the transition period in a conversational culture of the round-table, but it has failed. It appears that the parliamentary routine of the West German representatives was not sensitive enough to the idea of mutual collaboration on new models for unification of the two German states or development of a new, common constitution. These conversations were squelched by the capitalist "deal."

These kinds of questions about the relationship between political and rhetorical change arise now in the context of debates about Eastern Europe, primarily in Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary. The historical

development of these countries is heterogeneous, as were their systems of government under Soviet influence. But they have one thing in common: They appear to be going through a transition from closed systems of dogmatic discourse to open systems of plural opinions in conversation. It remains to be seen whether the freedom of public speaking and conversation will once again be co-opted by the traditional power elites (politicians, priests, managers) or whether this freedom will be seized by women and men eager to participate in a truly public discourse of consultation and decision. Right now they have a chance to participate in real citizens' movements.

Given adequate technical infrastructure, opinion-pluralism today is not limited to the local speech community. The Internet has changed the world profoundly, and that includes the world of the rulers, too. At any moment (24-7), one has access to unsupervised and uncensored feedback. "The audience can send information back to the source, which never had before been possible on a large scale" (Selnow 1998, 22). Traditional, hierarchical, even military top-down indoctrination must now contend with bottom-up flows of information in open systems. Strictly speaking, there are no "speech rooms" in the Internet, there is only conversation, either thematic discussions, or "chat" (cf. Geißner 2001b).

Profound political and technical changes are transforming the fields of rhetorical communication as well, transforming conversational rhetoric and the rhetoric of speaking. These changes bring the possibility that "the loss of foundation and consensus can be seen as a beginning to rethink our relations, rather than as justification for moves of power and an end of possible discussion." Finally, it is time to bid farewell to "deadening certainty" and to research (and teach) both forms of rhetorical communication "under conditions of indeterminacy" (Deetz 1995, 54f.). Therefore, it is not possible to predict the rhetorical consequences of

political change in fragmented societies. Any consequences will have to be in the transformation of social-pragmatic rhetorical forms, more precisely, in the development of a conversational rhetoric. But for this we will need "deliberative autonomy" for ordinary citizens.

Transl. by John Minderhout, Ann Arbor

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Herman Cohen

Communication, Freedom and Democracy in the Eighteenth Century

The connection between communication, culture, values and forms of governments a topic that, in spite of its modernity, has been of interest in a variety of disciplines for centuries. Humans have been curious about why other humans communicate differently than they do. And indeed, why they are unable to understand each other. Plato, of course, condemned democracy because of its use of rhetoric, and rhetoric because of its use in democracies. Plato had little use for written communication, instead he preferred the give and take of oral argument and dialectic. In the hierarchical state that he envisioned, Plato foresaw a society in which the search for truth was paramount. Plato, as he is often quoted, said "even right opinion falls far short of truth." Persuasive communication had, in his view, the function of deciding important questions by influencing opinion. He was suspicious of a form of communication that made the "worse seem the better cause through the force of eloquence."

In the Rhetoric Aristotle was directly concerned with the relationship between forms of government and the nature of the communication which occurred in them. He explicitly differentiated between the rhetoric of monarchies, oligarchies and democracies. He concluded that the rhetoric of the Athenian democracy was far more closely connected to freedom than in states ruled by an individual or by a self-selected group.

A historical period in which this connection attracted a good deal of attention was the period known now as the Enlightenment, which reached its full development in the eighteenth century. Science, as we now know it, originated during the Enlightenment. Empirical observation and experimentation became the standards of scientific knowledge. Perhaps no period in history has been more decisive in its influence on our lives. Much of what we call modern may be traced to that radical change in human thought. In a sense, all Europeans and Americans are children of the Enlightenment. Our values, our beliefs, our cosmology, our modes of thought and our perspectives of the world date to that era. Many of our ideas of government and representation, the place of the human beings in society, our attitudes toward science and our religious beliefs are products of the Enlightenment. All traditional ideas, political, religious, and social were now open to examination.

The Enlightenment philosophers and other writers, now that their fields of inquiry had been significantly widened, investigated many aspects of human thought and behavior. This period was marked by a search for laws and predictions in human nature similar to those discovered by Newton and other scientists. One of the areas of great interest was that of language and communication.

The modern British philosopher Isaiha Berlin clearly explained why it was necessary to devote attention to the study of language and communication:

> The eighteenth century is perhaps the last period in the history of Western Europe when human omniscience was thought to be an attainable goal. The unparalleled progress of physics and mathematics transformed the generally held view of the nature of the world, and still more, of the nature of true knowledge, to such a degree that that this epoch still stands like a barrier between us and the ages which preceded it...Yet the ancient disciplines of metaphysics, logic, ethics and all that related to the social life of men still lay in chaos, governed by the confusions of thought and language of an

> earlier and unregenerate age. It was natural and almost inevitable, that those who have been liberated by the new science should seek to apply their principles and methods to a subject which was clearly in even more desperate need than the facts of the external world (Berlin 1961, 14f.).

The Enlightenment was a time of curiosity about the history and development of humanity. Theological explanations were being questioned, doubted, or even rejected. Thus, inquiry became concerned with the speculative and observable aspects of human history. As history was pursued, the questions of how and when language and communication skills were acquired and developed was of considerable interest to Enlightenment thinkers. Writers ranging from Giambattista Vico to John Locke to Adam Smith thought it was important to address the question as part of their inquiries concerning the human condition. Particularly, they were concerned with the relation of language and thought. To understand human beings as communicating beings, they felt was an essential part of understanding them as intelligent persons.

The interest in humans and their faculties, combined with concern about freedom and the challenge to religious and civic authority, brought about a renewed and remarkably revised interest in the ancient subject of rhetoric. Works about rhetoric were reflective of the new philosophical thought.

The history of the ancient world was of significant interest to eighteenth century writers. Gibbon's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire was the most prominent work of this sort in English and Rollin's History of the Ancient World in French. Rhetoric and oratory were so characteristic of Greek and Roman society that the Eighteenth Century writers recognized that it was mandatory that they investigate the place of communication in those societies. Much interest was shown in how cultures influenced which forms of communication were permitted and what restrictions were placed on communication. The social institutions of ancient Greece and Rome

were of particular interest. Not surprisingly, the explanations offered were often a product of the values of the cultures in which the authors wrote. The writers were concerned with "national character." At the same time, they were much influenced by their own "national character." We would expect that governmental restraints, or the absence of them, would indicate how the connection between communication and freedom would be seen.

The most significant reawakening of interest in rhetoric occurred in Britain, particularly in Scotland. The new interest was present, although to a lesser extent on the continent. Some investigation, in particular, took place in France. The examinations of the history of rhetoric in these countries were reflective of the societies in which the writers lived. Writers in the two countries differed in their conceptions of the role of communication as an agent, an accompaniment, and a prerequisite of independence and freedom.

The writers in Britain and France perceived the connection differently, and they also interpreted the history of rhetoric in ways that were dissonant from each other. Different positions on individual and political freedom were held as well the purpose and social utility of public communication.

Typical of this kind of investigation was the writings of Dr. Hugh Blair in Scotland and Charles Rollin in France. Blair was the longtime Regius Professor of Rhetoric at the University of Edinburgh. He was the author of Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres (1860). Rollin, whose works on rhetoric are largely contained in The History of the Ancient World (1828), was Professor of Eloquence at the College Royale in Paris. Although they were near contemporaries, it is important to recognize that Rollin wrote during the reign of the Bourbons, and Blair produced his work shortly after the union of Scotland and England at a time of emerging democracy. These environmental differences influenced their political and communicative

perspectives. The different orientations of an absolute and a constitutional monarchy are evident in their writings.

Rollin found the source of effective communication in the stability of the state: "Eloquence does not usually grow up amidst the cares that are necessary in founding a state and the tumult of wars. She is the friend of peace and the companion of tranquility, and requires, if I may venture the expression, for her cradle a commonwealth already established and flourishing." (Rollin 1828, 355f.)

Blair's view of the communicative environment was almost the direct opposite of Rollin's He made a clear connection between communication and freedom in his lecture on "The History of Eloquence."

> It is an observation made by several writers that eloquence is to be looked for only in free states. Longinus in particular, [...]illustrates this observation with a great deal of beauty. Liberty, he remarks, is the nurse of true genius, it animates the spirit and invigorates the hopes of men; excites honorable emulation [...]and a desire of excelling in every art. All other qualifications you may find among those who are deprived of liberty; but never did a slave become an orator; he can only be a pompous flatterer (Blair 1860, 264).

Blair even offered a critical appraisal of French communicative practice, and of "arbitrary" government in particular. He contrasted the activity of democracies with the limitations of absolute governments.

> Their [French] eloquence, however, in general must be confessed to be of a flowery rather than the vigorous kind; more to please and soothe rather than to convince and persuade. High, manly and forcible eloquence is, indeed to be looked for only, or chiefly, in the regions of freedom. Under arbitrary governments |...| the art of speaking cannot be such an instrument of ambition, business and power as it is in a democratical state. It is confined within a narrower range; it can be employed only in the pulpit or at the bar; but is excluded from the great scenes of public business; where the spirits of men have their greatest exertion; where important affairs are transacted, and persuasion is, of course, more seriously studied. Wherever man can acquire most power over men by reason and discourse, which is certainly under a free state of government, there may we expect that true eloquence will be best understood and carried to the greatest height. (Blair 1860, 265)

In contrast to Blair, Rollin emphasized the personal aggrandizement that could result from skill in communication. The rhetoric described by Rollin had no connection to civic responsibility. In it there was no concern with the ethics of persuasion, no attention to the social purposes of communication, and no sense of responsibility to listeners. Rollin's chief concern seemed to be the personal power that might be gained through the mastery of rhetoric. Above all, he gave no attention to rhetoric as an agent of public will. He believed that:

> [...] This is a talent which exalts the orator above the [...] vulgar of mankind, almost above humanity itself; [...] which gives him an empire over the mind [...] which enables him to sway the heart to its purposes, to overcome the most obstinate resistance, to inspire such sentiments as he pleases, joy or sorrow, love or hatred, hope or fear, compassion or resentment, [...] where the orator by his eloquence over an immense people,, who hear with profound silence interrupted only by applause and acclamations [...] is there anything so grand so self soothing as this? (Rollin 1828, 363)

Rollin did write about persuasion, but his notion of persuasion was based on emotional and ethical proof, with little or no attention to logical proof. In contrast, Blair eschewed the motive of personal advancement, and stressed the importance of substance and purpose.

> To be truly eloquent is to speak to the purpose. For the best definition which I think can be given of eloquence, is the art of speaking in such a manner as to attain the end for which we speak. Whenever a man speaks or writes, he is supposed, as a rational being to have some end in view; either to inform, to amuse, or to persuade. He who speaks in such a manner is the most eloquent man.
>
> It follows clearly, that in order to persuade, the most essential requirements are solid argument, clear method, a character of probity appearing in the speaker, joined with such graces of style and utterances as shall draw attention to what he says. Good sense is the foundation of all. No man can be truly eloquent without it, for fools can persuade none but fools. In order to persuade a man of sense you must first convince him; by satisfying his

> understanding of the reasonableness of what you propose to him. (Blair 1860, 261f.)

It is apparent that Blair defined eloquence, or communicative competence, with emphasis on logical and ethical proof, with hardly any attention to emotional proof.

Rollin and Blair both discussed the history and origins of rhetoric in ancient Greece and Rome. Readings of their works reveal how their orientations and environments affected their interpretations of history. As might be expected, Rollin saw Athenian eloquence as a product of peace and tranquility. He asserted that a cyclic growth and a cyclic decay had occurred at Athens:

> Greece, so fertile in genius for all the other arts, was long time barren in respect to eloquence, and, before Pericles, may in some measure be said to have spoken like an infant, and that till then had she had only a small idea and set little value upon the talent of speaking. It was at Athens that eloquence first began to appear with splendour and it is not surprising that it was not in honour there, till after many ages. Eloquence does not grow up amidst the cares that are necessary in founding a state and the tumult of wars. (Rollin 1828, 367f.)

Blair, in contrast, found the source of Greek eloquence in the establishment of democratic government and the growth of popular political participation.

> Greece was divided into a multitude of petty states [...] there sprung up a number of democratical governments [...] of these Grecian republics, the most noted for eloquence, and indeed for arts of every kind was that of Athens [...] The genius of their government was altogether democratical...in the general convention of citizens was placed the last resort; and affairs there were conducted by reasoning, speaking and skillful application to the passions and interests of a popular assembly. There laws were made, peace and war was decreed, and then the magistrates were chosen [...] nor was the meanest tradesman excluded from a seat in their supreme courts. In such a state eloquence, it is obvious would be much studied [...] and what sort of eloquence? Not that which was brilliant, merely and showy; but that which was found, upon trial, to be the most effectual for interesting, convincing and persuading the hearers. For there

> public speaking was not a mere competition for empty applause, but a serious contention for that public leading which was a great object both of men of ambition and men of virtue. (Blair 1860, 273)

When Rollin wrote about the communicative environment in Athens and Rome his emphasis was on the personal gains to be achieved through eloquence, rather than its functional use in society. "Whoever spoke in those assemblies with the most eloquence, became by necessary consequences the most powerful. Hence the youth of any ambition did not fail to apply themselves, with the utmost diligence. to a study that alone opened the way to riches, credits and dignities. (Rollin 1828, 364)

To be fair to Rollin, however, it should be acknowledged that he did recognize that, in Athens and Rome, democratic societies provided a nurturing environment for the cultivation of eloquence.

> As well as at Athens and Rome, the two great theatres in which the mind shown out with the most luster, no study was ever cultivated more universally, nor with greater application and ardour, than that of eloquence. And we ought not to wonder at it. In republics like these, where all the affairs of state were examined in common; where war and peace. alliances and laws, were deliberated either before the people or the senate, or with both; and where everything was determined by plurality of voices, the talent of speaking must have prevailed. (Rollin 1828, 364)

Blair and Rollin offered quite different explanations for the disappearance of eloquence at Athens. Eloquence, wrote Blair, declined with the loss of liberty. He stated the cause simply and concisely: "After the days of Demosthenes, Greece lost her liberty; eloquence, of course languished, and relapsed again into the feeble manner introduced by the rhetoricians and sophists" (Blair 1860, 273).

Rollin, in part, agreed with Blair by mentioning "the ruin of liberty at Athens." He, however, explained the decline as an almost inevitable organic decay, largely due to the decline of the standards of rhetorical taste.

> This bad taste made its way with into the provinces where it became still more corrupt. As soon as eloquence had quitted the Piraeus [...] it lost that Attic health and vigour it had preserved for so long at home, assumed the manners of strangers and almost unlearned to speak. The ruin of liberty at Athens partly conduced to hasten that of eloquence. The great men who had done it so much by the talent of their speaking, appeared no more (Rollin 1828, 371f.).

Rollin's explanations for the rise and decline of eloquence in Rome were much like those that he stipulated for Greece. He posited tranquility and the influence of the Greeks as the primary causes of the development of eloquence at Rome. The decline he explained as a natural development.

> It was not till after she had subjected the most powerful nations and established herself in peace and tranquility that her commerce with Greece began to reform her grossness [...] The Roman youth who seemed to wake out of a profound sleep, became sensible to a new species of glory unknown to their ancestors and began to open their eyes and conceive a taste for eloquence.
>
> As soon as the Grecian rhetoricians had been heard at Rome, and taught there, and their books began to be read, the Roman youth conceived an incredible ardour for eloquence (372).

Rollin's explanation of the death of eloquence was quite simplistic. "It is the usual lot of human beings, when they have attained their highest perfection, to decline soon, and to degenerate ever after, Eloquence experienced this sad fatality at Rome" (378).

Blair remained an adherent of political explanations for the decline and fall of Roman eloquence. He traced its death to the loss of freedom in Rome: "The reign of eloquence among the Romans was very short. After the age of Cicero it languished or rather expired; and we have no reason to wonder at this being the case. For not only was liberty entirely extinguished but arbitrary power felt its heaviest and most oppressive weight." (Blair 1860, 268) Rollin in his explanation made no mention of the Roman political system.

Rollin did not compare Greek rhetoric with that of Rome. Blair did and found, on balance that, since the Romans were dependent on the Greeks, their work was inferior to that of the Greeks.

> As the Romans derived their eloquence, poetry and learning from the Greeks, so they must be confessed to be far inferior to them in genius for all these accomplishments [...] we shall always find that this distinction obtain, that in the Greek productions there is more native genius; in the Roman more regularity and art. What the Greeks invented the Romans polished; the one was original, rough sometimes, and incorrect; the other a finished copy. (Rollin 1828, 273f.)

Adam Smith, in his Lectures on Rhetoric and Belles Lettres, also compared Greek and Roman rhetoric. Smith, however, emphasized the more direct democracy of Greece.

> The nobleman of Rome would, then, find himself greatly superior to the greater part of mankind [...] his discourse would be pompous and ornate, such as appeared to be the language of a superior man.
> At Athens, on the other hand, the citizens were all on equal footing: the greatest and meanest were considered in no way distinguished, and; lived and talked together with the greatest familiarity (Smith n. d., 162).

David Hume, as well as Blair, was interested in comparing the public communication of Britain with that of the ancient Greeks and Romans. Both of them believed that ancient eloquence, especially that of the Greeks, was superior to that of the eighteenth century. Blair thought that although freedom prevailed in Britain, the complexity of British life made contemporary British public communication inferior to that of Greece and Rome.

> Though the parliament of Great Britain be the noblest field, which Europe at this day affords to a public speaker, yet eloquence has never been so powerful an instrument there, as it was in the popular assemblies of Greece and Rome. Under some former reigns, the high hand of arbitrary power bore a violent sway; and in later times ministerial influence has generally prevailed [...] Among them [the Greeks and Romans] the laws were few and simple [...] Here was an ample field for what they termed judicial

> eloquence. But among the moderns, the case is quite altered. The system of law has become much more complicated. The art of speaking is but a secondary accomplishment [...] knowledge much more than oratory has become the principal requisite. (Blair 1860, 283).

Hume, in his Essay on Eloquence, agreed that the complexity of the laws placed restrictions on contemporary eloquence. He, however, also offered a somewhat more cynical and sophisticated explanation for the differences.

Interestingly, Hume attributed some of the superiority of Greek and Roman rhetoric to the chaotic and cruel conditions of their government:

> "I [...] Where a pleader addresses himself to the equity of his judges, he has much more room to display his eloquence, than where he must draw from strict law, statutes and precedents.
>
> II [...] The decline of eloquence is owing to the superior good sense of the moderns, who reject with disdain all those rhetorical tricks, employed to seduce the judges, and will admit of nothing but solid arguments in any debate or deliberation.
>
> III [...] The disorders of ancient governments, and the enormous crimes, of which the citizens were often guilty, afforded much ampler matter than can be found among the moderns" (Hume n. d., 59).

Finally, Hume asserted that the ancients were superior because their standards of taste were higher than those of the moderns. "Ancient eloquence [...] is of a much juster taste than the modern [...] and if properly executed, will always have more command and authority over mankind. We are satisfied with our mediocrity because we have no experience of anything better." (60)

Since Hume was disdainful of Eighteenth Century public communication in his comparison, we are curious as to how he would judge the communication of the twentieth and twenty first Centuries, since the faults he found in his time are exacerbated in our time.

Blair was also critical of the communicative practices of his own time. He was severe in his disapproval of those who spoke only for the sake of

speaking, especially young men who had joined together to improve their public speaking.

> As for those public and promiscuous societies in which multitudes are brought together [...] who are joined by no common bond of union, except an absurd rage for public speaking, and have no other object in view but to make a show of their supposed talents, they are an institution not merely of an useless, but of an hurtful nature [...] They mislead those, who in their own calling might be useful members of society (Blair 1860, 384).

The treatment of the history of rhetoric by Blair and other Scottish writers clearly linked purposeful discourse to the freedom of men and institutions. Free, open and meaningful communication, they said can flourish only in free societies. In those states that were not free, such as France, the ostentatious, self-gratifying kind of communication described by Rollin was characterized by the absence of purposeful, political or social discourse.

There may be a lesson for our own time in this discussion. One can speculate, and some historians have, that the freer communication climate in Britain played a significant role in Britain's peaceful political and social change. In bourbon France, on the other hand, the absence, indeed the suppression of political discourse was a factor in creating an environment for violent and terroristic political change during the French Revolution. As we now know, violent revolution is characteristic of societies in which free communication is absent or severely limited.

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Elizabeth C. Fine

Revolutionary Afghani Women and Their Internet Rhetoric for Political Change

In 1997 the Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan (RAWA) launched its web site, becoming the first political organization in Afghanistan to have an Internet presence. The site has been enormously successful in communicating RAWA's feminist, anti-fundamentalist message to the world and eliciting financial and political support. At the same time, it raises questions about the efficacy of transmitting political rhetoric to a global audience via the Internet.

With over five million visits to its site, and over 5000 guests who have signed its guest book since August 21, 2001, RAWA has attracted many visitors. On September 12, 2001, following the attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon, 700,000 persons visited the site, in contrast to the usual 10 to 15 thousand visits per day. According to one of RAWA's webmasters, supporters in Switzerland, the UK and the USA who had their own servers volunteered to host the web site to help RAWA meet the demand (Matin, May 17, 2002).

This paper examines RAWA's rhetoric for political change revealed by the web site's structure, content, and style, and situates it within the rhetorical norms of Middle Eastern rhetoric (Arabic and Persian). Since RAWA depends on the site to raise consciousness and financial support among a world audience, it is important to evaluate the efficacy of its rhetoric. Many of the web statements were originally designed for live

audiences of RAWA supporters in Pakistan. What are the implications of such rhetoric when it is translated to English or another language and placed on the Internet, for a global audience? Examining comments in RAWA's guest book gives a good indication of the range of responses engendered by the arguments on the web site.

Since RAWA's web site has grown to an enormous size, serving as a library of documents of contemporary Afghan history, viewers can read it in many different ways, and at different times discover new material. In order to limit my analysis to a manageable and meaningful amount of material, I have chosen to examine first the meta-messages and content of the home page that appear when one first opens the web site and scrolls to the bottom. This initial content and style establishes the ethos of RAWA, defines its audiences, and creates a context for interpreting subsequent pages. Within this context established by the initial page, as well as other documents on the web site, it analyzes the rhetoric of RAWA's position paper published on International Women's Day, March 8, 2002, and assesses audience reactions to RAWA's messages through guest book comments and poems published on the web site.

The Revolutionary Association of the Women of Afghanistan was founded in 1977 by a group of Afghan women intellectuals under the leadership of Meena, as an "independent political/social organization of Afghan women fighting for human rights and for social justice in Afghanistan." After the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1979, RAWA worked in the war of resistance, but unlike the Islamic fundamentalist "freedom fighters," RAWA espoused democracy and secularism. As RAWA's anti-Soviet and anti-fundamentalist rallies gained them recognition and support, both the Soviets and Islamic fundamentalists targeted them for elimination. In 1987, Meena was assassinated in Pakistan, along with two members of her family (RAWA web site 2002).

RAWA has actively worked to aid Afghan refugees in Pakistan through establishing schools with hostels for boys and girls, a hospital for refugee Afghan women and children in Quetta, Pakistan, and conducting nursing, literacy, and vocational training courses for women. In 1981, it launched its bilingual (Persian/Pashtu) magazine, Payam-e-Zan. With the collapse of the Soviet puppet regime in 1992 and the ascendancy of the fundamentalist Mujaheddin, and in 1995, the Taliban, RAWA has intensified its political struggle "against the fundamentalists and the ultra-fundamentalist Taliban criminal policies and atrocities against the people of Afghanistan in general and their incredibly ultra-male-chauvinistic and anti-woman orientation in particular" (RAWA web site, 2002; Richter 2000). RAWA has around 2.000 members who work inside and outside Afghanistan ("Afghan feminists" 2001).

RAWA's main web site (home page) has been designed for an English-speaking audience. Its fullest graphic elements appear on that site. The translations of the site that appear in German, French, Italian, etc. are much simpler in design and basically consist of a list of links superimposed over a background of the images within RAWA's logo. The English-language site has a sophisticated appearance. It is easy to navigate and makes numerous direct appeals to the audience, including a welcome to the home page in the upper right corner in both Persian and English, and a pop up window inviting the viewers to TAKE ACTION by helping to distribute RAWA's literature. Moving boxes with the words "Take Action" appear randomly, and a window with a picture of the Afghan Women's Mission invites women to "Click here to find out how to help."

RAWA writes all of its messages in Farsi, or Persian, and then translates them to other languages (Matin, May 25, 2002). Since many of its statements were crafted for Farsi-speaking audiences, they are influenced

by the norms governing effective rhetoric in the Middle East. Scholars have defined several characteristics of Semitic compositions, including:

1. Saying the same thing in other ways, which seems like repetition to native English speakers;
2. Focus on beauty and form over content;
3. Exaggerated, flamboyant style (Lauson and Person n.d.).

The Persian language is heavily influenced by Arabic, and as Bouchra Moujtahid argues, "Arabs pay far more attention to impressiveness than to logic and reasoning," and their speech and writing "are characterized by exaggeration and emphatic assertion" (1996, 2). Persian speakers are fond of using animal imagery to define the characteristics of other people, whether positive or negative (Graeff 2002).

RAWA uses several framing devices that literally surround the home page and serve several rhetorical functions. The scrolling cautionary statements in a box on the right, near the top, warn the audience that the content could be both gory and disturbing, and while such warnings might discourage some viewers from proceeding further, they no doubt attract others to satisfy their curiosity about the nature of the photographs. RAWA's "apology" for such images deflects potential viewer criticism, while at the same time asserts the truth value of the images – they are the "reality" in which Afghans live. The words in red directed to the audience – "If you are freedom-loving and anti-fundamentalist, you are with RAWA" – ask them immediately to consider which side they are on, and suggest that pro-fundamentalists are against freedom. The long list of "RAWA in the Media" links so prominently displayed near the top contributes to RAWA's credibility by implying that it must be quite active and effective to have attracted so much attention from such a diverse and prominent group of media. Meena's picture and RAWA's logo on the top left convey important meta-messages about the ethos of RAWA. The

portrait of Meena signals that RAWA itself has come under attack, and though its leader was assassinated in 1987, the membership of RAWA has not been intimidated but has kept up the struggle. The logo depicting the Afghani women with long flowing hair and up-raised fists, carrying their banner of liberation, conveys a heroic, defiant, and feminist ethos. Finally, the scrolled message at the bottom of the page establishes RAWA's adversarial and forceful voice that it uses when speaking about its opposition, whom it characterizes as the epitome of "inhuman, evil-minded and terrorist fundamentalists." This statement gives a voice to the banner-carrying women in RAWA's logo and sets the tone for the often impassioned invective that permeates RAWA's speech about its fundamentalist enemies.

RAWA's web design is linear and easy to navigate. To the left is a column of the 19 major sections on their site, including movie clips, poems, publications, recent events, reports from Afghanistan, social activities, patriotic songs (MP3), RAWA Awards, and an extensive photo gallery. Centered in the middle of the page is a list of recent protest rallies, RAWA policy statements, testimonies, appeals, and press conferences. Below these are the images and links to four books on Amazon.Com about the struggle of women in Afghanistan. These are followed by a long list of 78 links to "Recent Reports from Afghanistan." If one clicks on "more" at the end of the list, one can find several more pages of reports, going back to 1993. The titles to many of the reports are indicative of the wide range of human rights abuses and suffering documented by RAWA: "A female worker was gang raped in northern Afghanistan," " Lifting the Veil on Taliban Sex Slavery," "Afghan Girls on Sale for 100 kg Wheat," "Afghans Eat Grass as Aid Fails to Arrive (with photo), "US Bombs Wipe Out Farming Village."

Eight thumbnail photographs of the suffering in Afghanistan immediately follow the recent reports. These photos are representative of

the hundreds of photographs that serve as documentary evidence for RAWA's claims. Although some of these photos are gory and violent, there are many within the site that are more so, such as a close-up of a smiling boy carrying the amputated feet of "criminals" through the streets. Indeed, perhaps the most effective evidence within the web site comes from the high density of photographs that accompany many stories. For example, 31 photographs appear with the story "RAWA's Aid to Biggest Kabul Orphanage." The photographs serve as iconic and visceral evidence that appeals to the audience's sense of pathos.

Following these pictures are eight other links to such information as RAWA's recent projects, news, interviews, and poems. An invitation to view and sign the guest book follows, along with links to two awards won by the web site, and a Backwash approval icon.

An effective way of amplifying its message and creating solidarity with visitors to the site is by reflecting audience viewpoints on the site. RAWA has posted 20 poems in English and one Persian poem. Most were submitted by web visitors. The American and European voices echo and amplify the anger engendered by the stories and pictures of the widespread human rights abuses, particularly against women and girls.

One of RAWA's most recent comprehensive articulations of its position on a number of key issues was issued on International Women's day, March 8, 2002, shortly after the majority of the Taliban had been removed from power. One of the biggest burdens of the speech is to clarify RAWA's controversial stance against US military involvement in Afghanistan as well as its strong critique of the Northern Alliance and the makeup of the new Loya Jirga.

The speech begins by reflecting on the celebration of last year's International Women's Day (2001), in which RAWA expressed the "fond hope" that in a year, it would be celebrating International Women's Day

inside "a free and liberated Afghanistan." Despite the "fumigation of the Taliban pestilence and their al-Qaeda carriers," RAWA expresses "bitter disappointment" that "our unhappy land is still far from enjoying freedom and liberty." The paper covers the following nine issues, and ends with a peroration of 250 words:

1. RAWA and the US military campaign against the Taliban and the Osama band (548 words);
2. RAWA and the war on terrorism (231 words);
3. The situation after the fall of the Taliban (1,508 words);
4. The establishment of peace (119 words);
5. Neighbouring countries (385 words);
6. Afghan Reconstruction (145 words);
7. Loya Jirga (Grand Council) (472 words);
8. The Constitution (267 words);
9. The future Afghan State (403 words).

To analyze the speech, I identified all of the images created by metaphor, metonymy, and other figurative language and looked at the image patterns and entailments that the speech creates around the following key agents in the ongoing political drama in Afghanistan: RAWA, fundamentalists (including Taliban, al-Qaeda, Northern Alliance, and the Rabbani gang), Afghanistan, the U.S., Mr. Karzai, and neighboring countries (Iran, Pakistan, Russia, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan). The following discussion focuses on the images associated with RAWA, fundamentalists, Afghanistan, and the U.S.

The results of the image analysis reveal a highly agonistic rhetoric in which RAWA appears like a resolute and unyielding Sophoclean heroine in the midst of a profound tragedy, in a struggle with powerful, blind, monstrous, and inhuman forces. The majority of the images within the speech define and describe the Taliban and other fundamentalist groups in

extremely negative ways as monsters, animals, criminals, pestilence, and vermin. Twice in the speech RAWA calls them "vampire fundamentalists" and "religious vampires" (par. 2, 10), and evoking another horror show, calls them "Frankenstein monsters" useful for the pursuance of U.S. policies.

In addition to being monsters, the fundamentalists are also dogs, according to RAWA. Using irony by placing quotations around the word "gentlemen," the authors expand on the dog imagery by saying that "The 'gentlemen' of the Rabbani gang, ex-fundamentalists and reborn 'democrats,' have worn the collar of fealty to the ilk of Abdullah Ozam and Osama bin Laden much more than the Taliban and have fed much longer on the crumbs falling from their tables" (par. 12). In the same paragraph, they describe fundamentalist groups from different provinces "falling upon each other" and "growling and snarling," and refer to their activities as "thuggeries," "political whorings," "intrigues," and characterize some of them as a "gang of scoundrels" and a "murderous band," all of which "show the cloven hoof" (evoking an image of the devil). The hell motif combines with dog imagery when RAWA calls them "hellhounds" (par. 16).

Evoking the dog metaphor through the verb "unleashing," RAWA likens the dog-like fundamentalists to psychopaths and criminals who have been "unleash[ed]" on the people of Afghanistan (par. 17, 19). RAWA acknowledges that the current Pakistani government has taken steps "to muzzle" terrorist Pakistani fundamentalist parties. To highlight the animal-like actions of these fundamentalists who are trying to seize power in the post-Taliban Afghanistan, RAWA describes their new European dress with the animal metaphor, "aping," along with a powerful metonymy: "With their ridiculous newly-acquired obsession with their 'civilised' appearance and their aping of the latest European menswear fashions, they may

succeed in masking their real political and ideological features and backgrounds from the eyes of superficial people particularly in the West, but they will never succeed in hiding their bloodstained sleeves from the eyes of our people" (par. 12).

RAWA is aware of its use of animal metaphors for its enemies. Another RAWA statement about a fundamentalist enemy, Zardad, begins by referencing "the truth of "RAWA's oft repeated assertions regarding the beastly nature of the entire gamut of Islamic fundamentalist parties" (RAWA web site, 2002).

By far the greatest number of metaphorical epithets hurled at the fundamentalists are those associated with criminals, such as thieves, scoundrels, bands, whores, thugs, and cutthroats. The term criminal, in all its forms, is used 11 times as an epithet for fundamentalists, gang is used three times, and bands is used four times. RAWA calls the fundamentalists "scoundrels" twice and speaks of Mr. Karzai's "concurrence with Jihadi cutthroats" (par. 14). In the same sentence in which depicts various fundamentalist groups as growling and snarling, it speaks of the "the thuggeries of Rashid Dostum and his gang of scoundrels in the north of Afghanistan, the most recent political whorings of Ismael Khan in the Herat area, and the intrigues of Rabbani and his murderous band in Badakhshan." The animal-like nature of these criminals is highlighted by the use of "den" to describe their abodes, as in "the den of these evil criminals in Afghanistan is under siege" (par. 8) and "other terrorist dens" (par. 37). Twice RAWA uses names for famous criminal groups to describe the fundamentalists, such as "fundamentalist mafia" and "religious Cosa Nostra" (par. 21).

To intensify the venality of these criminal terms, RAWA uses adjectives such as "depraved criminals" (par. 15), "crazed religious fundamentalism" (par. 2), "evil criminals (par. 8), and speaks of the "horrendous" (par. 9)

and the "bone-chilling" crimes of the Northern Alliance (par. 15). These fundamentalist enemies of RAWA are guilty of "heinous atrocities and treacheries" (par. 15). Joining the "depravity" image with animal metaphors, RAWA says that it prefers UN troops to keep the peace rather than the "unleashing of Jihadi psychopaths on the Afghan population" (par. 17). RAWA speaks of the "trademark barbarism" of Taliban and Osama & Co. (par. 8), and the "savage and vile" war that has been waged on women for the past 10 years (par. 34).

Proceeding down the animacy hierarchy, RAWA moves from "lower" human life forms, such as criminals, the insane, the barbaric, and the savage, to animals, such as dogs and apes, and finally, to still more lowly life-forms, such as vermin, sea-creatures with tentacles, and blight and pestilence, with the concomitant dangers of contamination, filth, stench, and contagion. Calling the fundamentalists "vermin" implies that they should be eliminated, and RAWA discusses the support of the UN and other nations as a way "to shorten the life span of these vermin" (par. 7). RAWA characterizes the Transitional Administration led by Mr. Karzai as being "enmeshed and paralyzed in the tentacles of the avowed enemies of democracy who have them encircled" (par. 31).

Assessing the composition of the Loya Jirga, RAWA argues that the "crucial issue" for selecting representatives should be "freedom from fundamentalist contamination" rather than ethnic or religious affiliation, lest the Loya Jirga becomes "carriers of the fundamentalist contagion" (par. 23). In discussing its proposed amendments to the Constitution of Afghanistan, RAWA argues that separation of religion from politics and the State is "the only way for preventing our nation from being blighted by fundamentalism or any other pestilence in the garb of religion..." (par. 27). In speaking of the U.S. attacks on the Taliban and al-Qaeda, RAWA calls it

"the fumigation of the Taliban pestilence and their al-Qaeda carriers" (par. 2).

Given the repetition of extremely negative metaphors for its fundamentalist enemies, it is not surprising to find that the verbs RAWA uses to describe its policies toward its enemies are logically entailed from the metaphors. For example, a "top RAWA political priority" is the "total obliteration not only of the Taliban and their al-Qaeda props but also of the criminal Jehadis" (par. 7). RAWA speaks of "total eradication of terrorism and fundamentalism in all its forms in our country," the "pulverization of the Taliban and the al-Qaeda" (par. 9), the "fumigation of the Taliban pestilence and their al-Qaeda carriers" and "to shorten the life span of the vermin" (par. 7).

Another key agent that RAWA evaluates is the United States. In contrast to its position paper of October 11, 2001 criticizing the U.S. strikes on Afghanistan, this statement separates its critique of U.S. policy from its assessment of U.S. citizens in general. It also acknowledges the suffering of U.S. citizens caused by the terrorist attacks on the U.S. Thus, this section of the Women's Day speech serves as a corrective to the October statement and as a response to the angry email responses by Americans to this statement that are recorded in the guest book.

The chief image that RAWA uses to characterize the U.S. government is poor vision and blindness, as they argue that the fundamentalist bands in Afghanistan are "creatures of myopic U.S. policies" and that the U.S. has "turned a blind eye to the higher interests of the people of Afghanistan" (par. 5). Indeed, the U.S. that has "supported Frankenstein monsters" who "were useful for the pursuance of U.S. policies" is now involved in "a fracas between patron and ex-proteges." Critiquing the U.S.'s policy of supporting the Northern Alliance, RAWA says "the U.S. is in fact abetting the worst enemies of our people and is continuing the same tyrannical

policy against the people and the destiny of Afghanistan which successive U.S. administrations adopted during the past two decades" (par. 8). But the American nation is "a great people," and RAWA has been "inundated by thousands of emails from across the United States expressing sympathy with our people and condemning the U.S. bombardments which claim innocent victims" (par. 6). Using water imagery to unite both Afghans and Americans, RAWA describes bereaved Americans who lost "dear ones in the September 11 tragedy" visiting Afghanistan "to sympathise and commiserate with the victims of the bombardments" and says "The tears of anguish of thousands of mourning Americans and grieving Afghans will give rise to a fountain of love and sincere bonding of the peoples of the two countries" (par. 6). The logical entailment following from RAWA's characterization of the U.S. government as blind and myopic is that it is incapable of providing vision or leadership that will improve the situation in Afghanistan.

In contrast to the venality of the fundamentalists and the blindness of the U.S. government, RAWA depicts Afghanistan itself as a victim of fate and circumstance, and indeed, as a tragedy. Despite the recent "fumigation" of the Taliban and al-Qaeda, women in Afghanistan "still don't feel safe enough to throw away their wretched burqa shrouds, let alone raise their voices in the thousands in support of freedom and democracy" (par. 2). The term shrouds, in association with burqa, suggests death, and RAWA speaks of the women in Afghanistan as "bereaved, agonised" (par. 40). RAWA speaks of the "dire misfortune of our ill-fated country (par. 19), and of "the renewed Afghan tragedy" (par. 23). It is the "most pauperised nation on earth" (par. 2) and a "fundamentalism-scourged people" who have endured the "euphemistically-called collateral-damage" which is really "bloodshed and misery" that the U.S. has "meted out" as punishment "to its rebellious

former agents." Such action, says RAWA, "cannot but incite our opposition to America's war in Afghanistan" (par. 7).

Against the backdrop of a poor and tragic country, RAWA presents itself as a fearless and steady sojourner "treading a precipitous path of tears and blood." Twice it describes itself as both intrepid (par. 3, 40) and steadfast (par. 3, 24), even "in the face of death and worse..." (par. 2). RAWA's own voice is something that it is proud of, especially its persistence, consistency, and strength. RAWA "takes great pride" in "persistently condemn[ing]" U.S. policy and in the fact that it has "never caved in to pressure nor 'circumspection'" (par. 5). It defines itself in "contradistinction to some mealy-mouthed, colluding women's organizations" by making a "top RAWA political priority" the "total obliteration" of its fundamentalist enemies" (par. 7).

As if to emphasize its courage, RAWA ends its speech in the vocative voice, challenging its opponents to "level any base accusation they wish against RAWA." Saying that "We will not flinch from reactionary and misogynist defamation and vituperations leveled against us," RAWA evokes military metaphors, depicting itself as marching forward and fighting at the "vanguard of our country's legion of women." Constituting "a battalion of the great army of women partisans of freedom around the world, the women of the world will find us [RAWA] at our posts" (par. 41). These metaphorical military images seem to clash with one of RAWA's anti-war principles, articulated near the end of the speech: "Let the succour and support for the fight of the women of Afghanistan against war and fundamentalism and for freedom and democracy strengthen and expand as never before!" (par. 42).

The Impact of RAWA's Web Site Rhetoric

With avowed enemies in both Aghanistan and Pakistan, RAWA's web site serves as a virtual headquarters, with its leadership operating clandestinely, using a P.O. Box number in Pakistan as an official address (Richtel 1999, 74-75). RAWA's enemies have tried to hack its site, twice setting up counterfeit sites full of pornographic images. Some of the entries in RAWA's guestbook contain threatening and vitriolic statements attacking RAWA's principles. In December, 2001, after Oprah Winfrey featured RAWA on her show, 300,000 persons visited its site, crashing the system (Scheeres 2001). Sympathetic Oprah viewers sent funds to RAWA to buy small cameras for women to hide under their burqas to document the Taliban human rights abuses. The photos and video clips on RAWA's web site, taken at great danger by the photographers, serve, in many cases, as the only documentation of life under fundamentalist rule in Afghanistan. Marina Matin says that they never delete any of these visual images, nor any of their reports from their web site, since they "are part of Afghanistan history and they should be there on our web site accessible to everyone" (May 17, 2002).

RAWA's intense rhetoric, much of which has been designed for live Farsi-speaking audiences, has evoked strong responses. One woman from the U.S. writes: "The photos in your gallery bring me to tears. Please understand that ignorance is rampant in this most 'educated' country – hence the idiotic remarks by some Americans here" (RAWA Guest Book, January 18, 2002). Indeed, this woman was one of several Americans apologizing for the strong words of fellow Americans who objected to RAWA's rhetoric against U.S. policy on Afghanistan. One reader, who was about to contribute money to RAWA, decided not to after reading critiques

of RAWA's rhetoric in the guest book. She writes: "Your rhetoric about the United States' involvement in Afganistan [sic] is quite unnerving and frankly, very offensive! How dare you talk about how the U.S. has wrongly killed innocent Afgans? [sic]" (RAWA Guest Book, January 12, 2002). On the same day, another reader, who had come to the site prepared to donate money, was angered by RAWA's "sanctimonious" and "very anti-American" rhetoric, and wrote: "until you retract or tone down your offensive RHETORIC against the United States of America, you will not get much support from me" (RAWA Guest Book, January 12, 2002).

RAWA's strong anti-fundamentalist rhetoric, with its dehumanizing metaphors may prompt some readers to believe that RAWA is against Islam in general. One reader from the U.S. writes: "RAWA is not fighting against the people or any individual but against the Islamic thoughts which are not practical in today's world" (RAWA Guest Book, August 17, 2001). In one of its rare responses to a guest book entry, RAWA writes: "we are not fighting against Islam. We are fighting against fundamentalism [sic] who misuse Islam for their political ends (RAWA Guest Book, August 17, 2001).

Despite RAWA's clear statements that it opposes fundamentalism, but not Islam, many comments in the guest book are filled with extreme diatribes against Islam, with calls to destroy it that echo, in tone, RAWA's own calls for the obliteration and pulverization of its fundamentalist enemies. For example, one woman writes, "The civilized world should turn Mecca into a garbage dump for nuclear wastes. Muslims are ignorant barbarians" (RAWA Guest Book, February 17, 2002). An hour later, a man echoes this angry response with the statement: "Mosques are like giant reservoirs for sewage. When Israel nukes Saudi Arabia I hope the Israeli soldiers go in and urinate in the face of every dead Muslim Saudi. I didn't care before, but the elimination of the Muslim religion from the face of the

earth should be the goal of every rational human being." (RAWA Guest Book, February 17, 2002).

Conclusion

After reviewing one of RAWA's representative policy papers and comparing its style and content to the home page, it is clear that RAWA's speeches are consistent with the frame's meta-messages of struggle, feminism, and anti-fundamentalism. Further, RAWA's use of arguments based on pathos, with ad hominem attacks on fundamentalists that are comprised of insulting animal metaphors, is in keeping with its own statement about its rhetorical strategy, which appears on the web under "RAWA's Standpoints." In its first point, RAWA says that the "nature and range" of crimes against the women of Afghanistan perpetrated by fundamentalists "has no precedence in modern history." If it had been facing "civilized opponents, we might have convinced them of our rights through logic and words of reason [...] We are of the opinion that any collaboration with the fundamentalists will only lead to further ravaging of Afghanistan by these bandits." Based on RAWA's own assessment of the nature of its enemies and the struggle ahead, it has adopted a rhetorical style that does not invite reconciliation, compromise, or coalescent argumentation (see Gilbert 1997, 111-112). Its metaphoric imagery of its opponents suggests that only if the disease and blight of fundamentalism is cured, the insane made sane, the barbaric made civilized, and animals transformed into humans, could real dialogue take place. The logical entailments of RAWA's metaphors suggest that a violent solution is

necessary to achieve its goals. "Metaphors can kill," as George Lakoff argues in "Metaphor and War" (Hallett 1991, 95-111).

Seen in the context of the scale of human suffering in Afghanistan, as depicted in the hundreds of photos on RAWA's web site, perhaps RAWA's language does not seem too strong. Yet its abusive imagery may inflame those with anti-Islamic prejudices to falsely generalize RAWA's attacks on Islamic fundamentalism to an attack on Islam in general. Such incendiary responses will make peace between Islamic and non-Islamic peoples more difficult. One German professor who attended the International Colloquium on Communication and heard this paper, said that the negative animal metaphors, such as "vermin" reminded her of the rhetoric of the Nazis, and did not make her sympathetic to RAWA.

RAWA has such powerful rhetorical devices on its web site that it might be better served by toning down its level of invective against its enemies. The pictures alone serve as strong evidence about the level of human rights abuses and atrocities perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalists. Moving poetry contributed by poets from around the world expresses solidarity with RAWA and builds audience identification. Numerous media articles on the web site also amplify RAWA's voice and credibility.

Leading an underground, on-line revolution for women's rights, human rights, and democracy has put RAWA at the forefront of those developing Internet rhetoric for political change. Its very successful web site raises questions about the effectiveness of political rhetoric that grows out of a specific culture when it is translated to the Internet in order to reach a global audience. Such a diverse audience may respond better to statements that are especially crafted for the wider audience of the Internet, rather than translations of speeches given to audiences in Pakistan.

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Henner Barthel

Communication at the Central Round Table of the GDR

Can Round Tables Provide a Viable Alternative to Parliaments?

During the first revolution on German soil that was both successful and non-violent, the Central Round Table (CRT) of the German Democratic Republic (GDR) was a prime focus of action and attention. The debates and discussions of the Round Table (RT) placed the events of the landmark upheaval in 1989 and 1990 in sharp focus. The verbatim protocols and documents (Thaysen 2000) of the 16 meetings that took place from December 7, 1989 until March 12, 1990 authentically portray the qualities and deficits of this much-debated (political) institution. Furthermore, they demonstrate its merits as an "instrument for the democratic transformation of a totalitarian state" (2000, XVII): The CRT of the GDR ensured that the upheaval was non-violent to the very end and served as a guarantee for democratic elections. This in itself is an historic achievement.

Today, the RT is still being portrayed as the "focus of demands and hopes for the option of a 'third way'" and a "focus for concepts of the future [...] both for 'real socialism' as practiced in the GDR and for the system of the Federal Republic of Germany" (Thaysen 1990a, 11). In view of this, at least one issue needs to be critically assessed: Can round tables present a superior alternative to the legitimate parliaments of open civil societies?

The definition of the term "round table" is vague at best. Accordingly, its history is rather uncertain.

Some analogues and forerunners for the term's current use do exist, however. While some historians view early Christian communities (Thaysen 1997, 672f.) as the first RTs as we know them, others believe King Arthur and the Knights of the Round Table to be the original source.

The circular shape of the table expressed the notion that all participants were deemed equal – an idea that has determined political decision-making since the time of the French Revolution. As a concept of modern politics, the RT entered European consciousness in the form of "round-table talks" via the English language.

As a rule, round tables are convened as (political) institutions wherever socially relevant groups (of political subjects) need to exchange opinions on a contentious issue that must be resolved despite conflicting interests. This conflict of interest brought to a head is one of the prerequisites for round table talks as we know them. Viewed in this light, the RT is an "organizational form of political communication" (237) that requires all participants to commit to strive for a compromise without any guarantee of success. Round tables serve as a final means of achieving consensus in the interests of all those concerned. They are thus the physical manifestation of a desire to achieve consensus in situations of dissent. As a rule, round tables can be convened in all public fields of communication, in business, science and culture, but most frequently in politics.

Today, the term "Round Table" no longer even prescribes a circular shape. The central RT of the GDR is a case in point: it was rectangular.

The fact that RTs are primarily viewed as instruments of political communication has to do with the very nature of politics. Political action is primarily geared towards power – be it the gaining and retention of power, or of power as the legitimate basis for successful political action. In democratic systems, the respective constellation of power is achieved by means of elections, thus giving legitimacy to the power of political

subjects. This (realistic) political definition clashes with the definition of politics in terms of normative ethics that goes back to Aristotle. His definition focuses on the ideal of reaching a decision by means of deliberation and for the benefit of the community. In the light of this tradition, the RT must be viewed as an "institutionalization of negotiation as a form of interaction" (240), its essence being the temporary suspension of power.

The situation and constellation of the round table might remind us of the basic elements of the term "discourse" as defined by Habermas and the ideal situation for speaking according to his Theory of Communicative Action. Here, the concept is also a debate free of and removed from power simply due to its situative structure (Habermas 1971, 138). By means of abstraction and idealization, it justifies rationality as a whole as a prerequisite for any reasoning intended to convince and without regard for the actual situations and conditions in which communication takes place.

The round table, on the other hand, is precisely the institutionalized expression of a situation of actual (political) negotiations between participants that hold diverging opinions. Here, the interpretation of "round" as a "circle of the like-minded" as defined by Rigotti (1995, 296; rough translation) receives its legitimation:

> Because there are more than two speakers, it is not sufficient to think in terms of bilateral symmetry. We must think in terms of a circular symmetry, in which all speakers are equidistant from the center. The conditions of symmetry and the expectations of reciprocity, which are fundamental concepts of morality, are built on the metaphor of the circle.

The concept of discourse without power according to Habermas can therefore not be equated with the RT as an institution.

Returning to the original question, I will now aim to:

- Determine the actual form of communication as defined by the Central Round Table of the GDR;
- Present research from the social sciences (by Glöckner-Rist & Mohler 1996) that may serve to clarify the organization of political debate, and
- Evaluate research from the field of communication studies (by Läzer 1998) regarding the debates at the Central Round Table.

The Central Round Table of the GDR

In order to understand the role of the RT during this time, one needs to be aware of the *conditions* of political communication (or lack thereof) in the GDR (cf. Barthel 1995 and 1998, 10ff.). Public political discourse was completely autonomous and hermetically sealed off from semi-official and private discourse between citizens. Putting it bluntly, there simply was no public communication on issues within society and with society itself, a fact described as follows by the citizen's rights movement "Neues Forum" (NF) in August of 1989:

> Where communication between state and society in our country (GDR; H. B.) is concerned, something is quite apparently very wrong.

Thus, this phase of political change at breakneck speed was also a time in which political communication underwent radical transformation – not merely on the streets, but also (at a later stage) in the media and political institutions (People's Parliament, parties and mass organizations) throughout the country. New forms of public political communication such as citizen's forums, town hall or Sunday debates and citizen's committees evolved as grassroots forums of democratic participation. "Big Politics"

had conquered the scene and the people had overcome its speechlessness (Läzer 1998, 248). During this time, a public forum for reasoning, debate and coming to terms with both the party and the government was lacking. Thus, the reflections of opposition movements led to debates in the form of round-table talks.

> The officials of the SED and their secret police were prepared for everything but a revolution of candles, prayer and round tables (Thaysen 1997, 673).

At this point, the SED – the East German "Socialist Unity Party" – was already on its last legs. Nevertheless, the fear remained that the party might use the advantages from its former monopoly of power to regain its previous status – with the help of Soviet weapons (as had been the case in 1953) in a worst-case scenario. Therefore, people were very apprehensive of the chaos brought about by the crisis as well as of potential outbursts of violence.

The GDR round table was directly modeled upon the round table talks that took place in Poland in February of 1989, where the Solidarno trade union sealed the end of socialism by forcing the government to lift its ban and by paving the way for the first-ever democratic elections.

Round tables generally work under great pressure, but in a decidedly unspectacular manner. By contrast, the CRT of the GDR took place with much public attention from December 7th 1989 until March 12th 1990 – incidentally a round table that had no democratic legitimization!

Initially, its initiators had envisaged a confrontation of sorts between the old state power and new opposition movements. Thus, the contact group's first suggestion aimed for an equal division of votes between both sides. As of the second session, a total of 16 parties participated in the round tables, together holding 38 votes. The tremendously large number of (more than 200!) participants, advisors and observers as well as their constant

fluctuation certainly did not have a positive influence on the course of the negotiations. The necessary consequence was quick to follow: the RT was split into several work groups, commissions and committees. Fourteen work groups were formed to draft many bills and proposals. (Unfortunately, their meetings were not public, so that their method of working could not be studied.)

The CRT served as a means of transforming the political system of the GDR, but, significantly, was no longer an influential factor when votes were finally cast on March 18, 1990.

> In the end, [the CRT] became an institution of control dominated by the head of the GDR government (Hans Modrow, H. B.) – contrary to the self-restriction it had explicitly imposed on itself at the outset (Thaysen 1997, 674).

The tremendously quick political development that took place from December 1989 to March 1990 also led to constant changes to the *function* of the CRT. Every single meeting therefore needs to be viewed in its societal context, its respective tone being set by highly differentiated power struggles, the state of negotiations and domestic constellations of power at the time. According to Thaysen (1990a, 152f.), the activities of the RT can be divided into four distinct phases determined by its dominating function:

1. From December 12th, 1989 until January 22nd, 1990, the focus was on forming factions and overpowering the SED and its secret police;
2. From January 8th to 29th, 1990, the main focus was participation in state power culminating in the establishment of a "government of national responsibility;"
3. From February 5th until March 12th, 1990, the decision not to allow "guest speakers" from West Germany in the election campaign was made and the struggle for new power after the elections began (on March 18, 1990);
4. From February 12th until March 12th, 1990 the Round Table served as the representative of a new/old unique GDR identity in the unification process.

Taken to an extreme level of abstraction, the *achievements* of the CRT can be summarized in two statements:

(A) The CRT in East Berlin served the important purpose of facilitating the transition from a totalitarian society into an open one without recourse to violence.
(B) The CRT can be deemed a failure in everything it aimed to do beyond this – certainly from a subjective, but likely even from an objective point of view (Thaysen 2000, XVII).

More than any other Central or Eastern European country in transition, the process of transformation in the GDR was greatly influenced by West Germany, a country in turn influenced by Western European as well as US and Soviet interests.

The relative importance of the RT within the context of ending the Cold War here offers *one* of many perspectives for the analysis of this "institution" of sorts. To a hermeneutic in the year 2002, the two attempts at description and explanation that follow can only begin to approach and analyze the true nature of past events.

Findings on the Organization of Political Debate at the Central Round Table

In their empirical research, Glöckner-Rist and Mohler (1996) aim to describe the structure and the process of problem-solving, valuation and interaction that occurred between political protagonists.

The authors evaluate the first and eighth meeting of the CRT in order to answer questions such as the following:

- How do protagonists of different political orientations and dialogue roles contribute to the negotiation of decisions intended to help the GDR come to terms with basic economic and social problems?
- How do different participants influence the course of a debate 1) on a formal level with regard to the number and length of their contributions (i.e. independent of the content) and 2) on a content level by initiating, sequencing or terminating issues at hand? (86)

These two meetings were the first to be analyzed because they represent the beginning and end of a period at the CRT that Thaysen (1990a, 39ff.) refers to as an "old struggle for power."

On a methodical level, the study investigates two types of variables as indications of interactive and thematic aspects of discussion organization and different dimensions of speaking:

a) The first variable serves to describe the interactive organization of debates (number and length of contributions). The authors (Glöckner-Rist & Mohler 1996, 87f.) record the characteristics of the contributions by analyzing their number and the amount of words used.
b) The second variable serves to describe the thematic microstructure of discussions, analyzing this aspect on a word level.

Using the German edition of the Lasswell Value Dictionary (abbr.: LVD 1970), the authors record the thematic structure in order to demonstrate how "gains and losses" come about with regard to aspects such as *power*,

rectitude, respect and *affection* and to show the significance and definitions of topics such as *wealth, well-being, enlightenment* and *skill* in discourse.

Findings on the Interactive Organization of Debates

A comparison of the two meetings shows a shifting of focus from a discussion between "old" forces (such as the SED/PDS) and "new" forces (such as the NF) towards one dominated by the "new" political protagonists. Nevertheless, a closer look shows that a reduction in contributions is not limited to the "old" powers, just as the increase in contributions is not limited exclusively to the "new" forces. (Glöckner-Rist & Mohler 1996, 90ff.)

An analysis of contribution contents over the course of debates also proved the constant dominant role played by moderators: In both meetings, more than 50% of all contributions were made by moderators. Further analyses demonstrated that more than 90% of all participant's contributions were made in direct reaction to a moderator's contribution and that that the right to speak was granted alternately to representatives of the government and to the opposition, respectively.

> Thus, the course of discussion in both meetings was formally regulated by the moderators, limiting the possibility of influencing the course of debate by the number and placement of one's own contributions as given in other discourse. (99)

The authors Glöckner-Rist & Mohler (1996, 100) find it to be conspicuous and worthy of further investigation "...that that moderators in both meetings are among those that utter the highest number of words despite their comparatively short contributions." In a second step, it would therefore be worthy of investigation to determine "... to what extent

moderators have also contributed to the discussion on a content level and whether differences between the representatives of different churches can be determined."

Excursus/digression: According to Thaysen (1990b, 82), the course of the meeting was characterized to a significant extent by the "synodic style of the chair." Even in individual contributions, a 'clerical' tone of voice seems to have been dominant; this is not surprising in view of the fact that many of the participants were priests or ministers (Ullmann, Eppelmann, Meckel and others) – in addition to several lawyers (Gysi, Schnur, de Maizière). Conceivably, the patient but also persistent and circumspect activity of the moderators may have been responsible for the consensus reached in several cases.

Findings on the Thematic Structure of Debates

It can be said of all speakers that only about 50% of the words used were taken from the LVD (Glöckner-Rist & Mohler 1996, 94ff.), the rest being chiefly function words (particles, auxiliary verbs and articles).

More than half of all politically relevant segments of contents were hardly noticed by most participants. The authors (101f.) also note that participants of differing political orientation and dialogue roles not only differed with regard to how actively they participated in these debates, but also in their impact on the thematic structure of debates.

The thematic *macro*structure has yet to be evaluated with regard to their connection to microstructural thematic references. It is thus conceivable that the moderators regulated the change of speakers to a much greater extent than previous observations make it appear by interrupting, preventing and demanding contributions, for instance.

Such an interpretation of the organization of debates could be complemented by an analysis of the para- and extraverbal means of expression used.

Findings on the Reasoning at the CRT

It was only at the CRT that "proposal, counter-proposal and re-proposal" became possible in the GDR (Thaysen 2000, XX). This is where Abraham Lincoln's appeal to use "...not bloody bullets, but peaceful ballots only..." (The Oxford Dictionary of Political Quotations) was literally implemented by the passing of electoral laws. "Ballot box, not bullets!" thus remains what is probably the greatest achievement of the RT.

Läzer (1998, 243) views the RT as a model for "a subtype of negotiation" superior to existing institutions in the GDR at that time, to say the least. Using the disputes concerning preparation for the first free elections by secret ballot in the GDR as an example, the author analyzes (250ff.) two *sequences of negotiation* (during the 11th meeting on February 5th, 1990) with regard to the different strategies of reasoning used by participating political forces:

- The debate regarding the date of the elections (originally scheduled for May 6th, but later rescheduled to March 18th, 1990)

1. Reasoning geared towards the matter at hand and towards consensus (proposal and substantiation of a motion);
2. Confrontation on an emotional level and by stigmatizing one's opponent (for example, the "incapacity of old" and "new incompetence").

- The debate regarding the admission of speakers from the Federal Republic of Germany during the GDR election campaign

3. Dissociation by thematic shifting of the issue (no guest speakers from the West);
4. References to value concepts from the time of transition and reunification (for example "equal opportunity" and "fairness");
5. "Out the window"-style reasoning (265), i.e. addressing both the person opposite and the television viewer (for example "responsible citizen" and "democratic controversy").

Läzer argues that the strategies of reasoning in particular (3 - 5), clearly have features of a dispute between political opponents, as is the case in election campaigns where there can be only winners or losers. (This practice of political dispute is directly opposed to the original RT concept, however.)

> (A brief reminder: The parties subsequently did not feel bound by the decision not to allow speakers from the West in the election campaign. This led to a situation where politicians from West Germany dominated the campaign.)

Historians might do well to follow the example set by the social and communication sciences and attempt to eradicate other "blind spots" of history by analyzing the verbatim CRT report, which is, all things considered, a core document of Germany history (and of parliamentary history in Germany in particular).

Linguists, in turn, are now also attempting to eliminate 'blind spots' of this kind (see for example Auer & Hausendorf 2000) by determining significant differences in speech nuances on either side of the Berlin wall, of barbed wire and the river Elbe after 40 years of division.

Even if many such blind spots will soon be illuminated, the CRT will continue to present many questions that must remain unanswered.

Round Tables do not Present an Alternative to Parliamentary Democracy

Can Round Tables then be viewed as a 'new model of democracy'? Can they perhaps even present an alternative to the parliaments of free democratic states?

I hope to have made the significant historic achievements of the CRT in the GDR (acceleration of liberation, ensuring non-violence) clear and at the same time managed to shed some light on the organization of the debates and the reasoning used. To western observers (Thaysen 2000, XX), this recapturing of freedom of expression in 1989/90 may have been as fascinating to observe as the parliamentary routine into which it subsequently developed. It also might have surprised such an observer to witness just how quickly the round table participants of the opposition adapted to parliamentary routine.

Nevertheless, this CRT – just as RTs as a generic institution – can never present a viable alternative to a parliamentary democracy.

In order to understand why the RT as an institution cannot replace free democratic parliaments suffice it to call to mind the "other" RT that took place at Schloss Cecilienhof, the Potsdam residence no more than a few miles away: This is where the "Big Three" (W. S. Churchill, H. S. Truman and J. I. Stalin) met in July of 1945 as representatives of the allied powers after the end of WWII. One of the three, US president Harry S. Truman presided over the RT. Voting, here, was clearly *not* possible (Thaysen 1990a, 176).

This too is a lesson to be learned from the Potsdam RT: Winston Churchill, the head of the British conservatives, readily gave up his seat at the Cecilienhof RT to Labour politician C. Attlee after the British people had surprised the world by casting their ballots against the war hero and in favor of the Labour Party.

The CRT at Schloss Niederschönhausen (originally in Berlin Centre, Church Meeting Hall of the Herrenhut Brotherhood of the Bonhoeffer House in the Ziegelstrasse, not far from the East Berlin Friedrichstadtpalast), on the other hand, was – as demonstrated – anything but round. Its name was no more than a political camouflage: From the outset, this RT pursued goals that were directly opposed to a parliamentary system.

> The protagonists of the RT did not aim to mobilize the masses but on the contrary strove to calm them (Thaysen/Kloth 1995, 1794).

In direct contradiction to the "myth of symmetrical communication" (Rigotti 1995), power was indeed exerted at the CRT just as in any parliament. The small but very significant difference was that the RT held *no democratic mandate* on which this power could have been based. The decisions that pointed the way towards the future were discussed behind closed doors. In order to avoid violence, all those concerned feigned "a consensus of circulating ideas" (Thaysen 1997, 675).

The CRT – just as other RTs in the GDR – increasingly moved away from the public settlement of conflicts, instead developing tendencies towards exclusion, secrecy and conspiracy. Subsequently, the RTs lost political attention and with it, their acceptance in a country increasingly influenced by Western German activities and goals.

> Under the conditions of an ailing totalitarian system, RTs fulfilled neither their defensive nor their offensive duties. At the same time, they were

neither competent nor able to make a constructive contribution to everyday politics (Thaysen 1997).

RTs are not merely institutions typical of transformation situations and thus, in a sense, (pre-)schools of democracy. They also exist in tried and tested democracies in manifold shapes: as advisory councils, informal talks of interested parties with the German chancellor, concerted actions, as institutions of arbitration, bodies for the preliminary clarification of issues etc. RTs, as such, thus are not a contradiction in terms to the parliaments of free democratic systems. Instead, they can serve as helpful additions to pluralistic systems. What they can never be, however, is a superior alternative to the legitimate parliaments of open civil societies.

After the events of 1989, it is easier to speak and conceive of "freedom competence" than ever before. This also holds true for the Federal Republic of Germany. It would be a fallacy to believe, however, that "competence" can be used as a synonym for "reality" on a permanent basis (Geißner 1996, 407). Therefore, the questions regarding new forms of political participation raised and discussed at the RT in 1989 and 1990 ought to be debated and, in some cases, implemented. These issues hold great potential when it comes to making further improvements to the political system of a country like the reunified Germany in the medium term. Round tables can and should thus step up and take their legitimate place alongside the core values of parliamentary democracy as we know it today.

(Transl. by Eva Stabenow)

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Hartwig Eckert

A Linguistic Analysis of How Major Political Decisions are Communicated

Decision-Making in a Representative Democracy

Political changes with far-reaching consequences have taken place in Germany over the last thirteen years, such as the reunification of East and West Germany, changes in the constitution, in particular those concerning matters of war and peace, and the introduction of new European laws (including the abolition of the Deutschmark) with the implication that Germany has surrendered a substantial portion of her sovereignty. There was no political party (apart from a few splinter groups) whose election manifesto represented an alternative to these decisions, and no referendum was held in Germany: And yet all decisions were declared to be those of the people. I will analyze political statements in terms of argument structure, semantics and discourse analysis and I will argue that – when it comes to major political changes – political communication is trying achieve the impossible: to convince the public that they have made decisions they have not made.

As I will discuss these issues mainly at the national level (as opposed to the individual states of the Federal Republic of Germany), it may be helpful to take a brief look at constitutional articles pertaining to decision-making processes. It is true that the constitution of Germany states that all state authority emanates from the people, but the addition, i.e. "It shall be

exercised by the people by means of elections ..." renders Germany the prototype of a representative democracy. Neither the president nor the head of government are elected by the people. The Federal Council is not a second chamber in the constitutional sense as it is not elected by the people, but by the governments of the individual German states (the "Länder"). The legislative period is four years and elections can only be brought forward under exceptional circumstances and only with the consent of the president. The "five percent debarring clause," which stipulates that in order to be represented in parliament a party must poll at least 5% of the votes, led to the fact that when the constitution came into force only four of the 36 parties which sought election were actually represented in parliament. A referendum at the national level is unconstitutional.

The German electorate can vote for a political party and its manifesto, i.e. for a package deal where issues such as unemployment, abortion, ecology, and war and peace are lumped together, but they cannot enforce a vote on any particular issue. The dilemma politicians are faced with is the question: How do I communicate major changes, such as the ones mentioned above, as decisions that were made on behalf of the electorate, that I act according to their wishes without actually letting them have a say in the matter, and that I represent at least those citizens who voted for me?

In a discussion on whether a referendum (with whatever restrictions imposed on its implementation as may deemed necessary) should be introduced as part of decision-making processes in Germany, the leader of the opposition, Angela Merkel said `No´ because "it is better to convince the voters through argumentation," as if holding a referendum ruled out reasoning.

Zero Information

Evelyn Waugh said about American fast food that it was not the taste he found disturbing, it was, rather, the absence of taste. There is, by analogy, something like fast food for thought characterized by the absence of information. In 2001, at the end of a summit meeting of the leaders of the European Union, with far-reaching consequences for the sovereignty of the individual countries, Joschka Fischer, the Foreign Minister, was interviewed about the results, and the following is a transcript of his statement in full as broadcast by the ARD, Germany's major state television channel:

> Es gibt ja so etwas wie, eh, 'ne Verhandlungsdramaturgie, wenn es um so viel geht, eh, das war auch in Berlin bei der Agenda 2000 während unserer Präsidentschaft so. Eh, es gibt Höhen und Tiefen, eh, aber insgesamt sind doch Fortschritte zu sehen, allerdings wir haben noch größere Klippen zu überwinden.
>
> (There is, of course, uhm, a negotiating scenario when there is so much at stake, uhm, this was also the case in Berlin at the Agenda 2000 during our presidency. Uhm, there are ups and downs, uhm, but by and large progress can be seen, there are, however, still a few major hurdles to be cleared.)

One may think of this type of rhetoric as a "cut and paste" technique, because this statement can be used again at the next European meeting, the G 7 summit meeting or the Bakers´ Annual Convention.

Brain Savers

In a cul-de-sac no one would enter a discussion on which route should be pursued because one does not have a choice here. In linguistics this situation has found expression in the principle "Meaning (in the sense of information content) implies choice." In the phrase "She has beautiful long straight blond X," there is no choice after "*blond*" and the word for "*X*" is 100% predictable, or, in terms of information theory, it is redundant. In the context of that sentence, there is no alternative for "*hair.*" The implications are that (a) even if one had missed the last word one would not ask the speaker to repeat it, and (b) one would not start a discussion on stylistic alternatives here, because there are none. Margaret Thatcher, the former Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, was nicknamed "Tina," which is an acronym of her favorite phrase "There is no alternative." As politicians in western democracies believe in freedom of thought, and as there is no Thought Police as in George Orwell's novel Nineteen Eighty-Four, they have to take refuge in frequent incantations of phrases that act – if the analogy with screen savers is permitted – as brain savers. In terms of discourse analysis, "There is no alternative" is a paraphrase of "stop thinking!"

This phrase was most frequently used when the German electorate looked with envy at France and Denmark, where referenda on the European unification were possible. In 1994, when European legislation was still under discussion and with only two months to go before elections to the European parliament were held, Das Parlament, a government weekly, had the following headline on its front page:

Die EU am Scheideweg:
„Zur europäischen Einigung gibt es keine Alternative"
Europessimismus ist Mode. In Frankreich und anscheinend auch in Deutschland und anderen Mitgliedstaaten der Europäischen Gemeinschaft.

(The European Union at a cross roads:
"There is no alternative to European unification"
Europessimism is in fashion. In France and apparently in Germany, too, and in other member states of the European Community.)

Let us take a closer look at this way of thinking as evidenced by the language of the author of this article: Of course, everybody could think of hundreds of alternatives, but – as mentioned before – the purpose of these phrases is to discourage thinking. The danger of this invocation is illustrated by the fact that Monsieur Pflimlin, i.e. the author himself, has fallen victim to it, as the two-part headline is a contradiction in terms. "Ein Scheideweg" opens up two alternatives by definition, which he negates in the second part. And the opinion of the people – as opposed to Das Parlament and politicians – is brushed aside as trendy and short-lived.

There are many paraphrases of the Tina principle, or, put differently, there are many alternatives to the phrase "There is no alternative." In 1996, when the European currency union was discussed, the then President of Germany was interviewed by Die Woche (14 June 1996) in an article with the headline "*Die Debatte ist gefährlich*" ("*The debate is dangerous*"). Asked about what he thought of introducing a referendum, he said a referendum was unconstitutional and one should keep ones hands off it. And he warned all political parties not to make an election issue of the introduction of the Euro: Three appeals to discourage alternatives to the course of action that he favored.

The German word "Sachzwang" implies the absence of choice by suggesting that one is forced to act in only one way due to the force of

circumstance. In a project on how pupils and students cope with the language of politicians and journalists (Eckert 1999), informants were given quotes from VIPs containing the word "*Sachzwang*" and were asked if they could think of feasible alternatives to the implied only course of action. There was no single usage of this word that our informants considered to be tantamount to the phrases "There is no alternative" or "We are compelled by the facts." We then asked our informants whether they could make up contexts in which the use of "*Sachzwang*" might be justified. They thought of natural disasters like floods and landslides, which would necessitate detours. The interesting and perhaps revealing result of this experiment was the complete absence of "*Sachzwang*" in our corpus of the media in precisely these situations.

Related to the use of "*Sachzwang*" is the fact that politicians often resort to conjuring up archaic images by using phrases such as "Es ist einfach kein Geld da" ("There's simply no money") and "Die Kassen sind leer" ("There is no money in the till"). Of course everybody knows that a modern state can borrow money, print money, raise taxes, reduce pensions, enforce a currency reform, sell assets etc., etc., but instead of saying "The government does not want to resort to any of these means for this particular purpose," we are supposed to think of a medieval king climbing down stone steps into a deep vault of his castle, opening the lid of great coffer only to find – to his great dismay – that there are no coins left in it. I feel that a modern democracy that takes political discourse seriously has to train its journalists to point this out to politicians in interviews. When politicians come up with the frequently heard phrase "Es ist kein Geld da, es handelt sich hier um Sachzwänge: das muss man einfach so sehen" ("There´s simply no money, these are compelling facts of the matter: this is the way one has to look at it") journalists ought to suggest alternatives instead of

saying "Danke, Herr Minister" and looking like Mowgly when Sir Hiss hypnotizes him.

Yet another variation of the theme "There is no alternative" is the cut and paste technique of truisms. The grand master of this technique was Helmut Kohl, the former chancellor of Germany. He was known to avoid the nitty-gritty bit, which he left to people lower down in the hierarchy. He frequently used phrases such as "Es kommt jetzt darauf an, besonnen zu handeln" ("It is important now to act sensibly"), "Es geht hier um eine für alle Beteiligten gerechte Lösung" ("This is about finding a just solution for everybody concerned"), and "Die Beiträge müssen im Rahmen des Möglichen bleiben" ("The contributions have to remain within what is possible and feasible"). The reader may like to place himself/herself in the position of the leader of the opposition and think of an immediate response to these statements.

Presupposition vs. Assertion

The word "*Vorurteil*" ("*prejudice*") logically and semantically presupposes the existence of "*Urteil*," and "*Rassenvorurteil*" ("*racial prejudice*") presupposes "*Rassenurteil*" ("*a racial judgement*"). A compound consisting of the two constituents "*Rassen*" and "*Urteil*" is, of course, a possible type of word formation, and since "*Rassenvorurteil*" exists there must, by definition, be the lexical alternative "*Rassenurteil.*" And yet, as any corpus analysis reveals, this compound is never used in German, no Internet search machine comes up with results, and German dictionaries do not have an entry for it. In order to appreciate the implications of this puzzling fact an analogy might be useful: If, after having asked informants to give us examples of "*bachelors*" and assuming

they had come up with a list of people they knew to be bachelors, we then asked them to give examples of "*husbands,*" we would be amazed if they hesitated and had to think about the meaning of "*husband.*" "*Bachelor*" as a term for marital status is defined by the absence of something (here: not having a wife, just like "*Vorurteil*" is defined by the absence of having evaluated the facts). So the lexeme "*bachelor*" is inconceivable without the existence of "*husband*" or "*married man.*"

The analysis of the two lexemes in question reveals that the absence of "*Rassenurteil*" as opposed to "*Rassenvorurteil*" does not represent a lexical gap in the language but a gap in usage, which is a reflection of our culture. When you ask Germans to give an example of "*Vorurteil*" ("*prejudice*") you invariably get "*Rassenvorurteil*" ("*racial prejudice*") as one of the first items. When you then ask them what a "*Rassenurteil*" ("*a racial judgement*") might be, they usually look puzzled, because their linguistic competence as native speakers tells them the word should exist but they have never come across it. After some reflection most people then come up with "All races are equal," as an example of a "*Rassenurteil,*" and if you then ask them whether that applies to, for example, growth and temperament, they usually get impatient and say these are facetious arguments and that these features were not the issue at all. If you are persistent and ask them whether empirical data have proved their thesis, the argument becomes very complex involving problems of underprivileged groups, the validity of IQ tests cutting across cultures and social classes, etc. My purpose in outlining these observations is by no means an attempt to revive the old Eysenck debate. What I am trying to argue is that most of us use the term "*prejudice*" not in the meaning of the dictionary definition: "Vorurteil (n. ...) *vorgefasste Meinung, Urteil ohne Prüfung der Tatsachen* [...] (prejudice: *a preconceived opinion without taking facts into account* [...])" (Wahrig 2001). In discussions that do not have an ideological basis, we do

not use the word "*Vorurteil*," i.e. in wrong answers to "How far is it to Berlin?" and "What time is it?" we would never accuse the interlocutor of having a prejudice. Longman´s Dictionary of English Language and Culture takes this into account by including the moral dimension: "prejudice, n. [...] unfair and often unfavorable feeling or opinion formed without thinking deeply and clearly or without enough knowledge ..." The existence of "*Rassenvorurteil*" and the absence of "*Rassenurteil*" has to be interpreted as the language community's attempt to say that what we are interested in are civic rights and a fair deal for all people, and not "Rassenforschung" (racial research), because whatever the outcome, it will not and should not have any effect on constitutional rights and equal opportunities.

In an experiment with pupils and students, I asked the test persons to classify a number of statements as "a prejudice" or "no prejudice" or as "not applicable/I am not sure." The answers were not given on the basis of the criterion "an opinion formed without thinking deeply and clearly or without enough knowledge," but rather on the basis of the other criterion: "unfair and often unfavorable feelings." Positive statements about underprivileged groups were not classed as "prejudices," irrespective of the empirical evidence at the test person´s disposal. So there was a marked tendency to class the following statements "no prejudice": "In Christian societies women have a better role than in Muslim societies," "Women are more sensitive to interpersonal relationships than men," "Black is beautiful," "Women have a greater gift for learning languages than men," whereas statements such as "Girls are not as good in physics as boys" and "In academic fields black people perform less well than white people" were classed as "prejudice" by most test persons.

The non-occurrence of "*Rassenurteil*" is one of the brain savers mentioned above. It signals that Germans (and other language communities

with a similar semantic set-up) have agreed to consider the debate closed and not to fund research into possible differences between races. To me this seems a very elegant and likable way of education through language. A related phenomenon is the term "*politically in/correct.*" In its absurdity (after post-modernism and constructivist theories) it smacks of thought police methods, and yet it is widely accepted because it was coined to educate us through language use in order to be fair to underprivileged groups. If the very same term had been coined by the Bush administration as a dogma of infallibility in order to condemn any linguistic means of disagreeing with the "politically incorrect non-Bush administration," it would have triggered off a huge debate among intellectuals all over the world. The condemnation or condonement of these brain saving techniques is as simple and understandable as the labeling of historic events and people as either a "Good Thing" or a "Bad Thing" in the satirical version of an English history text book in 1066 and all that.

Assuming then that the non-occurrence of "*Rassenurteil*" is a "Good Thing," we still have to be aware of speakers who take advantage of these tacit agreements, as a semantic analysis of these terms will show. The difference between "That is a prejudice" and "You are prejudiced" on the one hand, and "That's wrong" and "I am of a different opinion" on the other is that speakers using the word "*prejudice*" claim a metalevel of understanding. They do not see themselves as one of two people engaged in a debate, but rather as an umpire or a judge presiding over a debate with a higher level of understanding than the people taking part in it. The use of "*prejudice*" asserts that the opinion thus labeled is negative but only presupposes that the speaker has a metalevel of insight. Semantic features that are presupposed in compounds are less likely to be examined than those that are asserted. I have argued elsewhere (Eckert 2001) that the compound "self-realization" *asserts* the component "becoming real" and

presupposes the existence of a "self." Thus the phrase "No self-realization was able to take place" would always be interpreted as the denial of the process due to circumstances, but never as "the negation because no self had been developed that could be realized, or was worth the process of realization." Most young people interpret "*self-realization*" as the right to do as they please, but not as the responsibility to develop their own "self."

Many speakers take advantage of the following principle: Presupposed elements are rarely queried. In his article "Die Menschen-Feinde" ("The Enemies of Human Beings"), published in Die Woche (1 September 1994) Günter Heismann lists five "*Vorurteile,*" highlighted as subheadings in red. One of them reads: "*Vorurteil 1. Es droht eine`Bevölkerungsexplosion'*" (*Prejudice number one: There is the threat of a `population explosion'*"). He then quotes three UN estimates of possible growth rates to illustrate the complexity of the problem and the uncertainty of long-term predictions. And yet, by using the term "*prejudice,*" he claims to be above it all: His own claim that there is no threat of a population explosion over the next 150 years is classified as a judgement as opposed to the prejudices of other experts, or put differently, his prediction is not on a par with the others because it represents a higher level of cognition.

"Ve ask ze kvestionss"

An article by H. G. Teschner on the introduction of the new European currency in Die Funkuhr in 1998 begins with a statement on the fears of many Germans about the abolition of the Deutschmark: "Sie haben Angst, sich durch das neue Geld zu verschlechtern" ("People fear they may be worse off with the new currency"). One of the questions put to experts was whether German citizens might lose out when they exchanged their

Deutschmarks for Euros. The answer given by Dr. Sprenger, head of the Association of German Banks, was an emphatic "No!" because if the exchange rate was going to be 2:1 a glass of beer that used to cost 4 DM would cost 2 Euros in the future. This is an illustration of the ploy: "If you do not like a particular question answer another one." Germans did not ask him: "How many times does 2 go into 4?" In the past, governments had always assured Germans that their Deutschmark was characterized as a hard and stable currency. They now wanted an answer to the question whether German citizens´ money would still have the same purchasing power within a European currency or whether this could be affected by joining ranks with poorer nations. When journalists ask politicians or financial experts if gas prices will go up, they should not be satisfied with answers like: "No! You will still be able to buy gas for $20."

"Ausdruck von Volkes Wille"

Another question in the same article is "Could a referendum stop the introduction of the Euro in Germany?" The answer was:

> Nein! Alle großen Parteien haben zugestimmt. Ihre Entscheidung ist zugleich Ausdruck von Volkes Wille," sagt Boris Knapp, Sprecher von Finanzminister Theo Waigel. Laut Meinungsumfragen lehnen aber über 50% der Bundesbürger die neue Währung ab. Deshalb läuft jetzt ein Werbefeldzug zugunsten des Euro. Kosten: 15 Millionen Mark.
>
> (No! All major parties have given their consent. Their decision is at the same time an expression of what the people want," says Boris Knapp, spokesman of Finance Minister Theo Waigel. According to opinion polls, however, over 50% of all German citizens are against the new currency. That is why a publicity campaign for the Euro has been launched now. The cost of this campaign: 15 million Deutschmarks.)

It is only after the decision has been taken by the government that this government spends the tax money of the majority of tax payers to promote government policy and to ensure that what was labeled "*Ausdruck von Volkes Wille*" will be the "expression of what the people want," even though they did not know it at the time. This is one way of communicating political change in a representative democracy.

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John St. Rich

American Roman Catholic Journalist Dorothy Day: Agent for Social and Political Change

The devout Roman Catholic American journalist Dorothy Day (1897-1980) spent more than six decades of her life actively protesting and resisting the social and political structures of society which depersonalized and dehumanized the ordinary American worker. She lived and wrote as an urban social activist – a woman who loved the city and its poor, marginalized people. In her paradoxical personality, Dorothy Day exemplified both the contemplative and the active life. Daily devoting herself to a life of deep prayer, like her Cistercian monastic friend, the mystic Thomas Merton, she also picketed, paraded, marched, staged nonviolent protest actions, and was arrested many times (her first arrest was for advocating the rights of women). While she was a true revolutionary, a radical thinker, a social innovator who challenged the American social system for over sixty years, Day was thoroughly American, and, in spite of what many thought otherwise, always a loyal citizen. Her actions and her ideas, sometimes spoken with fury but with an underlying compassion for the outcast, called America to examine the nation's treatment of its social underclass.

As a young woman in college, she became keenly interested in social change and soon declared herself a socialist. With other friends, she joined demonstrations to protest the working conditions of mass production. Agonizing over the plight of the Depression poor in the early 1930s, Day

struggled to find a way to direct her energies and her moral principles for the downtrodden. Her answer came in meeting Peter Maurin, a Catholic Frenchman, who held similar socialist principles. While she had read social-justice advocates Tolstoy, Dostoevsky, and Chekhov, her new friend Maurin introduced her to the writings of other great thinkers: Maurizc, Maritain, Gildon, Peguy, and, especially, the encyclicals of the popes. Mark and Louise Zwick (1998) of the Houston, Texas, Catholic Worker write that it was Peter Maurin who brought the social encyclicals to Dorothy. He also brought her his understanding of Church history, the prophets of Israel, the Fathers of the Church, the Thomistic doctrine of the common good and the Sermon on the Mount, whose sayings he called the "shock maxims" of the Gospel. It was Maurin who brought the idea of a newspaper to popularize his ideas, his program of action of round-table discussions, houses of hospitality and agronomic universities, the new synthesis he wanted to make, as St. Thomas had in the Middle Ages (Zwick 1998).

Together, they would synthesize various socialist ideas into something new to challenge traditional Roman Catholic thinking about "charity" for the poor. Rejecting the extremes of both communism and capitalism, they envisioned a society composed of small groups of people living as the early Christians did, as Paul tells us in the Christian Scriptures' Acts of the Apostles: the people held all goods in common, shared according to needs, lived simply, and ministered with compassion to one another (See Acts 2: 42-6). Peter Maurin called for Agronomic Universities to be established throughout America where people would learn about simple and economical means of producing food and would learn about more compassionate means for developing a just social order. (This particular dream of Maurin's has never really been fulfilled.) With Peter Maurin's keen intellect and with Dorothy Day's impassioned journalist's spirit, their

ideas for social change coalesced. On May 1, 1933, the Catholic Worker Movement began with the distribution of the first issue of The Catholic Worker, an eight-page paper, which sold for a penny a copy (and still sells for a penny today, six decades later). The little tabloid was ready for distribution for the annual May Day Communist rally held at Union Square in New York City, on the Lower East Side at 14th Street.

As Eileen Egan (1983) says in Dorothy Day and the Permanent Revolution, "Dorothy's burning love for the poor and the voiceless lights up every page. With a searing, a compassionate pen she describes the exploitation of black labor in Mississippi by the U.S. War Department and the oppression of women in sweat shops and factories" (4). The little paper's title, The Catholic Worker, echoed the Communists' paper, The Daily Worker. A short editorial announced another, alternative way of viewing life and humanity's social problems:

For those who are sitting on part benches in the warm spring sunlight. For those who are huddling in shelters trying to escape the rain. For those who think that there is no hope for the future, no recognition of their plight – this little paper is addressed. It is printed to call their attention to the fact that the Catholic Church has a social program – to let them know that there are [people] of God who are working not only for their spiritual, but for their material welfare (The Catholic Worker, May 1, 1933).

The Catholic Worker Movement, with the clarion voice, announced its beginnings.

Laypeople, a few religious, and a few priests began to accept and promulgate Maurin's and Day's ideas; the newspaper, always a monthly, with a column by Dorothy, began to plant the seeds of a new kind of social revolution. Not all American Catholics, they were soon to discover, were tied to the party line of big corporate business, excessive usury, economic

exploitation of the workers, anti-Semitism, and warmongering. Philosophical, financial, and physical help began to materialize for their new venture. And they started their next practical phase of The Catholic Worker Movement: they opened a House of Hospitality. The idea was a simple, biblical one taken directly from the ancient Hebrew prophets, from Jesus' words in the Gospels, and from the Pauline Epistles – each and all promoting a "preferential option" for the poor. Day wrote, "Within The Catholic Worker there has always been such emphasis placed on the works of mercy, feeding the hungry, clothing the naked, sheltering the harborless... [Jesus'] love was always shown most tenderly to the poor, the derelict, the prodigal son, so that he would leave the ninety-nine just ones to go after the one" (The Catholic Worker, February 1959).

People donated money, food, clothes, and their time – and thus the neglected ones were given clothes, served soup and bread, listened to, and, as space became available, they were given a place to sleep. Alcoholics, the homeless, women victimized by husbands, the derelict – all were taken in, even when they were filthy and abusive themselves. The Houses of Hospitality spread from New York's Lower East Side – where Day herself chose to live the rest of her life in a state of voluntary poverty – to other cities from coast to coast. When Day was asked once how close she was to the workers, the poor, the marginalized, the expendable people, she said:

> Going around and seeing such sights is not enough. To help the organizers, to give what you have for relief, to pledge yourself to voluntary poverty for life so that you can share with your brothers is not enough. One must live with them, share with them their sufferings too.
>
> Give up one's privacy, and mental and spiritual comforts as well as physical... Yes, we have lived with the poor, with the workers, and we know them not just from the streets, or in mass meetings, but from years of living with them in the slums, in the tenements, in our hospices, in Washington, Baltimore, Philadelphia, Boston, Detroit, Toledo, St. Louis,

> Seattle, Los Angeles... We have lived with the unemployed, the sick, the unemployables.
>
> Going to the people is the purest and best act in Christian tradition and is the beginning of world brotherhood (Quoted in Daniel Berrigan, S. J. 1981, xxii-xxiii).

Here she vividly, poignantly illustrates how the Works of Mercy towards society's down-trodden are most pragmatically made evident in the Houses of Hospitality.

Peter Maurin and Dorothy Day felt passionately that human beings need to sense personal responsibility for their brothers and sisters. They argued that no government program, state welfare system, or charitable organization should do the job of helping the poor. Rather, individuals working communally, in a spirit of compassion and charity, will best do the job. Day carefully explained:

> No one asked us to do this work. The mayor of the city did not come along and ask us to run a bread line or a hospice to supplement the municipal lodging house. Nor did the Bishop or Cardinal ask that we help out the Catholic Charities in their endeavor to help the poor. No one asked us to start an agency or an institution of any kind. On our own responsibility, because we are our brother's keeper, because of a sense of personal responsibility, we began to try to seek Christ in each one that came to us. If a man came in hungry, there was always something in the ice box. If he needed a bed, and we were crowded, there was always a quarter around to buy a bed on the Bowery. If he needed clothes, there were our friends to be appealed to, after we had taken the extra coat out of the closet first, of course (The Catholic Worker, September 1942).

She was adamant that the Catholic Worker Movement was not a charitable organization. Even today the movement does not have a tax-exempt status with the U.S. Government. The Works of Mercy, she insisted, were to be charity of the heart, for persons, never for personal profit.

While the Houses of Hospitality proved no real threat to the Catholic hierarchy and to the larger secular society, Day's stance on other social

issues brought her into the realm of serious controversy, especially her anti-war beliefs and actions. When the Spanish Civil War caused American Catholics to support Franco and to oppose the anti-Church stance of the Communist-inspired Loyalists, Day and The Catholic Worker called for neutrality. The little paper took both Franco and the loyalists to task for brutal killings. The Catholic Worker then had its first test of loyalty: a peak circulation of 150,000 quickly fell to 75,000. Day, knowing for much of her life how to take a strong position and say No!, stood firm, putting the consciences of many of her readers to a difficult test. An even more decisive test of conscience soon followed with the outbreak of hostilities leading to World War II. The Catholic Worker stood boldly for pacifism in the presence of America's national mania for war. She proclaimed publicly and succinctly in their newspaper in January 1941:

> [T]he position of The Catholic Worker remains the same. We are Christian pacifists and try to follow the counsels of perfection... We firmly believe that our stand makes for the common good... We may suffer for this faith, but we firmly believe that this suffering will be more fruitful than any words of ours (The Catholic Worker).

Later in 1941 she declared more specifically her moral stance:

> We say frankly that we wish indeed that the workers would lay down their tools and refuse to make the instruments of death. We wish that they were so convinced of the immorality of modern wars that they would refuse to make the instruments of those wars (The Catholic Worker, April 1941).

Day (1970, 53) in her provocative essay "On Pilgrimage" reiterated her absolutist moral position against the use of force:

> All our talk about peace and the weapons of the Spirit are meaningless unless we try in every way to embrace voluntary poverty and not to work in any position, any job, that contributes to war, not to take any job whose pay comes from the fear of war, of the atom bomb. We must give up our place in this world, sacrifice children, family, wife, mother, and embrace poverty, and then we will be laying down life itself.

Day constantly, quietly, modestly insisted that the simple, stark words of the Christian Scriptures are to be taken for what they say: "Love your enemies, do good to those who hate you" (See Matthew 5: 38-48 and Luke 6: 27-36). Again she affirmed,

> Our manifesto is the Sermon on the Mount [Matthew 5-7], which means that we will try to be peacemakers. Speaking for many of our conscientious objectors, we will not participate in armed warfare or by making munitions, or by buying government bonds to further the war effort or in urging others to these efforts (The Catholic Worker, January 1942).

Eileen Egan (1983), a Catholic Worker herself, says that Day's "bold stance was followed by bold action" (12). A conscientious objector accompanied Day to Washington, D.C., where they testified before a Congressional Committee on behalf of alternative civilian service for lay Catholics who objected to serving in World War II and who, on grounds of conscience, refused to kill. Hers was a rare voice advocating nonviolence, and she infuriated many Catholics – laypeople, priests, bishops. She told a long-time friend of hers, Robert Coles (1987), a Harvard professor of psychiatry, what she knew very well:

> Cardinal Spellman didn't like The Worker politics. He wasn't the only one. Lots of Catholics were angry with us when we refused to call Franco a great defender of Western Christian civilization. Lots of Catholics were angry with us when we maintained our pacifism with agony during the Second World War. Lots of Catholics were angry with us when we weren't running to build bomb shelters in the 1950s, when we protested the madness of bomb shelters in a nuclear age, the madness of war in any age (83).

In this straightforward directness and clarity of Day's stance, Coles notes that "...she had a Gandhi-like simplicity about her [...] but as in Gandhi, a tough, shrewd, knowing political sensibility was also at work" (85).

Another prophetic Catholic voice, Daniel Berrigan, S. J. (1981), speaks clearly about Day's powerful influence on his own anti-war actions:

When William Miller's history of the Catholic Worker Movement was published, I had just come out of prison during the Vietnam years. I stayed up all night unable to put the book aside. What held me in thrall was an absolutely stunning consistency. No to all killing, invasions, incursions, excusing causes, call of the blood, summons to the bloody flag, caustic body counts, just wars, necessary wars, religious wars, needful wars, holy wars. Into the fury of the murderous crosswinds went her simple word: No ... It was the power of that single monosyllable, turning her away from every enticement to compromise, to come to terms, to make it big, to institutionalize, to play god, to cotton up to the moneyed and the powerful (xix-xx).

Writing in 1981 as a Plowshares Defendant, "one of eight Christians indicted, jailed, tried, and convicted for having destroyed, in September 1980, in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania, two nuclear warheads," Berrigan (1981, xxiii) declares that "it was the first nuclear disarmament [...] in thirty-five years." He salutes her moral convictions:

> Without Dorothy, without that exemplary patience, courage, moral modesty, without this woman pounding at the locked door behind which the powerful mock the powerless with games of triage, without her, the resistance we offered would have been simply unthinkable. She urged our consciences off the beaten track; she made the impossible (in our case) probable, and then actual. She did this, first of all, by living as though the truth were true.

In all her activities dealing with poverty, worker rights, and the mechanisms of war, Dorothy Day struggled to find wholeness in both her faith and intellect. Her granddaughter, Martha Hennessy (2002), speaking about her grandmother's attitudes on war, aptly sums up Dorothy Day's ability to achieve coherence in her life: "Dorothy created an example for us in which she integrated political, theological, moral, and social ideals into

an effective and powerful model." As she evolved in her "personalist" philosophy, she became "larger than life because she could galvanize others to act, and she still does" (2).

Her good friend, Robert Coles (1987), has written that in all her struggles to change the social order, she was always working to balance her own needs for both personal quietness and community. "Though she had both a contemplative and prophetic mind, her life was an active, essentially pastoral one: feed the hungry, house the needy, care for the sick. She was an earthy, political, practical-minded person, yet she could be almost willfully blind to the world's habits and priorities as she persisted in the direction of her faith" (159). She could balance the roles of being a war protester and of being the woman of prayer, picketing on the streets and faithfully attending the daily Mass at church.

Robert Coles (1987), in reflecting on the "central matter of moral inquiry" for us human beings, asks a simple but profound question: "How should we try to live this life?" (xxi). For Dorothy Day, Coles concludes, her daily efforts were "directed at people's attitudes, at their moral lives, at their overall ethical purpose as human beings. She wanted to affect not just the overall problem, but people's everyday lives – their manner of living with one another" (96). Living with one another in the ordinariness of the everyday becomes for Dorothy Day the arena of creating change. She says:

> What we would like to do is change the world--make it a little simpler for people to feed, clothe, and shelter themselves as God intended them to do. And to a certain extent, by fighting for better conditions, by crying out unceasingly for the rights of the workers, of the poor, of the destitute – we to a certain extent change the world; we can work for the oasis, the little cell of joy and peace in a harried world (Catholic Social Justice and Philosophy Website).

The prophetic voice of this pragmatic twentieth-century Catholic journalist continues to speak to us eloquently, simply, with deep personal

integrity: doing the Works of Mercy and disarming the human heart will change the interior landscape of our personal lives and reshape our corporate lives, thus fostering radical social and political change.

Note: This essay is an upgraded and revised version of an earlier project.

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Gary W. Selnow

The Vanishing Voter: How One-way Communication Damaged Democracy and How Two-way Communication Isn't Fixing It

> "Democracy does not place endless faith in the capacity of individuals to govern themselves, but it affirms with Machiavelli that the multitudes will on the whole be as wise or wiser than princes, and with Theodore Roosevelt that 'the majority of plain people will day in and day out make fewer mistakes in governing themselves than another smaller body of men will make in trying to govern them." (B. Barber 1984, Strong Democracy. p. 151. Berkeley: University of California Press.)

Growing Irrelevance of the People

It is curious that the lion's share of contemporary writing about political communication focuses on the messages from the politicians to the people and not the other way around. As a result, we all know what the politicans are saying, but hardly anyone looks at what the people are thinking except in the most superficial way. In a democracy, where it is said the people reign, you might think the analysts would pay more attention to how voters' interests are communicated to elected officials. Given the media's preoccupation with office holders, you would be forgiven if you jumped to the conclusion that the politicans are the foundations of democracies and not the people themselves.

In-depth studies of public thinking on significant national issues are rare. That is the problem, and that is one of the driving concerns of this paper. Where is the analysis of the voters' advice to elected officials and candidates about the course of Western democracies? We have become the unwitting disciples of elected officials. Our elected officials' utterances are examined for meaning, hidden and overt. A "good morning," from one Senator or MP to another will be analyzed for clues on upcoming votes. We read political speeches as though they were stone tablets, and yet we hardly notice what the people have to say.

Media coverage of the polls is about as close as anyone gets to examining the voters' beliefs and attitudes, and while the numbers, charts and graphs profess a rigorous voter analysis; they are almost always paper-thin representations of population views. Polls may accurately reflect respondents' beliefs of the issues at hand, but it is the selection of those issues and the multiple-choice assortment of answers that render most polls little more than guideposts for campaign strategies. Increasingly, we recognize that opinion polls are weather vanes – quite useful for top-of-the-head reactions – but assuredly not the digging-down to where attitudes and values are nourished.

The thinness of polls leads us to ask pivotal questions: Where is the public voice in the political dialogue of Western nations, and how have these celebrated democracies allowed the communications of the politicans to trump the messages of the people? How is it that political communication in many counties has evolved into a one-way flow of information, and how is it that academics have accepted this without raising a red flag? Ironically, much of what passes as public opinion is nothing more than the ideas of our leaders, multiplied by media, picked up by the people and parroted back to the politicians, as if the ideas were their own. This is not public opinion; it is national ventriloquism.

It is inevitable that the views of elected officials get more public attention than thoughts of the masses. It is easier for the press to cover the words of a select few instead of the words of the many; moreover, making sense of public views is difficult. Our pluralistic publics, unprecedented in their variance and size, come at every issue from every angle, which is why studies that characterize public sentiments on even the simplest matters are sure to miss the eddies as they chart the public mainstream.

In other words, no analysis of public attitudes can reflect reality any more accurately than a snapshot can depict a train of events. Worse, the labor and time required to do a proper job is enough to frighten off most news organizations. The default lies in the reductive nature of polls, and in the inadequate way polls are covered and reported.

What the coverage of the public lacks is sizzle. There is no public "face" to splash across the front page or to run on the evening news short of a mob scene or the mugs of a few people-on-the-street singled out to exemplify the thoughts of everyone else. These anecdotes have a limited theatrical value because they are not very flashy. From the perspective of news editors, polling statistics are even worse, they are not only cold but impersonal, and "personality," defined as color and charm, is the only way they know how to hold an audience.

Politicans Grab the Spotlight

Cover a politician, though, and you are on to something newsworthy – no, let's call it *media*-worthy. Here the papers and the television networks, especially the networks and their local affiliates, have a subject worthy of the effort. It is so much easier to cover the views of a handful of officials

than it is to cover thoughts of the muddy booted masses. There is a singularity of opinion, i.e., this MP's or this senator's take on a subject represents just that personal opinion. Not much interpretation or analysis is necessary as in contrast to saddling someone on the street with the burden of "speaking" for everyone in the voting population.

Reporters give the eager public figure a microphone and a softball question to prime the pump, then up and away with an easy-to-edit answer. The savvy politicans these days are well schooled to generate sound bites that make the reporter's job so much easier. A three-second question and an eight-second answer package nicely into a 30-second clip on the six o-clock news. The simplicity of coverage makes reporting an official's well-articulated view so much more attractive than reporting the messy beliefs of voters.

Besides that, the politicans are entertaining. So many of them have attractive personalities, they speak well; they already have an advocacy base in the audience, all of which makes for good television and catchy reading. The viewers and readers are familiar with the politicans (if only because the media have created the familiarity), so the audiences are primed. Covering the politicans is like telling an ongoing story, each day another installment in the soap opera of Western politics.

The media, therefore, simply by their choices of whom to cover, contribute significantly to the huge disparity in the power to communicate held by elected officials and the people. The politicans' lock on the media provide them with an insurmountable advantage over the voters who, at best, fight the odds at having their letters to the editor published or getting in a few comments on a radio talk show. The opportunities available for voters to communicate with elected officials and even with other voters are exceedingly limited. For all practical purposes, the voter has no real voice in the political dialogue.

Other Communication Forums

What about town meetings, phone calls and letters to the offices of elected officials? Here, voters speak their minds and send their views up line to the politicans. Don't these offer opportunities for voter communication? No, they do not for several reasons. First, look at town meetings.

More often than not, these are media events designed to show the pol rubbing shoulders with the people. The purpose is sizzle not steak. Town meetings are covered by local newspapers, radio and television crews, and do not be surprised to see film clips of these meetings in campaign advertisements. The truth is, elected officials cannot learn much from voters in such forums – the meetings are not even designed for that.

For one thing, they are too infrequent to provide an ongoing assessment of public views. For another, these forums hardly provide an opportunity for meaningful expressions of views. Speakers line up for their few minutes at the microphone, and for complex public issues, this just isn't enough. Time limitations force speakers to condense their views, often to the point of trivializing and distorting them. Even articulate speakers, when forced to run against the clock, have trouble expressing beliefs on complex issues. Imagine the difficulty for average citizens inexperienced at public speaking.

The people who show up at public forums are not a cross-section of the voting public and therefore do not represent the overall views of the community. Usually they are at the extreme ends of the spectrum on any given issue. Besides the zealots, town meetings attract people with extra time on their hands, curiosity seekers and poor souls in search of a free

buffet. Meanwhile, the silent majority – the less-driven 99 percent – stay at home. The point is that town meetings are more about the politicans than the people, they offer limited opportunity to communicate ideas on complex issues and they fail to represent the cross-section of views held by the voting public.

What about voter communication through phone calls and letters to the offices of elected officials? For one, these are narrow channels accessible only to the recipient and not to voters. There is nothing wrong with the elected official getting a message that is invisible to others, but such communications do little to enhance the public dialogue on public matters.

Beyond the limited audience, the problem with letters and calls is that elected officials rarely get them; their staffs get them, and what the staffs do with these messages is key. Usually these communications are reduced to tally marks on a score sheet: Letters for legislation tallied in one column, letters against it tallied in the other column. Discussions, explanations, personal anecdotes and the meaty reasons that constituents offer for their views are discarded as chaff, and that is a pity because they can help elected officials understand not only constituent thinking about specific votes but about matters more broadly of concern to people they are elected to represent.

Failed Promises of the New Communications

The latest channel of voter to official communication is e-mail, and while this has great potential to open the up-line flow of information, sadly that potential has not yet been realized. Make no mistake, e-mail now carries the lion's share of constituent communications, but it is not volume that matters so much as use and impact.[1]

The number of e-mail messages has quickly outpaced the volume of letters to elected officials for several reasons. One is that it is easy, addictive and inexpensive. Lots of people concerned about matters of public significance lack sufficient motivation to sit down with a pen and pad to draft a letter so only the most driven voters register their views by post.

E-mail, by contrast, requires a few keystrokes, a short address and it is off to the recipient. Yes, it requires a computer, but those economic and technological thresholds of entry to Internet communication are lowering daily. Most U.S. citizens and increasing numbers of citizens in Western Europe now have regular access to Internet-ready computers.[2]

Another reason we have seen a dramatic increase in the number of e-mail messages to elected officials is the provocation of organized groups. Often these groups send e-mail messages filled with alarming information that cries for quick and massive response. The messages usually suggest

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[1] Congress Online Project reports that the number of emails sent to Congress has more than doubled from 1991 to 2002, with senators receiving as many as 55,000 email messages each month. In 2000, a total of 80 million messages were received. Congress On-line Project, E-mail Overload in Congress Managing a Communications Crisis, http://www.congressonlineproject.org/email.html

[2] A) MSNBC reports (Feb 5, 2002) that 54% of the total U.S. Population is online. B) "The number of worldwide Internet users will surpass 665 million by the end of 2002, according to eTForecasts. The research company estimates that 111 million new Internet users have come online since year-end 2001. Currently, the US has over 160 million Internet users, making it the most online nation in the world. Japan follows with 64.8 million users, while China has 54.5 million. Rounding out the top five online nations in terms of users are Germany and the UK with 30.3 million and 27.1 million users respectively." (eTForecasts, Dec 5, 2002: http://www.etforecasts.com/pr/pr1202.htm)

text and offer addresses, which further lowers the participation threshold. To expand the reach of these campaigns, they ask recipients to relay the message to friends and relatives. This expands exponentially the reach and participation in such campaigns.

This is good, right? Well, yes, it increases public participation in public matters and thus expands the democratic base. And yes, people are getting involved. So, if you subscribe to the notion that any voter communication is good voter communication, then you would conclude that mass movements which yield voter e-mail responses are good.

But no, not if you dig a bit deeper. You will soon see that the mass e-mailings are pro forma, tailor-made for the casually involved. Many people forward messages without a genuine regard for the issue. All too often these messages chew like cotton candy – no substance for the receiver, no meaning for the sender. People forward messages to elected officials without real conviction for the cause and little understanding of the issue. So what does their message tell the elected official?

Not much because the sheer magnitude of electronic messages has led government staff to discount them, much to the loss of those who care. Elected officials increasingly put less stock in e-mail messages than they put in snail mail letters or phone calls. It does not take more than a handful of messages with pass-along text to alert the staff that a campaign is on and that senders are the lobbying tools of an interest group. Staff members will sometimes tally the number of messages to get a sense for which interest group has a larger mailing list, but the substance of these messages often slips by unnoticed.

The curse of political e-mail is this: organized campaigns cheapen all e-mail messages – even heartfelt communications from well-meaning constituents who carefully craft a note that they trust will receive serious attention. In our informal survey of congressional offices, we found that e-

mail is viewed as little more than an annoyance by overworked staffs who have little incentive or training to mine the messages for useful information.

That is a pity because e-mail will increasingly become the channel of choice for many voters. Office holders interested in understanding the views of their constituents should examine methods of culling the nuisance messages and making sense of the others. In time, content analysis software will help with this chore. True, the problem of representation will remain because only certain voters, not random samples of them, will send messages. But the ease of sending e-mail will invite greater participation and provide a range of views from a broader base, something now sorely missing from political communication.

At present, communication from voters is limited, and the disparity between the communication channels available to elected officials and to voters is grotesquely distorted. Officials hold all the cards; the mass media, direct mail, town meetings give officials a huge advantage over voters whose voices, by contrast, have become mere whispers in the public dialogue. The information flow is one-way, and consequently political communication has become communication from the top down.

Relevance of the Public Agenda

As the late Washington Post columnist, Meg Greenfield reminded us many years ago, governing is about agenda setting. The president and the Congress identify, and then rank order the national issues. How they arrive at those issues and how they arrange them on the national "to-do" list is central to setting the focus of the nation.

The American public today may hold little sway over the public agenda, but that is not necessarily new, nor is it uniquely an American phenomenon. Giovanni Sartori, an Italian political scientist, argued more than three decades ago that in no democracy have the people substantially impacted the public agenda. The public policy agenda, he says, is set by the leaders, who then bring the finished product to the people. He wrote:

> Public opinion assures the success or failure of a policy. But it does not initiate it. The average voter does not act, he reacts. Political decisions are not arrived at by the sovereign people, they are submitted to them. The processes of forming opinion do not start from the people, they pass through them. (Sartori 1967, 77)

Sartori's analysis describes elected officials as persuaders, not listeners. If he is correct, and that remains an open matter, the question stands: how do elected officials ultimately arrive at the public policy agendas? Whom do they listen to? Who influences them? Who bends their ears? In the final analysis, political power derives from communication power. It is allocated to those who are admitted to the conversation. People with the opportunity to communicate with elected officials can alter public agendas, influence votes, affect the allocation of public resources.

The mechanisms of access, while always involving the influence of money and class, are dominated today by cash and lots of it. Much has been written recently about the influence of big business and big labor, so we will skirt the subject here except to note that as money amplifies the voices of the rich, it makes it ever more difficult for average voters to be heard. In the context of agenda setting, average voters are not a significant part of the process by which the agenda is assembled. They have little, if any, access, they have few options for communicating their views to their elected representatives, and consequently they have little influence on the day-to-day operations of democracy, or on its long-term policies. At best,

the power of the vote gives citizens a blunt instrument with which to nudge leaders in one direction or another, but the vote alone is inadequate to communicate specific public views, and therefore to affect much the public agenda and legislative action.[3] At best, the vote validates or refutes existing policies.

Citizen Involvement in Democracy

Many people believe election day is ultimately judgment day on the representational style and substance of public officials. This thinking holds that representatives who fail to listen to their constituents or who drift too far from the values held by the voters increase the risk of losing their jobs.

That is a powerful argument, and entirely correct in theory but wrong in practice. It is true voters will throw out elected officials whom they believe no longer represent their best interests, but it is a lot less common than you might think.[4] Incumbency enjoys a mighty advantage.

Why is this so? For many reasons, including the capacity of office holders to raise money and to use the party structure to their competitive

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3 Anecdotes can help make the case that special interests often trump the interests of average citizens. Take the case of privacy rights in California. Opinion polls demonstrate overwhelming public support for a bill (SB773) that would limit the sharing of customer financial data among banks, insurance companies and brokerages, and the selling of data to telemarketers and other third parties. The bill would have required that these institutions notify the customers in clear language that they planned to share or sell this personal information, and then they would have had to obtain the customers express permission to do it. The people overwhelmingly favored the bill, that was evident from polls, e-mails and phone calls to sponsors. Despite such clear, public backing for the legislation, the state legislature, and its governor, Gray Davis, gave in to the financial institutions which were heavy campaign contributors and frequent visitors to state officials and to the governor. Here, elected officials simply thumb their noses at the public.
On the national level, consider the futility of publicly supported legislation on campaign finance reform, environmental restrictions, and medical research matters. The majority public view has been discarded in favor of special interests, usually moneyed interests, that buy their way into the offices of elected officials.

4 More than 90 percent of the Members of the U.S. Congress were returned to office in the 2002 election.

advantage. But one of the most significant reasons is the public visibility of office holders. A Member of Congress, MP, or Governor can easily attract media attention, get a minute on the evening news, grab a few headlines. Visibility keeps officials on the public radar, increases their familiarity, shapes their public image, and ultimately contributes to the perception that this official is active and hard at work on the people's business.

The power of incumbency streams from top down communication, but that is where we began this discussion: political communication has come to mean communication from the politicans to the people and not the other way around. Our stated concern was the failure of the people to communicate with elected officials and with other voters. This failure is all the more serious when it is recognized that most contemporary writing on politics ignores public-to-politicans communication and concentrates on the reverse – the contemporary practice and study of political communication which is the "talkdown" from government to the people.

Postscript: The Internet to the Rescue?

The twentieth century gave us radio, television, teletype, telephones, faxes and other personal and mass media. It was a period of extraordinary contributions to public communication, and that was even before the Internet came along in the final decade. The Internet, a Swiss army knife of public media, does what all the other media do with sound, text and pictures, but it has one feature unknown to all the others: interactivity. Two-way communication allows receivers at home to send information upstream, to send messages back to the sender. Two-way communication allows people to communicate directly with their elected officials and to

communicate among themselves to form groups and coalitions across great distances, something never before possible. The Net carries the voices of the voters and it enables a thousand Lilliputians to equal the mass of a giant. The Net is custom made for democracies under assault because it can restore balance to the scales that have tilted heavily in favor of the political class.

The sad truth is, the Internet has not achieved this potential, not yet. Campaigns run Websites, media post political stories, political watchdogs service small bands of aficionados on the Web and through e-mail, but widespread political usage among the voting public has failed to materialize. At first, analysts assumed it would take a critical mass with Internet access before we could expect the public to engage in the political discussion. Now, with more than half of the populations of many Western nations plugged in, that still has not happened. People shop, check the weather, peek at the peep shows and send greetings cards, but few engage in political dialogue with each other or meaningfully with their elected leaders. They have the way but not the will.

Maybe the spirit of democracy has been wrung from the body politic, which has resigned to its impotence in political matters. Maybe no issue has been big enough to focus public attention. But, that is hard to believe with the tainted presidential vote count in Florida, September 11th, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, environmental devastation and growing economic problems on a global scale. The potential of the Web is not being fulfilled and that is disappointing to many observers who welcomed the new medium as a vehicle of democracy.

It is also disappointing to see that so few representatives of the people are using the new medium to gather the views of their constituents. Earlier, we discussed the use of e-mail, or the lack of it. We were unable to find a single example of elected officials actively using the Net systematically to

mine the thoughts, needs and concerns of the voters. They could send inquiries, request feedback, ask voters' for their thoughts about upcoming votes on key issues. Elected officials can use the interactivity, the two-way flow, to improve the public input to public issues, how disappointing to see they are not doing that.

So, a new medium with great promise to recharge lifeless democracies is showing little promise of doing much at all. One can only hope that some inspiring event charges the public or some dormant instinct within voters activates us to use the powers of the Net to get the voice of the voters back into the political dialogue. When that happens, the Internet will play a prominent role because it alone allows two-way communication, and that will give voters their voices once again.

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Timothy G. Hegstrom

Organizational Communication and Political Change within Developing Nations

The problems of political change are global and local, interpersonal as well as international. With the increasing influence of multi-national organizations in international affairs, political change has also become an interest of organizational theorists. Some have approached the question of whether economic engagement leads to progressive political practices in developing nations with repressive political regimes. Such analysis has been related to national trade policies designed to encourage more liberal democratic policies. Often these policies have resulted in embargoes and other trade restrictions with nations ruled by governments with oppressive human rights practices such as in Cuba, Iraq, and South Africa. The USA, however, has extended Most Favored Nation status to China, allowing considerable liberality in trade. This has been justified by the argument that such trade will influence China's governance structures favorably.

Economic engagement, of course, requires communication. This was aptly demonstrated by George Cheney in the context of the decisions facing the Mondragon cooperatives in Spain in their efforts to adapt to the new economic challenges posed by the European Union.

> Though the market may appear to be wholly a matter of economic, material forces, further analysis reveals a huge component of human persuasion. The market depends on a high degree of trust and confidence simply to operate, as the 1990s roller coaster of stock prices in a number of exchanges around the world demonstrated well. As I have emphasized, discourse plays a

> shaping role in economic policy and therefore in bringing into being not only economic but social outcomes (Cheney 1999, 128).

It is, indeed, the human persuasion element of economic transactions that concerns us here. The part organizational communication plays in the attempt to encourage progressive political change has not been carefully considered. Pertinent questions include:

(1) How does organizational communication function in economic engagement with developing countries?

(2) Does the nature of organizational governance, and related organizational communication practices alter the potential for progressive political change?

China and Most Favored Nation Status

Sociologist Doug Guthrie has argued that China's political system has become more progressive specifically because of engagement with Western corporations.[1] He suggests that new regulations, company policies and procedural changes, and conversations with Chinese managers all point to the idea that the Chinese are becoming more conscious of human rights and "that changes they have set in place are in direct response to pressure from their Western partners" (Guthrie 1999b, 5P).

Guthrie's analysis is detailed. He points first to the legal changes in China designed to ensure human rights. Specifically, the 1994 Labor Law initiates procedures for worker grievances. Another 1994 law extends

[1] The term "Western" will be used to refer to the so-called Western trading bloc of nations throughout this paper. The political and human rights concerns discussed here originated in and are championed in the West (North America and Europe), and although the term is fraught with ambiguities, there may be no better English term to describe the political conventions we wish to reference. Here the term "Western" will refer to developed nations with liberal-democratic traditions, including Japan.

human rights to prisoners. A 1995 law allows individuals who have been wronged by the government to sue for just compensation.

Guthrie (1999a) is convinced that the bureaucracy required to engage in global economic affairs will stem from rationality, the rules and procedures, required of the bureaucratic organizational type. Economic engagement itself will lead to the required value shift and political change. Gradually, "our norms – the norms of the international community – will become China's norms" (Guthrie 1999b). Guthrie's (1997, 1998) work in China has also questioned the assumption that friendship networks (*guanxi*) will remain a significant non-rational element in Chinese business dealings, and that flat economic growth is adequate evidence of a lack of serious change in Chinese business reforms. He urges that research looking at decisions made at the organizational level provides a quite different view of the extent of Chinese political change at the institutional level.

Organizational Governance

The problem is likely more complex than it is represented in the current debate about Most Favored Nation status for China. It seems that one piece missing from the analysis is a recognition of the range of governance and communication systems represented within both the firms of developing countries and those of their Western trading partners. Surely, if the norms of international commerce are to be transferred to oppressive regimes, or to any developing countries, it happens in the communication between trading partners. If this is so, would not the governance systems of the organizations themselves, and the way in which these organizations communicate with relevant stakeholders, be more salient to the political change that eventuates than the governance systems of the Western nations

which charter these organizations? If so, we should carefully consider organizational governance.

Trading partners are unlikely to be moved away from oligarchical structures if their experience is with other successful oligarchical structures. They are less likely to extend rights to employees and other stakeholder groups (i.e., customers, community members, and minor investors) if they are modeling their behavior on organizations that do not extend such rights. With due consideration to earlier attempts to define organizational democracy (e.g., Bernstein 1976), Cheney emphasizes:

> [...] a system of governance which truly values individual goals and feelings (e.g., equitable remuneration, the pursuit of enriching work and the right to express oneself) as well as typically organizational objectives (e.g., effectiveness and efficiency, reflectively conceived), which fosters the connection between those two sets of concerns by encouraging individual contributions to important organizational choices, and which allows for the ongoing modification of the organization's activities and policies by the group (Cheney 1995, 170-171).

Note particularly the organizational communication concerns embedded in this definition. In order to value "individual goals and feelings" and to involve employees in decision-making, opportunities for employee voice must exist (Hegstrom 1990, 1999). Among worker rights that might be conferred by partner organizations in developing countries, the right to speak up without fear of retaliation from management must be of foremost concern. Again, if it is presumed that Western norms are assimilated by trading partners, it would seem important that the right to voice objections and make suggestions would be evident first in the Western organizations themselves. Thus, the extent of stakeholder voice in the organizations involved in such trade becomes an important question in this study.

Interviews with those Involved in Trade in Developing Nations

To better understand the way that organizational communication works in economic engagement to influence political change, and in order to study the extent of stakeholder voice in evidence, my students and I interviewed fifty-four American residents who have been involved in trade with developing countries. The information from each interview provided a separate case for analysis. Guthrie (1999a, 214) suggests that research on Chinese trade "must be grounded in empirical research and the observations of business people who are experiencing this rapidly changing world firsthand." It seemed reasonable to expand the focus to trade with any nations which are developing economically and may be experiencing political change in order to adapt to the new globalism. Since we wanted to talk to people with extensive experience in international trade, we sought interviews only with those who had worked for several years for a Western firm that conducted business in a developing nation and had traveled abroad to visit with the trading partner. Interviews were tape-recorded and were at least an hour in length. In about half the cases, the interviews were conducted in more than one session. A few of the interviews were conducted by telephone, but most were conducted face-to-face in California's Silicon Valley.

A Model of Organizational Communication and Political Change

To best illustrate the provisional conclusions drawn from these interviews, elemental concerns that seem to explain this role of organizational communication are organized as a model of organizational communication and political change. It specifically models the

organizational communication between agents of organizations involved in trade, so it is simultaneously interpersonal and organizational in nature. It is here presented as preliminary and must be considered tentative and assumed to be not comprehensive of all relevant elements. A summary of the model is given below in Table 1. An explanation of each element in the model is developed in the remainder of this paper. First, the range of possible political outcomes of economic engagement are specified. Next, antecedent communication conditions that seem to affect political change are indicated.

Table 1: Model of Organizational Communication and Political Change

Range of Consequences
Progressive Political Change
Negligible Political Change
Oppressive Political Change
Antecedent Conditions
Concern for Quality of Communication with Stakeholder Groups
Management Discussion and Explanation of Expectations Regarding Stakeholder Rights
Consultations to Assess Progress with Stakeholder Rights
Difficulty of the Rhetorical Challenge

Range of Consequences of Economic Engagement

Increased economic engagement can lead to a wide range of political changes, some of which might be grouped as progressive, some as negligible, and some as oppressive. Our interviews reveal the full range of possible outcomes. Many of these suggest progressive political changes. One of our informants, for example, represented a company interested in investing in cattle, a cement business, and possibly building a dam with World Bank support in Madagascar. He remembers that "the president of the country adopted a policy of 'No Bribes.' If any of the local officials or people asked for kickbacks or bribes, it was to be reported to the government and would be punished. This created a very friendly investor environment." We also found instances where firms changed their practices to conform to international norms such as an Indian software company's Human Resources programs involving an open door policy, monthly meetings designed to elicit employee feedback, suggestion boxes, a monthly "personal uplifting program," and employee training in interpersonal communication skills and presentational speaking. Most of these ideas were modeled on Western Human Resources practices and served to encourage employee voice. Many of the firms seemed justifiably pleased with the differences they have made in developing countries.

These individuals have witnessed exactly the kind of progressive political change that Guthrie observed in China.

Others did not have this experience. Numerous respondents reported no change or even negative influence from economic engagement in these nations. The familiar sins of the past, exploitation of cheap labor, exploitation of natural resources, paying bribes and kickbacks, are much in evidence in our contemporary global world of commerce. These practices often serve to corrupt local firms and governments. One small businessman

operating in the Philippines adds ten percent to his budget for bribes to accommodate local officials who can give him the permits he needs to operate. This is usually justified by disparaging the local people. One representative of an oil and gas steel piping firm said, "We like to deal with each country as little as possible [referring chiefly to the Middle East]. All of the countries are totally corrupt and everything they have to say is a lie. They work harder and faster if you offer them bribes. They do not have the same ethics as Americans do..." Activist Harry Wu has warned about the hypocrisy of American businesses in China (Lii 1999, 4P). It is especially evident in those cases throughout the developing world where American business agents engage in the very activities they condemn in others. This seems to feed a cycle of corruption.

This cycle obtains in situations involving the exploitation of cheap labor as well. If American workers will not work for the low wages that some companies are willing to pay, factories are moved off shore in search of cheaper employees. If wages are raised in these countries, even cheaper labor is sought. This has apparently occurred in Malaysia, according to a general manager for an engineering services firm.

> In Indonesia the workers' unions don't achieve as much as they do in Malaysia. For example, in Malaysia there is a shortage of unskilled labor. Unskilled labor is any type of manufacturing work that a person can train to do in a week or two. For those types of jobs in Malaysia we have to go out and get special permits and bring people in from Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Indonesia. The reason for this is because the people in Malaysia have the option of working in an American chip making company or a hard-drive building plant like Seagate. So, they can go get those jobs.

As long as a supply of workers can be found to work for lower wages, it seems they will be used. The concept of a "fair wage" or "living wage" seems a very "foreign" concept in these places, and, to some extent, in the United States. Nearly 200 foreign companies, chiefly from Japan and Europe have established manufacturing facilities in South Carolina to take

advantage of cheaper labor (Eisenberg & Goodall 1997, 5). The weakening effect of globalism on the ability of labor to be responsive to workers' welfare is widely understood. The great danger is that without adequate representation from unions, labor will be exploited. With respect to China, Guthrie (1999a, 211) discounts the motivation of cheap labor. He suggests that the real motive for a Western business presence is to sell to the expanding domestic market in China. For centuries, however, the exploitation of labor in various nations in the world has been a motive of business, and continues to be so today.

Perhaps most of the time economic engagement has not been as oppressive as it is simply negligible in its effect on trading partners. A representative of a memory module manufacturer opined that China was not becoming more democratic and open to employee communication. She allowed the conclusion that Western companies had some influence in making business communication more open, but suggested that the culture was basically resistant to change. Repeatedly, our informants would insist that their own companies had progressive programs to encourage stakeholder voice, but that these were not duplicated by their trading partners. In each case, they seem to be insisting that the culture resists the economy. The fact that it is difficult to predict whether trade will lead to progressive political change should not be surprising. There is, after all, a parallel dispute after years of academic research in political science assessing whether trade leads to friendlier relations among nation states (Hirschman 1945, 1980; Mitrany 1946; Deutsch et al. 1957; Haas 1958, 1964). Liberal theorists generally argue that trade leads to interdependence which fosters cooperation, although neo-Marxists argue that these relationships are one-sided, that less powerful nations will make unfavorable concessions resulting in their exploitation. Apparently, however, that which familiarity breeds is much in dispute. Waltz (1979)

argued that interdependence does not necessarily lead to cooperation, and that it provides greater opportunities for various kinds of conflict. Also, similar to the human rights debate about the impact of trade is the question of whether the sources of conflict are economic or cultural in nature (Crawford 1998).[2] Recent research in this debate has sought to understand the conditions and exigencies through which trade is likely to lead to either cooperation or conflict (Forbes 1997). It seems that in the discussion of political change, of governance and human rights, similar distinctions can be made.

Perhaps we can begin to specify the communication conditions under which economic engagement is likely to lead to progressive political change. We would submit four antecedent organizational communication conditions that might be associated with political change regarding human rights and fair treatment:

(1) concern for the quality of communication maintained by the organization with its various stakeholder groups (employees, customers, investors, community members, and so forth),

(2) the existence of management discussion and explanation of expectations regarding stakeholder rights,

(3) the presence of ongoing consultations to assess progress with stakeholder rights, and

(4) the level of difficulty of the rhetorical challenge.

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[2] Of recent import in this context is the growing evidence that the solutions to Middle East terrorism are not an attack on economic blight. The terrorists on both the Arab and Israeli sides are more economically successful and better educated than their countrymen (Krueger & Maleckova 2002). Polling results show more support for suicide bombers among the relatively well-off than from the poor. Ideological resistance to Western values and culture may be as important as economics in the struggle for territory.

Concern for Quality of Communication with Stakeholder Groups

The first of these antecedent conditions might be the extent of concern for the quality of communication with stakeholder groups. The partner firms are often in a position to observe whether the Western firm shows concern and to decide whether to be concerned themselves. Corporate practices are often imitated. Firms which do not have a commitment to the rights and welfare of stakeholder groups might be imitated, just as those who do have such concerns might be. From an organizational communication standpoint, to be effective politically in developing countries, Western firms must first be concerned about the quality of their communication with employees and citizens, both at home and abroad. As shown above, our respondents reported the full range of political change possibilities even when engaged with Western firms committed to progressive communication practices, but when human rights are not a concern of the Western firm, such concern cannot be imitated by partner firms. Some of the Western firms are more effective at exploitation than at modeling corporate citizenship. Fortunately, many firms have had a progressive political influence.

A pharmaceutical company operating in Malaysia structured a monthly meeting in order to encourage employee voice. In time, the Malaysians learned to imitate the discussional habits of Western employees. Our informant indicated that he had attended some of these meetings.

> We would see it on their [electronic] bulletin boards and sometimes we were there in the country during them [the meetings]. It was evident that the programs that were done in America were moving out to their location... The videotapes you couldn't ask questions to, but in the meetings, there were questions. Even in the countries where there was fear, there were questions. The organizations in other countries would see these tapes and would get the feel for how "give and take" our management was. They could see that the CEO would actually take grief from me, and that he

> would answer it and come back with the same kind of grief... People would definitely open up more.

A representative of a multi-national oil conglomerate insists that local subsidiaries "deviated very little from, if any, the practices of the mother company." If there has been some imitation of practices designed to encourage employee voice, this is even truer with programs designed to encourage customer voice. Because customer satisfaction is integral to the quality movement in manufacturing, it is probably a higher priority for corporations than employee satisfaction.

Most important among stakeholder concerns is undoubtedly concern for positive public relations. Some companies, like Agilent, see themselves as good corporate citizens.

> We have had as a corporate objective to be a model corporate citizen and in terms of the community, we want to give back what they have given us in terms of supporting our growth. So if you look at our history, you will see we are always at the top in terms of civic duty. For example, in Asia we have been voted in the category of best employer, and in many of the countries we have been voted the best employer to work for.

This respondent has identified very closely with his employer and seems personally committed to his firm's public declarations of support for employee rights and political progress. Other respondents are more sanguine. They simply want to avoid bad press. One representative of a firm providing computing services notes that no change or action was implemented until the press hounded them. This has been the case, too, with Nike and its partner factories in Mexico and China (Thompson 2001). One of Guthrie's (1999a, 209) informants who is actually engaged in promoting change at the institutional level was quite candid on this point when he said, "Believe me, we have our own interest in this. The last thing we want is the public relations disaster of allegations that our products are manufactured by a factory that violates human rights." It seems that

concern for public relations induces concern for employee relations. Concern for public relations likely stems, in part, from concern for investor and customer relations. Such concern can soon result in discussions with partner firms.

Management Discussion and Explanation of Expectations Regarding Stakeholder Rights

In his discussion of organizational democracy in the Mondragon cooperatives, Cheney (1999, 139) emphasizes the importance of members themselves negotiating the meaning of organizational democracy. Similarly, it is important for managers of organizations committed to stakeholder rights to discuss that commitment among themselves and with agents of partner organizations. Expectations must be shared. Good practices might be imitated without an attempt to influence, but such change is more likely to occur where these discussions occur. Such discussion seems to be the second organizational communication antecedent condition affecting political change.

Apparently, this injunction is not as obvious as it may seem. A representative of a small business involved in designing products manufactured in China explains it this way:

> We did not encourage the workers to express their complaints/voice to us. We did not try to express our complaints to them. They were working hard for the money that our American firm would provide them. The involvement in their rights as employees or their interaction with their management was not of much concern to us.

Even when Western firms are concerned about stakeholder rights, they are somewhat reluctant to discuss it with partner firms. Such overt attempts

at influence are sometimes resented. The marketing director of a company producing interactive corporate television networks with manufacturing facilities in Singapore and Kuala Lumpur talked to us about the conflict between the hope for a better institutional system and the resentment of foreign companies having to deal with forced American standards. This reluctance also results from a desire not to intrude upon the values and norms of local cultures. In fact, many Western companies have made such non-interference policies explicit, and these are sometimes interpreted by their managers as proscribing attempts to bolster stakeholder rights. A representative of an American company making electronic wire and cable for Local Area Networks working with small to medium sized companies in China said simply, "We exert no influence on how our distributors run their business." And a third respondent representing a much larger company said:

> The locals are not going to tell me if there are any problems. I'm not there during the day-to-day operations and that's where some problems might come about... What IBM tries to do is in every country you have to do business the way the country does it. We don't take the model we have in the United States and replicate it exactly in other countries because it may not work. If that's not what the locals do, it's not going to work.

Such "no influence attempts" policies and practices extend to customer voice as well as employee voice. A representative of a small consumer electronics business puts it this way: "We do respect [...] the customs and traditions of our partners in Mexico. We do not try to enforce or impose our practices among them. If they are influenced by our organization, then it is completely on their own."

Sometimes the failure to encourage upward communication with these employees costs the businesses dearly.

> Over a million dollars was being stolen. The way it was caught was when someone who worked for the guy called us over here in the U.S. In that part

> of the world, there is ethnic prejudice. There are Malaysians, Chinese, Indians, Filipinos. All these ethnic groups have animosity in some cases. So, when the call came in, the first reaction of management was that it was just some Malaysian guy who is talking nonsense. They dismissed it without investigating. This went on for a while until he called back again. And then they sent me over there to investigate... So, when we walked in there, the guy ran!

A key point in unraveling this narrative is that no attempts were in place to encourage employee voice.

> It was difficult for me to get management to accept any programs of that nature. There may have been other reasons why too. Why do we want to know about these things? Everything is OK. There's a lot of "kill the messenger" in the world. There have been several times when people have said to me, 'Why do you bring these things up?' There is a lot of head in the sand domestically and internationally.

This same informant was able to establish effective programs at another firm and describes how they were emphasized with Malay employees:

> One of the things we would do on a quarterly basis is have a teleconference to all locations telling what was going on in the company and announcing new programs. If you were overseas, you would get a videotape and you could play it at the international office. Many of the programs that were discussed were those that would bring back communication [...] like whistleblower stuff. Maybe three-fourths of it would deal with new products and stuff and what was coming out, and human resources issues, and then it would be, "and by the way, we have 800 numbers in every country that you can call."

Other respondents emphasize the need to supplement these electronic forms of communication with on-site visits, face-to-face, in the native language of stakeholders (especially employees). The representative of a manufacturer of cable modems for the telecommunications industry describes changing an organizational culture from one in which employees were not allowed to talk and not empowered to help with a development process into one in which employee voice was part of the standard operating procedures. She said, "We requested the presence of these people

in the meetings. We no longer wanted our request to be passed down, but wanted participation for everyone. They had to be there. There was no one representing them. With these people now present at the meetings, questions could be posed directly to any particular department." Each of these respondents demonstrate that stakeholder voice is fostered in situations in which Western firms actually participate in discussions with their partners about programs and procedures that will foster such voice. Not surprisingly, these discussions can be fruitfully supplemented by carrying out plans to follow up.

Consultations to Assess Progress with Stakeholder Rights

The existence of consultations with trading partners to assess progress will improve the chances of success in institutional political change. Assessment is a communication activity. Minimally, assessment provides feedback for managers to use in decision-making. More fully, it provides a venue for negotiating the meaning of such topics as human rights, stakeholder voice, and organizational democracy as they will be practiced with partner organizations. Once in place, the effectiveness of these mechanisms can be assured by assessment procedures.

A range of assessment procedures are used. Some of them are modeled on programs in Western organizations. For example, surveys of employee and customer satisfaction are becoming more prevalent. Nortel relies heavily on employee and customer surveys and requires the same at its subsidiary in China. A representative working with test engineers when asked about employee voice, said, "Yes. Since they are trying to imitate the western concept of doing business, they want the employees to participate by conducting a survey. This survey is conducted quarterly and whenever

an issue was found to be unsatisfactory for the employees, the management will act upon it." Similar procedures are used to assess customer satisfaction.

Assessment processes, to be effective, require a great deal of time and commitment. At times, they also require on-site inspections.

Inspections are even more intense and intrusive. In addition to an array of attempts to assess employee and customer voice, one of our informants described what his company refers to as an audit.

> We were dealing with a supplier, and the supplier was struggling, and we even had thoughts of dropping the supplier. We went over [to Singapore] and performed an audit. An audit [in this case] means we went through all of their processes, from receiving products all the way through manufacturing, accounts receivable, accounts payable, and we found seventeen different areas that needed improving. Over a year and a half time frame we worked with that supplier, and as a result, we were told two years later that the audit had helped them become a better company.

Guthrie's (1999a, 208) informant, mentioned earlier, was involved just as intensely in factory inspections in China. Guthrie writes that this company, in the interest of effective public relations, has been conducting inspections since 1995 to assure fair and humane treatment of workers. It seems that there are many ways to assess stakeholder voice. These can stand alone or be incorporated into larger inspections of business practices when required. The timing of assessment procedures can be an important business decision.

Perhaps the first assessment would be a pre-assessment of potential partners. One of our Agilent informants, for example, maintained that "It's important that we choose our suppliers and production partners carefully to ensure they share our commitment to quality, safety, and environmental protection." The Western organization that wants to attend to issues of stakeholder voice will apparently observe partners carefully for potential problems while a contract is being negotiated. Implicit in the triumvirate of

issues mentioned by the informant are key concerns of four different stakeholders, the customer (quality), the employee (safety), and the local citizen (environmental degradation). The stakeholder not mentioned is the one who puts up the initial stake, the investor. The concern for optimizing profits is the reason for international arrangements to start with. In a global world, the international press has needed to follow all of these issues. Effective organizational communication is needed to track concerns for all of these, both internally and externally, by attending to stakeholder voice. There are frequent failures. An American representative for a Japanese company offered this contrast.

> Our company here in the US acts swiftly when it comes to dealing with complaints. Right off the bat they will have meetings, conferences, visit our customers or have HR talk to our employees. We are always immediately dealing with the issues if you have to have a town hall meeting with the President to discuss issues we do it. [...] So we address every issue immediately. [...] [In Latin America] issues are never addressed. [...] They don't respond to them. They have to struggle just to get hold of them. So, I believe there is a lack of response time in dealing with issues. If it's not deemed important then they won't deal with it, or management isn't well informed or tuned to what's going on with its own company.

Such problems can be addressed by improved organizational communication systems, but that means intensive, even intrusive, management of partners, both suppliers and distributors.

Tompkins, in his analysis of organizational communication at NASA, introduced the organizational communication "penetration" which, for the great rocket scientist Von Braun, involved having a NASA employee on-site at each supplier to work with that company in understanding and solving engineering project issues. Tompkins suggested that the failure of NASA in the Challenger era could be partly explained by organizational forgetting and the abandonment of penetration as a cost-saving measure. It would appear that the Western organizations which have been most

successful in developing successful partnerships that attend to all the work of the organization, including assuring stakeholder rights, have used the principle of penetration by creating various kinds of assessment mechanisms. The ability to do this effectively depends on the degree of influence the Western organization is able to bring to bear on the situation. This may be within the purview of rhetoric.

Difficulty of the Rhetorical Challenge

A concern for stakeholder rights in partner organizations might be considered a rhetorical purpose, the discussions with stakeholders, the rhetorical occasion. Given this purpose and occasion, the organizational rhetor may have varying degrees of success in influencing stakeholder rights in countries that are not democratized. This likelihood of influence is the difficulty of the rhetorical challenge. There are both economic and cultural exigencies.

The most important of these is probably the financial clout that the Western organization brings to the situation. In China, for example, the government, and the Chinese people themselves, desire economic development and are interested in the jobs that economic engagement brings with it. As long as they have so much to gain in this respect from their Western partners, they will likely be somewhat amenable to influence. One of our informants who spent years in China, with reference to response to complaints said, "it is on the basis of the importance of the customer. The importance is not purely [which] country [the customer is from]. It is the size of the customer, the size of the order involved and whether the customer is an important, strategic one. It is purely business practice." For this reason, Chinese firms are more apt to attend to complaints from

international firms than from their own domestic customers and suppliers. Western influence has led to the change in Chinese law mentioned earlier and the willingness to adapt their methods.

Financial clout can put a Western firm in a position to influence, but the economic disparities can also play havoc with the fidelity of communication. This is explained by a company auditor who has worked in Malaysia.

> They're afraid to tell you about poor or corrupt business practices. There is a lot of defensiveness around the international realm because of tax havens. For the first five years, the revenue will not be taxed by that country. There is a good incentive to be there during those five years. When the haven expires, the only incentive to stay there is if the company is run well. It's a low cost provider of the service. It's more based on business practices and not on tax issues. So to have poor business practices brought to light would be a very bad thing for the local organization because the [Western firm] might walk away from it. However, sometimes the [Western] firm has a huge stake in the company, sometimes 100%. It depends.

So, the financial incentives to make changes can also impair communication channels unless there is ownership by the Western firm.

If the firm is a wholly owned subsidiary, the potential for influence is very large, impeded only by the parent firm's ability to adapt to the new culture. Partnering is another matter. The extent of penetration must be negotiated and will depend on the importance of the Western partner. Sometimes the Western firm will be advised to increase its influence, thus reducing the rhetorical challenge, by an acquisition or sizeable investment in the partner. On the other hand, if the Western firm is fairly inconsequential to its partners financially, it cannot be expected to have much influence on stakeholder rights issues because the rhetorical challenge would be insurmountable. Thus care and ability in this type of inter-organizational communication becomes most important when the

level of financial influence is not obvious, or when it is neither very high nor very low.

In addition to the financial exigencies, the range of cultural differences must be considered. Some cultures adapt more readily than others to the communication norms of the Western world. Many of our informants, cited above, characterized the cultural difficulties in communication. Some of them were quite chauvinistic in these characterizations, but this serves as further evidence of the kind of difficulties experienced. One of our informants was involved in creating distribution channels for financial software services in Eastern Europe. She noticed that at first complaints from developing countries, specifically Croatia, were easier to solve than those from Italy or France, which had higher expectations. In time, however, the Croatians became more vocal and suggested more improvements. They became more comfortable voicing concerns. Similarly, a firm developing software for manufacturing operations indicated that Filipino and Malaysian partners saw the interactions as a "learning experience." They were very receptive to discussions about processes. "They are almost too good. There is no black or white, and in the United States everything is grey. But because they are so good following directions, the quality is very good." Some cultural norms work in favor of the collaborations, some against them. Perhaps the greatest impediment to assuring stakeholder rights exists in those cultures in which there is a profound reluctance to speak up. Guarantees of stakeholder voice are ineffectual if not used. Our informants continually told us that there is a great deal of fear in many cultures: fear of superiors, fear of losing one's job, fear because there are few legal protections. "There's a lot of fear. They don't have the job security or the legal system behind an employee." Thus, even with financial clout, cultural differences might reduce an organization's rhetorical effectiveness.

Further, it should not be assumed that the direction of influence is one way. Collaborations mean that both sides will be affected. An oil services company in Malaysia hired a "Bumiputra," literally a "brown partner," to help locally with tasks like leasing facilities. The partner lined his pockets by secretly sub-leasing the properties and vehicles owned by the company. When this was discovered, management looked the other way. In fact, they increased the Bumpiputra's salary on the theory that he wasn't being paid as much as he thought he deserved. Ethical lapses were tolerated. One of our informants explained management's quandary in this way:

> You certainly influence each other's practice and ideals – not just one way. The developed countries trade and work with companies in developing countries because of their competitive cost and quality labor. This means that it is to [Western] companies' advantage to have their labor and environmental standards low. How wholeheartedly [labor and environmental standards are followed] depends on their shareholders, investors, and customers' concern.

Perhaps the rhetorical challenge itself, that the organizations believe they are facing, will affect the level of concern they feel about upholding standards involving stakeholder rights in the first place. They may avoid doing so when the task appears too difficult and secondary is importance to their financial goals.

Summary

An adequate description of the impact of trade on institutional political change will include an analysis of the organizational communication involved. The nature of the relationship between trading partners is determined by the communication required. While trade can result in a wide range of political outcomes, from progressive to oppressive,

predicting the outcome is a chancy proposition. Communication between trading partners seems to mediate between the goals of economic engagement and the nature of the political outcomes. Stakeholder voice is among the most important of stakeholder rights because there can be little relief from oppressive circumstances if those who are oppressed do not speak up. Stakeholder rights, especially employee rights, are best secured under conditions in which institutions are becoming more democratic, including encouragement to exercise voice. When Western organizations model concern for stakeholder voice, partner organizations might achieve progress through imitation. The role of the press and the public relations function within organizations is especially important in encouraging concern for stakeholder rights. If the Western organization is willing to actually discuss expectations and assess these human rights issues, progress can be encouraged. Finally, the difficulty of the rhetorical situation faced by organizations with partners from developing countries varies dramatically from one of these partnerships to another. Economic and cultural exigencies help to define this challenge, but the degree of financial clout is paramount. Where minimal financial clout exists, the rhetorical challenge is difficult. Perhaps these factors constitute a minimal model of organizational communication and political change in a time when commercial organizations have tremendous influence in international relations.

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Jaakko Lehtonen

Beyond Civil Society: Citizens as Decision-makers in a Customer-oriented Society

Communication is a path from the individual to the community.

The ultimate goal of communication in a democratic society is to engage administrators, politicians, citizens, and their organizations in a process of thinking about the desired future for their community and their nation. The Latin phrase *Communicare est participare*, (in a democracy) "communication means to participate," is repeated throughout the scientific work of Hellmut Geißner (Geißner 2000). The question to be discussed in the present paper is, who are the participants in that dialogue in our post-modern society, and what authority do they have to open the dialogue, set the agenda and decide on the outcomes of that dialogue?

The question relevant to the themes discussed in the papers of this compilation is: are society's policies and practices determined in a bottom-up process? In a top-down process the government and full-time politicians set the agenda, whereas in a bottom-up process the citizens are in a position to initiate topics for public discussion and decision-making. In the imagination of many Europeans, of which I am one, the United States has been the promised land of participatory democracy. But democracy has become commercialized and professionalized. To quote The Economist (8/14/99): "In the United States much of the activity involved in getting initiatives on the ballot such as collecting signatures has been taken over by

professional firms and [...] many referendum campaigns have become expensive affairs far removed from the grassroots."

Robert Putnam in his book, Bowling Alone (2000), paid attention to an alarming phenomenon in American society: fewer and fewer people are involved in civic life, fewer citizens turn out at the polls, participate in community organizations, or go to church. At the same time the public administration is said to be moving towards a more citizen-oriented culture. In this paper, the question will be asked whether the new public service culture really is citizen-oriented or customer-oriented, and whether the ultimate goal really is empowerment and encouragement of participation, or whether it is customer satisfaction. The lonely bowler will be described as the sacrifice made in exchange for a neo-liberal public policy which treats the citizen as a consumer, and allows big corporations to interfere in public management by active public affairs strategies, thereby replacing the individual citizens as active members of democracy.

Post-modernity

According to the prophets of post-modernity, ours is an age of cynicism and negative futurism. In the post-modern organization, the traditional employment relationship based on mutual commitment is being replaced by the vigorous reappearance of market forces. The post-modern citizen (or customer) is characterized as not committed to any idea, system, or value. S/he is skeptical and cynical with respect to the promises of advertisers, employers, and politicians. S/he is exposed to so many issues having potential moral implications that s/he tolerates chaos and disorder – or is

resigned to the erosion of ethical principles in society, or to pollution, and the depletion of the earth's resources.

Stevenson's (2002) interviewee uses an appropriate expression, "quiet despair", to describe the feeling of powerlessness and cynicism of citizens before leaders who ignore their needs. Stevenson advances the idea that in industrialized countries the concept of community has been threatened by the new global economy which is eroding the social infrastructure. In the new financial community people are too busy working on their individual futures to participate in the life of the community.

The new economic environment is not the only reason for Stevenson's quiet despair. *Abstentione* has always been implicit in representative democracy: in elections the citizen delegates the making of policy choices to a representative who has his/her own preferred policies; however, there is another reason for the dissatisfaction of present day voters. They may feel that their delegates no longer have any power either, and that the decisions are made in the lobbies and in the assembly rooms of big international corporations.

Social capital means networks, norms and mutual trust. Robert Putnam, one of the fathers of the social capital concept, suggests that the social capital of the U.S. society is drying up: mutual trust is breaking down, church attendance is down, union membership is declining, people bowl – but alone, not as members of a bowling club. His findings hold good not only in U.S. society, but in most Western European countries as well.

Public *fora* for debating public issues have fallen in importance not only in U.S. society, but in most Western European countries as well. Putnam's premises have been criticized, but the phenomena, a decline of interest in public issues, diminishing political participation and lack of commitment to public issues have a familiar ring in many countries. The same kind of individualizing tendency can be found in Scandinavia, in Germany, in the

U.K., in France and so on. The processes in society that sound the alarm for Putnam are common to the whole so-called developed western welfare civilization. Putnam suggests that social connectedness is on the decline and that communities are suffering from a new absence of civic-mindedness. Voter turnout rates have been declining in most Western countries; Putnam claims that people have been disconnected from their political system. Citizens have become spectators of the political arena. Civic society is disappearing – or is it?

Associations, clubs, interest groups, societies and other coalitions of people which together make up civil society are often called the third sector of society, alongside the state and the market. If Putnam's prophecies come true, only two "sectors" are left: the state and the market. Of these two, however, the power of national government is falling off at the same rate as the rate of the increase in the globalization of the market. Under certain circumstances, non-governmental organizations, such as Greenpeace, seemingly make use of power and force big corporations to back down, but such endeavors are more often acts of rebellion against decisions already made than initiatives in relation to new issues. Non-governmental organizations may demonstrate against globalization or against nuclear power, but their chances of steering the ship around are limited.

What are the causes of civic disengagement? Putnam's social capital concept may not capture the whole phenomenon. Scholars often connect citizens' passivity with cynicism and absence of trust (for further discussion, see Durlauf 2002). It may be that there are a number of phenomena in society which together contribute to this cynicism: the disrepute that politics has fallen into, scandals involving politicians, global processes, and so on. One possible scapegoat is television and the entertainment industry: are they responsible for voter apathy, or have the new technologies perhaps alienated the electorate from social participation?

New Media

Critics of the bowling alone notion have suggested that civil society is not vanishing but that, on the contrary, new forms of social capital may be developing. Advocates of the new technology-based virtual society would claim that social capital is not on the decrease but is looking for new ways of connecting people. They claim that Internet chat rooms, self-help groups, virtual communities and friendship networks create and maintain in cyberspace a new kind of dialogue. In a study carried out in the U.K., the majority of the respondents wanted to use computers to vote, convey opinions to government and obtain information from the government (Marcella, Baxter 2000). It is true that the Internet and the new mobile phone applications are making a new kind of discussion possible, but this discussion is conducted between isolated individuals. Chatting alone corresponds to the bowling alone concept in terms of interpersonal contacts. Chatting alone may not create the same feeling of belongingness, trust and understanding of shared responsibility as coming together in church, in clubs, and on other occasions.

On the other hand, human beings are extremely adaptive and the new virtual environment has the potential to change man's perceptions of the sense of community. Kanazava (2002) offers an interesting perspective to this issue. He criticizes Putnam's thesis that one of the reasons for the decline in social capital has been the tendency of television to make the communities people experience wider and shallower. According to Kanazava, human psychological mechanisms have difficulty comprehending entities that did not exist in the environment where the system was developed. The human brain has difficulty distinguishing real friends from people they see on television. Television did not exist in the

"environment of evolutionary adeptness" where every realistic image had its counterpart in physical reality. Therefore, the brain sees nothing shallow in the picture: watching television or sitting before a DVD is interpreted in the brain as participating in civic groups because the brain does not really know that we are not participating in them (Kanazava 2002, 171).

Some of us hold the opinion that consulting citizens directly is the only truly democratic way to determine policy. However, a rush away from the present representative democracy to direct democracy is unlikely. The use of advisory referenda may grow because of the technology which makes it easier to hold them. But selecting between a "yes" and "no" button may not be the same thing as communication proper in a community. That electronically mediated networks could substitute for the traditional face-to-face relationship, resulting in a new kind of virtual community and the feeling of a new kind of "communitarianship" is a belief which does not find any empirical support in recent developments. Both communities and the relationships sustained by communities sharing meanings may soon all be gone and replaced by commoditized instrumental relationships backed by the commoditization and commercialization of all social life (cf. Stevenson 2002).

In his recent article, Gary Selnow (2002) writes about the farmers in Kosovo who, thanks to the Internet, now can communicate with their colleagues in California. For the farmer in the Balkans, the Internet did indeed bring a new dimension: it helped in the reconstruction of civil society and it helped in getting rid of the communist regime, and it offered a new channel for individuals to make social contacts; but my question is whether it has brought democracy in its train to the Balkan republics – or indeed to anywhere?

Webster's Encyclopedic Dictionary defines democracy as "a form of government in which the supreme power is vested in the people and

exercised directly by them or by their elected agents under a free electoral system." In addition to elections, referenda are processes in which the ordinary private citizen may make his voice heard. But what is the significance of referenda as people-initiatives in our societies? Mandatory referenda may even today play a meaningful role in decision-making procedures in Switzerland, but in most countries referenda are advisory and they are arranged only in situations when the topic is too hot for the politicians to decide, or when the issue concerns moral and lifestyle principles. Topics such as abortion or alcohol distribution are risky for the politician's image but do not touch upon the distribution of power in society. The voters are offered an opportunity to discuss the issue and directly cast their vote, but they do not have the right to set the agenda. The issue is predefined and the agenda is set by the government, not by the citizens.

The Other Side of Society: Organizations

In the second half of the nineties and in the first years of the new millennium, the conscience of business organizations has been shaken by a new kind of movement: the demand for corporate social responsibility, CSR. It means, in brief, that business be conducted in a manner that meets or exceeds the ethical, legal, commercial and public expectations that society has of business. A company's CSR program is its response to the criticism leveled by various stakeholders against the old business practices in environmental, employment, human rights, and ethical issues. Although corporations are expected to benefit financially from socially responsive strategies, CSR is for most companies an act of faith. CSR has been described as a revolution which is reshaping business thinking. Vicki Jayne

(2002) asks, however, in her article whether the revolution in management thinking is real or just rhetorical. Some companies seem to have high-minded promises in their mission statements but the talk precedes behavior.

Enron may be the best recent example of a cosmetic approach to social responsibility. Before its collapse, the company was voted the best company to work for and its code of ethics comprised 65 pages.

The question naturally arises if company claims about ethicality and social responsibility are true and sincere, or pure and simple public relations puff. Motives for socially responsible behavior may be to keep the company's customers satisfied and to gain public approval for its operations. The reverse side of organizations' eagerness to commit to social charitableness is their increased interest in interfering in public decision making, in which the central channel of communication is known as lobbying.

For business organizations and the various interest groups in society, lobbying may be the most effective medium in the execution of their public affairs policies. The federal governments both in the United States and in the European Union have recently sought ways to control lobbying and to lay down some ground rules. During the winter of 2003, the Advisory Council for Municipal Lobbying in New York State discussed ways of restricting lobbying. However, the issue is a delicate one. It is obvious that the lobbying efforts of big tobacco companies to dissuade municipalities from enacting anti-smoking laws is ethically questionable, but the problem is how and where draw the dividing line between acceptable and proscribed forms of lobbying. Efforts by various small civic organizations to be heard in the legislative process should be counted among the fundamental rights of citizens while the efforts of some others may be regarded as unacceptable and thus disallowed.

As Jane Kirtley (1999) states in her article in the *Quill Journal*, the secret mediation of public issues silences the voices of citizens and runs counter to the ideals of openness, accountability, and public oversight. Today, lobbying is a broader concept than that contained in the original attempt to influence politicians in the lobby of the Parliament building. It still means influencing politicians, but also means attempting to influence government institutions and civil servants on all levels of public administration. According to Phil Harris (2002), lobbying is part and parcel of modern political communication. There are currently 28,000 non-governmental organizations in Brussels alone, lobbying to influence EU policy. The number of European lobbyists has increased since the early 1970's more than ten times. According to Wilcox (2000), there are more than 20,000 lobbyists trying to turn the heads of legislators in Washington. Lobbying and government relations in general are said to be the fastest growing specialties in public relations. Harris (2002, 49) connects the increase in lobbying with the fact that the governments initially relinquished their hold on various sectors of the economy and are now trying to recapture control through regulation, and the more government regulatory policy there is, the higher is the level of lobbying. Haug and Koppang (1997) ask whether organizations calculate that money invested in influencing governments yields a higher return for a company or an industrial sector than investments in product development or marketing.

Lobbying is obviously here to stay. It is also obvious that each organization that wishes to look after its interests will continue to influence the passage or defeat of legislation likely to influence its operational conditions. Lobbying is a fundamental element in political communication and in the process of decision-making, yet it is questionable from the point of view of democracy. Many cultures attach to the word 'lobbying' a negative meaning. A job title of lobbyist would not be on the top ten list of

professions, although there have always been individuals, delegations and representatives of groups or organizations who want to inform decision-makers about their interests and, at the same time, sway the issue in their direction.

Lobbying is always practiced in secret: citizens are told neither the agenda nor the results of discussions between lobbyists and politicians or civil servants. Lobbying can be good or bad. It may influence an official or sway him by suspect means such as logrolling, pressure, or bribery. On the one hand, lobbyists can provide politicians and the legislators with useful information; on the other hand, lobbying often means working for the interest of a powerful pressure group at the cost of the silent majority.

In the post-modern democracy, corporations are replacing individuals. Big companies rather than citizens (or the political parties and unions as the mouthpiece of citizens) are today the communication partners of governments. For individuals the concept of public discourse means that they seldom are heard before decision-making takes place, although they are sometimes informed about the decisions made behind closed doors between industry and the politicians.

Business counts what counts: social accountability interests companies because the image of a responsible corporate citizen may bring with it a competitive advantage. The increasing significance of corporations as authorized citizens in society is reflected in the many concepts which have gained popularity in the organizational and management literature: corporate citizenship, corporate responsiveness and responsibility, legitimacy theory, corporate social performance, corporate political strategy, etc. All of these concepts and theories teach the organizations about their social role: corporations are citizens with power who need to have a strategy which will assist them in participating in public decision making and to use this power to bend the social environment to support

their business goals. Organizations develop strategies on how to engage and successfully influence the outcomes of public policy making and learn to be better players in the marketplace of society. The number of interest groups is on the increase and their skills in how to influence decision makers are improving all the time. Mahon, Warticic and Fleisher (2002) ask the question whether the proliferation of public interest groups leads to better public policy processes and outcomes, or in the fractionation and paralysis of those processes.

Since the publication of R.E. Freeman's "Strategic Management: A Stakeholder spproach" (1984), stakeholder theory has been one of the leading organizational theory of our times. The theory – or theories – does not assign any specific role to government or society among a company's stakeholders. It posits the idea that a firm is an aggregation of several stakeholders who are seeking to advance their own interests. It does not directly specify the interrelationship between the company and society, but emphasizes the role of community relations as a resource that can be used to support economic performance (Lehtonen 2002).

The emerging importance of organizations as corporate citizens also is indicated by the fact that recently several new journals have appeared focusing on the interface between corporations and the government, for example Business and Politics (1999) and the Journal of Public Affairs (2001). Public Affairs is, in addition, a popular theme in journals of politics, sociology, management, and communication.

Towards a Civil Society?

The Civil Society Internet Forum defines the concept civil society as follows: "Civil society is a third sector of society alongside the state and the market. The values underlying civil society include freedom of association, freedom of expression, participatory democracy, and respect for diversity." However, out of the three sectors of society, the state, the market, and civil society, only the market seems to have real power. Market forces are in effect the strongest armed forces in society.

Public debates may belong to the picture of democracy. From the point of view of the business organizations, this is a paradox: most models of public relations recommend avoiding participation in public debate because of the risk of negative publicity. Instead of allowing an issue to become public organizations are advised to apply a strategy which allows potentially harmful issues to be identified in advance and to modify communication in order to gag public criticism. It is in the interests of the company to avoid public conflict.

Stakeholder dialogue, media publicity and public discussion are seemingly conflicting goals. Secret mediation of conflicting interests between business and the authorities may work well enough, but it may encourage corruption and self-interest to the point where it outweighs the public good.

Public participation in public decision-making is said to be the hallmark of democratic society. Democracy is built on the idea of participation by all. However, in the present global society, the parties with power are interested in discussing a public issue only if they feel threatened. One might ask, does democracy, in fact, need crises to survive? In the U.S. media, big scandals in politics and business are often celebrated as victories for democracy. For instance, in connection with the Enron scandal, some

writers commented on the claim that events such as the fraud of the Enron managers bears witness to the depravity of U.S. society (cf. Lehtonen 2002b). Typically, however, commentators did not interpret the scandals as proof of the corruption of the business morals, but as an indication of a democratic society's ability to overcome such crises!

Bringing the Theme to a Head

The concepts of "customer" or "client" imply a passive orientation on the part of the citizen to the parties who provide him with commercial or social services. Eran Vigoda (2002) points to the fact that there is a tension in public management between the state bureaucracy's tendency to see citizens as clients, and efforts to support citizens' involvement and participation in public issues. "Modern societies[...] tend to favor the easy chair of the customer over the sweat and turmoil of participatory involvement" (Vigoda 2002, 527). According to Vigoda, there is an inherent tension in the administration between better responsiveness, which implies a passive, unidirectional reaction to the needs and demands of people, and collaboration with people as partners, which would imply a more active bi-directional act of participation. In democracy, citizens are supposed to be the formal "owners" of the state, but in present day society they only have a more or less symbolic role in the political liturgy.

One customer, one vote. Does the customer orientation practiced by public administration mean the same as it does in marketing? That while products/services offered are tailored to meet the individual needs of the client, the customer has no influence over what constitutes the basic assortment of those products and services. In customer orientation, the

ultimate goal is customer satisfaction which guarantees the loyalty of the customer.

A proposal made in connection with the last presidential election in the U.S. offers a grotesque picture of the possibilities of technology to the virtual dialogue between the people and the politicians. Someone – he introduced himself as a marketing manager – suggested that a computer program already applied in marketing research be used in the dialogue between candidates and their supporters: the program reads an e-mail message sent to the candidate, identifies certain key words and compiles a tailored answer to be sent to the citizen on behalf of the candidate. In constructing the answer, the program selects from a set of ready-made phrases, thus, giving the impression that the presidential candidate himself wrote the letter personally just for him or her. Later on I was told that the proposal of this marketing specialist was put into effect. Man-machine discussion as a surrogate for political dialogue is a hideous example of the consequences of a blind belief in technology as a solution to the crisis of social participation.

The fragmentation of life styles and the individualization typical of the so-called Western postmodern societies bring in their train problems concerning the role of the individual and civil society in the decision – making process of the society. The situation has become complex because of the increased interest being shown by business and various non-profit-making organizations in participating in public decision-making. This can be seen in the upsurge in lobbying on the one hand, and in the customer orientation of the public administration, on the other, which has taught citizens to see themselves as private entrepreneurs who buy public services, lay claim to the quality of the services, but not as citizens who answer for those services. The two processes, the increased activity of organizations

and the decreasing interest of individual citizens in public affairs have resulted in a crisis in classical democracy.

Representative democracy no longer corresponds to the actual distribution of power in the society. The new information technology might offer opportunities for direct participation, but these opportunities have not been exploited so far. The ability to communicate is a prerequisite of participation – "Communicare est participare" – but chatting alone in front of a computer screen may not increase the private individual's interest in participating in public discussion and decision-making.

Endnote

Hellmut Geißner (1998, 1131 ff.) in his recent article gives the concept of *colloquium* several meanings. The ancient meaning was a dialogue, the working form of which is familiar or colloquial. Cicero translated the Greek word for dialogue by disputation or colloquium. A colloquium was a speech given in a concrete situation for a small number of people who have met to talk together about a given theme or for a given purpose. The members of the colloquium searched for the truth whereas later, in medieval times, scholars thought they already knew the truth. Geißner refers to a learned man, Heineccius, who in 1718 wrote that the dialogue in a colloquium is actually just a made-up discussion between educated men: "EST VERO DIALOGUS FICTUM INTER VIROS DOCTOS COLLOQUIUM."

I leave open the question whether this speech should be placed in the category of those who look for the truth, or those who believe they already

know the truth or maybe those who engage in debate in order to exhibit their education with made-up discussion problems.

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Annette Mönnich

Business Communication and Socio-cultural Change: Problems and perspectives

"Customer orientation" is probably the best-known example of a concept of organization development which strongly influences the *external* communication of staff and executives due to its large motivating force. The concepts for organization development, however, primarily comprise the *internal* communication in organizations, e.g. the increasing importance of team communication. Both concepts are changing communication training: staff of an insurance company learn how to speak in a customer-oriented manner on the phone; members of staff and executives of a group learn how to have an open dialogue in a 'learning organization,' etc. (Bohm 2000).

How are these developments interrelated with changing socio-cultural conditions? Moreover, what effect will the change in values in our society have on communication culture and communication ethics in organizations? And as a result of this: What necessary action should be taken in the future concerning communication training?

These connections will be explained in the following three theses.

Thesis 1:

Political change can express and include a change in values. These changed values are implemented in organizations and influence their external communication, especially public relations work and marketing.

For example, the political party "Die Grünen" was founded in the 1970s in West Germany. The main goal of this party was to protect the environment and create new environmental values. Today, about 25 years later, environmental issues have become so important in Germany that consumer habits have changed. More and more consumers buy products with a so-called "eco-label," which is a symbol of an angel on the packing denoting a product that is environmentally friendly. Also politicians, authorities and businesses have started showing a new awareness of "sustainability."

SustainAbility, a London and New York-based consultancy, coined this term in 1997, and says "that it means not just looking at the economic value companies add, but also at the environmental and social value they add – or destroy" (www.sustainability.com).

Many companies integrate environmental aims in their business strategies and no longer regard ecological issues as an optional extra.

An example from the automotive sector is Audi, which publishes information about its environmental protection policy and protection measures on its homepage. One interesting principle is: "Research and Development is a vital element of Audi's environmental policy. Audi has developed for its products ecologically efficient concepts, thus increasing international competitiveness" (www.audi.de).

Others, like the beer manufacturer "Krombacher," have decided to sponsor certain projects and integrate these in their marketing methods. Krombacher has recently started a television advertising campaign where the company tries to raise money to help protect the tropical rainforest in the Dzangha Sangha-National Park in Central Africa. With the slogan "help and enjoy," they have started a unique rainforest project together with the World Wildlife Fund – Germany and one of Germany's most well-known television-presenters, Günther Jauch. In this campaign, they invite everybody to have a "Krombacher rainforest-party together with friends and neighbors to help stop the destruction of the second biggest rainforest area in the world. With every Krombacher crate you buy you help to protect one square meter of rainforest in the Dzangha Sangha-National Park" (www.krombacher.de, 5/7/2002). This advertising campaign was "the most successful consumer campaign in the brewery's history," according to a Krombacher press release in June 2002. "Already four weeks before finishing the project, 8.5 Mio. m^2 of rainforest are protected. Our initial target of 10 mill. m^2 will be exceeded by far." (see Krombacher website).

I think that with the help of these examples a special phenomenon has become evident: socio-cultural values are implemented in companies, due to consumers who think that businesses should not only maximize profits, but also consider ecological and human issues. However, the implementation of these values is characterized by an ambivalence: on the one hand, companies have to find a balance between value-oriented actions, and, on the other hand, they use this tool of ethical behavior for economic purposes. This ambivalence we can describe with Jürgen Habermas (1988) as the tension between communicative action (kommunikatives Handeln) and strategic action (strategisches Handeln).

Thesis 2:

In addition, the process of implementing values also affects the internal communication of organizations. "Staff orientation" as a significant feature of company culture as well as the concept of a "value-oriented staff policy" are both reactions to the change in values in society.

Change in Values in West Germany (1945 – 1984)

Old Values	New Values
Discipline	Self-determination
Obedience	Participation
Hierarchy	Team orientation
Performance	Orientation towards employees' needs
Career	Personality development
Efficiency	Creativity
Power	Willingness to compromise
Centralization	Decentralization

(Wever 1989, 26)

The objective of BMW's "value-oriented staff policy" is to cover the wide spectrum of values among its staff, so that they can identify more easily with their company and, as a consequence, are more motivated to increase efficiency. "For 16 current basic social values in Germany BMW has developed measures on staff policy, to enable the company to co-ordinate the aims of the employees with the goals of the company" (Seidler 1997, 77).

BMW's Value-oriented Staff Policy

For example, the values

"independence and individuality":

Implementation of Values in Specific Staff Policy			
Society/ Staff		Staff Policy	
Basic values	Objectives	Strategies	Specific Measures
Independence	Creating more individual freedom and ability to choose		
Individuality	Promoting independent thinking	Taking individual and team responsibility	Management style Delegation Project management Teamwork
		System of agreement on operational targets	Participation of staff when agreeing on operational targets
		Participation of staff in decisions	Quality circles

(Rosenstiel 1990, 148)

In 2001, the BMW-Group stressed the fact that it wanted to continue its value-oriented staff policy and published the following:

Principles of staff policy (BMW Group; www.BMW.de)

1. Mutual respect leads to a positive settlement of conflicts.
2. Going beyond national and cultural boundaries is valued highly by us.
3. Performance and operating results of our staff are directly linked to the company's compensation.
4. Team performance is rated higher than the sum of individual achievements.
5. Safe and attractive jobs for committed and responsible staff.

However, in 2001, a value-oriented staff policy is explicitly linked to the goal of increasing staff performance and increasing the company's efficiency.

> The most important external influence on company and staff policy is a result of a fast growing international competitive pressure. Increase in competitiveness has become the central factor for success.
> ... Because in future employees will decide whether organizations are successful or less successful, and so staff for us is not a cost factor, but a success factor. We can only achieve a higher efficiency by increasing staff performance..." (www.BMW.de, 2001, 2)

Elements of increasing performance are assigned to specific strategy fields:

Elements of Increasing Performance	Strategy Fields
Achievement potential	Securing staff potential
Willingness to achieve	Leadership and co-operation
Achievement opportunities	Personnel systems and structures

Concerning "leadership and co-operation":

> Everything the employees have to solve together has to be done in a more process-oriented way. Hierarchical and function-oriented working methods are replaced by team- and process-oriented co-operation (p. 3).

Changed management style:

> Because of their confidence good team leaders are able to develop efficient structures and communication in a team.
>
> On the other hand, employees have to develop new qualities as well. They have to take responsibility for their contribution to the company's success, especially for the quality of their work. They have to be willing to achieve and to contribute their individual abilities to their teams and projects. (3)

Putting it in a nutshell, I would say that a "value-oriented staff policy" is connected with the "old" value "performance." By this measure the achievement principle is placed in a new context. The salary, for example, "is a financial appreciation of work and correlates with achievement, team orientation and success" (4).

Thesis 3: Conclusions for Communication Training

The main conclusion for communication training is to extend the implicit value-orientation of communication training[1] in order to reach an explicit value-orientation. This means integrating the aspects "value" and "value-orientation" more consciously and making the significance of values for communication behavior more transparent.

Central goals for explicit value-orientated communication training:

In connection with thesis 1:

To reflect together with the participants of communication training on the following questions: Which set of values is important for a company? How are these values communicated in internal and external communication? Is the communication of values credible?

In connection with thesis 2:

To reflect together with the participants of communication training on the following questions: Which values dominate the principles of leadership, which values are important to executives and other members of staff? How do managers and other members of staff realize their values and principles in communication, for example, in staff meetings?[2]

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[1] See e. g. Geißner 1986, Geißner1992, Slembek 1998, Mönnich 1998, Mönnich 1999
[2] Wever 1989; Haßelmann/ König 1997; Kießling-Sonntag 2000

Or, from a different point of view: how do members of staff and managers communicate? What intentions, based on particulan principles, and what values are expressed when communicating?

It can be assumed that in practice there is a whole range of "old " and "new" values in company communication. Moreover, it is important to recognize the conflicts between proclaimed values and prevailing structures, for example the conflict between "team-orientation versus hierarchical structures."

To examine: What emphasis is placed on these values in corporate culture and how are they related to corporate ethics (Lehtonen 1999; Ulrich/Wieland 1999)? In what way does culture determine corporate ethics? (Löhnert 1998).

To recognize if conflicts in communication are at the same time conflicts in values. This aspect does not only concern intercultural communication (Helmolt & Müller-Jacquier 1993; Niemeier, Campbell & Dirven 1998), but also intra-cultural communication as well as interpersonal and intrapersonal conflicts.

For example, during communication training, a participant asks whether s/he is allowed to interrupt another participant during a staff meeting. In Germany this question hides the intrapersonal conflict between the values of politeness and participation. (Mönnich 2001, 26)

For example, during a meeting, a manager criticizes another colleague: "I am not criticizing the result of your work, but I require more transparency." This request is not only a request for Grice's maxim of conversation "Try to contribute to a conversation in a way that is true" (*maxim of 'quality'*) (1975), but it is also a request for participation. Interpersonal conflicts of values become obvious here:

"truth *versus* concealment" and "participation in a team *versus* hierarchy."

For example, during a meeting, a manager criticizes another colleague for not having been informed earlier about a specific item on the agenda. His criticism about the missing information expresses the conflict "team versus hierarchy." When we take into consideration that the manager has had the experience of not belonging to the "inner circle" and that he nearly always gets relevant information for important decisions during the meeting, not earlier, we realize that this criticism also expresses a conflict among the members of the team.

Another aim of value-oriented communication training is to try to predict which difficulties might arise in communication because of the connection between achievement, team-orientation and success. If, for example, the members of a team have to motivate or assess each other, this will undoubtedly lead to conflicts in the team.

Another goal is to recognize difficulties in communication behavior which are caused by the connection of value-orientation and effectiveness. Here an example from 'telephoning': A secretary always answers the phone with the following phrase "Büro Dr. Kupfermacher guten Tag" (" Dr. K's office, hello"). The higher pitch and the intonation in her voice, repeated in a stereotype way, is remarkable. This has no particular purpose concerning the message. With the higher pitch and the intonation in her voice, she simply wants to express friendliness and a closeness to the listener. However, she achieves the opposite effect because the listener keeps his/her distance.

Habermas (1996, 147) points out: Whoever rejects an act of speech offered in a clear and understandable way disputes the

acknowledgement of this remark from at least one of these three aspects: *truth, correctness and veracity.* In the above-mentioned example, the listener disputes the truthfulness of the remark and implies that the speaker did not mean what she said.

The phenomenon of using speech patterns in a stereotyped way as in the example, in my opinion is the result of trying to solve the conflict between "value-orientation *versus* efficiency." From Habermas's point of view, we could say it is the tension between communicative action and strategic action. The example shows that this tension can obviously create ways of acting which are not credible and not successful. For communication training, it is therefore essential to show ways for credible communication.

Final Conclusions

In the interrelation between business communication and a changing socio-cultural context, the socio-cultural context seems to dominate business communication. But companies also have to be aware of the fact that they is a socio-political factor for an ethical-conscious society.

In order not to minimize ethics as an economic factor for profits (Ridder 1993, 128), as is the case in pragmatic strategies of companies, it is important to maximize corporate ethics as part of a "humane-oriented economy" ("lebensdienliche Ökonomie"; Ulrich 1998, 427).

> We are confronted with the ethical-political crunch question, whether we still have the political will to renew the unsurpassed free-democratic ideal of a civil society and its values 'equality of opportunity, justice and solidarity' and to initiate political reforms, or whether we want to sacrifice the ideal of a 'respectable and well-organized society' to constraints and submit everything to the pressures of the economy. (Ulrich 1999, 18f.)

Peter Ulrich's concept of "Integrative Business Ethics" says that companies should account for their actions, especially the ethical basis of their actions, when having discussions with the critical public. (Ulrich 1999, 26)

In addition, especially conflicts in international companies show how important it is to reach a consensus on the valid norms and values in internal company communication. That is why Kreikebaum/Behnam/ Gilbert plead for "communicative-ethical conflict management" (2001, 121ff. For an understanding of business ethics as communicative ethics, see Zerfaß 1994, 301).

The purpose of explicit value-oriented communication training is to support these processes critically and courageously.

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Edith Slembek

Political Change through Communication: Breaking with Ancient Taboos?

Taboos standardize social conduct; they regulate how to act and "what to do, and what not to do." They place members of a society under constraints. Taboos are learned at an early age, and violations are strictly sanctioned. A "civilized" child learns early on that his excretions are taboo, for instance. Many rules apply to the teaching of cleanliness.

Today, for example, spitting is taboo. It was a common practice throughout the past centuries and in Western civilization, and only became taboo during the course of the twentieth century. Only fifty, sixty years ago, people had to be reminded of this ban on spitting. In the railroad trains, enameled signs were installed beneath the windows, warning in black-and-white and in several languages, that there was to be "No Spitting." Railway stations still featured spittoons, indicating that spitting was restricted to these areas. Today, without questioning, we swallow any excess saliva. We have internalized the taboo.

Here another taboo area: despite all the sex and promisguity shown in movies, sex in public is still taboo, and in some countries even kissing or the exchange of other caresses are taboo. Even though the limits of modesty have been relaxed in many places, the genital area still secures a person's self respect and personal dignity. Therefore, it is taboo to penetrate another person's genital area, to injure a person's dignity with sexual harassment, or to destroy it with rape. This much can be

generalized: "Certain things" happen on a daily basis, at all times, and in all societies, but they cannot and must not be recognized because they are taboo. Therefore, they have been excommunicated from the discourse of society, and they cannot be changed "individually," neither by general acceptance nor by general rejection. People and groups acting outside of social taboos will be ignored, simply not acknowledged, or judged. The opportunity to change these matters will only arise when broad and public discussions of taboo subjects have become possible.

Generally, however, this does not happen from one day to the next. Many matters, which are still taboo within the general society, have already long been discussed and questioned within smaller groups, and they are only partially taboo anymore. Therefore, each topic that is considered to be taboo needs to be examined: it is taboo – for whom? Not taboo – for whom? Taboo – why? Who is helped by the taboo? Who is harmed by it?

Each taboo seems to be ambivalent without the context of orthodoxy; it seems to contain an accepted ban, a "taboo," and at the same time some sort of "non-taboo."

Taboo matters are "non-taboo" for smaller circles. Although the generally accepted taboo still applies to them personally, their critical observation of social matters has led them to recognize that the taboo can no longer be tolerated. These groups free themselves from perception-restricting blinders, they do not allow anyone to forbid them independent thinking, and they question dogmatic statements. However, in these cases it is possible that a new dogmatism, the new group ideology, might give rise to a new taboo.

Once these groups stop thinking only for and about themselves, they will try to win public support for the necessary change of, or even break with, the taboo. Public discussion is the first step to condemnation of taboo

matters, or to winning acceptance for the change of an existing taboo. To illustrate this process, I chose "violence as a means of war" as an example.

War means "...the attested freedom to commit all sorts of criminal acts" (Malinowski 1942/1986, 217). "War means the reversal of the normal, constructive standards of human cooperation. Acts that are prohibited as criminal acts under normal circumstances [...], will be elevated to military virtues during the war: killing, destruction, intimidation, raping, and robbing" (220).

At all times and during all wars, women have been and still are becoming the enemies' victims of sexual violence. "Rape as a consciously used means of war weaves like a red thread through all of history, regardless of nationality, geography, culture, race, class, caste, or ideology" (Schmidt-Harzbach 2002). The perpetrators are conveying this message: "You do not exist as a person or a human being." "In male communication, the warrior adheres to the rule: "'Rape the enemy's wife...' The victors' desecrations are robbing the defeated men of any remaining illusions of power and possession" (Guendel 2002). In addition, the siring of "bastards" destroys ethnic pride for a long time afterwards. This is not an old wives' tale, but our contemporary history. It happened during World War II, it happened in Bosnia, it happened (and is still happening?) in Kosovo, and it happens anywhere in the world wherever wars are waged.

During 1945 and for a few months after the end of the war, violence against women was definitely discussed among women, but it did not come to light within the larger public, and so it did not enter public consciousness. As a child during this time, I remember overhearing how the adults were whispering behind their hands about this or that woman, "who had to confess." This was not meant for my ears, and it was not until decades later when I finally understood the meaning of this phrase. "Confessing" – a lingual euphemism from lofty moral heights for an event

of the most abysmal humiliation. "Behind the hand" – that means the fates of women were condemned to public silence, they were taboo, even though violence is a collective female experience.

"In 1945, when more than 450,000 soldiers of the Red Army fought in Berlin, 1.4 million girls and women lived in the city. Between early summer and fall of 1945, Red Army soldiers raped at least 110,000 of these girls and women... 11,000 of these women of childbearing age became pregnant... More than 40% suffered multiple rapes" (Johr 1992, 54f.).

The German Armed Forces and the SS also used "violence against women as means of war." The total number of rapes in all of the countries occupied by German troops is unknown. But more than 500 Armed Forces bordellos were in existence, where mostly Eastern European and Jewish women were forced into prostitution. The main reasons for the establishment of these bordellos were these fears: sexually transmitted diseases could become epidemics, and a general ban on sexual contacts could lead to offences against decency (meaning for the most part homosexual acts, which would undermine military morale).

Rosenthal's research concerning how violence against Jewish women during National Socialism affected their children and grandchildren makes clear that many Jewish women in the concentration camps were forced into prostitution in the camp bordellos (Rosenthal 1999, 27). The SS and privileged inmates had access to these bordellos. The interviews, however, clearly show that "... the topic of experiences of sexual violence in connection with the past persecution had been greatly tabooed, in private as well as in public discourse. This taboo was established by a silence and a denial, which now is very difficult to overcome for the survivors as well as their descendants. We can also conclude that the repeatedly observed tendency towards the social exclusion of survivors of collective massive

violence [...] even increases in regards to survivors of sexual violence within the context of war" (Rosenthal, 27).

During the Nürnberg Trials (the 1945 – 1949 trials against the survivors of the Nazi elite conducted by an international military court, and by U.S. military courts), rapes were only mentioned incidentally in some indictment documents but did not result in convictions – not even in the twelve follow-up trials. The violence against women by German men, which resulted in forced prostitution for the benefit of the armed forces and the SS, is taboo for the perpetrators and their descendants as well as for the survivors and their descendants (Rosenthal, 28). The women bear the additional stigma of having been dishonored and desecrated. The collective silence is transferred to the next generations in some way or other (Rosenthal; also Vegh 1983 with a different focus). Collective silence, too, means non-communication on both sides: the silence of the traumatized women and the secrecy of the perpetrators. As long as the taboo cannot or must not be broken, and as long as it cannot be discussed, public opinion cannot form, and change cannot take place.

Only the violence against Bosnian, Croatian, and Serbian women has raised public consciousness about violence against women as a means of war. During the war in Bosnia and Croatia, hundreds of thousands of girls and women were raped not only by Bosnian Serbs, but by soldiers of all nations (including the U.N. Blue Helmets!); many of them suffered multiple rapes, many of them were murdered. (Guendel 2002, 3) In Kosovo, phenomena occurred that were similar to those in the wake of sexual violence against women during World War II.

"In addition, rapes in Kosovo can destroy the usually very stable social construction holding together large families. Enormous pressure to hide and deny these events is exerted upon the victims as well as their families" (Amnesty International, May 27, 1999, 1). Nonetheless, some women were

ready to make public the violence they and other women had experienced. Newspaper reports and especially television reports began removing the taboos, at long last leading to public discussions and to a change in public consciousness. This was followed by a change in communication regarding violence against women as a means of war.

In 1998, it was finally decided to establish an international court; even the U.S.A. signed this agreement. [The Bush administration annulled the U.S. signatures for the International Court in May 2002!] The Haag Tribunal passes judgments on war trials and war criminals. Now, for the first time in history, sexual violence against women during war is regarded as a war crime!

In his statement for International Women's Day (March 8, 1998), Kofi Annan, General Secretary of the United Nations, demands urgent measures to combat violence against women and for the protection of women during armed conflicts. In his words, these two subjects are "... especially urgent: Violence against women and the affects of armed conflicts upon women" (Annan, March 8, 1998, 1). For the first time in March of 1998, a war criminal was brought to trial before the International Court for mass raping.

In the end, breaking with this taboo has led to the legal foundation upon which it is now possible to name "rape as a means of war" a prosecutable crime. Common experiences of many women during war times, matters which used to be excommunicated and buried in general silence, have been changed by communication. But for whom did change occur? Taboos prevent freedom – still, for whom? And what kind of freedom can be obtained by breaking with taboos?

While working on this paper, I noticed the ambiguousness connected to breaking with taboos. Events become public, and thus become open for discussion, for the most part when the media takes them up. This is what happened here, too. Rapes of girls and women during war became a media

topic. Magazines published pages upon pages of illustrated reports, and numerous television shows – women shows, television discussions, and news reports – picked up the topic as well.

The media pays attention to provable facts, which means in this case, that the victims' physical appearance differs very much from the usual portrayals of women. Women on television are for the most part young, beautiful, attractive, and perhaps witty. The "victims" should be total wrecks, emaciated, and miserable. But the victims gain their real credibility only with the help of comments of the experts: doctors, psychologists, or perhaps employees of Amnesty International. They all give witness, that real horrors took place, that many women were raped, tortured, murdered, and that the survivors have been harmed permanently.

"The media and their makers do not at all act as advocates of the victimized women in order to plead their cause in our public media: Rather, they play the role of the persecutor in a typical rape trial, where they themselves bring suit and ask permission to bring in the victims as admissible evidence" (Kappeler 1992, 36).

Women who publicly gave witness of their horrid experiences hoped to win more compassion for the victims of humiliations; they perhaps hoped to find more psychological and political support; but by now, they are bitterly disappointed. "We believe that this sensationalist journalism only served to frighten and shake-up the victimized women even further" (Zagreber Frauenlobby, December 21, 1992, quoted in Kappeler, 51).

From this point of view, it seems that, although breaking with taboos regarding violence against women as a means of war has turned these actions into prosecutable crimes and brought about the sentencing of the perpetrators, it still did not change anything for the victimized women themselves.

Why? Because published opinion has not turned into public opinion? Because fear of the taboo is stronger than the courage to be free? Because this courage for freedom would destroy the taboo's protection for our own forces, too, if used against foreign forces? Because the media's own taboo breakers are still clinging to the media-empowering taboo?

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The Interrelation of Minority Cultural Policy and Minority Cultural Discourse: "KulturQuer-QuerKultur," a Regional Association Promoting "Intercultural Cultural Work" as Minority Critique in Cultural Policy Discourse

Introduction

One of the legacies of my travels and stays in the USA is its struggle with what modern multicultural society is about. This fueled much of my thinking and writing. Contrasting lives, ideas and communication across cultures and societies has always been a great passion of mine and is still the core of my research interest. So, in many ways, my present contribution will weave a text with biographically different threads of thought. As our discussions at the conference showed, further threads could be pulled from several other articles in the present volume.

I will report on the development of a regional cultural association that aims at changing mainstream cultural policy in German municipalities to account for minority culture. My participation as a member was accompanied by reoccurring non-understanding and some striking "irritations" (in the psychoanalytical sense). I will argue that certain aspects of typical migrant socialization act as a barrier to the development of communicative competencies needed for board members of an association aiming at political change.

"KulturQuer-QuerKultur Rhein-Neckar e.V."

"KulturQuer-QuerKultur Rhein-Neckar e.V." (KQ) is a regional association with its center of activity in Mannheim, my town of residence. Rhein-Neckar embraces the region around the cities of Heidelberg, Mannheim and Ludwigshafen. It was founded in 1999 by a group of 38 members and has today nearly 60 members originating from about a dozen different nationalities, with a majority being of Turkish origin. Its main goal is to promote a changed understanding of migrant cultural production as not being limited to the heritage of their country of origin or folklore. KQ conceives of intercultural cultural work as dealing with creative cultural production processes which result in so called "hybrid"[1] forms of cultural expressions. These artists' works are influenced by their lives in multiple cultures and migrant socialization, which does not inevitably mean their themes to be problematic and laden with conflict.

Social and Regional Contexts

Mannheim counts roughly 320,000 inhabitants, more than 20% of which are of other nationality than German. These nationalities include 34% Turkish (almost 23,000), 14 % Italian, 8% Yugoslavia, 4% Croatian, 5% Polish and Greek (not included are German immigrants from Russia) (Statistikstelle der Stadt Mannheim, January 2001). Those who followed the PISA debate about Germany's educational system know the most underachieving group are immigrant students (Spiewak, *Die Zeit*, 18. July

[1] Köhl (2001) also refers to critical aspects of the term (48, FN 64).

2002, 3). So, cultural minorities articulating their expectations and demands toward the majority of German society belong to an elite[2].

The local background for founding this association was a study group on "intercultural cultural work"[3] in 1997/98 following two workshops on the topic (Wolfgang Biller, personal communication July 26, 2002). There is an institutional gap for artists with migrant backgrounds, particularly for the 2nd and 3rd generation. The cultural office, which would be the competent institution to turn to for these artists, has very limited financial resources compared to the department for migrant affairs. In Mannheim, money for migrant artists traditionally came from the administrator for migrant affairs. The staff of departments for migrant affairs are typically accustomed to paternal gestures toward the "gastarbeiter" (guestworker) and rather unaware of critical issues of "interculturality." They are also not qualified for aesthetic assessments. Their concept of interculturality confines itself mainly to "folklore, kebab and tea" (to caricature the German reception of migrant life, referring here to the largest minority, the Turkish population). According to the founding members of KQ, this is also the case in Mannheim. Thus, there are conflicting interests in the fight about relocating finances toward the cultural office so that artists have aesthetically competent persons to turn to.

These issues are, however, not unique to Mannheim. A recent study by the BPB (the National Institute for Political Education) on intercultural cultural work in German communities concludes: "Intercultural cultural

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[2] Multicultural society in Germany is different to the US (cf. Soraya 1994). It is at an earlier stage in its development. This situation is similar across Europe, although in Germany there seem to be even fewer people from ethnic minorities in outstanding positions than in Great Britain or France, or the Netherlands (for example a *Newsweek* survey found all over Europe only three board members in Europe's largest companies to belong to ethnic minorities (Foroohar, 2002.) Maybe the increasing attention to diversity issues will bring some change (Stuber, 2002).

[3] A rather new term appearing more and more in the context of discussing cultural policy. The term is not well defined yet. The broader meaning refers to various kind of intercultural activities including folklore evenings. The narrower concept refers specifically to aesthetic forms of expressions by (second and third generation) migrant artist integrating plural cultural influences in their work (cf. Internet research, google 26.07.2002).

work has to be regarded as a cross-sectional task [for all institutions] and must not be delegated to special interculture-institutions" (cf. Görres, Groß, Oertel, Röbke 2002, 17, translation by S.S.-K)[4].

After one and a half years of preparation, the study group on intercultural culture work decided to found an independent association in order to achieve political change in municipal cultural policy. This decision was contested (Wolfgang Biller, personal communication July 26, 2002) and difficult to make (Regina Trösch, personal communication July 18, 2002). As founding members told me: "the founding already speaks for itself " ... many [...] were 'like paralyzed,' so that one thought 'now they won't go along any more'... There are few who think themselves capable to represent themselves and equal-minded fellows." Consequently, there were a lot of starting problems. The goals of KQ, according to its statues, are:

- To improve communication between ethnic groups and institutions;
- To achieve greater acceptance by political bodies of the local communities;
- To act as a forum which promotes new creative work with cultural syntheses articulated by multicultural agents and connects already existing activities of this kind.

Parallel to the development of the study group two women ethnographers conducted a field research project in Mannheim on the topic of intercultural culture work. It had initially started on "interculturality," but this topic emerged as a burning issue in Mannheim among the politically involved migrants.

Last year, the results were published (Köhl 2001), which helped me understand more and to some extent triggered the present contribution. In the following, I will introduce some selected aspects of Köhl's work as

[4] This development of insights resembles the debates in multicultural education in the USA in the 1980s about reforming the curriculum away from special studies (see also Soraya 1994)

they relate to the current issue of barriers for migrants in articulating their own position promoting political change.

Strategies of "Intercultural Cultural Work" – Ethnographic Field Work Down the Road

Naming – "Identities in Question"

In the field, terms like "intercultural" were generally strongly rejected or not understood at all. "Migrants of 2nd (or 3rd) generation" were also refused as acceptable names. The core circle of interlocutors named themselves "migrants" and "not of German origin" (Köhl 2001, 12)[5]. The rejections of names and labeling point at severe offenses in the course of their lives in Germany. "Identities in question" was one of the emerging topics (Hall 1993). The refusal to locate themselves or let others locate them is to a large extent a reaction to cultural or national categorization, a problem the majority of migrants growing up in Germany have to deal with. I observed a frequent combination of dichotomous thinking (good or bad, Germans and non-Germans) and a resistance to acknowledge cultural ways of speaking, thinking and acting[6]. This may partly be due to the fact that many of them – quite different to the situation in the US – do not possess a German passport. Thus, they are not admitted to political participation, and keep the status of foreigner, no matter where they were borne.

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[5] A number of Köhl & Menrath's interlocutors are members of an association called "Die Unmündigen" (the minors), a group on which sociolinguistic research is being conducted at the IDS (Institute for German language) (www.ids.de)

[6] Similar phenomenon are described in Bennett's model of intercultural sensitivity (Bennett 1994). This model, however, does not account for the political aspects of interculturality and for the emotional processing of experiences like cultural discrimination or racism.

Solidarity with the Researchers – A Quest for Recognition?

All of the interlocutors tried to win the researchers to their purposes in exchange for information. Köhl reports that it was very difficult for them to withdraw from these demands. For reasons of objectivity and to avoid functionalization, they tried not to take sides. Yet, they could not keep up this distance without disturbing the research process. So they finally did take a stand for an intercultural cultural work "based on a dynamic model of culture and ethnic identity" (70). The interlocutors' attempts to make the ethnographers declare their solidarity with them can be seen as a quest for recognition, although a rather monopolizing one (see below).

Ethnicization and Marginalization Met by Irony and Satire

A large majority of the second and third generation of migrants in Germany experiences continuous discrimination and structural racism. Cultural movements of independence are Kanak Attak (Zaimoglu – "the Malcolm X of German Turks"), which uses a new style of language and caricaturizes German cliché of Turks to absurdity. The younger generation (mostly born in Germany) experiences much rejection in the course of their socialization and are consequently critical of ethnic categorization. Increasingly they do not define themselves by the folklore of their heritage; at the same time, they also do not strip off their origins. They combine various experiences and plural cultural influences into their own ways. Today migrant artists do not want to be categorized by the cultural heritage

of their countries of origin (Staiano 1997 quoted in Köhl 2001 speaks of "ethnicization"). They feel marginalized by municipal cultural policies as described above. Their themes are not necessarily dominated by their status as migrant or migrant descendant, but deal with general issues, be it aging, love, or landscape (Köhl 2001). Migrant artists want to be judged by aesthetic criteria and not by origin (cf. · enocak in Amirsedghi & Bleicher 1997, 133). This issue also relates to their need for recognition as artists[7].

Köhl (2001) discusses structural or institutional racism as a form of hidden racism including "all processes which, intentionally or not, result in the continued exclusion of subordinate group" (Miles 1989, quoted in Köhl 28). A good example from their fieldwork in Mannheim is the native term "Sozialmafia" ("social mafia"), meaning the network of people working with migrants in the area of social work, youth groups etc., mostly of German origin. They adopt the cause of protecting, supporting, defending "foreigners" and their supposed ways of life, but actually lead a 'Stellvertreterdiskurs' ("substitutes' discourse"/discourse by self-appointed advocates). Besides the artists' critique of the present cultural policies and its discourse, Köhl discusses also new concepts and proposals for a change in cultural policy, particularly with respect to minority cultural policy. The emergence of KQ can be regarded as a logical consequence of the situation and debate in Mannheim.

Köhl found irony and satire to be strategies used in intercultural cultural work. These ways of communicating unmask ethnic categorizations and show their authors as subjects and agents in minority cultural discourse, not any more as mere objects. She also experienced irony and satire as communicative strategies in interviews and concluded irony to be a general attitude towards life for some of the interlocutors.

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[7] Critique is an essential part of recognition, as Straub (1999) argued in his article on "understanding, critique and recognition."

Commentary and Critique

In my view, there is some interesting bias in Köhl and Menrath's research. First, they were not given much credit as ethnographers until they took sides for the political position of the migrant artist. Thus, they made an arrangement that did not allow them to develop an impartial understanding of the structural relationships. Also, the artists themselves were not viewed critically, neither with respect to aesthetic qualities of their work nor with respect to their accounts of mainstream cultural politics and their personal commitments and contributions to change. Among Köhl's original intentions was also a critique of the minority elite (personal communication July 24, 2002), unfortunately she could not maintain this position.

Second, some of the people involved in the discourse on minority cultural politics are of German origin. They were not given a voice in Köhl and Menrath's research. In order to account for more complexity of the issues at work, one would need to include all participants. Also, from the point of view of policy change as implying organizational change, one would need to consider the opposition in this conflict: the staff of the municipality. Political change needs to take into account a whole system of interdependencies.

Generally, cultural policy (which in Germany is mostly municipally administrated) works as a network of old ties and connections. Innovative, (cultural) critical voices are seldom heard. This is an experience not only

migrant minorities share with other minorities, for example, homosexuals or political dissidents in political satire[8].

Irritations and Reflections
My Own Involvement

Acquaintances had won me as a member of KQ. In this way I entered "the field" in the Fall of 1999. From its beginning, KQ organized several successful events, often in cooperation with other institutions: exhibitions, literary readings, political satire, and public speeches and panel discussions on "culture," its ideology and the consequences for cultural policy. Yet, among the board members conflicts increased. I perceived some striking irritations at my first encounters with the association, which I will interpret ethnographically along the lines of an ethnohermeneutic approach as introduced to the colloquium on ethnohermeneutics in 1992 (Soraya 1992, 1996, 1998). However, time resources for the present article did not allow for strict methodology: no tape recordings were made, only notes were taken during the interviews with members of KQ; also no external supervision was used to reflect on my own biases. I did share my interpretations with my interlocutors and asked for their response. Therefore, in spite of some "dialogical validation," the present contribution remains at an exploratory level.

[8] Here is an interesting parallel in wording as KulturQuer entails "quer" as opposing the mainstream, Queer as being in opposition to straight refers to homosexual critique. This parallel can unfortunately not be pursued in the present context (cf. the debate in queer studies, Johnson 2001).

"Parricide Aboard"

Among the founding members of KQ, no one volunteered to run for president of the board. Instead they asked someone who was recognized and respected in Mannheim to represent them, an elder man of Greek origin[9], a so-called first generation migrant. After a short period, conflicts arose, several board members perceived him to be too "patriarchal," too "bossy." This was the main story I encountered when I first joined a board meeting. My immediate reaction was admittedly rather stereotypical psychoanalytic: what was going on here seemed like a classical "parricide" (as portrayed in Freud 1912/1999). I spontaneously articulated this interpretation and even found some cautious support. But the reactions were something between slightly embarrassed, laughing as if they had been caught or unmasked, and admiration. For Christine Köhl, the interpretation of the parricide also rang a bell (personal communication, May 9, 2002. and July 23, 2002); she supported it. I had confronted some of the founding members: "Why did you hide behind a man of the first generation? Someone who was not even involved in the formation of the group?" Various accounts were given: "he first seemed ok," "he is well respected," "we had little experience leading an association" – they did not convince me. The founding members did not present someone from among their own ranks to stand up for them and take responsibility. The very goals of KQ had to do with overcoming the heritage of the guestworker cliché. Why select a first generation representative? The expectation was that his influence would empower them. As conflicts between the president and other board member increased, they were not solved communicatively, but the first president was urged to resign.

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[9] Whether the Turkish-Greek conflict tradition played any role in the development of the relationships here is subject to speculation, I found no support for it in my interviews and observations.

In our interview, the first president of KQ expressed his perception of these incidences as follows: "They were looking for someone who can make the dirty work – excuse me – : administrative bodies, offices, registering at the local district court [...] In meetings, I had the impression the Turkish participants had already conferred before [...] there was dissent ... I was accused of being authoritarian. [...] There is one thing they underestimated, I was teaching on intercultural topics for more than 20 years at the PH (educational college) in Heidelberg [...] I am not a lay person in intercultural questions. And I have a very strong opinion" (Pantelis Nikitopoulos, personal communication, January 16, 2003). In my view, the expectation of the first president was a double-bind: on the one hand, he should empower the group by virtue of his reputation, but simultaneously the group "disempowered" him by ignoring his expertise.

My interpretation of this conflict evolves from trying to make sense of the contradictory movement of first inviting someone from outside then expelling him. This movement parallels the fate of the German "guestworkers," who were also invited by Germany, not with the intention of having them stay, but only to do the dirty work no one else wanted to do. Upon completing their tasks they are expected to return, for they are guests, migrants not immigrants.

But there are also other themes at work here: In a sense, the establishing of such a presidential figure, and the subsequent "coup" seems in two ways symbolic:

a) with respect to the institution KQ:
b) The decision to separate from this president parallels the very act of founding this association with its goals of emancipating from the cliché image of the first generation migrant in German society, the "Gastarbeiter."
c) with respect to migrant members personal development:

d) There may be an unconscious (repetitious) need for emancipating from a figure of the old patriarchate which does not fit their own self-conceptions any more (cf. McLuhan 1958/2001, 93-94: "educating father").

The criteria for choosing their first president point at a collectivist orientation (Hall 1976). It seems as if the persons involved are considerably influenced by a traditional socialization with rather patriarchal features[10]. On the one hand, this may support dependency patterns which strongly rely on personal relationships, which at worst can lead to helplessness, paralysis, and rather closed systems. On the other hand, the founding of KQ and the conflict with their first president shows a need to individualize from the migrant history, which gives the impulse towards struggle. At times I had the impression that migrant members seemed caught in between these two motions. Understanding this conflict and its "solution" in terms of a parricidal scene accounts well for these various layers of meaning.

The Paralysis of the Board or "Aboard without a Captain"

The problem of a missing president had not been solved. After the first president of KQ had resigned, no one followed as president. After several points of dissent, members of the board simply stayed away from board meetings. Without ever naming an open conflict, the treasurer resigned, and the administrative minimum was hard to ensure. Rather normal group conflicts, one may assume. I see them, however, to be symptomatic for a particular dynamic in this group, a view also shared by one of the board members of German origin with a rich experience in various associations.

[10] This can, of course, also apply to many German families, depending on various socio-cultural factors.

Some members of KQ told me about some professional dependencies as they work for municipal institutions, and their jobs are often paid by or supported by the administrator for foreign affairs. These existential dependencies constitute a serious threat for their freedom of expression, which also influence the board. But independent members also became reluctant pursuing their jobs. My overall impression of what works as social-psychological barriers to the self-government of the migrant members has to do with their self-images, a lack of self-confidence and an obvious ambivalence in taking a public stance in representing themselves. Only a few seem sufficiently politically committed, no one filled the power vacuum. My last experience (July 4th) may support this interpretation even further.

The Second Round: Who Speaks for Us? Near Death Experience and Resuscitation

Until July 2002, no one had taken the position of the president, and the vice president had led the board. The lower district court requested an election of a president, otherwise the association would have to be disbanded and liquidated. New board elections were called for. In the run up to the elections, one member of the board, himself an artist and a founding member, was willing to run for president. Yet, to the surprise of everyone, he indicated at the general meeting that he would not run for president. (As he told me later, after a little dispute with some members the evening before, he felt not enough backing among potential board members.) The association would have to be disbanded and liquidated that very evening. No one else wanted to run for president. At the very last

moment, I decided to stand for the position. After that, six other women volunteered to be candidates for the remaining posts. We were elected as the new board of KQ[11].

The idea of writing about the conflict within this association had been brewing for some time. When I had planned this paper, 'action research' was not my intention. I could gain some useful insights, maybe even more so because of my observer position. Taking over the presidency seriously limits my self-reflection. At this point, I would like to reflect upon certain aspects of myself as a researcher, which differ from most other members of KQ and which played a role in getting myself involved, both as ethnographer and as active member.

As a binational having lived in several countries not sharing the same discriminatory and racist experiences of the majority of migrants, I grew up differently. I am educationally privileged, having a university degree and an international education. My family does not have a working class migrant background. With an academic father living as a political dissident in exile, I became politicized early on. I lacked any understanding of municipal cultural policy, I was a true "stranger" in that respect. I was not involved in the conflict within the board as I hardly knew anyone when I joined. My bias may be to underestimate: a) how much members of non-German origin are still influenced in their communication and thinking by their cultures of origin; b) what impeding effects discriminatory experiences may have on competencies in conflict resolution. I sympathize with the sacrificed expert, as I also joined as an outsider and as expert in intercultural issues. Besides he, like my father, is a political dissident, and therefore we share a certain degree of fighting spirit and self-assertion. Thus, I may lack empathy for other migrant biographies.

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[11] In Köhl's research, only 20% of the interlocutors were women.

Discussion

The near death of KQ and its consequent resuscitation by myself and six other women was a rather strange and unplanned experience, particularly as I was working on this paper. But the deadlock situation of coming together in a general meeting and being confronted with such an expected turn around fits the parricide-scene quite well. In *Totem and Taboo*, Freud (1912/1999) introduces the construction of the "primordial crowd" ('Urhorde'), an attempt to sketch prehistoric social development. Drawing from theories by Smith and Atkinson, Freud (1912) describes the basic pattern of the parricide in the primordial crowd to be driven by the perception of a despotic father who would not let his sons grow up as men and leave them their own reign with their own wives. The sons unite against the father, kill and even devour him. Freud suggests that the killing of the father leads to a decay of the group (1912/1999, 172f.). A power vacuum results, due to rivalry among themselves the brothers cannot legitimize someone from among their own ranks to follow the father's position. Freud sees here the beginning of social contracting, including the incest taboo and exogamy, upon which "[A] good part of [...] the perfection of power was passed over to the women, the period of the matriarchate began" (Freud, 1950/1999, 188). Maybe it needed women to take over the board of KQ. But I do not want to overestimate this indeed very interesting parallel.

I would like to go back to the phenomenon of the paralysis of the board. The ability to debate about points of dissent is rather underdeveloped among the migrant members. Conflict communication is avoided. There

seems a lack of awareness of the fact that groups do not have naturally shared ways of dealing with differences in opinion, in modes of talk, in coming to common decisions, but need to negotiate these. How far these barriers are rooted within the German migrant socialization is beyond the reach of the present contribution.

Mario Erdheim (1982) describes various forms of internalized mastery, mechanisms that stabilize existing conditions of power. With reference to Parin's (1978) case analysis of political events, he states: "The repetition of the basic personality conflicts triggered by political conflicts is the gateway for mastery to enter the individual and settle in. To the same extent as the individual does not succeed in solving his inner conflicts, these become potential bases for masters" (417, translation by S. S-K).

Maybe here is a potential starting point for developing a program in communication education that accounts for the particularities of migrant needs for people working in NGOs[12]: giving them a chance to reflect upon their own "internalizations of mastery" and thus maybe letting them find ways of "solving" inner and social conflicts more consciously.

Conclusion

These present interpretations serve as preliminary working hypotheses which do not claim the status of results. The problems KQ experienced within its board, its self-governing organization, seem partly due to a specific lack of experience and abilities to deal with group conflict as well as to take a public stand in representing themselves.

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[12] The need for such programms is expressed in Kabis (2002). Compare also von der Fuhr (1998).

This structural change is one side of the coin political change: the other is the communication, certain forms, certain ways which correspond with the political requirements for change. The communication people display in order to change the status quo also needs to change. Strategies of irony and satire will not be enough to move things. What is needed is political power. This requires a certain degree of self-reflexivity, communicative efforts for compromises beyond black and white. The interrelationship between political change (in minority cultural policy) and communication (in minority cultural discourse) shows a need for both structural changes and political communication education.

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Bernd Schwandt

Teaching Communication to Students in East Germany: About Perceived Differences and Whether They Really Exist

> I don't know how they recognize it. I don't talk about it. They don't ask. And still, most of the time I know what they are thinking: She's from the West. Right. I am from the West and work in the East. As a journalist in Brandenburg. And when I am on tour between Ziesar and Schwedt and talk to the people in the villages, we talk about everything, but not about where we come from. Not necessary. I rarely ask, because anyone living in Ziesar, Kuhhorst or Senftenberg lived here long before reunification. Mayors, managers and high-level officials are the only exception. And they don't ask either: the Television-woman is from the West [...]
>
> After the television-woman is taken for a Wessi:
> "You thought that I come from the West?" "Oh, no no, not at all, for heaven's sake", he answered [...] "For sure you are not a 'Wessi'. You are talking German." He had to laugh at my puzzled expression. Then he added: "Recently I went to a meeting. One of the speakers asked, before starting: 'Is there a lawyer among us? Nobody raised his hand... Is there a Wessi among us? Nobody answered. Okay, then we can talk German.'" (Wätjen in Simon et al., 2000, 51)

I have been teaching communication in the East of Germany, at the University of Applied Sciences in Erfurt, Thuringia for four years now. More than 90 percent of my students are from the East, and I am among the 90 percent of the professors from the West. So one could assume that one of the topics of discussion in classes would be communicative differences between East and West Germans. For the most part, it does not come up. Sometimes I ask. Even then they do not talk about it. How come?

Research questions often have a background that remain hidden due to a certain understanding of "objectivity." In this case, it might be helpful to make it explicit. My question is fuelled not only by my current job, but also by my biographical background. For my students, I am one of 17 professors from West Germany. This is correct insofar as I grew up in West Germany. Yet, I was born in East Germany; my parents left East Germany in 1961 when I was a one-year-old, taking with them their "refugees-from-the-East" identity. Reading about the specific differences I will refer to later on, I realized that my parents preserved quite a lot of their East German cultural identity over 41 years; did I grow up with this identity concept without being aware of it?

My first experiences in Erfurt were centered around the feeling that "they don't talk to me in my communication classes, making me first helpless, then angry." Another experience: *Some* students behave "normally": ask questions, make ironic comments, start a conversation outside of class. My prejudices proved unpleasantly accurate: Most of them turned out to be 'Wessis'. Could it really be that extreme?

Yet, I realized that I might be oversimplifying: I taught in West Germany about ten years ago. I was a Ph.D.-student then, now I am a professor: there is a greater gap in status. I was thirty then, students twenty-five and older, now I am forty-two and they are twenty. Some of their parents might be around my age. Then, I was teaching psychology, education, and communication students. Now I teach business students – the fact that they *have to take* my class does not necessarily increase their motivation. So, the differences I perceived might be due to other factors.

In order to find out the other perspective, I asked my students. The main reaction was: "This 'Wessi-Ossi' applies to our parents, our teachers and so on. I was ten years old when the reunification came, I can't remember very well happened before 89. And I'm fed up with that topic. – Don't ask!"

Other answers were: "For sure there are differences, but they are difficult to grasp, I can't tell you what exactly they are."

Having taught for four years, I realize that classes now work better. Yet, I cannot really tell what has changed: I have become familiar with the culture, I guess. Yet, I would like to know what has changed. Furthermore, there are other indicators that differences exist:

I perceived students' uneasiness with making their own decisions and felt pressured by a call for authority: "You should decide who is leading the group" – something I never experienced in West Germany.

A lack of interest in politics in general and of student participation in bodies in particular is also evident: it is rather difficult to find 3 out of 700 students who are willing to represent the students in the faculty meetings.

Thuringia currently has an unemployment rate of 16%. So, willingly or not, most of the students will have to move to West Germany to find jobs after they graduate. Students are aware of the lower socio-cultural prestige of their dialect: many of them want to get rid of their Thuringian dialect.

For most of my colleagues, possible "cultural differences" are not a relevant topic. Instead, they see the problem of too many untalented and disinterested students. The dropout rate over eight semesters is about 50%.

Some students directly address value conflicts: "I grew up with the maxim: be cooperative. For the past ten years I have been told: look out for your own benefit, ignore the others. I am not stupid; if this is the game, I can play by the rules."

For four years, I have been confronted with two contradictory assumptions. One is: East and West Germans are biographically influenced by different "cultures" and so there are differences in communication as well. In consequence, one should try to find out what they are.

The other is: Differences are mainly due to the past and with the growing together of two German states, and within a time span of one generation, they will gradually disappear.

Since I am deeply embedded in that problem and do not feel very "objective" in my viewpoint, and since neither my (West German) colleagues nor my (East German) students were very informative on the topic, I tried to find out what others have written about it, and compare it to my experiences. In the following discussion, three kinds of major sources are referred to:

- Narrative biographical texts of East and West Germans between the ages of twenty-five and thirty (Simon et al. 2000);
- Data collected in polls (Wagner 1999);
- Psychological explanations (Klein 2001).

Biographical Texts

"The book of differences: Why the unity is no unity" (Simon et al.) was published in 2000 by a group of people around thirty years of age, half from the West, half from the East, mainly journalists, but also students, a lawyer, a politician, sharing their experiences concerning German unity. In largely narrative texts, the 23 authors report many experiences of struggling with identity: Ossis feeling like Wessis, doing everything to eradicate their denied Ossi-identity and behaving like a Wessi. Wessis who feel they are in a foreign culture, as depicted in the following text:

> "I already knew this strange state of mind, this being a foreigner from my time in Italy. There I had to learn the language to realize what the most important topics in the life of an Italian are – eating, love, and most important, la mamma. Only then could I communicate, became part of the

> group. At this party, I understood the language, but not much more. [...] If it is true that in every group there are secret rules according to which everyone behaves knowingly or not, then I didn't understand them at all there" (Andrasch 2000, 67).

The overall tendencies of the collected texts are

The process of German reunification is closely linked to the biography and identity of those people who are between 25 and 30 now. Ongoing cultural and political change influenced them at an age that is more crucial for social identity than the age bracket of forty to fifty. Also, they encountered the change more consciously than my current students, who were five to ten years old in 1989.

Both "Ossis" and "Wessis" feel they are seen less as a person than as an example of a category by members of the other group. This depiction by others enhances their own reflection on mechanisms that create "personal" and "group" identity. ("The East Germans are a category of West German paternalism." Dieckmann 2003)

Over the decade from 1989 to 1999, differences have decreased in terms of different vocabulary, dialects, outer appearance; others say: differences have become less visible, are far subtler – but they have not disappeared. Other differences, including economic issues, have decreased less than people had been promised.

Wolf Wagner: Culture Shock Germany

Wagner (1999) sees the reunification as a "culture shock" phenomenon and tries to interpret differences found in polls. Aside from the still existing

economic differences, he cites cultural differences between East and West Germany. Out of eight examples (career patterns, attitudes towards work, self-presentation, conflict styles, politics and truth, gender differences), I want to focus on two areas that are directly involved in communication, *shaking hands* and *everyday conversation.*

Handshakes	
East Germans	West Germans
First encounter of the day and saying good-bye	Only on formal occasions
Advantage: informal, gaining time	Advantage: closeness, personal encounter
Perceive themselves as friendly, polite, informal	Perceive themselves as friendly, polite, correct
Call the West Germans arrogant, distanced, impolite	Call the East Germans stiff, old fashioned, stuffy

(Wagner 1999, 129)

Wagner reports his experience as a new (West German) professor in the East. Going to the university library, he greeted the library staff with a friendly "hello" and walked by – not knowing that according to East German "rules" they would expect a handshake. For the library staff, he was behaving in a distancz, arrogant, overbearing way, and the next time they would behave the same way – so he was astonished and later angry because of the distant, unfriendly way they answered his requests for books. This "fit" into the general prejudice that East Germans are unfriendly, lazy, and not service-oriented at all.

Wagner finds another difference in the function of complaining in everyday conversation. Wagner explains this with different functions: complaining about the weather, increasing prices, unemployment, for example. Complaining enables communication that is free of competition

or fear. It gives no cause for envy, nobody is showing off. Everybody is equal. In a situation where differences were growing, an atmosphere of equality and solidarity could be maintained. (Wagner 1999, 135ff.)

Complaining in Everyday Conversation	
East Germans	West Germans
Prefer to talk about problems and grievances	Prefer to talk about soft topics, small talk
Advantage: closeness and solidarity	Advantage: positive atmosphere
Perceive themselves as open, talkative	Perceive themselves as diplomatic, witty
Call the West Germans: distant, shallow	Call the East Germans: complaining, whiny, insatiable

(Wagner 1999, 139)

"Wessis" on the other hand – I quote Wagner – are influenced by the US-American rule of positive thinking: talking about success is part of presenting yourself in public. From that point of view, talking about failures is embarrassing: it is misunderstood as a call for help and attention. If the "Wessi" reacts to this call, the failure will become even more "official" and more embarrassing. If he/she ignores the topic, they may appear selfish and disinterested. So it is better to change the topic.

Addressing communication patterns might create a similar kind of embarrassment: Students are aware of their lower social prestige (dialect, income, "taste" in clothing) – an "authority" (they see a professor as far more distant than I perceive myself), and what is more a "Wessi," addressing this "deficit" makes this topic even more embarrassing. This fits in with my experience: They talk about these topics, but stop doing so as soon as I am around.

In order to overcome the reluctance of students to discuss such controversial topics, I used a videotape of the "Harald Schmidt Show" (A rather sarcastic comedy show. Schmidt is well known for his jokes about all kinds of minorities, ridiculing rules of political correctness.). In this five–minute take, an actor is playing an East German TELEVISION anchorman (with long hair, a batik t-shirt, and speaking in Saxonian dialect). After his first sentence, he gets hit in the face, accompanied by a comment from the production manager "Hey Ossi, do that once more and you get a slap in the face." He replies: "Nee, also, das hab ich nun würklisch nisch verdient" ("hey that's not fair, I didn't mess it up"). A couple of sentences later, he gets another slap and complains, asking the producer for a reason. The producer: "I don't know either, Ossi, my team is working independently." Later a "documentary" is shown of nagging, bad-tempered visitors at a congress called the "Ninth Internöl" (a congress dedicated to moodiness and nagging), making fun of bad-tempered East Germans.

To provoke the students, I took up the topic of the humiliation and embarrassment of East Germans; I expected that the students would be provoked and would take a critical viewpoint towards this kind of comedy. To my surprise, many of them argued that "Ossis" really behaved like that and deserved this kind of "mirror." Freud called this "identification with the aggressor."

Communication Cultures: "You Just Can't Understand"

Klein (2001) states that there are two different communication cultures with differences that provide opportunity for ongoing misunderstandings. As a coach for work teams, he describes typical communication (and

perception, interpretive, value) differences that occurred in his work with East and West German clients. Klein groups his observations in the categories of extra-verbal expressions like eye contact, distance, hand shakes; conversational routines like pausing or questioning; and issues of context and meaning, for example, self-presentation or public and personal space.

The differences in extra-verbal expressions are barely perceived, but probably the easiest to describe. West Germans "use" shorter eye contact than East Germans. Intensive eye contact is interpreted as intimate, too close or aggressive. For the East German on the other hand, eye contact is a means of getting in contact and more important than clothing or other outer appearance (Klein 2001, 33f.). Furthermore, West Germans maintain a greater distance than East Germans. Klein (2001, 36ff.) states that he observed a difference in perceived adequate distance ranging from ten to thirty centimeters – a phenomenon that is widely known from intercultural studies. West Germans tend to "occupy space" by loudness, gestures, moving around; East Germans leave space for the other and wait to be offered space (39f.). In a brief depiction like this, it seems impossible to preserve the cautious way Klein describes these differences: as patterns, as subtle tendencies embedded in communicative actions – not as stereotypes that inhibit understanding instead of enhancing it.

A second group of differences are described as communicative strategies and their underlying meanings. West Germans tend to establish an image of being individualistic and successful and consequently start conversations with something positive (in a way, they behave in a very "American" way at this point). The East German, on the other hand, tries to establish community and equality, denying differences; this is easier by beginning with "negative" points (this was mentioned already by Wagner as "complaining"). Both try to start a conversation with small talk, but the

other is not likely to answer the (expected) routine (49f.). Related to this are differences in self presentation: Westerners tend to overemphasize their skills and experience, they are perceived as showing off, exaggerating; the Easterner on the other hand understates his abilities, shows weak points. Klein describes the "Western" pattern as "present yourself in a positive way – the other will deduct half of it, and then he/she has an adequate picture" – and vice versa.

Further on, Klein finds differences in saying *yes* or *no*. West Germans easily say "no" if they do not agree. The Easterner tries to avoid dissent or distinction and therefore avoids a "no" if possible. (This is probably similar to differences between US-Americans and Japanese.). In Klein's example, a West German even asks whether there are any objections – none of the East Germans replies. Yet, they did not agree; in their understanding, there were no specific objections, but still they did not accept the plan; if they had agreed, they would have said "yes" to the proposal. (91ff.) Further, dealing with dissent, the Westerner is seen as aggressive and as tending to escalate conflicts, while the Easterner does not voice his/her arguments, stays reserved and feels easily personally offended. Again, this difference is explained with diverse underlying meanings. In the Western pattern, escalating a position makes it explicit, so it is easier to negotiate. This is seen as a kind of a sport. In the Eastern pattern, escalation is avoided in order not to insult or offend the other; once the other is offended, there is an interpersonal breakdown that will inhibit negotiating about facts. (Klein 2001, 102ff.)

Klein describes many more discrepancies in communicative styles. Partly, his findings overlap with those of Wagner (whom he refers to) and to patterns described by Tannen (1993). His book title You Just Can't Understand us is an obvious allusion to Tannen.

Conclusion

Most authors conclude that the "clash of cultures" that was obvious in the first years of reunification has for the most part disappeared. Yet, differences in cultural identity have become stable, Wolfgang Engler (2000) compares them to the cultural identity between Anglo- and Franco-American Canadians that have lasted over two centuries.

Writing about these differences remains tricky in several ways. In this article, I have tried to make sense of communicative patterns in which I am interwoven myself – there is no distanced ethnographer's view. The literature as well is dominated by personal experiences; the stories depicted often describe impressive breakdowns (Agar 1980), but often it remains unclear what is representative. Here Wagner (1999) provided some helpful statistics I could not refer to. Cultural differences also overlap with economic differences, local mentalities, gender issues, age, profession and so on. The public discussion on these issues is still often very emotional. The television show I referred to is one example.

For my work in Erfurt, I conclude that knowing about different communicative patterns – like shaking hands – is helpful in everyday interaction; at least, I was surprised (and somewhat amused) that my use of handshakes increased after reading Wagner and Klein. Even more important seems the "silent" background of my students, including a capitalist worldview with its "business logic," high competition, and the knowledge to be among that part of the population that benefits from reunification. Professors are role models for people "who have made it."

Public speaking, in combination with video feedback, is a lesson in self-presentation, and by extension differentiation. A typical problem that occurs in feedback sessions is that many students will not participate or

only say things like "this was fine." Up to now, I have attributed this behavior partly to shyness, partly to unwillingness to participate in the course. From this socio-cultural point of view, this might be an attempt to avoid embarrassment as well as competition, and to practice solidarity.

In the context of the whole situation of the students – having chosen a subject that is closely linked to capitalism – there might be a reaction that could be phrased as "We are willing to learn "your" rules of bookkeeping, controlling, tax laws etc. We are not willing to learn your patterns of communication on top of that – this would threaten our cultural identity."

I do not think I *really* know how to deal with communicative styles in my courses now. But I was surprised how many interesting articles and books exist on the topic and I have ended up writing an article about what I do not know. So maybe, the actor Peter Sodann (quoted in Witzel 2002, 44) is right when he says: "The Ossi does not always say everything he knows. In contrast, the Wessi often says more than he knows."[1]

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[1] Many thanks to my colleague Patricia Rankin for her help in bringing these thoughts into readable English.

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Donald E. Williams

Conditioning the Young Mind: Assuring Cultural Compliance through Textbook Instruction in the Schools of the Antebellum and Warring South in the United States of America

Anchoring Unquenchable Hate

Rare is it that poems and songs are written to register the unmitigated hate of the authors and to inculcate hate in the minds of readers and listeners. The following Civil War verse, however, is a notable exception. Entitled "The Good Old Rebel," it was written shortly after the war by a Southerner, Innes Randolph, and widely published in colloquial idiom. To illustrate the tenor and thrust of this piece, carried in Reed Smith's book, South Carolina Ballads, these three of the six verses carry the gist of the poem's message:

I hates the Yankee nation
and everything they do;
I hates the Declaration
of Independence, too.
I hates the glorious Union,
'tis dripping with our blood;
I hates the striped banner –
I fit it all I could.
* * * * *
Three hundred thousand Yankees
is stiff in southern dust;
We got three hundred thousand
before they conquered us.
They died of southern fever

and southern steel and shot;
I wish it was three millions
instead of what we got.

I can't take up my musket
and fight 'em no more,
But I ain't a-goin' to love 'em,
Now that is sartin sure.
And I don't want no pardon
for what I was and am;
I won't be reconstructed
and I don't care a damn
(Smith 1928, 45f.).

This poetic moan, not to be mistaken for pastime doggerel, carries the message of uncompromising hatred. Spitting out withering scorn, Randolph targets not only abstract concepts of philosophical instruments providing the bases of government, but people, individually and in the mass.

What life forces, other than the monstrous terror of face-to-face battle cobat could have generated this intensity of detestation? What activities, practices, and agencies exerted the vigor to tap into the minds of citizens of the southern states comprising the Confederate States of America and create the foundational structure for corporate abhorrence toward a contrasting aggregate of people populating the northern states constituting the Federal Union – an abhorrence endowed with extraordinary staying power in the decades prior to the Civil War, during the war, and, in some quarters, continuing into the 21st century?

A venerated axiom honored by nations around the world striving to enhance civilization is that formal education shapes minds. To sponsor in broad sweep societal education is to confirm the identification, vitality, and destiny of the commonweal of a people bonded by shared concerns. Directed educational enterprise can be both prescriptive and protective for premises embodying values and truths deemed worthy of perpetuation.

In southern states before and during the Civil War years, as identifiable southern character became more and more perceivable and esteemed, the citizenry of these states, constituted predominantly by people of the white race, relied on their schools for the young, the strongholds for educational effort, to cultivate in girls and boys an understanding of and appreciation for the precepts and practices defining life in the South. The purpose of this paper is to explore how this program of instruction was conducted as well as to delineate both its proximate and ultimate effects.

Considered wholly, a strict phasic progression does not appear evident; those in charge of planning and providing teaching in the schools posited the North as a formidable enemy and, simultaneously, the South as a bulwark for tested and proven ideas and laudable living patterns. All through the Southland, there became numerous resentful Southerners who viewed the North with calculated, irrevocable hate.

In a song written in the second year of the war, 1862, entitled "The Bonnie Blue Flag," Annie Chambers-Ketchem depicts the North as an infamous assailant. (In 1906, Dolores Bacon included this song in her compilation entitled, Songs Every Child Should Know.) Here is the second of seven stanzas:

> As long as the Union was faithful to her trust,
> Like friends and like brethren, kind were we and just;
> But now when Northern treachery attempts our rights to mar,
> We hoist on high the bonnie blue flag that bears a single star.
> (Bacon 1906, 126f.)

Echoing the accusatory sentiments expressed in this song were similar statements regarding the North in the instructional materials presented in textbooks of the period. Southern educators were alert to the impact school textbooks potentially had on students, not only in regard to the disciplinary focus but also to the ideational maturation of young people. In his textbook,

The Confederate First Reader, Richard McAllister Smith testified that the prose and poetry selections had been selected "to interest and instruct pupils and to elevate their ideas, form correct tastes, and instill proper sentiments" (Smith 1864, 3).

The centrality of textbooks to the educational endeavor was emphasized by Jefferson Davis, President of the Confederacy, writing to a large assembly of teachers in Columbia, South Carolina: "It would be difficult to overestimate the influence of primary books in the promotion of character and development of mind. [...] The first impressions on the youthful mind are to its subsequent current of thought, what the springs are to the river they form" (Proceedings of the Convention... 1863, 18). Corroborating this point of view was another high government official, Zebulon Vance, Governor of North Carolina: "This is certainly the time [...] [for] impressing the minds of our children with the effusions of Southern genius" (19). Relating the matter of textbook usage to the encompassing context of which it was a part, advocates for the cause of education explained the pivotal role schools played in the besieged South:

> We will carry on this war [...] in the school room. [...] In the minds and hearts of our younger children there is a citadel whose possession, by good or bad principles, is to be decisive of our future fate... [If the child is] free from proper educational influence, [...] it will be debilitating and dwarfing the mind [...] and rendering him incapable of the [...] important task of preserving freedom (Address to the People... 1861, 8-9).

Within this context of ominously threatening circumstances, textbook writers vehemently chastised the North. In her textbook, The Geographical Reader for the Dixie Children, Marina Branson Moore provided explanation for the cited despicable actions of the North:

> Northern people began to preach, to lecture, and to write about the sin of slavery. The money for which they sold their slaves was now partly spend [sic] in trying to persuade the southern states to send their slaves back to

> Africa. And when the territories were settled they were not willing for any of them to become slaveholding. This would soon have made the North much stronger than the South and many of the men said they would vote for a law to free all the Negroes in the country. The southern men tried to show them how unfair this would be, but still they kept on.
>
> In the year 1860, the abolitionists became strong enough to elect one of their men for President. Abraham Lincoln was a weak man, and the South believed he would allow laws to be made which would deprive them of their rights. So the southern states seceded, and elected Jefferson Davis for their President. This so enraged President Lincoln that he declared war, and has exhausted nearly all the strength of the nation in a vain attempt to whip the South back into the Union. Thousands of lives have been lost, and the earth has been drenched with blood, but still Abraham Lincoln is unable to conquer the 'rebels' as he calls the South. The South only asked to be let alone, and to divide public property equally. It would have been wise in the North to have said to her southern sisters, 'If you are not content to dwell with us longer, depart in peace. We will divide the inheritance with you, and may you be a great nation.' [...] The [northern] people are ingenious, and enterprising, and are noted for their tact in 'driving a bargain.' They are refined, and intelligent on all subjects but that of Negro slavery; on this, they are mad (Moore 1863, 13f.).

In the textbook, First Book in Composition, authored by L. Branson, who stated it was "especially designed for the use of southern schools," the writer placed a choice before the young pupils: "Can we stand patiently by, and see our property torn from us? No. Each generous emotion of our hearts forbids it. Let this tyrant tremble, and all his satelites [sic] beware!" (Branson 1863, 37).

Other textbook authors, in order to make their condemnation of the North all the more telling, juxtaposed the allegedly nefarious war offensive of the North with the shining retaliation qualities of the South. K. J. Stewart, in his textbook, A Geography for Beginners, offered this contrast after having discussed the southern region literally as an overflowing cornucopia of nature's bounties:

> Every effort that human ingenuity could contrive, or immense resources of money and vast armaments on sea and land could accomplish, was made by the Northern government to capture the capital and other important places,

> and break up the political organization of the Confederacy. But by the constant, evident, and acknowledged aid of the God of Battles and King of Nations, these efforts have all failed, and, at vast expense of suffering and blood, the people of the Southern States have fought their own way to independence and the respect and amity of the great nations of the world. (Stewart 1864, 43)

Moore, in her Geographical Reader, instructs readers about the ravaging done by the North in defiance of the inventive, persevering determination of the South:

> This is a great country! The Yankees thought to starve us out when they sent their ships to guard our seaport towns. But we have learned to make many things, to do without others, and above all to trust in the smiles of the God of Battles. [...] We were considered an indolent, weak people, but our enemies have found us strong, because we had justice on one [our?] side. (Moore 1863, 14)

Chiseling this juxtaposition more precisely for the benefit of her pupils, Adelaide de Vendel Chaudron, in her book, The Third Reader, provided crisp sentence reading exercises such as, "We fight for right, but they for might" (Chaudron 1864, 98).

In the school rooms of the southern states in which young students were exposed regularly to anti-North attitudes as they studied textbook materials, the Federal Union, in the minds of these developing girls and boys, was doubtlessly typed as a sinister entity – one to be feared and hated. Basis was provided in the textbooks to regard the North as grossly inconsiderate of the South, committed to holding the region in subjugation, tyrannical in its resolve to exert economic and moral dominion over the southern people. Moreover, the North had steadfastly and mercilessly assaulted the South in terms of the region's security and livelihood.

The message to the children, "We have logical reason to hate the people of the North," was projected clearly and registered firmly.

Rhetorical Framing

In the educational setting, the South was motivated to instruct its children in the wisdom of the South's prevailing life patterns and about the blessings of its natural resources which together made for a promising future. To castigate another alternative interpretation in the flux of the times led to the upholding of the colliding alternative if it were to claim the abiding fealty of the receiving audience. The rhetorical motif suggested here was framed in the relevantdecision-making process involving young students in the antebellum and Civil War periods. Disdaining to choose the alternative of having a more tolerant attitude toward the North, they faced the decision of whether they could summon up a long-term, judicious pledge to their home area, the slave-holding South, which had been emphatically and widely censured.

If this censure were to be revoked, the institution that had long drawn fire from the abolitionists and other liberal groups in the North, and requiring confirming vindication, was that of human slavery. Abolished in other societies, slavery was firmly grounded in the ongoing life of the southern states. The practice of people having legal title of ownership in other people had been referred to as the very cornerstone of the societal structure by the Vice President of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens. In the South, slavery was a settled principle. As a time-honored social institution, it charted life. Significantly, as a standard of the people, it was accorded the prestige of what Daniel O'Keefe terms a cultural truism – "a belief that within a given culture [...] is rarely, if ever attacked" (O'Keefe 2002, 247).

Before and during the Confederacy period, the commanding social thought, initiated in childhood, held there was virtue in maintaining a layered society – there was the slavery layer and there was the separate broader layer for all other people not classified in the slavery layer. The premise stipulating there was a permanent place in society for slavery, made secure by governmental, educational, and religious agencies, led to what another rhetorical theorist, Herbert Simons, refers to as a "cultural ideology." The system of thought upholding slavery was hegemonic, i.e., it was indisputably all-controlling (Simons 2001, 48).

With the schoolroom providing them their lectern and their audience, teachers, in writing textbooks for their students, straightforwardly defended the institution of slavery as a positive good. Classroom teachers identified with their assumed role of being defense advocates. In an address circulated in 1861 among the citizens of North Carolina and emanating from a conference of teachers and friends of education in Raleigh, this challenge was clearly given to teachers:

> [Our] struggle for national existence and independence [...] is to be maintained and carried on [...] in the schoolroom [...] [to] prepare a people to be a free and self-governing nationality. [...] [We who have] an official connection with our schools [...] are placed as watchers over an interest of vital importance to the welfare of our beloved country, and the plain and paramount obligations springing out of this relation override all other considerations.

The leading proponent of this position was Calvin H. Wiley, State Superintendent of Public Instruction in North Carolina, who could have personally authored this solemn declaration of the need to be met: "We all know the fact that the whole civilized world entertains erroneous opinions in regard to the state of society in the slave-holding states of America [...] The institutions of no people have ever been more misrepresented" (Address to the People... 1861, 1f., 4f.). Wiley's glowing estimate of the

future of slavery in his state appeared in his well-received textbook, The North Carolina Reader, which believably exalted the promising features of living in North Carolina, one of which he asserted was the endless need for and supply of the manual labor of slaves: "Here the slave owner can find swamp lands where slave-labor in farming operations will always be profitable; and he can also in the mines and forests of turpentine trees, in the fisheries, and on works of internal improvements find good employments for the same species of property" (Wiley 1851, 85). Designed by Wiley to have wide appeal in the state, this book, he envisioned, would go "with the Bible and the almanac into every home" (Johnson 1937, 315).

Faith in formal education was justified, it was claimed, because schools had been the proven force for "rapidly elevating the tone of society among the ruling race." Furthermore, the active effort of this ruling race had a compelling unique service to provide:

> The Southern States of America [are] distinguished by a peculiar social system, and one obnoxious to the phariseeism of the world, [and] are especially called on to think in such things for themselves, and to see that their children are instructed out of their own writings. [...] [We are] firmly convinced that our own position on the subject of slavery is the right one (Address to the People... 1861, 10-11).

Discrediting the opinion sometimes held by people outside the region, that there were no common binding interests between slaveholders and non-slaveholders, a correspondent in an 1860 issue of the Southern Recorder maintained that slavery

> gives independence and dignity to the poor man of the South. It is that which makes him feel his equality with the slave owner, for however poor the [white] man in the South may be, he can stand erect when he looks down and knows [...] the Negro is below, and will remain so (Kaestle 1983, 207).

Magnifying the primary psychological nature and advantage of slavery, the trustees of an academy for women in Fredricksburg, Virginia, declared "that the South without slavery would be like Shakespeare's Hamlet without a Hamlet" (ib. 205).

Many Southerners, teachers and other shapers of public thought, were sensitively aware that authors and publishers in the northern states had long monopolized the school textbook market throughout the South. Even before war convulsed the populace, educators were calling for southern writers to guide instruction on southern topics in southern schools. As North Carolina teachers declared, "If we are ever emancipated from thralldom to foreign influences, we must have our own authors and our own publishers [...] If our schools are kept up, they must be supplied with books printed at the South" (Address to the People... 1861, 13).

This 1861 reference to "foreign influences" unmistakably implicated the Federal Union. As early as 1845, it was charged these "foreign" publishers provided textbooks for the South containing "sentiments not only offensive but actually poisonous to the mind" (Ezell 1951, 306).

In response to this voiced need, a welcomed spate of South-oriented school textbooks was disseminated from publishers in Raleigh, North Carolina, Richmond, Virginia, Mobile, Alabama, Greensboro, South Carolina, Columbia, South Carolina, and other Confederate cities, until 1865, the last year of the War Between the States. Affirmative implicative support on behalf of the institution of slavery was their hallmark. Desiring to assure this emphasis, educational leaders such as William A. Smith, President of Randolph-Macon College in Ashland, Virginia, were in favor of "purging school texts of any sentiments hostile to slavery" (Eaton 1964, 76f.).

Mathematical problems, for instance, directly posed questions pertaining to negotiations related to slavery. Even though his 1857 textbook, Elements

of Algebra, was published in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, Daniel Harvey Hill presented arithmetic problems such as these:

> A planter, who knows that his negro-man can do a piece of work in five days, when the days are 12 hours long, asks how long it will take him when the days are 15 hours long.
>
> A gentleman, who owns 20 slaves, had laid in a twelve-months' supply for them, when he purchased 10 more. How long will his supplies last?
>
> A planter purchased a number of slaves for $36,000. If he had purchased 20 more for the same sum, the average cost would have been $150 less. Required: The number of slaves, and their average price.

In each instance, the condition of slavery is in place. The computation assignments involved are presented as reflective of life; the considerations are customary.

In contrast, when Hill detailed problems referring to instances of fraud, the perpetrators were citizens of the North, as these examples illustrate:

> A Yankee mixes a certain number of wooden nutmegs, which cost him 1/4 cent apiece, with a quantity of real nutmegs, worth four cents apiece, and sells the whole assortment for $44, and gains $3.75 by the fraud. How many wooden nutmegs were there?
>
> A man in Cincinnati [Ohio] purchased 10,000 pounds of bad pork, at one cent per pound, and paid so much per pound to put it through a chemical process, by which it would appear sound, and then sold it at an advanced price, clearing $450 by the fraud. The price at which he sold the pork per pound, multiplied by the cost per pound of the chemical process was three cents. Required: The price at which he sold it, and the cost of the chemical process (Hill 1857, 106, 124, 321).

On the basis of these examples, it would be natural for the children to associate Northerners with deceptive business practices. Fraud was represented as being purposeful. While the appellation, Yankee, customarily designating Northerners, was regarded by some Northern people as a respectful nickname, the term in the South before, during, and after the Civil War years ranked high among the most opprobrious word

usages. This attitude of youngsters toward the nickname and toward people of the North to whom it referred was surely intensified by disdainful reliance on it in the schoolrooms.

Typical of the defenses directed to young students was that of Moore in her textbook, The Geographical Reader for the Dixie Children, published in Raleigh:

> The men who inhabit the globe are not all alike. Those in Europe and America are mostly white and are called the Caucasian race. This race is civilized, and is far above the others. [...] The African or Negro race is found in Africa. They are slothful and vicious, but possess little cunning. They are very cruel to each other, and when they have want, they sell their prisoners to the white people for slaves. [...] The slaves who are found in America are in much better condition. They are better fed, better clothed, and better instructed than in their native country. These people . . . are descendants of Ham, the son of Noah, who was cursed because he did not treat his father with respect. It was told him he should serve his brethren forever. [...] We can not tell how they came to be black, and have wool on their heads (Moore 1863, 10).

By implication and by explication, capping the passage with derision, Moore wrote to provide justification for slavery.

As teachers and textbooks posited a frame for decision-making, the alternative of condoning human slavery was stringently reinforced for the young heirs of the historic status quo.

Holy Bible Justification

The lodestar in justificatory discourse permeating Confederate textbooks was the beacon for guiding the life of the Christian, The Holy Bible. Classroom teachers, courted by book publishers, counseled: [To defend our social condition, we must be] shut up to the Holy Scriptures [...] We have to begin to construct and defend theories from the simple word of God; let

us at once fill our schools with books which draw all their ethical doctrines from this divine source" (Address to the People... 1861, 12).

Textbook author Richard Sterling contended as he dedicated a section of his book, Our Own Third Reader: For the Use of Schools and Families, to the topic, "Bible View of Slavery": "The study of the Bible is a great matter [...] It speaks only truth on all matters. He who knows the Bible well may be wise and good and happy, though he never reads any other book" (Sterling 1862, 161).

Sterling provides for students direct citations to verses in both The Old and New Testaments testifying to the beatification of the practice of slavery. In the book of Exodus, Chapter One, for instance, there is reference to a servant faithful to his master: "His master shall bore his ear through with an awl, and he shall serve him forever." Similar supporting excerpts are given from various books of the Bible including Genesis, Ephesians, and I Timothy. From the book of Titus, Chapter Two, these verses are presented: "Exhort servants to be obedient unto their own masters, and to please him [sic] well in all things, not answering again, not purloining, but shewing all good fidelity, that they may adorn the doctrine of God our Saviour in all things."

Elucidating, Sterling stated that when the words, servant, bondman, and bondmaid are used in The Bible, these are synonyms for the word, slave. He continues by describing the context of biblical times:

> Slaves were a possession, bought, sold, and inherited. [...] So it continued all through the Bible history, all through the period from Malachi to Christ, and all through the New Testament period. [...] [We can infer from] the phraseology in Christ's language and parables that there were slaves in almost every family who were able to afford them. [...] They were in all the primitive churches, believing masters and believing slaves, and there is no hint of the unlawfulness of this relation, any more than that of the husband and wife, or parent and child. The whole Bible has come from a slaveholding people. It is full of allusions to this institution (ib. 213f.).

Supplementing Sterling, but writing more directly to the immediacy of the topic, S. L. Farr admonished children in the book, published by the North Carolina Christian Advocate Publishing Company, The First Reader for Southern Schools: "It is not a sin to own slaves. It is right. God wills that some men should be slaves, and some masters. It is a sin to treat a servant ill. He is a man, and Christ died for him. It is not best to set him free, but to keep him and be kind to him" (Farr 1864, 17).

Farr emphatically charged the teachers to assume responsibility for the successful projection of the textbook materials if the children were to learn: "The teacher should question the pupils upon the truths contained in each lesson, and this should be done until the teacher is satisfied that the lesson is understood" (3).

Moore complied with this sense of charge by providing in catechistic format a series of questions to guide review, such as these exchanges:

> Question: Is the African savage in this country?
> Answer: They are docile and religious here.
> Question: How are they in Africa where they first came from?
> Answer: They are very ignorant, cruel and wretched (Moore 1863, 37).

The Holy Bible, relied on in absolute terms by teachers and textbook writers, provided divine, supreme sanction for the practice of human slavery. By holy writ, this traditional institution of society was blessed by ecclesiastical decree as interpreted for young school children.

Argument by Definition

Fundamentally founding their defense of the practice of slavery on biblical scripture, pro-slavery advocates were also concerned about basing

their affirmative cases on what they considered to be sound definitions of basic concepts. Representing this concern was E. N. Elliott, President of Planters' College in Port Gibson, Mississippi. Writing one year before hostilities began in 1861, he expressed objection to conventional definitions of the terms, "slave" and "slavery." Amplifying his definitional position, he offered a juxtaposed contrast in his book, Cotton is King and Pro-Slavery Arguments, which served as something of a mainstay for the defenders of slavery:

> A slave is merely a "chattel" in a human form; a *thing* to be bought and sold, and treated worse than a brute; a being without rights, privileges, or duties. Now, if this is a correct definition of the word, we totally object to the terms, and deny that we have any such institution as *slavery* among us. [...] [The South] had received from Africa a few hundred thousand pagan savages, and had developed them into millions of civilized Christians, happy in themselves, and useful to the world. They [the southern states] had never made the inquiry whether the system were fundamentally wrong, but they judged it by its fruits, which were beneficent to all. [...] We understand the nature of the Negro race; and in the relation in which the providence of God has placed them to us, they are happy and useful members of society, and are fast rising in the scale of intelligence and civilization, and the time may come when they will be capable of enjoying the blessings of freedom and self-government. [...] But we know that the time has not yet come, that this liberty which is a blessing to *us*, would be a curse to *them* (Elliott 1860, v, viii).

The condition of slavery itself, according to Elliot, should be defined by its intended functioning, and not by abstract legalisms. He argued that slavery should be understood against a template of rights of the slave vis-à-vis the rights of the master. For the edification of teachers and the people of the South at large, Elliot declared:

> Slavery is the duty and obligation of the slave to labor for the mutual benefit of both master and slave, under a warrant to the slave of protection, and a comfortable subsistence, under all circumstances. The person of the slave is not property [...] but the right to his labor is property, and may be transferred like any other property.

> The master [...] has a right to the obedience and labor of the slave, but the slave has also his mutual rights in the master: the right of protection, the right of counsel and guidance, the right of subsistence, the right of care and attention in sickness and old age. He has also a right in his master as the sole arbiter in all his wrongs and difficulties, and as a merciful judge and dispenser of law to award the penalty of his misdeeds (vii).

To be sure, many people living in the era of the Confederacy would regard this definition as being overindulgent and compromising. These people would be more attracted to the terse definition stated by Farr: "Slaves [are] *owned* by their masters" (Italics are added.) (Farr 1864, 16).

Projecting definition into life was the approach preferred by the group of teachers meeting in deliberative session in Columbia in 1863. To the public, they made this statement as civic-minded counselors:

> The theory of our [slavery] practice is that the superior should adopt the inferior as a member of his household, placing him under his own immediate supervision and that of his wife and children, where the sympathies between man and man are brought into active play, where every want is seen and felt for, where every crime is discovered and punished, and where the influences of religion and of a constant observation of the habits of a higher civilization are allowed to exhibit their educational and disciplinary power.
>
> We hold that if we are to have others in subjection to us at all, it must be in this way, and that a system of personal servitude of this kind, and for whose origin we are not responsible, is justifiable, and the only kind of paramount domination of race over race that is justifiable by the light of God's revealed truth (Address to the People... 1861, 12).

Expounding a reasoned definition of slavery, many educators sponsored for their pupils and for the populace at large a fundamentally humane rationale for continuing this practice. Implementing this humanistic definition, southerners upholding the slavery system could proceed convinced the system was sound and justified. Other educators, however, held that slavery, in concept and in operation, was based on the ruling principle of ownership, i.e., some people literally *owned* other people and

could effect arbitrary control over them, maybe considerately or maybe inconsiderately.

Demonstration in Reality

Biblical justification and definitional soundness attempts launched the discussion of slavery into the realm of its actual living-out, i.e., its day-to-day reality. The defenders of this institution that had been woven into the fabric of community life for almost two and one-half centuries portrayed slavery, cognizant of allegedly isolated heinous aberrations, as a decided good.

Hypothesizing believable narratives, slavery's champions provided illustrations of how camaraderie was enjoyed between master and slave. Samuel Lander, author of The Verbal Primer, told the story of Uncle Tom cautioning his master about keeping rein of his horse as a train approached: "Take care there, Mas' John; that horse will throw you, if you don't mind. Don't you see the train coming up the road? Woe, [sic] Dobbin; woe, sir. . . Pull the reins tight, Mas' John; I wouldn't have Dobbin to throw you off for the world" (Lander 1864, 36).

In another story, Lander tells of a little girl who approached Uncle Tom, who was sawing wood, with a cheery "Good Morning" and a comment, "Uncle Tom, here you are still hard at work." The slave replies, "Oh! Yes, Miss; that's all poor Tom is fit for." "But wouldn't you rather be free, Uncle Tom," asked the little girl, "so that you could work for yourself?" "Why, no, Miss," replied the old slave, "Don't you know Master gives me everything I want, and takes care of me when I am sick? What do I want to be free for?" (27).

Other textbook writers built the case for slavery by discussing the status of slaves as a class, not as individual men and women. Moore, for instance, presented this assurance to young pupils who read her textbook, The Geographical Reader for the Dixie Children:

> (Re Virginia:) There are many planters who own large numbers of slaves. These are generally well treated, and are as happy a people as any under the sun. If they are sick, Master sends for the doctor; if the crop is short, they are sure of enough to save life; if they are growing old, they know they will be provided for; and in time of war, they generally remain quietly at home, while the Master goes and spills his blood for the country.
>
> (Re South Carolina:) [Slaves] are hardly so well treated as in North Carolina and Virginia, but they have the Gospel preached to them, and are generally contented and happy.
>
> (On the coast:) [The enemy has] stolen many of the Negroes who tilled the land. They told the slaves they were free, and even formed regiments of them to fight against their masters. But the Negro is too cowardly for a soldier, and so he is but little service to his northern friends (Moore 1863, 19f.).

The inclusive scene of the lives of the slaves, according to Moore, was a generally heartening one of bliss, disrupted occasionally by bothersome mistreatment from misguided masters. Moore provided her child readers with this overview:

> [Slaves] are generally well used and often have as much pocket money as their mistresses. They are contented and happy and many of them are Christians. The sin of the South lies not in holding slaves, but they are sometimes mistreated. Let all the little boys and girls remember that slaves are human, and that God will hold them to account for treating them with injustice (14).

Impact of the Pro-Slavery Discourse

This concerted response to the challenge from the despised northern states to defend slavery and to the stated need for children's school textbooks to be written by Southerners and published within the geographical boundaries of the Confederate States of America was impressive. The intention of these writers was to present the case for the continuation of human slavery in their midst so that young students could comprehend the averred wisdom on this formerly widely accepted societal norm, now being fiercely attacked by many people living in the northern states. The presumption regarding the rightness of slavery now faced dethronement by force of ideas and by force of arms. Crucial to the success of this campaign was the confirmational reception of the pro-slavery message by school children, the consumers of the admonishments and assurances directed to them as the South's future citizens.

Well-primed in the contention that the Bible carried the word of God and, as such, served as the ultimate source shaping thought and behavior, these children could react profoundly to textbooks setting forth scriptural dicta sanctifying slavery. Nothing equaled biblical documentation to provide the stamp of finality to a declaration about the life around them. That life, for the great majority of these children, did not feature slavery in the near-at-hand sense, as few of their parents owned slaves. But slavery, indeed, was a key factor across the spectrum of southern life. Children saw slaves working in the fields and walking along the roads, listened to adult talk about slaves, experienced daily the manifest distinctions, subtle and conspicuous, upholding the tenet that the black and white races were and should be separate in all channels of life. For young readers, these distinctions settled the question of how should slavery be defined: Slavery was a way of life dramatically different from the way in which white

people lived, in terms of background, assumptions, patterns, and expectations. For them, the presumption that slavery should continue was carried. Slavery, in the children's way of thinking, was a solid and everlasting given for life.

Slaves had their place and white people had their place in God's world, and all seemed well. Furthermore, the controlling influence of the senders of these messages to the schoolchildren – their teachers and their textbooks – provided "the conjunction of expertise and trustworthiness [that] make for reliable communication" (O'Keefe 2002, 183f.). Expertise and trustworthiness – were not these two salient marks of character personified for young students by the accepted prototypes of the respected classroom teachers and the respected authors of the textbooks effectively relied on?

The children's prevailing orientation was demonstrated by the textbook stories casting slaves in subservient roles and in contexts in which they were eternally obedient to a Master; in actuality, they were owned by the ever-present superior.

Textbook discussions of the institution of slavery as it was perceived in the South during the antebellum and Civil War periods enabled the region's coming generation to feel entirely comfortable growing up in the milieu of slave and free. Furthermore, and more significantly, their textbooks did very little to kindle imagining later life proceeding minus the historically central component of human slavery. For school children in the southern states in mid-nineteenth century, reading their textbooks and listening to their teachers, who were probably regarded as their most trusted public authority figures, the status quo, insofar as the castigated institution endemic to their experienced surroundings was concerned, was assailed from afarbut not refuted. Even when slavery was terminated by the aegis of law generated by the Federal Union, its belief accoutrements embedded in the vestige of socially assigned superiority of the white race over the black

race would endure indefinitely. Pro-slavery sentiment bequeathed this legacy as a strong and lasting determinant of both policy and practice within the diversity characterizing the restored nation.

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Gene Michaud

Patriot Games: A Ritual Analysis of Super Bowl XXXVI

As the theme of this anthology is "Communication During Times of Political Change," it seems important at the outset to briefly discuss the political changes that have occurred in the United States since the events of September 11, 2001, before analyzing the ways in which these changes have been incorporated into American media. The idea, frequently expressed by U.S. political and corporate leaders, that "everything has changed since September 11th" needs to be examined in terms of the actual changes that have occurred in the relations of power both externally – between the U.S. and other nations and cultures – and internally – between the U.S. government and its people.

The destruction by "terrorists" of the two World Trade Center towers and a part of the Pentagon building in Washington, D.C. produced a climate of crisis in the United States. Over the last century, the continental U.S. has been largely spared the kind of direct material effects of military and political conflicts that have been visited on other countries. Even the ubiquitous analogies between the events in New York City and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 are imprecise in this sense. Though the attack on Pearl Harbor was a direct attack on U.S. military forces, the Hawaiian Islands were not at the time part of the United States. Thus, on September 11, the U.S. found itself in a crisis situation, and post-September 11 policies can be viewed as an attempt to deal with this crisis.

In regard to global political relations, perhaps the most obvious change in this regard was the announcement by U.S. President George W. Bush of

an open-ended "war on terrorism" that has had some profound immediate effects, most notably the ongoing military operations in Afghanistan, as well as some far reaching implications. Bush called on the international community to join the U.S. in this effort, but it was clear, as a number of analysts pointed out, that the U.S. intended to proceed with its aggressive military and intelligence efforts with or without international support.

Within the U.S., there have also been some significant political changes. Of these, perhaps the most important was the swift passage of the "USA PATRIOT Act," which altered the relations of power between the U.S. government and the people of the United States. As Chang (2001, 2) points out:

> The USA PATRIOT Act creates a federal crime of "domestic terrorism" that broadly extends to "acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws" if they "appear to be intended [...] to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion," and if they "occur primarily within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States." Because this crime is couched in such vague and expansive terms, it may well be read by federal law enforcement agencies as licensing the investigation and surveillance of any political activists and organizations based on their opposition to government policies... Environmental activists, anti-globalization activists, and anti-abortion activists who use direct action to further their political agendas are particularly vulnerable to prosecution as "domestic terrorists." [...] [T]he Act grants the executive branch unprecedented, and largely unchecked, surveillance powers, including the enhanced ability to track email and Internet usage, conduct sneak-and-peek searches, obtain sensitive personal records, monitor financial transactions, and conduct nationwide roving wiretaps.

In addition to the changes in global and internal political relations, the events of September 11 also precipitated some important changes in the content of the U.S. media. These included the withdrawal from television, movie theaters and other media forms of certain programs, films and advertising campaigns that were thought to be inappropriate in the wake of the crisis (Elliot, 2001; Friedman, 2001; Leland and Marks, 2001; Vignoni 2001). Another significant change had to do with an emphasis on what

constituted "newsworthiness." One manifestation of this was the inclusion of much more coverage of international news, though journalists, editors and commentators wondered openly how long this would last given the market-driven nature of U.S. media. A second manifestation was the large number of stories in the media that dealt with the immediate social response of U.S. citizens to the events of September 11. American newspaper readers and television news watchers were treated to story after story about self-sacrifice and selflessness in the face of the crisis, from the police and firefighters who gave their lives, to the merchants who gave away food and provided shelter to rescue workers, to the hundreds of Americans who lined up and waited for hours to donate blood. Such stories have traditionally been assigned to the margins of mainstream journalism, categorized as "human interest" stories. In the immediate period after September 11, these stories *were* the news (Cook 2001, 6).

But as the initial effect of these events faded, some other trends in media representations of the September 11 tragedy and its consequences began to appear. Many of these acknowledged the crisis of September 11 and simultaneously tried to incorporate the event within the familiar discourse and paradigms of mainstream commercial media. These included numerous statements of political leaders, widely reported and repeated in the media, that the proper response to the events of September 11 was not to allow acts of terrorism to disrupt American life. For example, former New York Mayor Rudolf Giulliani stated, "Some one told me they thought it's their patriotic duty to shop. I certainly think it's our patriotic duty to get back to our lives" (Lacheller 2002, 1).

I would argue that a significant issue concerning the U.S. response to the events of September 11 is the way these events have been articulated through various media forms in ways that both promote or accommodate certain changes in global and internal political relations while maintaining

the traditional relations of power within the U.S. In this paper, I will demonstrate that the reaction to the events of September 11th have been integrated into ritualized forms of media in order to reinforce existing social relations of power that favor the U.S. political and corporate elite both internationally and internally, and that one key mass mediated event in which this can be seen is in the telecast of the XXXVI Super Bowl on February 5, 2002.

It is common knowledge that different cultures develop different cultural forms that best express their beliefs, values, the goals of their society, etc. Through their interaction with cultural forms members of society become enculturated – learn the values and beliefs of their society. Communication theorist James Carey (1988) explicitly emphasizes this phenomenon when he articulates two different views of communication events: the transmission view of communication and the ritual view of communication. Under the transmission view, the emphasis is on the transmission of messages across space to influence or control thought and action. This, of course, is the view that guided mainstream communication research in the U.S. and other countries for many years and still dominates most discussions of communication. Under the ritual view of communication, however, the emphasis is on repetition of messages over time to maintain a society by reaffirming certain cultural beliefs and values. Carey uses the example of reading a newspaper to make the distinction between these two views. Most people would think of that activity within the transmission view – as an experience in which information is transmitted from the newspaper to its readership. But Carey describes the process of reading a newspaper as a cultural act in which the reader is offered a familiar interpretive position or role to assume (i.e., "an American citizen"). The reported events are presented in a familiar dramatic form with well-established lines of conflict, and the reader then experiences the playing out

of these conflicts until some resolution is reached. Under this view, reading the newspaper is a situation where, to quote Carey, "nothing new is learned but in which a particular view of the world is portrayed and confirmed." (Carey 1988, 20)

A point that Carey makes and I want to emphasize here is that communication occurs and should be seen in both of these ways. Both happen simultaneously. Information is presented, and beliefs and values are expressed, reaffirmed, or altered. But understanding the ritual nature of communication, especially in regard to mediated communication events, helps us realize why some media forms begin from a privileged position. Although audience members are free to reject both the ideas and the interpretive positions that are proffered, the ideas and values they contain and the positions they offer the audience are very familiar and do not therefore require much effort to appropriate and accept.

The stories that get told and retold over time are central to this process, and are versions of, or parts of, what is sometimes referred to as a master narrative – the big stories around which forms of social organization are constructed and maintained. If this big story has been sufficiently repeated and elaborated over time, it becomes unnecessary to retell it in detail – it can be evoked by the use of a few key symbols, phrases and images. As we shall see, the Super Bowl provides many good examples of this phenomenon.

Understanding the Super Bowl as a ritual requires some acknowledgement of the role that sports, and especially televised sports, plays in U.S. culture. Real (1995) points out that the conventional theories of sports that are most frequently articulated in the United States generally avoid criticism and tend to emphasize the social integration of youth into certain American cultural values that are generally accepted as important. Most notable among these are the values of teamwork and competition,

which are held to prove useful in many areas of American life, including work, school, business, and warfare. On the other hand, researchers who look at sports using various modes of cultural analysis have tended to emphasize the ways in which sports promote values related to conflict within the power relationships of society. As Real states: "Whatever positive social integration sports accomplish, they also injure people, create antagonisms between fans, encourage passive consumption, pit owners against players, endorse male domination, and in some cases encourage violence" (Real 1995, 464).

In terms of media, sports events play a prominent role. Many Americans, especially males, who read newspapers, watch television, or look for news on the Internet seek sports related information first. The economics of media sports also indicate their importance in U.S. society. Billions of U.S. dollars are spent each year in the representation of sports activities in the media, and vast amounts of technological resources are also brought to bear. Advertisers pay large amounts of money to have messages about their products inserted in mediated sports events in various ways, and are constantly seeking new methods.

Media sports events, in particular, provide multiple opportunities to articulate the dominant myths of a particular society, producing, supporting and reiterating common social understandings. Gopnick (2002) has argued that, largely as a result of intense media coverage, the sports that are central to American culture are those that lend themselves to visual spectacle. As one of the announcers during Super Bowl XXVI proudly states: "The Super Bowl has evolved from a game into one of the greatest spectacles...". Televised sports activities provide precisely the kind of dramatic presentation that Carey points to in his analysis of the ritual view of communication. The viewers are invited to take up positions in the unfolding action as fans – they are encouraged to make personal and

emotional identification with the competitors. In U.S. professional sports, the actual geographical and social links between the fans and individual sports competitors or members of particular teams is frequently very tenuous. Professional sports teams such as the New England Patriots or the St. Louis Rams are primarily made up of players who do not come from the geographical areas that their team represents. Further, these players may be members of a particular team for only a short period of time. Nonetheless, as the particular sporting event unfolds, viewers are strongly encouraged to identify with a particular player and/or a particular team.

Televised sports activities, like all media events, are also sites of ideological struggle. As noted above, the meanings of a particular media event – a news program, a situation comedy, a drama – is to some extent dependent on the perspective of the viewer who engages in that event. But it is also clearly true that media events are produced in ways that allow particular meanings to predominate. Media sports events represent one form of what anthropologist Victor Turner (1982) calls "social drama" – a ritualized form of conflict management. Social dramas play an especially important role when norms are breached, prompting a crisis that requires social action to repair and refurbish the pre-existing norms and to incorporate new events into familiar perspectives. The final stage of the social drama precipitated by crisis is the reintegrative stage – an attempt to make sense of the crisis in terms consistent with previous social experience and established cultural patterns. As Becker (1984) points out, confronted with events that are new or extend beyond the parameters of the easily understandable, members of a given society tend to fall back on previously established shared understandings of the world to make these events comprehensible. Thus the successful conclusion to a social drama will resolve the crisis, frequently in symbolic form, in ways that invite all members of society, including marginalized groups, to share the meanings.

As Haines (1990) notes, such a process is by nature essentially conservative. Grossberg, Wartella and Whitney (1998) point out that media rituals must be able to accommodate change when necessary, while essentially reiterating existing social values. As Turner notes, any changes must be accomplished within established frames of reference – otherwise reintegration would fail, creating or exacerbating social fragmentation. Under this view, cultural forms such as televised sports are sites where social meanings are enacted or performed and, when necessary, where distressed societies and subcultures find healing and closure in the aftermath of crisis.

Consequently, when we look at the specific events of Super Bowl XXXVI televised on February 5, 2002, we are looking at one form of social drama that necessarily had to deal with the crisis precipitated by the events of September 11, 2001. The overarching question is: how does this specific media ritual address the events of September 11, and what options does it offer U.S. citizens in terms of the reintegration of U.S. society. While I will not be able to address in this essay all of the ways that this occurs, we can look at a number of important moments within the spectacle of Super Bowl XXXVI itself and find some important answers to this question.

Super Bowl XXVI as Ritual

If sports events are central to a society's articulation of its central beliefs and values, the Super Bowl is the premiere sports event in the United States. It meets the three criteria that Goethals (1981) states are basic requirements of all rituals. First, it offers the possibility of participation to many individuals. Secondly, it occurs in a special space that is set aside for

the performance of the ritual (in this case, the Louisiana Superdome). Finally, it occurs within a specific and special time frame, with a carefully structured beginning, middle, and end. Super Bowl XXXVI was telecast on the Fox television network, a division of Rupert Murdock's News Corporation of America, which in turn is a division of Murdock's multinational media empire. As promotional material offered by one of the event's sponsor's points out, "the Super Bowl is annually the nation's highest-rated TV program and the most-watched single-day sporting event, [with] an expected 130 million viewers in the United States and 800 million viewers worldwide." Specifically in regard to Super Bowl XXXVI, according to ratings data, an estimated 131.7 million people (or just under 60% of the U.S. population) watched the televised version of the game, in addition to the tens of thousands of spectators in the arena and several hundred more people involved in the pre-game, half-time, and post-game ceremonies. Because of the immense television viewership, advertisers paid just under $2 million dollars per 30 seconds of commercial time to advertise their products and services during the game.

According to newspaper listings and TV Guide magazine, the official time of the game's telecast was 6pm EST. Those who tuned in at that time first saw an ad for the upcoming film Spiderman, which ironically was one of the film's scheduled for release in the Fall of 2001 but held up because it featured the title character swinging from the World Trade Center buildings in pursuit of a mad terrorist and his henchmen. Some of the original footage from the film was re-shot and re-edited, and the ad informed the Super Bowl audience that the film was now scheduled for release in May 2002. This was followed by an ad for Radio Shack products, featuring an ex-football player as a spokesman for the company and showing an African-American couple using and enjoying some of Radio Shack's new

audio technologies. A trailer for an upcoming FOX network program, "That 70s Show," followed this.

At the conclusion of these three advertisements, the broadcast then moved to the Superdome in Louisiana, but the actual beginning of the game was still about 40 minutes away. As with all recent Super Bowls, televised pre-game activities had been underway for several hours on several networks, and viewers who had tuned in at 6pm saw the end of Fox's Super Bowl pre-game programming featuring Paul McCartney. At the end of McCartney's performance, television viewers were treated to five more advertisements, the first for an upcoming Fox network telecast of a Nascar race, the second for Hyundai automobiles, the third for Sam Adams Light beer, the fourth for Jaguar automobiles, and the fifth for McDonald's fast food. In the Sam Adams beer commercial, a young African-American male plays a prominent role.

When the ads concluded, television graphics announced the beginning of "The Charles Schwab Super Bowl Kick-Off Show." This segment of the broadcast begins with a short video establishing the importance of Super Bowl XXXVI in light of the events of September 11. It begins with a shot of the American flag, followed in rapid succession by a shot of an American eagle, a shot of the Statue of Liberty, a shot of American schoolchildren reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, a shot of a middle-aged man in a suburban setting receiving a newspaper from a delivery boy over a white picket fence, the shadow of a weather vane against a stormy sky, a shot of a fireman with soot on his face, a shot of an American fighter pilot saluting from the cockpit of his plane, a shot of loggers posing in front of a downed tree, a shot of the Iwo Jima memorial as the flag is lowered to half-mast, and finally to shot of a New England Patriot football player waving a small American flag. Over this montage, the play-by-play announcer for Fox football telecasts, Pat Summerall, intones the following words:

> There comes a defining moment in our nation that cries out for support. With hopes toward tomorrow, it is our traditions and values that are the flames that will burn forever in this nation's soul. Americans have answered back, showing unwavering courage, character, and an indomitable spirit. But there are times when we can look to the past to point us in the present direction.

These shots lead to a sequence in which players from both teams quote excerpts from famous presidential speeches, including those of John F. Kennedy, Theodore Roosevelt, Franklin Roosevelt, and ending again with Kennedy's exhortation to "Ask not what your country can do for you – ask what you can do for your country." As this sequence ends, we see a shot of a stealth bomber flying overhead, followed by a succession of shots featuring players from each team taken from various games preceding the Super Bowl. Over this montage, our narrator says:

> This Sunday we celebrate so much more than football, we celebrate freedom as well. The freedom to honor men whose contributions may lie on the playing field, but whose happiness lies in the thrill of effort and the joy of achievement. Super Bowl Sunday has evolved from a game into one of the greatest spectacles in the world. At the end of the day, there will be a winner and a loser, but lives will be changed forever because they are part of something great, and greatness, no matter how instantly achieved will stay with them forever – much like the indelible spirit of Americans everywhere.

The sequence ends with these final lines, and viewers are presented with an image of an African-American in a soldier's uniform lifting and embracing a young African-American child.

Following this video segment, the teams are introduced as they run onto the field. After several more advertisements, Maria Carey, an African-American woman who the television audience is informed is "the biggest selling recording artist in history," sings the U.S. National Anthem accompanied by the Boston Pops Orchestra. This followed by another series of advertisements, after which viewers are presented with the

ceremonial coin-toss to determine which of the two teams will begin on offense. The two celebrities chosen to carry out this part of the ritual are Roger Staubach, a former quarterback and naval officer, and former president George H. W. Bush, father of the current U.S. president, who is introduced as a "World War II hero and 41st President of the United States." After several more advertisements, and at about 6:40pm EST, the actual kick-off takes place and the game begins.

As the first series of plays unfolds, the telecast cuts away from the action on the field to graphics that highlight the players on each team. For Super Bowl XXXVI, these graphics are introduced in a sequence in which members of the U.S. military, standing around a lighted globe, touch points of light from which images of the players then appear.

Dyer (1993) has argued that a key function of entertainment is to provide an audience with utopian visions of the world, and that these utopian visions are directly and specifically related to real social conflicts and tensions within society. For example, although there is deepening poverty in the U.S. that disproportionately affects people of color, the images contained within the Super Bowl, and especially within the advertisements, are images of material well being and abundance that specifically include African-Americans. Miller (1991) has pointed out that the inclusion of African-Americans in entertainment in prominent roles is precisely to suppress the notion of racial conflict in U.S. society and to promote the idea that all Americans live in a consumerist utopia in which everyone shares equally. Certainly, the images from Super Bowl XXXVI ritually reinforce these sentiments.

The prominence of advertising in Super Bowl XXXVI is nothing new, and is part of the ritual that most Americans expect, accept, and in some cases, eagerly anticipate and enjoy. Although sports commentators may utter a few lines about the celebration of "effort and achievement" that they

see at the core of this ritual, the continual bombardment of images of consumption suggests a different emphasis, particularly in light of the events of September 11. As Cook (2001, 6) has argued about American popular culture, and especially advertising, in the wake of September 11, "In addition to the ubiquitous display of Old Glory, [the American people] are now exhorted to re-associate our identities under the signs/flags of McDonald's, Prada, Tommy Hilfinger, Old Navy, and Coca-Cola, fusing citizenship and consumption once and for all in some grand integration of self, commodity, and nation." For Halton (2001, 1), the patterns of living proffered to Americans through such mediated and consumer-oriented rituals as the Super Bowl represent a form of automatism, which works to suppress various forms of "spontaneous life through which we are human... Halton states, "The September 11 [airplane] highjackers represented one example of this automatism" and further argues that "unaware, automatic consumers" represents another. According to Halton (2001, 1), "...the automated American is underslept and underwalked, overworked and overspent, for these depravations enhance compliance and reduce awareness." Media rituals, of which Super Bowl XXXVI is a prime (and prime time) example, tie together patriotism and consumption in ways that deflect critical evaluation of each. Perhaps more disturbingly, the images of the Super Bowl XXXVI ritual responds to the crisis of September 11, 2001 by adding to these American values the idea of an unbounded and ubiquitous U.S. military presence that encompasses and polices the nation and the globe, making the U.S. consumer utopia safe from the forces of "terrorism." As a social drama, Super Bowl XXXVI replays the traditional rituals of sports and consumption within the context of a more militarized world.

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Dorota Piontek

The Beginning and Evolution of Political Marketing in Poland after 1989: A Short History

So-called round table talks held in 1989 opened a new era in the Polish political system. A pluralistic party system and a system of free elections were introduced. Breaking down the state monopoly of the press market and opening a path for de-monopolisation of electronic media created new circumstances for political communication.

The first imperfect free elections in Poland in June 1989 began an era of political marketing. Since that time, five parliamentary, three presidential and three self-governmental campaigns have taken place, new experiences have been collected and more and more sophisticated techniques of persuasion elaborated. American and West European standards of conducting political communication have been accepted as a pattern of new relations between politicians, media and citizens. This does not mean, of course, that foreign experiences are fully present in Polish conditions: some of them did not work, some were impossible to implement, and some were transformed into a specific form of local color.

Changes in the position of the mass media in the social and political systems have evoked new challenges both for media and politicians. They had to learn how to manage their mutual relations and, what is more important, how to conduct political discourse in front of citizens.

The television and radio act of 1992 introduced a duopoly in electronic media. Former state television and radio stations gained a status of public

media in the European (British) sense of the notion. It means they have a privileged position in comparison with commercial broadcasters, but also some obligations to fulfill. According to existing law, public radio and television broadcasting organizations shall reliably present, analyze and discuss viewpoints represented with regard to crucial public issues by political parties, national organizations of trade unions and unions of employers, and must produce and transmit programs enabling political parties to present their viewpoints. Detailed conditions of such programs are described in the regulations of the National Broadcasting Council.

Meeting quantity indicators is not, however, tantamount to reaching quality standards of political discourse, which are described in terms of ritual chaos rather than a significant exchange of opinions and debate. Both politicians and the media are to be blamed for this. It results in a negative image of politics and politicians as well as media efforts in political life in Polish public opinion.

Considering media factors and some financial, organizational, legal and historical limitations, the development of political marketing in Poland seems to be very dynamic, but irregular, and has specific dimensions not present in stable democracies.

In the Polish election system, parties taking part have a handicap of free airtime for advertising. Article 24 of the Broadcasting Act states that political parties and other organizations participating in elections to the Sejm, the Senate, and local self-government and candidates for the President shall be entitled to transmit election programs via public radio and television services free of charge; the broadcast time is divided in proportion to the number of registered rolls; the election programs are broadcast in blocks in which the order of the individual committees' program appearance is established by drawing. Neither television nor radio management can interfere in messages prepared by committees. Public

electronic media serve, in this case, as channels of communication between parties (candidates) and voters. But the public media are also under obligation to create their own campaign programs. These are usually interviews, debates among politicians and discussions with experts.

Political marketing in Poland was born in 1989. April 13th brought a proclamation of elections settled on June 4th. It was the beginning of the first election campaign, quite a new quality in Polish political life. Two main powers took part in a challenge: the Polish United Workers Party (PUWP, the Polish Communist Party) (then still in power) and Solidarity. The latter availed itself of an interesting strategy: to select as many candidates as it could win according to the round table agreements. The idea was to suggest that voters not vote for persons, but rather for the program. The candidates' main form of advertising was famous pictures with Wał sa, one of the legends of Solidarity and its best-known leader. A lack of time (only a few months for a campaign), a lack of money and a lack of access to television, which was still under total control of the state created significant limitations, but at the same time evoked creativity not present on the PUWP side. In May 1989, Gazeta Wyborcza (Electoral Gazette) started to be published. It was the most important and the biggest forum for Solidarity at that time. Keeping its name, Gazeta Wyborcza has become with time the most influential and powerful opinion maker. A not very sophisticated, but a vivid and enthusiastic campaign brought Solidarity a victory. It won everything it could at that time: 35% of the seats in the Sejm (the lower chamber) and 99% in the Senate (one was taken by an independent candidate).

During the first presidential elections, six candidates were running. For the first time, elements of negative campaigning, directed especially against Stanisław Tymi ski, called "a man from nowhere," were observed. In spite of the negativity, that man, a Polish emigrant from Canada unknown before

the start of the campaign, successfully reached the second ballot, where he lost to Wał sa. Tymi ski used some techniques of American campaigning. Other candidates also tried to behave professionally, although they relied on volunteers recruited from show business.

In 1991, the first totally free parliamentary elections took place. The most important form of advertising was the party political broadcast (called election programs, in which the broadcast time was divided in proportion to the number of registered rolls) on television. Some of the broadcasts were bizarre, some dull, most were full of talking heads, but they attracted a lot of public interest as they were something new in the political communication process.

The 1993 parliamentary elections are remembered as the first attempt to adopt American standards of political marketing. More than 20 committees (parties) were running and most of them were supported by professional advertising agencies that did not have much experience in political persuasion. Only one party – the Liberal-Democratic Congress (LDC) – decided to employ a foreign company – Saatchi & Saatchi. This was the most professional campaign, however, it did not work. The campaign's American style – dynamic, optimistic, full of joy, music, happenings, entertainment – stood in contrast with the mood of voters facing negative social results of economic reforms (unemployment, lack of social security, business scandals, corruption, etc.). The party, whose leader was an incumbent prime minister, failed. Some innovations were introduced at that time: songs as election anthems of particular parties, show-business people supporting campaigns, billboards with images of leaders and leading slogans[1], but still television election programs with talking heads dominated. In messages, the emphasis was on symbolic forms rather than on issues. Parties did not take their own polls because of high costs and

relied on the results of those published in media by independent agencies. Only the LDC systematically ordered surveys and used focus groups.

In 1995, Aleksander Kwa niewski won the presidential election with a slight lead in the second ballot. The campaign was a new quality in Polish conditions: it was professionally prepared and based on non-media instruments. The media, especially television, favored Wał sa, so Kwa niewski's headquarters emphasized direct meetings with voters. A tour around Poland in a special bus was organized; the candidate was perfectly familiar with local problems, thanks to the great work of the local structures of the Democratic Left Alliance (supporting Kwa niewski). After the first ballot, public television organized for the first (and so far the last) time a debate in the studio between two candidates. Journalists invited by the politicians taking part in the debate asked the politicians questions, and candidates did not discuss them with each other. Debates were won with no doubt by Kwa niewski, who was perfectly prepared and able to keep his cool, which cannot be said of his opponent. After the first ballot, the campaign became more negative and full of mutual accusations of lies and financial falsehoods.

For the 1997 parliamentary campaign, the main parties were well prepared. It became common to employ professional agencies and use the media not only in terms of free of charge limits. Politicians strived for interviews and used other public relations instruments. Leaders published their books; committees organized mass meetings with free beer and sausages for voters. Images of candidates and parties became more and more important. For the first time, the Internet was used on a large scale, and although there was limited access to the Internet among Polish population, regular users of this technology were recruited from the upper classes so they could act as opinion leaders. Most committees made their own quantitative and qualitative surveys of public opinion.

The 2000 parliamentary campaign witnessed a failure of the first totally negative campaign directed against the incumbent president, who was supported by more then 70% of the voters. As a result, Kwa niewski won in the first ballot with a huge lead over the others. As an interesting innovation, the media proclaimed a "wives' war," rightly assuming that the First Lady was a great advantage for the incumbent president. Extremely popular because of her charity activities, as well as her personal charm and style, she was able to appeal to floating voters or voters not interested in politics. Marketing tools were used very cautiously because for the first time committees were legally subject to financial limitations on campaign spending.

The 2001 campaign was probably the most populist since 1991. Some new parties were established just before the campaign. Although their leaders were well known from their previous activities, voters were confused and the campaigns concentrated on differentiation strategies. Standards that had been worked out before were strengthened, but expense limitations introduced by the election law narrowed the possibilities for new interesting solutions. The campaign itself was rather dull, but its outcomes were quite surprising and provoked discussion about the role of the media (especially television) in the political process. The success of at least two parties may be a contribution to the hypothesis of the spiral of silence[2].

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[1] Very popular among graffiti artists, who made funny or caustic inserts. For example: the Labor Union slogan "you deserve more" was completed by "than Labor Union," "first, economy" received a note "second, don't steal."

[2] Two weeks before elections, two parties, the League of Polish Families (LPF) and Selfdefence, scored about 1-2 points in polls. During the elections, the LPF reached 7% and Selfdefence 10%. Their success resulted from the support of certain media (mainly Radio Maria, a Catholic, orthodox, anti-European radio station regularly listened to by about 3 million voters) and the possibilities opened up by free air time in the public media. It was LPF's first chance to present itself to the broader audience and for many voters it was the first possibility to hear opinions they share on nationwide media.

The media system in Poland can be characterized as a duopoly in the electronic media (public and commercial) and free and commercial press market. Broadcasters try to distance themselves from politics, which – in the case of public media – is an obligation, whereas the press does not avoid showing its preferences. As mentioned before, public broadcasters have some responsibilities to the political sphere; politicians try to influence journalists to advance their views. Commercial broadcasters confine themselves to information formats and do not engage in political discourse. There is, however, one exception: *TVN 24*, a commercial information channel, patterned after CNN, was launched just before September 11th, 2001. It offers a wide range of information about domestic and international politics, studio discussions with experts and increased analyses. The National Broadcasting Council has control over electronic media. According to the 1992 Broadcasting Act, the National Broadcasting Council was appointed as a state organ, competent in matters connected with radio and television. It consists of nine members representing different social and political circles. Four of them are appointed by the Sejm, two by the Senate and three by the President. Thus, it is political in origin and is very often criticized as not being objective in its activities and statements. In the electoral process, it ensures that public broadcasters fulfill their obligations properly.

There are five main dimensions that condition the development of political marketing in Poland. The first one is legal. There are time limitations for public broadcasting of political commercials in the media (usually three weeks before elections), both unpaid and paid. Proportional parliamentary elections force party strategies, although the role of leaders, and their personalities is still increasing.

The second condition is financial: there are legal limitations on election spending (12 million PLN [about 3 million €] for presidential campaigns,

29 million PLN [about 7,25 million €] for the last parliamentary elections); successful committees can count on state subsidies, so fundraising is not a central campaign issue. The system, however, does not favor the development of expensive, sophisticated techniques of political marketing and polls; campaigns are strictly centralized because of financial requirements.

The third dimension – political – is connected with the party system: the political scene in Poland is still not stable. The very Polish tendency to split existing parties generates – especially before elections – new parties, coalitions or alliances which creates a lack of continuity in marketing activities and disorientation among voters; the growing brutality of political life discourages voters from following campaigns and participating in voting.

Fourth, the media factor results from the existing media system and the historical role of the media in the political system. The public electronic media try to fulfill the objectivity rule (equal access, equal time), and do not encourage meritorious, issue-centered debate; they are not too insistent, or investigative. Journalists let politicians say what they want, so it usually happens that politicians take over the discussion, which means quarrels, avoiding answering questions, making personal comments which are often not understandable for viewers. The politicians' comments and behaviors are predictable, the debates usually do not bring anything new – so it is no wonder that the average share of studio debates is about 2% and election programs are viewed by 3% of the voters. On the other hand, the commercial media are not really interested in covering politics, including campaigns, as they seem not to be interesting for the audience which is seen as a market.

The last, but not least, dimension is of a mental nature. Politicians believe in their natural charisma and skills, so they are not aware of the

need to practice public relations tools. They still hesitate to use professional training and still have an arrogant attitude of knowing better. There are only a few political actors who are able to understand and use the media as a means of persuasion and as a means to create personality. On the voters' side, there is a lack of trust of politics and politicians, and a distrust of or suspicion towards positive self-presentations, attitudes or appearances, which are so typical of politicians during campaigns. Polish citizens are not interested in political or social activities. The standards of political culture are still being shaped. The level of education within Polish society is relatively low, and its voting decisions are almost unpredictable because of a huge rate of floating voters.

One may say that a present form of political marketing in Poland is a matter of mutual dependence between political marketing and external dimensions which influence its development; another may say that it is a vicious circle. Nevertheless simple, not to say primitive political marketing, is not the main factor affecting the political process. Existing conditions do not favor the development of modern sophisticated political marketing. Considering many critical opinions on the role of political marketing in contemporary democracies, it may be a controversial question whether this is to be considered a good or a bad thing.

Kevin M. Carragee

Social Movements, the News Media and Political Change

This paper examines a seeming paradox. Contemporary research within cultural studies or critical media studies repeatedly has underscored the news media's role in maintaining the legitimacy of those who hold political and economic power, while simultaneously emphasizing how news organizations denigrate social movements that challenge the established social order (see, for example, Gitlin 1980). American history, however, is replete with examples of social movements that effectively challenged centers of institutional power and, in so doing, stimulated meaningful social and political change. By examining this seeming paradox, I hope to contribute to a more developed understanding of the interaction between social movements and the news media.

I begin with a brief discussion of how communication researchers, especially within cultural studies, have defined the mass media's ideological role. Particular attention is devoted to how past scholarship has defined the interaction between the news media and social movements. Following this examination, I provide a discussion of specific contexts and conditions in which social movements are able to influence news discourse and secure political change. The American civil rights movement is used to illustrate these contexts and conditions. I conclude by advancing a revised perspective on movement-media interaction, a perspective designed to provide a more adequate conceptualization of this interaction. The interaction between social movements and the news media raises central concerns, including the news media's relationship to political authority and

the character of news coverage focusing on challengers who demand social and political change.

Cultural Studies and the News Media's Ideological Role

It has become a commonplace within cultural studies scholarship to highlight the news media's role in sustaining the political and economic power of elites within contemporary capitalist societies. Although many studies have noted the news media's contribution to the construction of meaning, researchers within cultural studies have argued that journalistic constructions of reality reinforce the existing political and social order; in this view, news organizations, as agencies of social control, routinely denigrate and inhibit dissent (Hall 1979; Hallin 1987). News stories as symbolic accounts provide the public with definitions of social and political realities. According to scholarship within cultural studies, these definitions are largely in keeping with the meanings, values and interests of powerful institutions and groups in society.

Multiple studies have explored the relationship between the news media and the social order by examining the character of news reporting concerning alternative movements. In his very influential study of coverage of the New Left by The New York Times and CBS News, Gitlin (1980) argues that these news organizations delegitimized the student movement through a variety of framing devices. Shoemaker (1984, 72) provides "some support to the theory that the media act as agents of social stability" in her analysis of news stories concerning eleven American political groups. Other studies have advanced similar findings regarding the ideological character of news reporting on the women's movement.

Many critical analyses of the news media's ideological "work" have relied on Gramsci's concept of hegemony (1971) as a central theoretical construct (Carragee 1991; Gitlin 1980; Hall 1980; Hallin 1987). Within these studies, hegemony refers to the processes by which ruling classes and groups shape popular consent through the production and diffusion of meanings and values by the major ideological institutions in a society, including the news media. In their sensitive interpretations of Gramsci's work, Hall (1980) and Williams (1977) stress the complex, contradictory and evolving character of hegemonic ideology. Hall (1980, 36), for example, writes that "[f]or Gramsci, 'hegemony' is never a permanent state of affairs and never uncontested."

Evaluating the Cultural Studies Perspective on the News Media's Ideological Role

Scholarship within cultural studies certainly has enriched our understanding of the relationship between news and ideology. By examining the news media's signification processes, studies within this tradition have underscored the media's central role in the production of meanings and values within society. With its attention to questions of social and political power, this scholarship also has addressed issues that have frequently been neglected by mainstream social scientific perspectives on the media. Some studies have provided specific insights on the complexities of hegemonic processes by exploring media production processes or by examining the ways in which audience members accept or resist hegemonic meanings distributed by the news media. These are significant contributions and I find considerable value in cultural studies

perspectives on the relationship between the media and political authority; indeed, my own work has been influenced by this tradition in significant ways and I have tried to contribute to this tradition's development (see, for example, Carragee 1991, 1993).

Despite these contributions, a careful examination of cultural studies scholarship on the news media's ideological role raises a number of troubling issues. I will focus in particular on difficulties associated with research on the interaction between social movements and the news media, although many of the issues I will discuss can be related to a broader range of cultural studies scholarship.

Perhaps most significantly, some research in cultural studies presents an overly deterministic perspective on the interaction between social movements and the news media by its recurring emphasis on the ways in which the news media denigrate social movements challenging political authority. According to this perspective, the news media effectively limit the growth of alternative social movements and, in so doing, routinely prevent social and political change. Barker-Plummer (1996, 27) characterizes this as the "hard hegemony model" and she points to a number of its limitations, concluding that "the position that news media will inevitably marginalize 'real' criticism and incorporate all other kinds is simply too deterministic to accommodate the day-to-day complexity of movement-media relationships." This model neglects the fact that social movements at varied times in American history have helped to mobilize public support for meaningful change. Indeed, movements have at times made effective use of the news media as a political resource.

The limitations of the hard hegemony model are a product of a number of difficulties. Cultural studies scholarship has focused far more attention on the news media's definition of social movements than on the *interaction* between movements and the media. Taken alone, textual analyses of

reporting patterns are unable to shed light on how social movements attempt to influence news coverage. To put it another way, cultural studies research primarily has focused its attention on the signifying practices of the media, neglecting the ways in which movements create and distribute social and political meanings. This is odd shortcoming for a tradition of research with a fundamental interest in the social construction of meaning.

The hard hegemony model represents a fundamental misunderstanding and simplification of Gramsci's insights. In the hands of some, hegemony is reduced to the unproblematic distribution and acceptance of an integrated dominant ideology (for example, see Binder 1993; Dahlgren 1982). This mechanistic definition of hegemony neglects Gramsci's emphasis on ideological struggle and contestation. In keeping with this emphasis, Williams (1977, 112) points out that a "lived hegemony is always a process. It has continually to be renewed, recreated, defended and modified. It also is continually resisted, limited, altered, challenged by pressures not at all its own." I have provided a more extensive summary of how some researchers have simplified Gramsci's arguments (see Carragee 1993).

The strong hegemony model also provides a rather simplistic definition of social movements. Given its attention to how news stories define a movement, this model implies that particular movements have a singular identity or character. This neglects that a social movement, in the words of Gamson and Mayer (1996, 283), represents "a field of actors, not a unified entity." The self-identity of a movement, therefore, is a product of internal negotiation and conflict. The construction of movement identity occurs over time as movements evolve and adapt to changing political opportunities or constraints. This complex process is neglected by much of cultural studies research on movement-media interaction. This suggests the

need for particular caution in advancing claims about a singular, unified movement.

Finally, the strong hegemony model provides an overly determined view of journalists and their work given its almost exclusive focus on the economic and organizational constraints confronting reporters. These constraints, of course, are important and they do explain, in part, why news frequently perpetuates the political status quo. Nonetheless, journalists in many news organizations have a degree of autonomy. Their reporting is not simply determined by the organizational or economic pressures of journalistic work. At certain times, under certain conditions, journalists produce stories sympathetic to demands for meaningful change. For example, the Progressive Movement in early 20th century America was much sustained by the efforts of muckraking journalists who identified with this movement and shared some of its basic political and social goals.

I share Barker-Plummer's view (1996, 28) that the hard hegemony model needs to be replaced by a more contingent and contextual understanding of movement-media interaction. She points out that the interactions between social movements and the news media are "structured and complex, yet essentially indeterminate. That is, despite some recurring patterns in movement-media interactions, we cannot say that these interactions will always result in a particular outcome. Like other forms of communication, the movement-media dialog is basically open-ended. This vital openness makes news media a potential tool for social change."

Movements and Political Change

Even a cursory examination of American history reveals multiple occasions where social movements secured significant political and social

reforms. These movement successes cast considerable doubt on cultural studies approaches which reduce the news media's complex role to the safeguarding of established centers of power. Using examples from only the 20th century, the Progressive Movement secured important political and social reforms, including the direct election of senators, the establishment of federal regulatory agencies and increased governmental oversight of big business. Similarly, the feminist movement gained greater political and economic power for women, while simultaneously altering the American legal system so that it offered greater protections for women. Thus, for example, the feminist movement identified, indeed named, sexual harassment as a social problem that needed legal redress.

The modern environmental movement also realized some of its goals by mobilizing public support for a greatly expanded governmental effort to relieve pressing ecological problems.

The relationship between these movements and the news media was and, in some cases, is complex. Research indicates that some news organizations at some points provided respectful treatment of these movements and their aims. For example, Barker-Plummer (1996) and Tuchman (1978) provide impressive evidence that the feminist movement at times made skillful use of the news media to advance its political and social objectives.

A compelling research need is to further identify the contexts and conditions which contribute to or detract from the ability of social movements to secure political change. Cultural studies scholarship on movement-media interaction has not significantly contributed to identifying these contexts and conditions. Sociological research on social movements, including scholarship on movement-media interaction, has provided insight on these concerns. I will first sketch a number of insights derived from this research and then illustrate these insights by discussing the strategies and

tactics of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, including this movement's successful effort to influence news coverage of its struggle. The experience of this movement indicates that the news media under certain conditions can be tools for meaningful social and political change.

Sociological research on social movements has identified a number of factors that are central to the ability of social movements to secure political change. I will focus on three of these factors: the ability of movements to recognize and seize upon moments of political opportunity; the degree to which movements have effective mobilizing structures; and the ability of movements to engage in strategic framing processes to attract news coverage and influence its character and, therefore, mobilize public support.

Social, economic or political grievances alone do not fully account for the emergence of a social movement and its growth. Marginalized groups often confront substantive political, economic and social problems without seeking a redress of these problems through collective action. Similarly, these problems may stimulate the emergence of collective efforts at change, but these efforts often fall far short of mobilizing large numbers of people to join a social movement seeking to secure change. The emergence and growth of social movements, then, is tied to social and political contexts that provide opportunities for the evolution of collective action. Political opportunities open or close for social movements and the ability to recognize and seize moments of political opportunity are central to the emergence and growth of movements.

The existence of moments of political opportunity is but one factor that influences the emergence and growth of movements. According to resource mobilization theory, the emergence of collective action also depends on complex organizational structures and forms of communication. Movements arise in conflicts where activists have a combination of

political opportunity and pre-existing structures and institutions from which to operate (Gamson 1990). Within any given institution, according to resource mobilization theorists, there is a center of power where the establishment largely controls resources, rules, and the ability to make meaning. As opportunities arise, through particular events or a broad social change, for example, a particular institution is weakened and challengers gain the ability to have an influence.

The ability of social movements to mobilize support and secure change also depends on the effectiveness of the framing strategies employed by movement activists.

Framing involves the definition of issues and events through patterns of selection, emphasis, interpretation, and exclusion. Gamson and Modigliani (1989, 3) define a frame as a "central organizing idea [...] for making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue." Social movements, along with other political actors, sponsor frames both in an effort to attract favorable news coverage and to mobilize public support.

News stories, then, become a significant forum for framing contests in which political actors compete by sponsoring their preferred definitions of issues and events. The ability of a frame to dominate news discourse and other discourses depends on a variety of complex factors, including its sponsor's economic and cultural resources, its sponsor's knowledge of journalistic routines and practices, and a frame's resonance with broader political values or tendencies. Past research indicates that framing contests frequently favor political elites given the routine practices of American journalism and given the significance of resources in the successful sponsoring of frames (Gamson 1992; Ryan 1991). While movements do encounter difficulties in shaping news coverage, they do, at times, frame issues and events in skillful ways and, in so doing, shape both journalistic definitions and public understandings of these issues and events.

The sponsorship of collective action frames is particularly important for social movements because these frames encourage political activism and civic engagement. Gamson (1992) identified three components of these frame: an injustice component (an identification of harm produced by human action); an agency component (a belief that it is possible to change conditions through collective action); and an identity component (the identification of a specific adversary). Collective action frames are central to meaning-construction within movements.

An examination of the American civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s, particularly the efforts of Martin Luther King, Jr. and his Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), illustrates how a particular movement identified and seized particular political opportunities, possessed internal mobilizing structures that sustained its activism, and engaged in sophisticated framing strategies to influence news coverage, mobilize support and secure its goals. I will devote much more attention to framing strategies given their crucial significance in the interaction between the civil rights movement and the news media. While a detailed examination of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper, a sketch of these concerns reveals the weaknesses of the hard hegemony model, including its view that the news media invariably sustain dominant ideological meanings and denigrate alternative movements.

While formidable obstacles still confronted the civil rights movement by the mid-1950s and early 1960s, this period still represented a time of enhanced political opportunity for collective action. The movement, for example, could profit from the increased tension within the Democratic party between its segregationist Southern wing and Northern liberals. The integration of the American military and the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954) declaring educational segregation unconstitutional represented substantive, albeit historically belated, federal

interventions in securing greater rights for blacks. Moreover, the election of John F. Kennedy in 1960 raised hopes for a more activist federal approach to civil rights. Finally, an expanding interest in the civil rights struggle by some segments of white America, including student and labor groups, provided black activists with increased opportunities for coalitions. All of these factors enhanced political opportunities for the civil rights movement.

By the mid-1950s, the black civil rights movement also had developed extensive institutional and social networks to sustain its activism. In his analysis of the civil rights movement, Morris (1984, 282) argues that "[t]he basic resources enabling a dominated group to engage in sustained protest are well-developed internal social institutions and organizations that provide the community with encompassing communication networks, organized groups, experienced leaders, and social resources, including money, labor, and charisma, that can be mobilized to attain collective goals." Institutional and social networks, often linked to African-American churches and colleges, served as important mobilizing structures for the civil rights movement.

McAdam (1996) provides impressive evidence that the framing strategies employed by Martin Luther King, Jr. and the SCLC succeeded in attracting favorable news coverage, mobilizing public support and influencing public policy. The ability of the movement to secure these goals reflected the skill and complexity of its framing of events and issues.

The movement's ability to secure news coverage was rooted in several factors. King and the SCLC recognized the effectiveness of staging disruptive actions, including boycotts and demonstrations, to attract news coverage. Disruptions of the public order meet the requirement of newsworthiness given the conflict between a challenging group and governmental authorities. The success of the Montgomery bus boycott in 1955-1956 convinced King and his associates that the use of civil

disobedience to disrupt the public order was an essential means to secure the related goals of attracting news attention and obtaining reforms.

As many social movements have learned, attracting news attention does not necessarily mean shaping coverage in ways consistent with a movement's self-definition and goals. King and the SCLC, however, employed frames that clearly resonated with American political and social experience and, in so doing, attracted sympathetic news coverage and public support. King's rhetoric mixed familiar themes from Christianity with values derived from traditional democratic theory, while simultaneously emphasizing the philosophy of nonviolence. Its multi-thematic character appealed to multiple publics, bridging, for example, the gap between secular liberals and those committed to religious values. King's skillful evocation of American political principles derived from the Constitution and Declaration of Independence linked the civil rights movement to these principles, making it difficult for opponents of civil rights to divorce the movement from mainstream American values.

Finally, King and the SCLC had "a genius for strategic dramaturgy" (McAdam 1996, 348); that is, the movement used strategic actions to define itself and its adversaries through compelling dramas. The staging of these actions was an important element in the movement's framing strategies. For example, King strategically selected Birmingham, Alabama as the site for a civil rights campaign in 1963 because of the likely violent reaction of its Commissioner of Public Safety, "Bull" Conner. Indeed, the police reacted violently to the movement's civil disobedience, producing vivid scenes of peaceful demonstrators being mauled by attack dogs and injured by the force of water produced by fire hoses. McAdam (1996, 349) concludes that these scenes defined movement activists as "peaceful Christian petitioners, being martyred by an evil, oppressive system. The stark, highly dramatic nature of this ritualized confrontation between good

and evil proved irresistible to the media and, in turn, to the American people."

The strategies and tactics of King and his associates in the SCLC produced extensive news media coverage of the civil rights movement; much of this coverage was sympathetic to the movement and its aims. This coverage helped to produce unprecedented public support for the struggle for black civil rights. In turn, the movement's success in gaining both news attention and public support forced a political response. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965, therefore, owed much to the interaction between the civil rights movement and the news media.

The experience of the civil rights movement in the 1950s and 1960s suggests that the news media can, at times, contribute to meaningful social and political change. More specifically, this experience suggests how social movements by seizing upon moments of political opportunity, by possessing significant mobilizing structures and by employing effective framing strategies are able to use the news media as a political resource.

Conclusion

By highlighting the contexts and conditions in which social movements are able to both influence news discourse and secure substantive political change, this analysis suggests that cultural studies approaches focusing on American society often advance a deterministic and reductive definition of the news media's role. To characterize the news media as ideological institutions that inevitably support and legitimize the existing structure of power in American society is to ignore specific historical moments when the news media helped to shape progressive social and political change.

This indicates the need to abandon the mechanistic definition of movement-media interaction advanced by the hard hegemony model.

As an alternative to this model, research should examine the complexities inherent in the interaction between social movements and the news media. This research needs to remain sensitive to the very real constraints confronting social movements that seek progressive social change; these constraints are embedded in the inequities in power and resources that characterize American society. This research also needs to recognize that powerful institutions and groups have far more access to news as a political resource than do marginalized communities and groups. Despite these significant constraints, social movements have the capacity to shape news discourse in significant ways and, in so doing, secure the political and social reforms they seek.

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