Growth, Saving, Financial Markets, and Markov Switching Regimes

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Abstract. We report evidence that the relation between the financial-sector share, private saving, and growth in the United States in 1948–96 is characterized by several regime shifts. The finding is based on vector autoregressions on quarterly data that allow for Markov switching regimes. The evidence may be interpreted as support for a hypothesis that the relation between financial development and growth evolves in a stepwise fashion. Theoretical models in which structural financial developments entail fixed costs imply such stepwise patterns. The estimated variable relations are roughly consistent with the patterns to be expected from such models, although our data do not admit definite conclusions. The timing of the shifts coincides with changes in regulation and in the financial-market structure.

Keywords. growth, Markov switching, saving, structural financial development, vector autoregression.

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1 Introduction

There are theoretical reasons why structural developments of financial markets may be described as a regime-switching process. Such a process can, for instance, be characterized by a rapid-innovation regime, when large changes occur, and a quiescent regime, when only minor developments take place. By large structural financial development, we mean things like the introduction of new instruments (such as options and mutual funds) and new transactions technologies (such as computerized trading and automatic teller machines) and major changes in legislation (such as allowing banks to operate across state lines).

One reason why structural financial developments take place discretely is that they involve inherent fixed costs (see, e.g., Saint-Paul 1992 and Lindh 2000). Another reason is that indivisibilities in the production technology may require a threshold level of development in order to be insurable by financial diversification (see Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997). If such factors are important, we expect that sudden rises in the financial cost share are linked to changes in its relation to output growth and saving.

It is an empirical issue whether regime shifts can actually be detected in the data and what the differences in the relations between these variables may be. To these ends, we analyze a Markov switching vector autoregression (MS-VAR) using quarterly data (1948–96) on changes in the financial-sector share (as a proxy for costs) of U.S. corporate GDP, the growth rate of nonfinancial corporate GDP, and changes in the gross private saving rate. Such a model is well suited for our purposes, since we do not wish to impose a priori restrictions on when regime shifts occurred.1 Neusser and Kugler 1998 is a recent time-series study that uses that financial-sector share as a measure of financial development.2

Our approach differs from the general literature on financial development by focusing on discrete and recurring shifts rather than on long-run relations between growth and financial development. According to this literature financial development can influence growth in three ways: by raising the proportion of saving actually invested, by raising the social marginal productivity (as in, e.g., Greenwood and Jovanovic 1990 and Bencivenga and Smith 1991), or by influencing the private saving rate (see, e.g., Devereux and Smith 1994 and Obstfeld 1994). Levine (1997) provides a comprehensive survey of this literature.

For the MS-VAR model we find evidence of several regime switches, and the estimated relations are broadly consistent with a set of stylized predictions. Moreover, the shifts seem to coincide in time with major changes in legislation and financial-market structure, that is, with large structural financial developments, thus adding credibility to the hypothesis that the shifts are not statistical artifacts but indeed reflect real economic regime changes.

As expected the variables are considerably more volatile during the rapid-innovation than during the quiescent regime, and the average change in the saving rate is higher during the former periods than during the latter. We also find that all three variables seem to contain unique information for predicting the regimes and that the financial-sector share and the growth rate help predict the next-period change in the saving rate.

The next section discusses in some detail the different patterns that could theoretically be expected in the relation between saving, growth, and the financial-sector share. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis. In Section 4 we attempt to relate the estimated regime process to the evolution of the financial market in the United States. Finally, Section 5 offers our conclusions.

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1 MS-(V)AR models have previously been used to examine phenomena such as business cycles (see, e.g., Hamilton 1989 and Diebold and Rudebusch 1996), the term structure of interest rates (see Hamilton 1988 and Sola and Driffill 1994), and mean reversion in asset prices (Cecchetti, Lam, and Mark 1990).

2 In contrast to our study, Neusser and Kugler 1998 focuses on the long-run relation between financial development and growth.
2 Dynamics of Financial Costs, Saving, and Growth

In this section we discuss the short-run dynamics that would arise from financial regime shifts. This is an aid in the interpretation of the statistical model we use below to explore the nexus of financial costs, growth, and saving. In the literature we have found no strong empirical evidence for any specific model explaining the connection between financial development and growth. The discussion below is therefore heuristic and does not rely on a formal model. We do rely rather heavily, however, on general features that characterize many recently studied theoretical models.

As a point of departure, we consider it a stylized fact that financial development has a long-run positive relation to economic growth. In the recent surge of cross-country regressions of growth on just about every conceivable variable, the positive correlation of financial development with growth is one of the few findings that seems reasonably robust to the inclusion of alternative sets of control variables.3 Causality is, however, still a matter of debate.4 Studying causality without due consideration of regime shifts is one possible source of confounded conclusions.

2.1 Theoretical background

The main possibility we wish to explore is that financial development proceeds by a sequence of changes that are separated in time. Specifically, we look for shorter rapid-innovation regimes as financial markets are extended and longer quiescent regimes as the new market configurations are consolidated. Especially relevant in the previous theoretical literature are Saint-Paul 1992 and Acemoglu and Zilibotti 1997. These articles formalize a one-time shift from a stage of underdeveloped financial markets to a stage with more or less complete financial markets. Diversification in the absence of financial insurance is achieved by using less risky but on average less productive technology. Saint-Paul’s growth results hinge on fixed information costs in financial markets and a capital externality generating growth. Combined with an assumption of low-risk preferences, this ensures a positive effect on both saving and growth from financial development. Acemoglu and Zilibotti, in contrast, assume that there are indivisibilities in the technology itself and pecuniary externalities due to the absence of financial insurance. This set-up does not rely on a positive savings effect to generate the positive growth effect.

Generalizing Saint-Paul’s basic model, Lindh (2000) points out that there may well be a sequence of less than complete structural developments of financial markets. Allowing for precautionary saving, growth-enhancing effects can be counteracted by declines in saving. Empirical estimates of the parameters of the intertemporal elasticity of substitution suggest strong precautionary saving behavior. This, in turn, implies negative effects on saving when financial markets pool production risks and increases expected future utility from consumption.

In the empirical section we study the short-run relations between the financial-sector share (as a proxy for costs) $\phi$, the growth rate $g$, and the rate of saving $\beta$. We find that the joint evolution of these variables in U.S. time-series data is characterized by regime switches. In order to interpret these results, it is useful first to state what dynamic patterns we would theoretically expect to observe in the data.

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Table 1
Hypothesized pattern of effects in different regimes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Quiescent</th>
<th>Rapid innovation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\psi_t$</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta_t$</td>
<td>+/−</td>
<td>$\beta_t$</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$g_t$</td>
<td>+</td>
<td>$g_t$</td>
</tr>
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</table>

2.2 Stylized predictions

Our study is exploratory, and we do not formally test any specific model. Nevertheless, in order to have some theoretical benchmark for expected results, we make two specific assumptions:

1. Structural financial developments entail a cost that is fixed in relation to the production level.
2. In the long run, growth is increased by financial development, but this effect is mediated through comparatively slow dynamics.

Combining these assumptions with general results from models in the literature, we arrive at the expected relations that are summarized in Table 1. Our arguments for these expectations are briefly indicated below.

The theoretical remarks here are mainly based on closed-economy one-good models and framed in a set of quantity relations. Thus, relative price changes, in particular, changes in interest rates, are fully determined by the quantity variables. For the U.S. this should be a reasonable first approximation in the very simple framework on which we rely.

2.2.1 The financial-sector share

Financial-sector share measures transaction cost per unit of output. Output growth would thus tend to decrease the financial-sector share. A higher saving rate, on the other hand, should increase the volume of transactions and thus the financial-sector share. These conclusions could be modified by scale and scope economies in transactions, changes in transaction technology, and so forth, but a fair guess is that $\psi$ increases with $\beta$ and decreases with $g$ in the quiescent regime. In the rapid-innovation regime, the cost hike due to added fixed costs should dominate and make predictions ambiguous.

2.2.2 The saving rate

Theoretically growth and the financial-sector share have ambiguous effects on the saving rate. In both cases increases will raise expected utility of future consumption. With a high (low) intertemporal elasticity of substitution this increases (decreases) current savings. Since the ambiguities derive from offsetting income and substitution effects, savings should at least be affected in the same way by both variables in the quiescent regime. In the rapid-innovation regime financial costs rise rapidly, so the direct effect on the saving rate is an unambiguous decrease. Moreover, high preceding growth rates of output given increased transaction costs may well be associated with lower saving rates.

2.2.3 The growth rate

In the long run saving rates as well as more extended financial markets should have a positive effect. An increasing cost share for financial transactions, however, should hamper growth in the short run, as would short-run demand effects from increased saving. In the quiescent regime we thus expect a positive effect from the financial-sector share. But this positive effect will not show up in the rapid-innovation regime. An increasing saving rate would be expected to increase long-run growth either transitorily or permanently but might have adverse effects on demand in the short run. Unlike the rapid-innovation effect from rising financial costs, this demand effect from saving may show up also in the quiescent regime. At a quarterly frequency the demand effect could dominate.

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5This implies that we do not compute impulse response functions in the empirical analysis, since that would require a formal identification scheme, which, in turn, is difficult to obtain unambiguously without a theoretical structure.
In spite of several qualifications (indicated by question marks in Table 1) the above arguments yield some guidance about the expected patterns for a vector autoregression. The effect on saving of structural financial developments and faster growth is expected to reveal whether precautionary saving is dominant in the quiescent regime. Rapid-innovation periods should be rather short compared to quiescent regimes and should tend to be triggered by high preceding rates of growth.

3 The Empirical Analysis

In this section we examine empirical evidence for the intertemporal relationships between the developments of financial markets, saving, and growth. In order to shed light on the issue discussed in the introduction we will let a vector autoregressive (VAR) model specialize into an MS-VAR and hence allow for different regimes to characterize the evolution of financial markets, saving, and growth.6

If it turns out that a two-regime VAR seems fit to describe the data, we expect one relatively frequent regime and one considerably less frequent regime. This has one serious implication. Because of the limited amount of data available, the curse of dimensionality will effectively restrict the number of parameters in the model. As a consequence we will in the following consider models with one lag, that is, compare a VAR(1) with an MS-VAR(1), although results for a VAR(4) are also presented for comparison. Furthermore, and for the same reason, the precision of the estimates for the less-frequent regime will be low and hamper interpretability of that regime.

3.1 U.S. quarterly data

Data are available on a quarterly frequency from 1946 to 1996 in the National Income and Product Accounts (NIPA) (U.S. Department of Commerce 1992, 1997). The latest revision we had available, however, extends back only to 1959 (taken from EconData’s April 1997 update). Data from the period 1946–58 are taken from U.S. Department of Commerce 1992.

We took the most reliable indicator of financial costs to be the gross domestic product attributed to financial corporate business.7 It is not obvious how the relative cost should be measured. In order to avoid problems of interpretation and to enhance comparability we have used the financial-sector share measured as financial GDP divided by corporate business GDP (NIPA Table 1.16, row 18, divided by row 1) in current values. This avoids the tricky issue of how government production should be treated in this context as well as ameliorating the problem of linking data between the revision and earlier series. The changes in definition as compared with earlier data mainly concern the government sector.

The saving share has for similar reasons been measured as gross private saving divided by the sum of private consumption and private domestic investment (NIPA Table 5.1, row 2, divided by Table 1.1, row 2 plus row 6). Whereas the earlier NIPA convention essentially added only the budget surplus to gross private savings to arrive at gross savings, the current convention adds actual gross government saving, which makes up the bulk of the difference between the GDP measures. This raises the gross saving share quite considerably. Our measure is designed to avoid this problem. Similarly for comparability the growth rate has been computed as the growth rate of real nonfinancial corporate business GDP ($g_t = \log(y_t / y_{t-1})$, where $y$ is taken from NIPA Table 1.16, row 36).

6As can be seen from (3.1), it is more appropriate to label a VAR as a special case of an MS-VAR, that is, the case of a single-regime model. The above formulation can be justified, however, considering the long tradition of econometric VAR models in contrast to the recently introduced MS-VAR model. An example of the latter is Blix (1998), examining Swedish inflation in a trivariate, two-regime model.

7The finance and insurance sector includes a number of real estate and business services that are not strictly financial. To sort this out we would need considerably more detailed industry divisions than are published in NIPA and most likely we would run into trouble with numerous changes in definitions over such a long period. Quality adjustment biases may also be a problem in these variables (Corrado and Slifman 1999 shows, however, that the nonfinancial corporate-sector data are fairly reliable). Adding capital gains into the saving measure would also be appropriate, but to our knowledge this is impossible to do back to 1948.
From 1959:4 onward, real values are in terms of chained 1992 dollars, whereas prior to this date, real values are in fixed 1987 dollars. The first three quarters in 1959 of the growth series are computed from U.S. Department of Commerce 1992 because the first two quarters are missing in the 1997 revision. Furthermore the growth series starts only in 1948, since real-value estimates are lacking for the first two years.

3.2 The statistical model

In order to make data suitable for the proposed analysis we have made the following transformations: the financial-sector share and the national saving rate are in first-differences and hence stationary. Moreover, by multiplying these two series by 400 and the growth rate by 100, we avoid numerical convergence problems in the estimations and also get comparable measurement units.

Let \( \mathbf{x}_t \) be a trivariate time series with components \( x_t = (\Delta \psi_t, \Delta \beta_t, g_t) \), where \( \Delta \psi_t \) is the annual change in the financial-sector share of GDP, \( \Delta \beta_t \) is the annual change in the private saving rate, and \( g_t \) is the annual growth rate of real nonfinancial corporate business GDP. The vector \( \mathbf{x}_t \) is assumed to be generated according

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Karlsen (1990, chap. 5) gives a sufficient condition for second-order stationarity that applies to MS-VAR models (see also Holst et al. 1994). As long as the autoregressive coefficients depend on the regime process, the stationarity condition for linear VAR models is not valid, and hence the existing unit root tests may not be meaningful. Moreover, there is not any theoretical guidance on how to relate the idea of cointegration to MS-VAR models under this circumstance. Since the growth rate looks stationary (see Figure 3), whereas the log of the financial-sector share seems to be trending (Figure 1), the saving rate appears highly persistent (Figure 2), and hence it is unlikely that the latter two series are cointegrated, we decided to apply first-differences to the two possibly nonstationary time series. The first-differences of these series are depicted in Figures 4 and 5, respectively. When we calculate the modulus of the largest eigenvalue, as defined by Karlsen, for the estimated first-differenced MS-VAR(1), we find that it is roughly 0.43 and, hence, well inside the stationary region.
to the following MS-VAR\((p)\) model:

\[
x_t = \mu_{s_t} + \sum_{k=1}^{p} A_{s_t}^{(k)} x_{t-k} + \epsilon_t, \quad t = 1, 2, \ldots, T
\]  

(3.1)

where \(p\) is finite and typically small, \(\epsilon_t \mid s_t \sim N(0, \Omega_{s_t})\), with \(\Omega_{s_t}\) being positive definite, and the initial values, \(x_0, \ldots, x_{-p}\), are taken as fixed.

The unobserved regime or state variable \(s_t\) is assumed to follow a \(q\)-state Markov process with transition probabilities \(\Pr[s_t = j \mid s_{t-1} = i] = p_{ij}\), for all \(t\) and \(i, j = 1, 2, \ldots, q\), and \(\sum_{j=1}^{q} p_{ij} = 1\) is satisfied for all \(i\). In addition, we assume that the Markov process is irreducible (no absorbing states) and ergodic.

For this particular application the maintained hypothesis is that \(q = 2\), that is, two states or regimes are sufficient for a fair description of the \(x_t\) process. We will, however, compare the two-regime model with a traditional single-regime VAR, that is, the case of \(q = 1\).

The random vector \(\mu_{s_t}\) and the random matrices \(A_{s_t}^{(k)}\) and \(\Omega_{s_t}\) depend only on the state taken on by \(s_t\). If \(s_t = 1\), then \(\mu_{s_t} = \mu_1, A_{s_t}^{(k)} = A_1^{(k)}\) and \(\Omega_{s_t} = \Omega_1\). Maximum likelihood (ML) estimates for the MS-VAR(1) model are obtained via the expectation maximization (EM) algorithm; for more details the reader is referred to Hamilton 1990, 1994. Standard errors for the point estimates are based on conditional scores, as in Hamilton 1996. The VAR(1) and the VAR(4) models are estimated with (Gaussian) ML.

Because there are unidentified nuisance parameters under the null (the transition probabilities \(p_{ij}\) and the parameters of, say, the second regime), it is, as yet, unclear how to test the single-regime model against the
two-regime model.\textsuperscript{9} It is still possible, however, to empirically discriminate between the single-regime VAR models and the MS-VAR(1) by examining their performances in terms of specification tests, that is, by testing for serial correlation and autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity.

3.3 Specification results
Table 2 presents some stylized facts about the behavior of the change in the financial-sector share of GDP, the change in the saving rate, and the growth rate. Over the sample period we find that the change of the financial-sector share of GDP each quarter is 0.1 percent, with a standard deviation of about 0.8 percent. The average change per quarter in the saving rate is approximately zero, but this series is considerably more volatile than the other two; it has an estimated standard deviation of roughly 4 percent. The average growth rate is much higher, about 1.75 percent, with a standard deviation of about 2.8 percent. Moreover, the three variables do not seem to be contemporaneously correlated, as indicated by the small covariances.

Having estimated the MS-VAR(1) model, we may calculate the corresponding state-conditional moments (see Warne 1996 for details on the relationship between the state contingent moments and the parameters of

\textsuperscript{9}Some procedures have been suggested in the literature, for instance, Hansen 1992, 1996. These procedures may be useful for univariate $q$-state Markov switching autoregressive (MS-AR) models when the number of restrictions under the null of $q - 1$ regimes (versus $q$) is low. In our case, the number of restrictions under the null of a VAR($p$) model versus an MS-VAR($p$) model with two regimes is $11 + 9p$. For computational reasons, the Hansen approach is not useful even for $p = 1$. Moreover, the selection of $p = 1$ is inappropriate for the single-regime VAR model, since the empirical evidence suggests that this model is badly misspecified. Hence, any test of one versus two regimes when $p = 1$ is bound to be biased in favor of the alternative. For longer lag lengths (e.g., $p = 4$), one might suspect that a test of one versus two regimes is biased in favor of the null since, given the evidence for the MS-VAR(1) in Table 4, the alternative is likely to be highly overparameterized.
the MS-VAR model). First, we find that about 168 observations belong to regime 1 and the remaining 26 to regime 2. The probability of remaining in regime 1 is estimated to be 95 percent and the corresponding estimate for regime 2 is 66 percent. The point estimates of the Markov transition probabilities indicate that both regimes are persistent and that the second regime occurs less frequently than the first. An $F$-statistic version of the Wald test of the hypothesis that the Markov chain is not serially correlated, that is, that the transition probabilities are equal to the long-run or ergodic probabilities, is strongly rejected by the data when inference is based on the assumption of asymptotic normality.

Table 3 displays the conditional first two moments for $x_t$. The most apparent difference between the two states is the greater volatility recorded for the less frequently occurring second state (see, e.g., Figure 6); standard deviations are roughly three times larger in regime 2. As for first moments, it can be seen that the mean of $g_t$ is slightly larger in the stable first state, whereas the mean of $\Delta \beta_t$ is negative in the first state and in the second, volatile state, positive and considerably larger than the unconditional mean. Finally, the second state is associated with a decline in the financial-sector share. The two states can be described as one stable and one volatile where saving increases and the financial-sector share decreases.
Figure 5
First-differences of the gross private saving rate with the estimated rapid-innovation regime periods, \( \Pr(s_i = 2 \mid X_T; \hat{\theta} > 0.5) \), in the shaded areas.

Table 3
Estimated state-dependent moments for a two-state MS-VAR(1) model

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean Covariances</th>
<th>Regime 1</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \tilde{\psi}_t )</td>
<td>0.145</td>
<td>0.316</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \tilde{\theta}_t )</td>
<td>(-0.058)</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( g_t )</td>
<td>1.805</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Mean Covariances</th>
<th>Regime 2</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \tilde{\psi}_t )</td>
<td>(-0.165)</td>
<td>3.007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( \Delta \tilde{\theta}_t )</td>
<td>0.518</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>( g_t )</td>
<td>1.457</td>
<td>---</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The Markov Process

\( \hat{p}_{11} = .947 \quad \hat{p}_{22} = .663 \)
\( \hat{\pi}_1 = .864 \quad \hat{T}_1 = 167.7 \)

\( H_0: \quad p_{11} + p_{22} = 1 \quad F = 11.30 \quad [.001] \)
Prior to an interpretation of the estimated state-conditional parameters of model (3.1) it is useful to evaluate the data description properties of the MS-VAR(1) model. We will use a VAR(1) and a VAR(4) as reference models and examine how the three models conform to the assumptions of serially uncorrelated residuals and no autoregressive heteroskedasticity. Test results are summarized in Table 4.

According to the univariate specification tests, the VAR(1) model is severely misspecified with respect to serial correlation, autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity (ARCH), and normality. This is not surprising when looking at the differenced data in Figures 3–5, which display periods, or clusters, of high volatility. The null hypotheses for the MS-VAR(1) model can be rejected only in the case of ARCH in the financial-sector share equation. Moreover, when testing the VAR(1) as a system, the multivariate tests suggest rejection of multivariate normality and serial correlation (p-values are .000 and .001, respectively). A multivariate ARCH test in the MS-VAR(1) model cannot be rejected, nor can a multivariate test of serial correlation (p-values are .239 and .691, respectively).

Based on these tests our conclusion is therefore that the MS-VAR(1) provides an adequate description of the data, whereas the VAR(1) does not. In order to check that this result is not simply an effect of a larger set of parameters in the MS-VAR(1) or of serial correlation in the VAR(1), we undertook the same tests for a VAR(4). The results show that this larger model is still misspecified and that the periodic volatility outbursts are not accounted for even with four lags; there is also no evidence of serial correlation.

3.4 The theoretical predictions meet the data

The results in Table 5 indicate effects in the quiescent regime (regime 1) that are in rather good agreement with the theoretically expected pattern in Table 1. The financial-sector share is positively affected by previous
saving and negatively by previous growth, as expected. The saving share is negatively (although insignificantly) affected by both the other variables. Although the sign could not be a priori determined, the negative effect is in fact the one expected from empirical work on the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, indicating that income effects dominate the saving response. Growth is related negatively to previous changes in the financial-sector share and positively to the saving rate.

The estimated coefficients in the rapid-innovation regime (regime 2) are also close to the expected. As they are very imprecisely estimated, however, because of the few “observations” of that regime, we cannot attach much importance to the point estimates. A glance at Figure 1 indicates that the estimated rapid-innovation regimes are catching downturns after a financial-sector expansion rather than during the expansions themselves.

One implication for the MS-VAR of the hypothesized pattern of effects in Table 1 is that the financial-sector share should Granger-cause the growth rate in mean variance. Technically, this means that for some
time periods

\[ E[u_{g,t}^2 | \{ \Delta \varphi_t, \Delta \beta_t, g_t \}_{t=1-p}^{T-1-p}] \neq E[\tilde{u}_{g,t}^2 | \{ \Delta \beta_t, g_t \}_{t=1-p}^{T-1-p}] \]

where \( u_{g,t} = g_t - E[g_t | \{ \Delta \varphi_t, \Delta \beta_t, g_t \}_{t=1-p}^{T-1-p}] \), and \( \tilde{u}_{g,t} = g_t - E[g_t | \{ \Delta \beta_t, g_t \}_{t=1-p}^{T-1-p}] \). Warne (2001) presents the set of necessary and sufficient conditions for Granger noncausality in mean (the standard Granger noncausality hypothesis), mean variance, and distribution (conditional independence). Similarly, the pattern of effects in Table 1 implies that the financial-sector share should be Granger-causal for the saving rate in mean variance.\(^{10}\)

For the MS-VAR model, there are two channels through which, say, \( \Delta \varphi \) can be useful for predicting the \( g \). First, it can help to predict the regime (an “indirect” prediction channel). Second, conditional on the regime, it can help in improving the one-step-ahead forecast of the growth rate. Since there are two channels through which the financial-sector share can be informative about the next-period value (and the uncertainty of the prediction error), there is not a unique set of parameter restrictions for testing the noncausality hypothesis.

There is, however, a finite number of cases, and if one of these cases is true, then \( \Delta \varphi \) is Granger-noncausal in mean variance for the variable we are interested in. Given an MS-VAR model with two regimes and three observable variables, the total number of such cases is four.\(^{11}\)

In the case of, say, the hypothesis \( \Delta \varphi \Rightarrow g \), a common feature of the four sufficient conditions is that, conditional on the regime and the past values of \( \Delta \varphi \) and \( g \), \( \Delta \varphi \) does not help to predict the next-period value of \( g \). Letting \( a_{i,j,k} \) denote the \((i, j)\)th element of \( A_{i,j}^{(1)} \), this means that \( a_{31,k} = 0 \) for both regimes. These restrictions represent the second of the two prediction channels that were alluded to in the previous paragraph.

In Table 6 we report \( F \)-statistics and \( p \)-values from testing the hypothesis that \( a_{i,j,k} = 0 \) for both values of \( s_i \) and with \( i, j = 1, 2, 3 \). The evidence here agrees with the results in Table 5 and, in particular, we cannot reject the hypotheses that the coefficients on the lagged financial-sector share are zero for both the saving rate and the growth rate equations.

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\(^{10}\)The predictions in Table 1 do not, however, imply that the financial-sector share should be Granger-causal for the growth rate or the saving rate in mean; that is, the variances of \( u_{g,t} \) and of \( \tilde{u}_{g,t} \) can be equal. The reason is that if the Markov process is serially uncorrelated, then Granger noncausality in mean implies that the expected values of the random coefficient on \( \Delta \varphi_{t-1} \) in the saving rate and in the growth rate equation, respectively, are zero. As long as the two possible values for each random coefficient have opposite signs, the weighted (by the ergodic probabilities for the Markov process) sum of the two values can be zero for each case. This is consistent with the hypothesized relationships in Table 1. Noncausality in mean variance, however, requires that each possible value for these random coefficients is zero and is therefore not consistent with the pattern of effects in Table 1.

\(^{11}\)Under the assumption of conditional normality for \( \epsilon_t \) in Equation (3.1) and that the matrix with Markov transition probabilities has either full rank or rank equal to one (which is always satisfied when there are two regimes), Warne (2001) shows that Granger noncausality in mean variance is equivalent to Granger noncausality in distribution.
Note that these two sets of restrictions are -tests of various Granger noncausality in mean variance hypotheses.

Table 7

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>$H_{0}$</th>
<th>$r$</th>
<th>$\Delta \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta \beta$</th>
<th>$\Delta \varphi \Rightarrow \mathbf{g}$</th>
<th>$\Delta \beta \Rightarrow \Delta \varphi$</th>
<th>$\Delta \beta \Rightarrow \mathbf{g}$</th>
<th>$\mathbf{g} \Rightarrow \Delta \varphi$</th>
<th>$\mathbf{g} \Rightarrow \Delta \beta$</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>(C1.1)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3.383</td>
<td>3.383</td>
<td>2.564</td>
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<td>[.000]</td>
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<td>[.003]</td>
<td>[.003]</td>
<td>[.000]</td>
<td>[.000]</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C1.2)</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>2.568</td>
<td>3.293</td>
<td>2.969</td>
<td>3.293</td>
<td>2.969</td>
<td>2.568</td>
</tr>
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<tr>
<td>(C2)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.375</td>
<td>4.583</td>
<td>4.304</td>
<td>3.956</td>
<td>3.903</td>
<td>5.535</td>
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<tr>
<td>(C3)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>2.602</td>
<td>.604</td>
<td>1.131</td>
<td>.603</td>
<td>1.200</td>
<td>2.443</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $p$-values are in brackets.

The $F(r, T - s)$-approximated $F$-statistic is computed from $F = ((T - s)/(Tr))W$, where $W$ is the Wald statistic, $r$ is the number of restrictions, and $s$ is the closest integer to the average number of free parameters per equation under $H_{0}$, that is, $s = \text{int}(38 - r)/3$.

For (C1.1) the reference distribution is $F(15, T - 8)$. The set of restrictions is $\mu_{t1} = \mu_{t2}, \ a_{t1,1} = a_{t2,1}, \ d_{t1,1} = d_{t2,1}, \ a_{t1,2} = a_{t2,2}, \ a_{t1,3} = a_{t2,3}, \ d_{t1,2} = d_{t2,2}, \ d_{t1,3} = d_{t2,3}, \ a_{t1,0} = a_{t2,0}, \ d_{t1,0} = d_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,t1} = \omega_{t2,t1}, \ \omega_{t1,t2} = \omega_{t2,t2}, \ \omega_{t1,t3} = \omega_{t2,t3}$, $\omega_{t1,0} = \omega_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,\omega} = \omega_{t2,\omega}$. The set of restrictions is $x_{t} \not\Rightarrow x_{t}$, where $i \neq j$.

For (C1.2) the reference distribution is $F(19, T - 6)$. The set of restrictions is $\mu_{t1} = \mu_{t2}, \ a_{t1,1} = a_{t2,1}, \ d_{t1,1} = d_{t2,1}, \ a_{t1,2} = a_{t2,2}, \ a_{t1,3} = a_{t2,3}, \ a_{t1,0} = a_{t2,0}, \ d_{t1,0} = d_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,t1} = \omega_{t2,t1}, \ \omega_{t1,t2} = \omega_{t2,t2}, \ \omega_{t1,t3} = \omega_{t2,t3}$, $\omega_{t1,0} = \omega_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,\omega} = \omega_{t2,\omega}$, $\omega_{t1,\omega} = \omega_{t2,\omega}$. The set of restrictions is $x_{t} \not\Rightarrow x_{t}$, where $i \neq j$.

For (C2) the reference distribution is $F(3, T - 12)$. The set of restrictions is $p_{11} = p_{12}, \ a_{t1,1} = 0$, and $d_{t1,0} = 0$ for the hypothesis $x_{t} \not\Rightarrow x_{t}$, where $i \neq j$.

For (C3) the reference distribution is $F(6, T - 11)$. The set of restrictions is $\mu_{t1} = \mu_{t2}, \ a_{t1,1} = a_{t2,1}, \ a_{t1,2} = a_{t2,2}, \ a_{t1,3} = a_{t2,3}, \ a_{t1,0} = a_{t2,0}, \ d_{t1,0} = d_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,t1} = \omega_{t2,t1}, \ \omega_{t1,t2} = \omega_{t2,t2}, \ \omega_{t1,t3} = \omega_{t2,t3}$, $\omega_{t1,0} = \omega_{t2,0}$, $\omega_{t1,\omega} = \omega_{t2,\omega}$, $\omega_{t1,\omega} = \omega_{t2,\omega}$. The set of restrictions is $x_{t} \not\Rightarrow x_{t}$, where $i \neq j$.

Next, in Table 7 we report $F$-statistics of Granger noncausality in the six different directions that are possible in our model. For a given pair—for example, the financial-sector share and the saving rate $(\Delta \varphi \Rightarrow \Delta \beta)$—the noncausality hypothesis implies that at least one of the four sets of restrictions, (C1.1), (C1.2), (C2), or (C3), must be satisfied; the specific parameter restrictions are given in the table.

For the case in which we wish to test the hypothesis that $\Delta \varphi$ is Granger-noncausal in mean variance for $\Delta \beta$, restrictions (C1.1), (C1.2), and (C2) imply that $\Delta \varphi$ is conditionally noninformative about the regime, whereas (C3) implies that $\Delta \beta$ does not directly depend on the regime (other than via $g$ or the residual covariances). Moreover, the (C1.1) and (C2.1) restrictions allow the Markov process to be serially correlated, whereas (C2) does not. Finally, (C1.1) and (C1.2) are different in the sense that (C1.1) means that only $\Delta \varphi$ has to be conditionally informative about the Markov process, whereas (C1.2) implies that both $\Delta \varphi$ and $g$ are conditionally informative about the regime process. The former case turns out to imply that $\Delta \varphi$ is Granger-noncausal in mean variance for $g$ as well as for $\Delta \beta$, whereas the latter case happens to imply that both $\Delta \varphi$ and $g$ are Granger-noncausal in mean variance for $\Delta \beta$.\[12\]

From Table 7 we find that the (C1.1), (C1.2), and (C2) restrictions are strongly rejected by the data both for the saving rate and for the growth rate case. This suggests that the financial-sector share process contains unique information for predicting the regime process. Exactly how this information matters depends on which restriction(s) is (are) not consistent with the data. At the 5 percent level of marginal significance, however, we can reject the (C3) hypothesis only in the case of the saving rate. In other words, the financial-sector share

\[12\]Note that these two sets of restrictions are not nested.
seems to be Granger-causal (in mean variance) for the saving rate, but not for the growth rate. Moreover, the growth rate appears to be Granger-causal for the saving rate.

Apart from Granger causality from $\Delta \varphi$ and from $g$ to $\Delta \beta$, there is no evidence of such causal links. Interestingly enough, it is always the $(C3)$ restrictions that cannot be rejected for these cases, whereas the other sets of restrictions are always rejected. This means that all three variables are useful for making inference about the regime process and that the evidence on causality is primarily found in the equation describing the saving rate. The volatility outbursts evident in Figures 3–5 can be found in all three time series and thus explain the former result.

4 What Happened during the Rapid-Innovation Periods?

We estimate five rapid-innovation regimes with duration greater than two quarters. The rapid innovation period 1992–93 is closely followed by two further indications of regime shifts in the second halves of 1994 and 1995. The latter of these is not as pronounced as other switches. The two estimated instances of the rapid-innovation regime in the beginning of the 1980s are probably linked. We therefore consider four rapid-innovation periods; the first in 1950–51, the second around 1975, the third mainly in 1982, and a longer fourth period in 1992–94.

Do these rapid innovation periods have any connection to real events? To answer that question we survey some literature on the development of the U.S. financial system.

The interaction between financial developments and legislation is, of course, a case of mutual interdependence. Changes in the financial system necessitate changes in legislation, which in turn precipitate new changes in the financial system. The causal connection is seen by most observers, however, as running from financial-system pressures to legislation. Deregulation has to a large extent been motivated by practices that already had started to evolve within the bounds of the old rules.

Below we very briefly specify some events that are connected to switches in financial regime. What events are we looking for? Our maintained hypothesis is that the volatile rapid-innovation regimes found in the empirical record signify comparatively rapid developments of the financial markets that are associated with fixed costs. We also look for events in the years just before a rapid-innovation period, since the data show that financial-sector share expansions tend to precede the rapid-innovation regimes (cf. Figure 1). Thus, the appearance of more comprehensive financial markets as well as new financial instruments qualifies to the extent that these markets and instruments are associated with higher fixed costs. Some financial innovations may affect only transaction costs (i.e., the variable part of financial costs), thus postponing the regime shift, whereas innovations to complete markets would be expected to be reflected also in fixed costs. Whether the latter effect shows up as a regime shift or not will depend on how gradual the introduction process is and the size of the fixed-cost shift. Automated teller machines (ATMs) are mainly a transaction cost innovation, but they entail substantial fixed costs and to some extent also affect the availability of cash, easing some minor liquidity constraints. The distinction is therefore hard to uphold empirically.

4.1 The rapid-innovation periods

A discussion of the postwar U.S. financial history with a complete analysis of the chains of events around the rapid-innovation periods and their causes is beyond the purpose of this article. Nevertheless, we find it useful as an informal check of our results to give a short account of important financial events that potentially are connected to rapid market developments in the rapid-innovation periods. Of course, a concentration of important financial events around the rapid-innovation periods does not verify our hypothesis. If no such events could be found, however, this would be a strong indication that the hypothesis is false. Below we give a cursory review of the events that did take place around the estimated rapid-innovation periods.
4.1.1 First period: 1950:1–51:3 Financial restrictions from World War II were abandoned toward the end of the 1940s. Consumer credit controls were abolished in June 1949, and interest ceilings on deposits were successively raised through 1948. In June 1950 the Korean War began, leading to a short speculative boom.

The most important event was that credit outstanding from the Federal Reserve increased very fast in 1949–50. In part this was a reflection of the record mortgage volumes that accompanied a liberalization of government mortgage programs in 1950. In 1950 federal insurance of savings and loans associations was raised to the same level as that for commercial banks, and savings bank statutes were amended to allow out-of-state federally underwritten mortgages (Klaman 1961). Thus, extensive restructuring of the mortgage markets must have taken place within the estimated rapid-innovation period.

4.1.2 Second period: 1975:1–4 The rapid-innovation period in 1975 was preceded by a great amount of turbulence in international financial markets and regulation. The end of the Vietnam War and the first oil crisis were important events that contributed to a high pressure for change in the financial system. Also, the domestic financial system underwent substantial changes both in terms of organization and in terms of financial innovations and new markets.

Negotiated brokerage commissions were allowed for the first time in 1975, and the structure of investment banking rapidly changed. In 1973 the final breakdown of the Bretton Woods system had made new services for international payments necessary. In 1974 automated brokerage services were made available to primary dealers in Treasury securities. Trade in interest rate futures was introduced in Chicago in 1975 (see Wilson 1993).

During 1971–73 the regulation of negotiable certificates of deposit was abolished. This led to massive volume increases in the trading of these instruments up to 1975. In 1972–73 NOW-accounts (i.e., savings accounts with negotiable orders of withdrawal, in effect interest-bearing checking accounts) started to evolve. These accounts circumvented Regulation Q, under which regular demand deposits had a zero interest rate ceiling. This was only part of a general movement in the markets to find ways around the interest regulations. See Klebaner 1990 for more details.

Thus, 1975 was the culmination of a period of fundamental changes in the financial system that took place in several areas, and this period was followed by a calmer development for a number of years before the pressure for change started to mount again.

4.1.3 Third period: 1981:3–82:3 In 1982 Congress responded to market pressures and doubled the statutory limits on bankers’ acceptances to 200 percent of bank capital. Money market deposits were first allowed in 1982. In 1981 international banking facilities were exempted from reserve requirements and from some state and local government taxation so that U.S. banks could be competitive in international markets. A Supreme Court ruling in 1981 accelerated merger activities, as regulators were forced to become more liberal. In 1982 the Garn–St. Germain Act allowed thrifts to offer banking services previously reserved for commercial banks.

The period was also preceded by a number of deregulations. In December 1980 shelf registration of bond issues, that is, anticipatory clearing of bond issues, was allowed for the first time. Interest rate regulation was phased out over six years beginning in 1980. In 1980–82 savings and loan associations were given more discretion in the range of services they could offer (for details, see Meerschwam 1991 and Mullineux 1987).

These deregulations were also reflected in the financial markets. The market for so-called junk bonds (that is, bonds lacking normal credit rating) started to increase rapidly in 1981. Options on a diverse array of futures contracts were introduced at several exchange markets in 1982. ATMs made branching regulation even less efficient than before. Mortgage-backed securities and federally backed variable rate mortgages were allowed. Securitization of international debt as well as loan sales, interest swaps, and other innovative financial activities expanded (see Klebaner 1990). There was a general tendency to dissolve the distinctions between local thrifts (mainly savings and loan associations) on one hand and commercial banks and investment banks on the other. Mullineux 1987 discusses this in detail.
This rapid-innovation period was thus characterized by turbulent restructuring of the financial markets and a much more extensive deregulation than in the previous periods.


The period 1992–94 was preceded by a rapid expansion of regional banking due to state deregulation at the end of the 1980s (see Hawawini and Swary 1990). In 1993 the junk bond market went through a revival. As a response to the problems of thrift institutions, mainly savings and loan associations in the 1980s, the previous regulatory authorities were dissolved in 1989 and replaced by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which in the following years reduced the reliance on deposit funding that had caused much of the problems (see Stiroh 1997).

This rapid-innovation period marks the beginning of a very rapid expansion of existing markets and trading instruments. Deregulation in and before this period is generally seen as long overdue responses to market developments that already had taken place.

4.2 Summary of evidence
Every regime shift is associated with new developments on the financial markets and in the regulatory framework, although the character of these developments varies. The rapid-innovation regime is characterized by a higher volatility than the quiescent regime, and (some) estimated rapid-innovation periods may be connected to recessions. This could be interpreted to mean that we simply pick out recession phenomena and variations in volatility due to other causes than financial development. The shifts do not coincide with the NBER-classified recession periods, however, except in the case of the 1981:4–82:3 recession. On the contrary, the shifts are rather more associated with upturns from recessions in economic activity, but upturns from recessions are not always associated with regime shifts.

Exogenous events like the downfall of Bretton Woods, the end of the Vietnam War, and the oil crisis in 1973 may certainly have caused some of the volatility in 1975, for example. Our point is not that the rapid-innovation periods estimated from the MS-VAR are causally related to structural financial developments. Rather, whatever the ultimate causes are, the rapid-innovation patterns we see in the data seem to be associated with widespread changes and growth in the financial markets.

There are important financial events that are not associated with the rapid-innovation periods. An obvious example is the stock market crash in 1987. Our survey of U.S. financial history does not allow us to conclude that there is a qualitative difference between development in the rapid-innovation regime as compared to development in the quiescent regime. The accounts of the evidence we have found, however, are at least not inconsistent with such a view. We cannot falsify our maintained hypothesis on the grounds that nothing much happened in the financial markets in and around the estimated rapid-innovation periods.

5 Conclusions
The main conclusion from our work is that the MS-VAR model successfully describes the data, since it can account for much of the apparent heteroskedasticity. This indicates that the possibility of regime switches should be taken into account when analyzing the time-series relations between financial development and growth.

The autoregressive patterns in the quiescent regimes are largely consistent with theoretical expectations. These patterns indicate that the main effect of financial development is to decrease precautionary savings. The patterns in the rapid-innovation regime, although not well determined, are widely conforming to the expected.
There is plenty of institutional evidence that the statistically determined rapid-innovation periods are associated with new developments on the financial markets on several levels. Substantive changes in regulation as well as rapid developments in new financial instruments and markets are closely associated with the timing of the rapid-innovation regimes.

Further research along these lines may shed new light on the old question of causality between financial development and growth. Our Granger causality analysis points in the direction that causal (predictive) effects can be discovered only from the financial-sector share and from growth to the saving rate. This is consistent with the finding that all three variables are useful when one is attempting to make inferences about the regime process.

It should be emphasized that the noncausality hypothesis concerns only one-quarter-ahead predictions and that our results have little (if anything) to say about longer forecast horizons. Since the length of a time period in the theoretical discussion is unspecified (although it is not far-fetched to take it to be longer than one quarter), the lack of Granger causality from the financial-sector share to the growth rate should not be interpreted as strong evidence against the hypothesis of a causal link from financial development to growth. It does suggest, however, that the dynamics of the link need to be better specified in order to settle the issue.

References


