

Postmaterialism and Democracy: What Does the Postmaterialist Value Shift Mean for Democracy?

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Abstract

This thesis explores the possible impact of a postmaterialist value shift on the future of democracy in advanced industrial democratic countries.

Research over the past few decades has questioned the responsiveness of representative democratic institutions in advanced industrial democracies to individual and communal needs in society. Radical democratic theorists have called for direct action, structural reform, and other social and political changes to make democracy “stronger.” Increased education levels brought on by continued economic and physical security in advanced industrial societies has led to a change in the ability of citizens to access the political process. How the relationship between the citizen and the state is altered as a result of continued prosperity is a primary motivation for this research.

Working with World Values Survey data, I examine individual and societal level relationships between postmaterial values and direct political participation and acceptance of participatory values. Empirical evidence supports the hypotheses that postmaterial values are positively associated with direct political participation and as the level of Postmaterialists increases in a given society the level of participatory behavior and acceptance of participatory values will also increase. Substantive analysis suggests that increase in the level of postmaterialism in a country will lead to increases in alternative political activity and other forms of direct participation.

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Chapter 1: Introduction

This thesis is intended to explore the association between the Materialist/Postmaterialist value orientations and direct participation in the citizenry of the United States and Western Europe. The work of Ronald Inglehart provides an extensive amount of data and analysis related to changes in culture and value orientations in democratic societies. Inglehart points out, “cultural change...is reshaping the social basis of political conflict, the reasons people support political parties, the kinds of parties they support, and the ways in which they try to attain their political goals.”¹ It is the last part of this assertion that will be the central focus in the pages that follow. A number of hypotheses are put forth in the following chapters, but ultimately I seek to determine if there is support for the idea that the postmodernization process, more specifically, the shift towards postmaterialism, will lead to increased direct political participation and acceptance of participatory values. It is the work of Inglehart, along with selected theorists of radical democracy that lay the foundation for this thesis.

It is hypothesized that postmaterial values are positively associated with direct political participation and as the levels of Postmaterialists increase in a given society the level of participatory behavior and acceptance of participatory values will also increase. As societies advance through stages of industrialization into the postindustrial, it is believed that changing citizen demands on the formal structures of the state will lead to higher levels of direct participation. Data collected in three waves, spanning from 1981 to 1997, organized in the World Values Survey, is the foundation for the empirical

¹ Inglehart, Ronald. *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 5.

analysis carried out in the pages that follow. These data allow the theoretical notions presented in the second and third chapters of this thesis to be explored empirically.

The evidence that emerges from these data is quite clear. Without exception, postmaterial values are positively associated with alternative political activity, at both the individual and societal level, in the United States and Western Europe. Associations between the postmaterial value orientation and these forms of direct participation, participation outside the formal institutional structures of the state and absent intermediary political actors such as political parties or interest groups, provide clear evidence in support of my hypotheses. Additional support for my hypotheses is found in the relationships between the postmaterial value orientation and membership in politically motivated voluntary organizations, willingness to discuss politics, expression of a high level of political interest, and support for social movements. This leads me to conclude, that as societies become increasingly postmaterial, it is likely that direct political participation and acceptance of participatory values will increase.

With the decline of nationalism and, more recently, communism as real challenges to democracy, alternatives to current modes of democratic rule within advanced industrial democracies may begin to emerge from within democratic schools of thought. Democracy is not yet done. My efforts are intended to explore the possibility of increasingly participatory modes of democracy in Europe and North America.

This research will be laid out in the following manner. The second chapter of this thesis will introduce the relevant literature and establish a theoretical foundation for participatory values and behavior. In this chapter the work of Ronald Inglehart and radical democratic theorists will be presented and linked to participatory behavior and

values. The third chapter will present and explain the hypotheses driving this research. Additionally, a brief outline of the methodology and structure of the subsequent chapter will be explained. The fourth chapter will be used to explore the societal level linkages and individual level associations between postmaterialism and values and behavior associated with strong democracy. The fifth and final chapter will provide a conclusion to the research by summing up the important findings and what they might mean for the future of democracy and the relationship between the citizen and state in advanced industrial democracies.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

The fall of the Berlin Wall and the drawing back of the iron curtain were points in the history of democracy that marked the “Third Wave” of democratization. Much hope existed, as this wave began, that this would be a glorious era for democracy.² Hope dwindled as evidence surfaced in developing democracies that suggested democracy did not work effectively in all states.³ Emerging democracies saw difficulty in establishing the rule of law and human rights violations emerged as a major impediment to the stability of these developing democracies.⁴ In post-industrial democracies, those democracies characterized by having transitioned from production based to skilled-labor and service based economies; a shift was taking place.⁵ The shift, as Inglehart characterizes it, is the postmodern shift. He suggests,

Economic development is linked with social change – but the process is not linear. Though a specific modernization syndrome becomes increasingly probable when societies move from agrarian to an industrial mode of production, no trend goes in the same direction forever...In the past few decades, advanced industrial societies have reached an inflection point and begun moving on a new trajectory...described as “Postmodernization.” With Postmodernization, a new worldview is gradually replacing the outlook that has dominated industrializing societies since the Industrial Revolution...It is transforming basic norms governing politics, work, religion, family, and sexual behavior.

It is the transformation of the relationship between the citizen and the state that is of importance in this paper.

² Fukuyama, Francis. “The End of History.” *The National Interest* 16 (Summer 1989): 4-18.

³ See O’Donnell, Guillermo. “On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems.” *World Development* 21:8 (1993): 1355-1369; Finer, Samuel E. *The History of Government, Vol. 1*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Welzel, Christian. “Effective Democracy, Mass Culture, and the Quality of Elites: The Human Development Perspective.” *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 43:3-5 (2002): 269-298.

⁴ See O’Donnell, “On the State”; Linz, Juan J. and Alfred Stepan. *Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe*. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996); Finer, *History of Government*; Rose, Richard. “A Divergent Europe.” *Journal of Democracy* 12:1 (2001): 93-106; Welzel, “Effective Democracy.”

⁵ The concept of “post-industrial” is developed by modernization theorist Daniel Bell in *The Coming of the Postindustrial Society*. (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

If the nature of the relationship between the citizen and the state is changing, that is, are citizens making new demands on their government and participating in politics and civic life in ways we have not seen before, can this be viewed as a challenge to the representative democratic state? Inglehart responds to this question by analyzing the trajectory of social and political change in 43 nations over a period of time. His theory, discussed below, evaluates the reciprocal nature of social, economic, and political change and the way in which these changes have changed or will change the nature of culture in a given society.

Inglehart and Postmaterialism

In *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*, Ronald Inglehart argues, over time “[postmaterial] values become prevalent, bringing a variety of societal changes from equal rights for women to democratic institutions and the decline of state socialist regimes.”⁶ Further, Inglehart contends, “deep-rooted changes in mass worldviews are reshaping economic, political, and social life. [He] examines changes in political and economic goals, religious norms, and family values, and explores how these changes affect economic growth rates, political party strategies, and the prospect for democratic institutions.”⁷ My efforts in this thesis will focus on the last of these areas Inglehart explores. Specifically, I am interested in the possibility of greater political participation by citizens within and outside the formal structures of democratic institutions. That is, I am interested in the possibility of a more participatory mode of democracy as postmaterial values increase in democratic

⁶ Inglehart, Ronald. *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), 6.

⁷ Ibid, 1.

societies. The question here is, what does the future hold for advanced industrial democracies around the world?

Inglehart has made impressive contributions to the study of value change in postindustrial societies. In 1977 with *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles Among Western Politics*, he began developing a theory of value change focusing specifically on economic changes, increases in available technology, a decrease in the number of wars, increasing education levels, expansion of mass communications networks, and increased global mobility.⁸ These changes in Western societies, Inglehart argued, led to a rise of postmaterialist values and political skills, which in turn led to political and social changes.

At the core of Inglehart's theory are the 4- and 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist batteries. Both question batteries were designed to tap one of many possible components of the Postmodernization dimension of societal change. The indexes produced by these question batteries tap Materialists needs of survival and physical security, as well as Postmaterialist needs of belonging, self-expression, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction.⁹ To tap this value change the 4-item question asks respondents to choose the two of four items that were most important to them: (1) maintaining order in the nation, (2) giving the people more say in important government decisions, (3) fighting rising inflation, (4) protecting freedom of speech. Respondents who chose responses 1 and 3 are classified as Materialists; those who chose responses 2 and 4 are classified as Postmaterialists; the remaining combinations are classified as mixed.¹⁰ The 12-item

⁸ Newman, Saul. "Constructing Political Culture Theory: The Political Science of Ronald Inglehart." *Politics and Policy*, 30 (December 2002), 599.

⁹ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Chapter 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid*, 133.

index is designed to “tap long-term preoccupations, not one’s response to the immediate situation. The twelve options [in the 12-item index] were designed to permit a fuller exploration of Maslow’s need hierarchy.” Six of the 12 items were intended to tap the materialist value priorities of fighting inflation, promoting economic growth, maintaining economic stability, maintaining order, combating increasing levels of crime, and maintaining strong defense forces. The remaining six items were intended to tap the Postmaterialist beliefs in more say in government, free speech, more say in the work place, beautified cities and countryside, humane society, and society where ideas count.¹¹ By tapping a respondent’s priority ranking of these values a Materialist/Postmaterialist value orientation can be elicited. Inglehart argues, by knowing “the relative proportions of Materialists to Postmaterialists in each birth cohort of a given nation, plus the size of each cohort, one can calculate the amount of value shift that would take place each year as a result of the intergenerational population replacement...”¹²

I will use both the 4- and 12-item indexes in my analysis of value change. It is clear that the 12-item index is the stronger of the two indexes. However, the 12-item index was not used in the first wave of the WVS and cannot be relied upon for time-series analysis. The 4-item index’ “most serious weakness is the simple fact that it is based on only four items. Consequently, it may be excessively sensitive to short-term forces...It seems more than likely that the proportion of respondents giving high priority to [a given item] would increase not as the result of fundamental value change, but simply because [it] is a very serious current problem.”¹³ The 12-item index on the other hand would spread the risk of an item gaining short-term importance over a greater

¹¹ Inglehart, Ronald. *The Silent Revolution*. (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1977), p. 43.

¹² *Ibid*, 138-139.

¹³ *Ibid*, 39.

number of items. Additionally, “a broader-based index might help reduce the amount of error in the measurement, something that is always a major problem in survey research...A set of consistent responses to a large series of related questions probably *does* reflect a genuine underlying preference.”¹⁴ However, Inglehart has made clear that the 4- and 12-item indexes produce very similar results for showing value shifts in advanced industrial societies.¹⁵ Therefore, I will use the 4-item index along with the 12-item index to establish value and behavior shifts in Western Europe and the United States. The 4-item index will be used for societal level analysis of all three waves of data, while the 4- and 12-item indexes will be used for individual level analysis for the most recent data point.

In his 1977 *Silent Revolution*, Inglehart first presents the idea that the postmaterialist value shift may lead to greater political participation among Western publics. He posits, “Western publics are developing an increasing potential for political participation.” He continues,

This change does not imply that mass publics will show higher rates of participation in traditional activities such as voting but that they may intervene in the political process on a qualitatively different level. Increasingly, they are more likely to demand participation in *making* major decisions, not just a voice of selecting the decision-makers...These changes have important implications for established political parties, labor unions, and professional organizations, for mass politics are increasingly apt to be elite-challenging rather than elite directed...Special skills are prerequisite to playing an effective role in the politics of an extended political community. Consequently, rising levels of political skills should enable Western publics to participate at a higher level. These publics may be approaching a threshold at which they can again take part in the actual decision-making process rather than entrust it to relatively skilled minorities.¹⁶

¹⁴ Ibid, 40.

¹⁵ Inglehart, Ronald and Paul Abramson. “Measuring Postmaterialism.” *American Political Science Review* 93:3 (Sept. 1999).

¹⁶ Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution*, 293-321.

These changes towards elite-challenging behavior are driven, Inglehart argues, by the rise of educational levels and the advances in “electronic media” in advanced industrial societies. Certainly, much has changed in technology since Inglehart first presented his notion of more direct participation. The increase in speed by which knowledge and information can be transmitted has opened a new arena for political participation.

In 1990, Inglehart published an evolved theory of value change in *Culture Shift in Advanced Industrial Society*. Inglehart used time-series data to argue “that a glacial shift in political attitudes was taking place due to generational replacement at a rate of approximately one percent a year.”¹⁷ In the mid-1990s Inglehart moved away from his argument of postmaterialism as an individual level measure to society-wide levels of change based on the Materialist/Postmaterialist battery. The evolution of his theory led to the 1997 publication of *Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies*.

In *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Inglehart argues “certain syndromes of economic, political, and cultural changes go together in coherent trajectories, with some trajectories more probable than others.”¹⁸ By understanding cultural elements of industrialized or industrializing societies, it is possible to accurately predict social, economic, and political trajectories. These trajectories, Inglehart argues, are not solely economically, politically, or culturally driven, but rather are reciprocally related. Modernization, as Inglehart argues, is the process by which societies increase urbanization, occupational specialization, levels of formal education, and levels of mass

¹⁷ Ibid, 301.

¹⁸ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 7.

political participation. Additionally, modernism is characterized by economic efficiency, bureaucratic authority, scientific rationality, and religious and political authority. The process of modernization coupled with the rapid advancement of industrialization led to a breakdown of cultural norms that were present in the “traditional” societies. The breakdown of traditional culture led to an increase in motivations of “individual economic achievement” and “hierarchical bureaucratic organizations.” Modern society saw a de-emphasis placed on community and communal responsibilities and an increase in materialist concerns such as economic and physical security.

Postmodernization theory, as presented by Inglehart, posits that modernization and industrialization, as characterized by hierarchical institutions, political and religious authority, bureaucratic structures, and strict cultural norms have reached the point of “diminishing marginal utility” making way for the shift from modern to postmodern society. The unexpected economic prosperity following WWII and the creation of modern welfare state, in addition to the decline of modern social, economic, and political institutions has cleared the way for the postmodern shift. Increased security that resulted from economic prosperity led to the shift among age cohorts from materialist values that characterized modern society to emergence of postmaterialist values. It is likely that the financial security postmaterialists enjoy may allow for more “free” time to be politically informed and to engage in political activity.

Conversely, as society is freed from scarcity of goods, a direct result of industrial *over*production patterns, a new phenomena results and the structure of society is changed. Ulrich Beck exposes the nature of the late industrial epoch, arguing that technological productivity can limit scarcity but at the same time unleash by-products and hazards in

the form of *risks*. Historically, Beck argues, social, economic, and political theory has been concerned with addressing inequalities in the distribution of wealth, but as the welfare state addresses these issues and the technological advances in industrial overproduction increase available resources, the concern shifts from the distribution of wealth to the distribution of risk. Hunger ceases to be a concern within society; it is replaced with problems of obesity. In a more general sense, scarcity is no longer a question of major concern while excess waste, environmental degradation, nuclear and atomic disaster become the focus of distributional interest.¹⁹ Inglehart addresses Beck's concern, "As long as people were overwhelmingly engaged in coping with survival, more remote concerns had little salience. But the attainment of existential security does not bring Nirvana. Postmodern society has brought increasing attention to quality of life problems, and far more demanding standards for societal performance. As a net result, people probably worry just as much as ever, but they worry about different things: there are profound differences in the behavior and worldviews of people who feel insecure about their personal survival and people who worry about global warming."²⁰ How Postmaterialists cope with changing concerns, whether through traditional democratic institutions or through radical participatory methods is the question with which I am concerned. What this means in terms of this research is, how does the postmaterialist culture shift influence participatory behavior? Will a society with a larger relative number of Postmaterialists also see high levels of direct political activity? I hypothesize that this will likely be the case.

¹⁹ Beck, Ulrich. *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity*. (London: Sage Publications, 1992).

²⁰ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 37.

Unprecedented economic and physical security laid the foundation for the emergence of postmaterialist values in the postwar era. It is important to note that Postmaterialists are not non-materialist or anti-materialist in their value orientation, but rather place higher priority on values of belonging, self-expression, and intellectual and aesthetic satisfaction than on values of physical and economic security. These changes in values take place over time and intergenerational cohort replacement accounts for the “shift” in values.²¹ Inglehart notes, “at the time of our first surveys, in 1970-1971, Materialists held an overwhelming numerical preponderance over Postmaterialists, outnumbering them by nearly four to one. By 1990, the balance had shifted dramatically, to a point where Materialists outnumbered Postmaterialists only four to three.”²²

Participatory Democracy and Radical Democratic Thought

This work is an effort to explore the relationship between the postmaterialist value shift and participatory values and behavior. The following sections are intended to introduce the objections strong democrats have to representative democracy, present literature that spells out the characteristics of direct democracy and radical democratic thought, and draw out a set of values and behaviors from the literature that characterize participatory democracy. This area of academic discourse was a mainstay in political

²¹ Inglehart’s theory of generation replacement begins earlier with work by David Butler and Donald Stokes in *Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping Electoral Choice*. (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1969). Chapter 3 of this book, “The Political Life Cycle” presents a very similar hypothesis as Inglehart. Butler and Stokes indicate that this concept of cohort or generational effects in social and political attitude development grew in strength so much that it became a standard subject of empirical studies in the 1960s in many countries. A number of classic writings on this subject include Herbert Hyman *Political Socialization*. (Glencoe, Illinois, 1959), and Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, *The Civic Culture*, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963), Paul Abramson, “The Differential Political Socialization of English Secondary School Students”, *Sociology of Education*, 40 (1967): 246-274, Jack Dennis et al. “Political Socialization to Democratic Orientations in Four Western Systems”, *Comparative Political Studies*, 1 (1968): 71-101.

²² Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 35.

science literature from the 1960s to the late 1970s, but the work of radical democratic theorists decreased in its presence in academic discourse through the mid-1980s. Nonetheless, many concepts important to direct participation can be drawn from this body of literature.

“Thin” Democracy

In *Strong Democracy*, Benjamin Barber undertakes a critical evaluation of liberal democracy. Barber lays the foundation for “strong” democracy by pointing out weaknesses in the representative system of government. He views “thin” democracy, or democracy based on representation over participation, as individualistic and hedonistic; it is a system of people functioning under a social compact in order to protect individual liberties rather than pursue greater social justice and equality. Clearly, “representative government inevitably establishes distance between the rulers and the ruled, implying the possibility that this distance may attain such proportions that it would be difficult to continue to speak of democracy.”²³ In his 1943 book, *Business as a System of Power*, Robert Brady, writing about the organization of liberal democratic capitalist states, argues,

Liberal democracy has never dared face the fact that industrial capitalism is an intensely coercive form of organization of society that cumulatively constrains men and all their institutions to work the will of the minority who hold and wield economic power; and that this relentless warping of men’s lives and forms of associations becomes less and less the result of voluntary decisions by “bad” or “good” men and more and more an impersonal web of coercions dictated by the need to keep the system running.²⁴

²³ Klingemann, Hans-Dieter, and Dieter Fuchs. *Citizens and the State*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 2.

²⁴ Brady, Robert. *Business as a System of Power*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1943), intro.

Strong democracy, on the other hand, is a system of self-governing citizens that moves away from a structure of political elites and acknowledges a communal mindset and works to develop a civic relationship.

There are two distinct aspects of the civic relationship. First, the “democratic community, defined by the participation of free, active, self-governing citizens in the creation of their common future...” The second aspect of the civic relationship is “the democratic citizen as the participant in a self-governing democratic community.” This relationship is founded around civic education, leadership, religion, and patriotism, but is limited by scale and the uncertainty of the public vision for the future.²⁵ Barber argues that much of the problem of scale can be circumvented by using new advances in technology. He suggests the introduction of video, telephone, and mail services that would allow increased participation by an increased number of people. John Naisbitt argues, “we created a representative system over two hundred years ago when it was the practical way to organize democracy. Direct citizen participation was simply not feasible, so we elected people to go off to the state capitals, represent us, vote, and come back and tell us what happened.” With the advances in telecommunications and computer technology, “we know as much about what’s going on as our representatives and we know it just as quickly. The fact is we have outlived the historical usefulness of representative democracy and we all sense intuitively that it is obsolete.”²⁶

In a manner reminiscent of Rousseau, Barber argues for participation in place of representation. Barber argues that “the voter is free only on the day he casts his

²⁵ Barber, Benjamin. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 217.

²⁶ Abramson, Jeffrey B., *The Electronic Commonwealth: The Impact of New Media Technologies on Democratic Participation* (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1988), 164.

ballot...[and] equality falls into the box with the ballot.” He continues, representative democracy is neither democratic nor even political for that matter, as “politics becomes what politicians do; what citizens do (when they do anything) is vote for politicians.”²⁷ In his *Social Contract* Rousseau argues, “the cooling off of patriotism, the activity of private interests, the largeness of the state, the abuse of government: these have suggested the route of using deputies of representatives of the people in the nation’s assemblies...Once public service ceases to be the chief business of the citizen,...the state is already near its ruin.”²⁸ In liberal democracy, George Benello argues, “politics is basically the same as the approach to economics. The liberal individualistic’s view of political man...sees him as a passive political consumer, casting his vote in the market place of political figures and ideas, much as economic man is viewed as a passive economic consumer, seeking to maximize his gain.” Moreover, “social interaction is seen in terms of tradeoffs and bargaining between *interest groups* [emphasis added]...whose interests are ultimately irreconcilable and capable only of being compromised.”²⁹ The solution to this problem of representation lies in direct participatory behavior. Benello continues, “the value of the face-to-face group, hence, lies in the ability to nurture and integrate individual needs rather than, as in the case of bureaucratic schools and factories, reshaping the individual to meet the needs of the institution. Worthwhile group action not only nurtures the social nature or the self, but carries forth significant human tasks requiring coordination and joint effort.”³⁰

²⁷ Barber, op. cit., 146.

²⁸ Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. *The Basic Political Writings*. Trans. Donald A. Cress. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1987), 197-198.

²⁹ Bennello, George C. “Group Organization and Socio-Political Structure.” *The Case for Participatory Democracy: Some Prospects for a Radical Society*. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971), 40.

³⁰ *Ibid*, 40-41.

Postmaterial values, as we learn from Inglehart, tend toward tolerance, trust, ecological concern, and other issues of personal and communal well being. George Benello and Dimitrios Roussopoulos envisage a system of participatory democracy as a system that is committed to the full dissemination of power, whether political, bureaucratic or corporate, to those affected by it. This later incarnation of democracy is beyond what is likely realistic in industrial and post-industrial democracies. Though I do not wish to abandon hope that a highly engaged citizenry could establish a system that Benello and Roussopoulos envision, I am more concerned here with not fully abandoning or attacking liberal democracy, but rather exploring how the postmaterialist shift might correct some of the “thinness” problems of this mode of democracy. That is to say, how will the postmaterialist shift impact liberal democracy and how will it influence change in the interactions between citizens and the state.

Barber argues that we must rid ourselves of this “thin” democracy and “take ourselves seriously as citizens...for democracy can only survive as strong democracy, secured not by great leaders but by competent, responsible citizens. Effective dictatorships require great leaders. Effective democracies need great citizens.”³¹ In response to the “thinness” of liberal democracy Barber lays out a plan for “strong,” participatory democracy that, as he argues, portrays man as existing in a community of equals and not as atomistic individuals in search of personal pacification.

Throughout the literature on political participation and radical democracy, public discourse is a central aspect and is crucial to education and decision making. Rousseau posits,

³¹Barber, op.cit., xvii.

When a sufficiently informed populace deliberates...the general will would always result from the large number of small differences and the deliberation would always be good. But when intrigues and partial associations come into being at the expense of the large association, the will of each of the associations becomes general in relation to its members...For the general will to be articulated, it is important that there should be no partial society in the state and that each citizen make up his own mind. There precautions are the only effective way of bringing it about that the general will is always enlightened and that the populace is not tricked.³²

Public disputes and conflicts must be subjected to “a never ending process of deliberation, decision making, and action.”³³ Strong democracy is about participation and community, that is to say, it is about citizenship.

Participatory Values

A set of values are present in participatory and radical democratic literature that make up my conception of strong or participatory democracy. Among the concepts of participatory democracy are interest in politics, approval of social movements, lack of confidence in national government, lack of confidence in parties, and belief in government openness.³⁴ This list of concepts is not exhaustive, but rather serves as a starting point for evaluating change in value orientations in relation to a set of concepts associated, in the literature, with participatory modes of democracy.

³² Rousseau, op.cit.

³³ Barber, Benjamin. *Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age*. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984), 151.

³⁴ See Inglehart, *Silent Revolution*; Barnes, Samuel H. and Max Kaase et al. *Political Action: Mass Participation in Five Western Democracies*. (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1979); Fuchs and Klingemann, op. cit.; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*; Curtin, D.M. “Transparency and Political Participation in EU Governance: A Role for Civil Society?” *Cultural Values*. 3:4 (Oct. 1999): 445-472; Lodge, Juliet. “Transparency in Democratic Legitimacy.” *Journal of Common Market Studies*. 32:3 (Sept. 1999): 343-369; Pharr, Susan, Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton. “A Quarter-Century of Declining Confidence: Trouble in Advanced Democracies?” *Journal of Democracy* 11:2 (2000): 5-25.

Political apathy, Klingemann and Fuchs suggest, is the absence of political interest and political action.³⁵ Politically apathetic citizens are not likely to engage in direct participation. It is the combination of political interest and political action that are necessary for direct participation. Low levels of political interest might lead someone to the voting booth, but it is unlikely to lead them to a picket line or to occupy a building. Barnes and Kaase suggest, it is the knowledge of possible means of political participation coupled with interest in politics, political sophistication and ideological conceptualization, that are important in political action.³⁶ A high level of political interest, then, is necessary, in combination with voluntary political action, for direct participation.

Participatory values of trust in government and parties have seen a decline in past decades. Of importance to this paper is the notion that declining trust levels in parties and government lead to changes in the relationship between the citizen and the state. Elite challenging behavior and alternative political action may result from decreasing levels of trust in traditional government institutions. Prominent in the discussion of long-term trends in government/party trust is the argument that shifting political issues and orientations among the electorate is leading to a downward trend in levels of trust. Ola Listhaug points out,

The new politics argument can be divided into two parts. The first stresses that rising education levels, especially at the university level, increases the potential for cognitive competence which encourages political action and protest. Furthermore, enhanced political resources and skills among citizens will make them functionally independent of political parties. As parties constitute a principal institution for the integration of individuals into the political system, growing political independence, or anti-party feelings, in the electorate would have negative consequences for levels of political trust. The new politics arguments also contend that the issue agenda of the mass

³⁵ Klingemann and Fuchs, *op. cit.*

³⁶ Barnes and Kaase, *op. cit.*

publics of the economically advanced countries is increasingly dominated by questions which are not reflected in current political priorities. This will alienate citizens holding political values which do not agree with the goals of their governments. This question of 'new' versus 'old' values is frequently formulated as the conflict between materialist and postmaterialist value priorities, with the later issue preferences more strongly represented among groups which are not part of the political establishment.³⁷

Declining trust levels, at least theoretically, leads to alternative political activity.³⁸ This notion is central to my set of hypotheses which will emerge with support in a later chapter. Finally, social movements are seen as a response to declining levels of trust in advanced industrial democracies and as an alternative to conventional forms of participation.³⁹

The belief in government openness or transparency is a central component of a healthy democracy. It is also important to direct participation. D.M. Curtin argues that government transparency is central direct participation.⁴⁰ The ability of citizens to participate in open dialogue and the political process depends in large part on accessibility to both information held by the government and to the dialogue itself. Juliet Lodge posits, transparency and democracy provide ample opportunities for discussion and are central to a participatory culture.⁴¹ At very least, government openness provides an opportunity for citizens to hold government responsible, but I argue it also allows citizens an opportunity to engage directly in the political process.

³⁷ Listhaug, Ola. "The Dynamics of Trust in Politicians." *Citizens and the State: A Relationship Transformed*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 262.

³⁸ I define "alternative political activity" as participation outside the formal institutional structures of the state. This may be in the form of protesting, striking, occupying buildings or in showing support for established or newly developing social movements. The activities are termed "alternative," not because they happen infrequently or have not entered mainstream political culture, but because they are alternative to formal institutional structures of the state.

³⁹ Pharr, Susan J., Robert D. Putnam, and Russell J. Dalton. "A Quarter-Century of Declining Confidence: Trouble in Advanced Democracies?" *Journal of Democracy* 11:2 (2000), p. 6.

⁴⁰ Curtin, op.cit.

⁴¹ Lodge, op. cit.

Participatory Behavior

Values and behavior cannot necessarily be said to go hand-in-hand. Further, it is not the purpose of this paper to stop at establishing a link between participatory values and postmaterialist values. It is necessary to establish a link between participatory behavior and postmaterialist values. Ultimately, at least for participatory democracy to emerge, it is behavior and not values that will cause a true shift in civic and political institutions. Therefore, a number of participatory behaviors central to participatory democracy will be explored. These participatory behaviors include involvement in voluntary organizations, political “talk” or discussion, and participation in alternative political activity.⁴²

At the heart of strong democracy is *talk*; not speeches in the traditional sense of politics, but rather open discussion. Political talk is an exchange of ideas and interests, both individual and communal, where an equal exchange of talking and listening takes place to reformulate individual interests into community interests. Around this talk a sense of community forms and a common affection for the fellow citizen develops. A civic relationship develops around which this talk is carried out, education is promulgated, and citizenship bonds people together. People are no longer abstractions, but are individual citizens with great commonality and equality. Benello suggests, that through this process “the individual can learn to identify with larger areas of social purpose and in the process lose his dear of a consequent loss of personal identity, of being swamped in the larger whole. As the individual learns that he need not only be

⁴² See Benello, op. cit.; Barber, op. cit.; Klingemann and Fuchs, op. cit.; Young, Iris Marion. “Activist Challenges to Deliberative Democracy.” *Political Theory* 29:5 (Oct. 2001): 670-690.; Hicks, Darren. “The Promise of Deliberative Democracy.” *Rhetoric and Public Affairs* 5:2 (2002) 223-260; Dionne, E.J. et al., eds. *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship*. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003).

acted upon but can act upon the group and influence it...”⁴³ This idea of political “talk” or public deliberation, Hicks suggests, “if conceived with all of the complexity inherent in our actual talk rather than as a theoretically designed speech, can accommodate both dialogue and oppositional argument.”⁴⁴ Political talk, then, “always involves listening as well as speaking, feeling as well as thinking, and acting as well as reflecting. These characteristics are evident in and help explain the particular political functions of talk in a strong democratic system.”⁴⁵

Involvement in voluntary organizations and alternative political activity are also central to the idea of participatory democracy. Rousseau promoted the idea that direct participation through assemblies inside the boundaries of a nation-state was crucial, but there is political and civic action that must serve to balance this “talk.” Alternative political activity can be seen as activity outside of the traditional political institutions of the state. This can also be understood, at least in a general sense, as an informed citizenry accessing the system through alternative and increasingly necessary methods. As discussed above, Klingemann and Fuchs indicate that non-institutionalized or alternative political activity is the result of newly emerging demands by the citizens on the state. When the state is not highly responsive and citizens become increasingly intelligent, these citizens access the system in new ways; i.e. non-institutionalized political activity.⁴⁶ Benello sees alternative political action in a different, more radical and necessary light. He argues,

In the present system, representatives are free to listen only to those segments of their constituency that can buy re-elections. It has been likened (by

⁴³ Benello, *op. cit.*, 41.

⁴⁴ Hicks, *op. cit.*, 254.

⁴⁵ Barber, *op. cit.*, 178.

⁴⁶ Klingemann and Fuchs, *op. cit.*, 18.

Christian Bay) to a system wherein medical treatment is given first and foremost to the healthiest, and only last to the most ill. When power, not need, is listened to, the political system is exactly that. The only way to be heard in such a situation is to create substitutes for existing power, following the formula that one is heard precisely to the degree that one's capacity for disruption and disturbance makes it expedient to respond.⁴⁷

It is not enough to talk about politics, though this is central, as discussed above. One must become engaged with the politics close to their lives, both physically and in impact. Additionally, it is important that a sense of community is formed in which individual interests dissolve and the community grows in importance. This is fostered through voluntary civic involvement.

Voluntary civic associations encourage participation in many ways and can be synergistic and beneficial to those involved. The value of association with civic groups and activity, it is suggested, "lies in its ability to nurture and integrate individual needs...The individual can learn to identify with larger areas of social purpose and in the process lose his fear of a consequent loss of personal identity, of being swamped by the larger whole."⁴⁸ Barber views civic engagement in a similar way suggesting that "civic activity educates individuals how to think publicly as citizens even as citizenship informs civic activity with the required sense of publicness and justice."⁴⁹ Voluntary associations, then, are the means by which people become able to associate personal interests with the group and eventually break down the notion of individual interest for community goodness.

This notion of strong or direct democracy may seem, at least to some, too much like the *general will*. I do not believe that the strong democrats introduced above have suggested the general will be imposed on society, but rather a community consciousness

⁴⁷ Bennello, op. cit., 48-49.

⁴⁸ Ibid, 41.

⁴⁹ Barber, op. cit., 152.

pursued with care through political talk, alternative political activity, and civic engagement. Stronger democracy requires much of the citizens and the state. We will explore the changing relationship between the citizen and the state for centuries to come, but let us begin here with the role of the postmaterialist shift on the future of democracy.

Chapter 3: Hypotheses and Methodology

Introduction

In this chapter a set of hypotheses related to value shifts in advanced industrial democracies of Western Europe and the United States will be introduced and explained. In addition, a general outline of the methodology employed to test this set of hypotheses will be introduced. Generally, I hypothesize that as postmaterialist values increase in the advanced industrial nations of Western Europe and the United States there will be an increase in participatory values and behaviors that are central to the formation of a stronger mode of democratic practice. As a means to establishing this, I hypothesize a set of relationships between postmaterial values and participatory democracy. Crosstabulation analysis and frequency outputs will be the main methods of analysis used for exploring how the postmaterialist shift influences values and behavior at the individual and societal levels, respectively. This analysis will be carried out in two stages of analysis. First, individual level associations between Postmaterialists and participatory values and behaviors will be explored. Second, societal level trends based on frequency output will be evaluated to determine if a relative increase in the number of Postmaterialists in a given society corresponds with increases in participatory values and behaviors.

This paper does not argue that a shift towards postmaterialist values will lead to the emergence of a participatory mode of democracy. However, I posit that a foundation of values and behaviors must be in place for the emergence of a more participatory mode of democracy to develop. More importantly, I believe that, as a result of societal wide changes in value orientation towards postmaterial values, new demands will be placed on the state, thus changing the relationship between citizen and the state. It is the changing

dynamics between civil society and the formal institutions of the state that give hope for more direct participation by the citizenry in the future in advanced industrial democracies.

While some have argued the transition to a stronger form of democracy should be revolutionary, I contend, along the lines of cultural theorists, including Inglehart, that “[political] culture *cannot* be changed overnight.⁵⁰ One may change the rulers and the laws, but to change basic aspects of the underlying culture generally takes many years.”⁵¹ In this case, I argue that over time values central to participatory democracy fall into popular favor thus laying the groundwork for political transition. This shift, if it does occur, will take place as an evolution rather than a revolution. Some evidence for the emergence of these values and practices central to participatory democracy may be found through the evaluation of time-series data from the WVS. Evaluating time-series data allows evidence, if present, to emerge, of an evolutionary change in the nature of civic and political values.⁵²

Hypotheses

Two hypotheses will be tested in this thesis. The first hypothesis tests individual level associations between Postmaterialists and participatory values and behaviors. The second hypothesis looks at societal level trends to determine if an increase in the relative

⁵⁰ For “revolution” as a means of culture change see Lens, Sidney. “The Road to Power and Beyond.” *The Case for Participatory Democracy: Some Prospects for a Radical Society*. eds. C George Benello and Dimitrios Russopolos. (New York: The Viking Press, 1971).

⁵¹ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 19.

⁵² Of great interest for this research are the values and behavior of Postmaterialists. Unfortunately, a lack of panel data makes exploring hypotheses related to individual respondents impossible. It is not possible to track behavior and value changes in individual respondents and therefore attention is directed to individual and societal level analysis of associations and general trends in society as relative numbers of Postmaterialists increase or decrease over time.

number of Postmaterialists is linked to increases in participatory values and behavior. It is important to look at both values and behaviors, because evidence has shown that, at least in the American context, attitudes and actions do not always correspond.⁵³ Changing attitudes among a citizenry may not be enough to evoke some response from the current political institutions. However, pressure via direct political participation through institutional or non-institutional means may provoke a response in the form of institutional change from the state. We might, then, need to look at non-institutionalized political behavior and civic engagement as a catalyst for change in society.

Not only are more demands being made to actors within traditional political institutions, but “with regard to the relationship between citizens and intermediary actors, we expect a weakening of the attachment of citizens to political parties and interest groups – the two major types of traditional collective actors.”⁵⁴ Hence, this thesis looks at the way in which society copes with changing concerns, whether through traditional democratic institutions or using radical participatory methods. It has been suggested that “non-institutionalized forms of participation are more effective for attaining specific political goals, than institutionalized involvement. This, with the emergence of new issues demands, one expects participation in elections to decline and involvement in non-institutionalized forms of political involvement to increase.”⁵⁵ Thus, this thesis hypothesizes increased participation in response to changing dynamics in society as postmaterial values and education increase among Western democratic societies. Therefore, this paper tests the following hypotheses:

⁵³ Skocpol, Theda. “Will September 11 Revitalize Democracy?” *United We Serve: National Service and the Future of Citizenship*. eds. Dionne, E.J., Kayla Meltzer Drogosz, and Robert E. Litan. (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2003).

⁵⁴ Klingemann and Fuchs, op. cit., 14.

⁵⁵ Klingemann and Fuchs, op. cit., 18.

1) Postmaterial values are positively associated with increased participatory behavior and greater acceptance of participatory value orientations. These participatory behaviors, it is expected, will increasingly take place outside traditional political institutions.⁵⁶

2) As the relative number of Postmaterialists increases in a society there will be an increase in the importance in that society placed on the behaviors and values associated with participatory modes of democracy.

The relationship between Postmaterialists and those values central to participatory democracy is expected to be positive. Additionally, the relationship between the Postmaterialist and participatory behavior is expected to be positive. Further, as more people in a given society develop postmaterialist values, the greater the increase will be in direct participatory action outside of traditional institutions. This is a theory that must be left to future generations that will see greater relative numbers of Postmaterialists who will have a deeper and broader impact on institutions and culture. I do not posit that because a society has more Postmaterialists than Materialists it will necessarily adopt a mode of participatory democracy. In fact, as Inglehart and other cultural theorists suggest, “culture [political, economic and social] *cannot* be changed overnight...An awareness of the fact that deep-rooted values are not easily changed is essential to any realistic and effective program of social change.”⁵⁷ However, it is expected that as values central to participatory democracy fall into popular favor a foundation will be laid for

⁵⁶ This hypothesis has been supported as recently as 2004. Ronald Inglehart and Gabriela Catterberg provide evidence from the 1999-2001 wave of the World Values Survey that suggests an upward trend in alternative political activity from as far back as the first wave of the survey. See Inglehart, Ronald and Gabriela Catterberg. “Trends in Political Action: The Developmental Trend and the Post-Honeymoon Decline.” *Islam, Gender, Culture, and Democracy*. ed. Inglehart, Ronald (Ontario: de Sitter Publications, 2004).

⁵⁷ Inglehart, op. cit., 19.

political transition towards greater citizen involvement in the political decision-making process.

The relationships between postmaterialist values and participatory democracy are grounded in a theoretical framework developed from literature. Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of needs suggests that as one need is met higher needs emerge. Human behavior, he suggests, is motivated by unsatisfied needs.⁵⁸ As lower level needs, materialist needs, to use the language of Inglehart, are met, higher needs become more salient. As previously discussed, higher level needs are elicited by responses to the 4 and 12-item index developed by Inglehart.⁵⁹ Inglehart has tested the validity of this measure and has shown that Postmaterialists are more likely than Materialists to identify a certain set of "higher level" needs as important.⁶⁰ Klingemann and Fuchs suggest, "it seems obvious to regard greater participation in political decision-making processes as the political expression of the general value of self-actualization. The emergence of new participation demands can, therefore, be seen as one consequence of the increasing importance of individual self-actualization."⁶¹ Additionally, as people spend less time meeting lower level needs, such as food, shelter and security, more time will be available to pursue civic education and engagement. Therefore, it is expected that participation will become the method by which society copes with the problems of risk and of elite-directed democracy.

As Inglehart pointed out 25 years ago, "Increasingly, [citizens] are more likely to demand participation in *making* major decisions, not just a voice of selecting the

⁵⁸ Maslow, Abraham. *Motivation and Personality*. 2nd ed. (Harper and Row, 1970).

⁵⁹ Materialist/Postmaterialist Values (4-item index): [v1000], (12-item index): [v1010], ICSPR 2790; (4-item index): [v378], (12-item index): [v379], ICSPR 6160

⁶⁰ Inglehart and Abramson, op. cit.

⁶¹ Klingemann and Fuchs, op. cit., 16-17.

decision-makers...mass politics are increasingly apt to be elite-challenging rather than elite directed...Special skills are prerequisite to playing an effective role in the politics of an extended political community. Consequently, rising levels of political skills should enable Western publics to participate at a higher level.”⁶² It is these skills that are able to be developed in times of relative economic and physical security; the same time in which postmaterialist values are able to develop. This suggests that as postmaterial values develop, citizens develop the skills necessary to access the political decision-making process. In time, these skills, combined with newly emerging value orientations, lead to behaviors that bring into question the responsiveness of formal political institutions. Klingemann and Fuchs follow the same line of argument, suggesting that a “reason for the emergence of new participation demands is the increase in personal skills...The more highly people evaluate their competence in a given field, the more likely they are to attain goals in this field through their own efforts.”⁶³

Mass direct participation in advanced industrial and post-industrial democracies, because of the complexity of many issues, may not develop in the form of every citizen being engaged in every decision. The future of participation, however, if my theory is correct, will encompass greater civic involvement and political engagement where citizens are able to enter the decision-making process for those issues most salient to their lives. This participatory response has not played out in societies, but the foundation that I seek to identify, the foundation of participatory values, lays the groundwork for a future of participatory democracy.

⁶² Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, 6.

⁶³ Klingemann and Fuchs, *op. cit.*, 17.

Sample

The selection of countries for evaluation is based mainly on the nations' level of economic and political advancement. The postmodern phase follows a long modernization process that is characterized by industrialization and advanced industrialization in the form of high-technology and service based economies. The states of Western Europe and the United States were among the first in the world to undergo industrialization thus providing fertile grounds for the postmodernization process to build upon. As a result of increased economic and political stability over time, the societies of North America and Western Europe have developed the characteristics of post-industrialism. Time and space limit the breadth of my research and I must therefore limit the number of nations surveyed in my efforts to establish trends in value and behavior shifts in advanced democracies. Thus, of primary focus in this paper are those countries that are advanced industrial democracies in the West mentioned above.

The European Union with the addition of Norway and Switzerland was my starting point for selecting Western European countries for analysis of the postmaterialist value shift.⁶⁴ Norway and Switzerland were added to the list of possible countries because of their central, though independent, importance as oil and financial powers, respectively, to Western Europe. A number of limits have reduced the list of countries to

⁶⁴ The European Union, at the time of this paper, includes Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Denmark, Britain, Ireland, Greece, Luxembourg, Belgium, France, Austria, Italy, Spain, and Portugal. Greece and Luxembourg are not within the scope of the WVS and cannot be included in this analysis. Austria and Portugal have limited data on a number of key variables and for this reason were not included in the analysis. The decision to use European Union countries stems from the level of economic and political advancement in that set of countries. Norway and Switzerland opted out of the European Union, but are still important states in Western Europe and may prove valuable in my analysis. I have chosen not to use the new member states (those states that will join the union in 2004) or the applicant states. These states have a political history that would require too in-depth an analysis to make sense of any statistical evidence that is presented. The length of this paper prohibits me from evaluating the whole of Europe and the available data have limited me in across time comparisons for more than a handful of states.

be evaluated to six. A primary limitation on the countries selected for this study is the available data. The WVS provides data on 43 countries around the world. However, only 24 were surveyed in the first wave of the WVS. Of these countries only 13 are member states of the European Union. Among these only West Germany, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Britain, and Spain were represented in all three waves of the WVS. Therefore, this non-random sample of Western European states will be used to provide additional evidence of trends in postmaterial value orientations and the relationship of those values to participatory democracy.

Methodology

To test the set of hypotheses presented above, I will work with three waves of the *World Values Survey, 1980-1984, 1990-1993, 1995-1997* (ICPSR 2790) and the two waves of the *World Values Survey, 1980-1984, 1990-1993* (ICPSR 6160).⁶⁵ I will test the hypotheses, as postmaterialist values increase in a society there will be an increase in the importance in that society placed on the concepts associated with participatory modes of democracy and Postmaterialists are more likely to have been and to be engaged in civic and political activity than Materialists. In general, I will begin with crosstabulation analysis of the postmaterialist index and indicators from the WVS that operationalize the

⁶⁵ World Values Survey 2790 and World Values Survey 6160 will be jointly referred to as WVS. In the WVS 2790 Codebook, Inglehart describes the WVS as a “series designed to enable cross-national comparison of values and norms on a wide variety of topics to monitor changes in values and attitudes across the globe...Broad topics covered were work, personal finances, the economy, politics, allocation of resources, contemporary social issues, technology and its impact on society, and traditional values...Respondents were also queried about their attitudes toward religion, morality, politics, sexual freedom, marriage, single parenting, child-rearing, and the importance of work, family, politics, and religion in their lives...Respondents’ opinions of various forms of political action, the most important aims for their countries, confidence in various civil and governmental institutions, and whether they would fight in a war for their country were also solicited.” The WVS proves an invaluable resource for secondary data analysis regarding the hypotheses of this thesis.

values central to participatory democracy. I will continue with analysis of aggregated frequency distributions for 16 Western Europe, similar distributions for six states of Western Europe, and distributions for the United States to evaluate societal level links between a shift in the relative number of Postmaterialists in society and in participatory values and behaviors. Support for my hypotheses will result from moderate positive relationships between the independent variable, 4- and 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist index and the selected dependent variables from the WVS.

When appropriate, I use Goodman and Kruskal's τ or the Somer's d statistics. Somer's d is used as an asymmetric measure of association meaning that the dependent and independent variable are known ahead of time. Somer's d is also a Proportional Reduction of Error statistic (PRE). PRE statistics allow the analyst to determine how well knowledge of one variable improves the prediction of the second variable. If the independent and dependent variables are unrelated, knowledge of the first variable would not allow the analyst to reduce the number of errors estimating the second variable. The more closely a PRE statistic approaches 1.00 the fewer the estimation errors that will occur. Conversely, a PRE statistic of 0.00 indicates no relationship between the two variables.⁶⁶ The measure of association used for ordinal level associations is Somer's d. Goodman and Kruskal's τ is used for the cases in which the dependent variable was measured or indexed at the nominal level. This measure, like the measure of association used for ordinal level associations, is an asymmetric measure of association and a PRE statistic.

⁶⁶ Blalock, Hubert M. *Social Statistics*. Revised 2nd ed. Boston: WCB McGraw-Hill, 1979, p308-311, p442-443, and Knoke, David, George W. Bohrnstedt, and Alisa Potter Mee. *Statistics for Social Data Analysis*. 4th ed. (Itasca, Illinois: F.E. Peacock Publishers, 2002).

Analysis will be carried out in two distinct phases. The first stage of analysis will explore individual level associations for all 16 countries for from Western Europe (West Germany, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Britain, Spain, the Netherlands, Iceland, Denmark, Ireland, N. Ireland, Belgium, France, East Germany, and Italy), the six country Western European sample, and the United States. It is believed that the variables included in this analysis will be related to postmaterialism as a part of a more general value orientation in post-industrial democracies. Therefore, trends in value orientations should be similar between the United States and Western Europe and among states in Western Europe. The second stage of analysis will evaluate general trends in societal level data for the same countries used in the first stage of analysis. It is believed that general trends in the level of postmaterialism in a given country will follow the same general trend in other value and behavior orientations.

Chapter 4: **Participatory Democracy in Western Europe and the United States**

This chapter will begin with an evaluation of relationships between postmaterialism and higher levels of direct participation and acceptance of participatory behaviors at the individual level of analysis. Then, frequency distributions will be employed to map societal level linkages between a rise in the relative number of Postmaterialists in a society and societal shifts towards values of participatory democracy. Finally, evidence will be presented indicating that at both the individual and the societal level, postmaterialism is in fact linked with an increase in behavior associated with a more participatory mode of democracy.

Postmaterialism and Participatory Democracy

The strongest and most consistent association found was between postmaterial values and alternative political activity. Variables that conceptualized participatory behavior provided some interesting evidence of a relationship to postmaterial values. Among the statistically significant relationships are alternative political activity, voluntary political organization involvement, and discussing politics. Table 4.1 shows the relationship between Alternative Political Activity and the 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist index for Western Europe and the United States. The WVS 1995-1997 asked respondents to indicate which activities they have done or would be willing to do; options included signing a petition, joining a boycott, attending lawful demonstrations, joining unofficial strikes, and occupying buildings.⁶⁷ The hypothesis presented in Chapter 3 suggests that a positive relationship exists between postmaterial

⁶⁷ The full question set for each operationalized variable can be found in Appendix 1.

values and increased participation and participatory value orientations. This relationship is clear in Table 4.1, which shows Postmaterialists in Western Europe are 44 percent more likely than Materialists to be engaged in two or more alternative political activities; Postmaterialists in the United States are 54.3 percent more likely than Materialists to be engaged in alternative political activities at the same level as their counterparts in Western Europe. Certainly, these increased likelihoods of participation by Postmaterialists to be involved in these alternative activities makes vividly clear the relationship between postmaterialism and increased participation.

Table 4.1 Alternative Political Activity: Western Europe and U.S.

	Materialist		Mixed		Postmaterialist	
	0	1	2	3	4	5
Western Europe						
No Activities	56.8	46.5	39.6	33.1	28.4	13.5
One Activity	32.3	38.5	41	40.2	34.6	31.6
Two or more Activities	11	15	19.3	26.7	37	55
N=7760	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .186 sig. = .000			
United States						
No Activities	44.1	33.1	29.5	25.5	13	7.3
One Activity	46.3	48.2	48.7	46.9	47.8	29.1
Two or more Activities	9.3	18.7	21.8	27.7	39.1	63.6
N=1318	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .174 sig. = .000			

Western Europe is comprised of East and West Germany, Sweden, the Netherlands, Finland, Norway, Iceland, Denmark, Switzerland, Britain, Ireland, Northern Ireland, Belgium, France, Italy, and Spain.

Of great importance to this paper is the clear and consistent link between postmaterialism and alternative political activity. Alternative political activity can be seen as activity outside the traditional political institutions. It can also be understood, at least in a general sense, as an informed citizenry accessing the system through alternative and increasingly necessary methods, because, as Klingemann and Fuchs indicate, non-institutionalized or alternative political activity is the result of newly emerging demands by the citizens on the state. When the state is not highly responsive and citizens become increasingly postmaterial, these citizens access the system in new ways; i.e. non-

institutionalized political activity.⁶⁸ From the data, it is clear that there is a relationship between the Materialist/Postmaterialist value orientations and alternative political activity. The empirical link between postmaterialism and alternative political activity along with its substantive importance makes this variable one of great interest for this paper. Evidence from a six nation non-random sample provides additional support for an increase in alternative political activity as the relative number of Postmaterialists increases in society.⁶⁹

As Table 4.2 indicates, alternative political activity provides significant support for the hypotheses proposed in this paper. Not only is this indicator associated with the postmaterial value orientation in the United States and Western Europe as a whole, it holds up in each of the six nations selected for further analysis. Table 4.2 shows that in Britain, West Germany, Spain, Finland, Norway, and Sweden Postmaterialists are 46.6, 43.3, 31.2, 31.4, 58.1, and 54.1 percent more likely than Materialists in those societies to be engaged in two or more alternative political activities, respectively. Substantively, alternative political activity is important to the analysis of increasing participatory behavior. This type of behavior is both politically direct and outside the formal institutional structures of the state. This indicates that citizens are taking a more direct role in politics on their own, outside of the formal structures of the state, thus supporting the notion of elite-challenging behavior.

⁶⁸ Klingemann and Fuchs, *op. cit.*, 18.

⁶⁹ A six nation non-random sample was taken from Western Europe as a means of exploring further the strongest relationships established throughout this paper. Norway, Finland, and Sweden were selected because Nordic countries often have higher levels of postmaterial value orientations within their societies. Germany was selected as a major Germanic influenced continental power, Spain was selected as a Latin influenced European power, and Britain was selected because of its unique relationship to Western Europe.

Table 4.2 Alternative Political Activity: Six Nations

		0	1	2	3	4	5			0	1	2	3	4	5
Britain	0 Act	36.8	29.8	24.4	17.4	15.7	6.9	Finland	0 Act	84.6	67.6	60.3	49.8	44.2	18.8
	1 Act	48.7	54.7	54.6	54.7	54.2	31.9		1 Act	7.7	22.9	29.1	30.6	30.4	42.2
	2+ Act	14.5	15.6	21	27.9	30.1	61.1		2+ Act	7.7	9.5	10.6	19.6	25.4	39.1
	N=1289 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .170 sig. = .000								N=830 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .203 sig. = .000						
W. Germany		0	1	2	3	4	5	Norway		0	1	2	3	4	5
	0 Act	46.7	52.9	36.1	28	20.7	9.8		0 Act	52.8	44.5	33.7	24.6	13.7	15.4
	1 Act	40	32.2	47.9	45.3	35.4	33.6		1 Act	36.1	40.2	40.9	41.2	35.3	15.4
	2+ Act	13.3	14.9	16	26.7	43.9	56.6		2+ Act	11.1	15.2	25.3	34.2	51	69.2
N=911 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .269 sig. = .000							N=1086 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .225 sig. = .000								
Spain		0	1	2	3	4	5	Sweden		0	1	2	3	4	5
	0 Act	83.6	79.9	74.9	67.9	64.2	27.7		0 Act	37	26.3	26.4	18.9	17.7	11.1
	1 Act	9.1	13	17.2	15.7	14.9	33.8		1 Act	48.1	47.4	34.7	33.5	22.8	20
	2+ Act	7.3	7.1	7.9	16.4	20.9	38.5		2+ Act	14.8	26.3	38.9	47.6	59.5	68.9
N=955 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .158 sig. = .000							N=880 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .182 sig. = .000								

Previous analysis of voluntary organizations, which included church or religious organizations, sports or recreation organizations, art, music, or education organization, professional associations, charitable organizations, and other voluntary organizations, indicated no relationship between Postmaterialists and such civic engagement. By controlling for voluntary organizations with greater political motivations such as political parties, local community action groups, third world development of human rights groups, ecology organizations, women's groups, peace movements, animal rights groups, and voluntary organizations focused on health, a clear relationship presents itself.

Similar to alternative activity, voluntary activity is a form of direct involvement that is expected to be positively associated with postmaterial values. This, however, does not seem to be the case when including all types of voluntary activity in the analysis. There is a great theoretical difference between involvement in a church or civic group versus involvement in a political party or interest group, for example. A bowling league or choral group strengthens civil society, while doing little for increasing political

participation. The Sierra Club, People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, or the League of Women Voters may build social capital but at the same time are much more likely to increase political participation. While each activity is an important component of building social capital, the relevant question here is how a society's social capital is put to use?

Membership in politically motivated voluntary organizations is, however, positively associated, with relative similarity, to the postmaterial value orientation in both Western Europe and the United States. The WVS 1990-1993 asks,

Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?

- v23 E) Political parties or groups
- v24 F) Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality
- v25 G) Third world development or human rights
- v26 H) Conservation, the environment, ecology
- V 30 L) Women's groups
- V 31 M) Peace movement
- V 32 N) Animal rights
- V 33 O) Voluntary organizations concerned with health

Table 4.3 Membership in Politically Motivated Voluntary Organizations: Western Europe and U.S.

	Materialist		Mixed		Postmaterialist	
Western Europe	0	1	2	3	4	5
No Membership	83.4	82.1	80.2	77.1	72.8	61.3
1-2 Memberships	12.9	13.4	14.6	15.4	17	20.3
3+ Memberships	3.7	4.5	5.2	7.5	10.1	18.5
N=18940	x2 = .000		Somers's d = .065 sig. = .000			
United States	0	1	2	3	4	5
No Membership	73.4	70.9	71	65.6	57.3	37.7
1-2 Memberships	16	18.1	17.8	21.6	21.3	22.6
3+ Memberships	10.7	11.1	11.2	12.7	21.3	39.6
N=1688	x2 = .000		Somers's d = .079 sig. = .000			

The relationship between discussing politics and postmaterial values was also statistically significant in the expected direction. The WVS 1995-1997 asked respondents how frequently, if ever, they discussed politics. Table 4.4 demonstrates the relationship between the 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist index and the frequency of discussing politics. For reasons suggested in Chapter 2, discussion of politics is central to participatory democracy. It is discussion of politics that allows the exchange of ideas and interests, both individual and communal. Discussion of politics can foster the development of community and a common affection for the fellow citizen, can increase social capital and is another form of direct participation. A civic relationship develops around which this talk is carried out, education is promulgated, and citizenship bonds people together. The centrality of political discussion to strong democracy cannot be overlooked.

Table 4.4 Discussing Politics: Western Europe and U.S.

	Materialist		Mixed		Postmaterialist	
	0	1	2	3	4	5
Western Europe						
Never	33.3	27.9	26.1	23.2	18.6	10
Occasionally	52.4	56.3	57.7	58.5	60.9	60
Frequently	14.3	15.7	16.2	18.3	20.5	30
N=8455	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .085 sig. = .000			
United States						
Never	30.6	31.2	29.9	21.7	21.6	9.1
Occasionally	61.3	57.3	55.9	60.5	58.9	52.7
Frequently	8.1	11.5	14.2	17.8	19.5	38.2
N=1418	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .106 sig. = .000			

Each of the six nations in the subset of Western Europe reached statistical significance on the variable discussing politics. The relationships in each of these countries are substantively significant for this research. Tables 4.5 highlights the relationship between the 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist index and discussing politics.

Table 4.5 Discussing Politics

		0	1	2	3	4	5								
Britain	Never	31.7	32.5	39.7	34	28.5	18.4	Finland	Never	10.7	25.6	21.6	14.7	14.6	8.2
	Occasion	51.2	56.7	48	51.9	54.2	52.6		Occasion	78.6	57.9	65	67.1	62.8	53.1
	Frequent	17.1	10.8	12.3	14.1	17.3	28.9		Frequent	10.7	16.5	13.4	18.2	22.6	38.8
	N=1388 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .056 sig. = .000								N=946 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .100 sig. = .000						
		0	1	2	3	4	5			0	1	2	3	4	5
W.Germany	Never	59.7	59.6	51.1	37.9	34.6	20	Norway	Never	29.6	29.2	34.2	27.1	24.9	13.2
	Occasion	34.3	32.6	38.1	47.7	52.9	48.6		Occasion	66.7	63.7	57.5	67.1	66.5	72.1
	Frequent	6	7.8	10.8	14.5	12.4	31.4		Frequent	3.7	7.1	8.2	5.7	8.6	14.7
	N=1107 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .173 sig. = .000								N=904 x ² = .046 Somer's d = .068 sig. = .003						
		0	1	2	3	4	5			0	1	2	3	4	5
Spain	Never	33.3	16	14.7	11.6	5.2	0.8	Sweden	Never	27	16.3	12.8	14.5	8.7	0
	Occasion	46.7	62.4	61	65.5	65.4	66.4		Occasion	62.2	65.7	71.5	60.4	66.3	48.7
	Frequent	20	21.6	24.2	22.9	29.4	32.8		Frequent	10.8	18.1	15.8	25.1	25	51.3
	N=959 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .103 sig. = .000								N=1108 x ² = .000 Somer's d = .104 sig. = .000						

The relationship between postmaterialism and frequently discussing politics, the relationship between postmaterialism and alternative political activity, and the relationship between postmaterialism and voluntary political activity are statistically significant in the expected direction as well as substantively significant. These associations support the most important arguments I have made throughout this paper; the nature of the relationship between citizens and the state is undergoing a change and that more direct participation through non-institutionalized activity is emerging as the relative number of Postmaterialists increases in societies. It is this change that will allow, over time, Postmaterialists to introduce characteristics into social and political practice that draw the citizens into the political process.

Postmaterialism and Participatory Values

The World Values Survey 1981-1984 and 1990-1993 provide a number of indicators of direct participatory values that are not provided on the more recent version

of the WVS. Additional support for my initial hypothesis can be found in these data. Using them, I wish to take a look at a set of participatory values that may be of interest when evaluating the association between postmaterial values and direct participatory values. This new set of participatory values includes interest in politics, approval of a specific set of social movements, and belief in the idea of government openness. With few exceptions, the data suggest a number of clear associations between postmaterialism and this second set of participatory values and behavior. Initial hypotheses indicate expected positive relationships between postmaterialist values and participatory behavior and values. These hypotheses are supported, to varying degrees, in the analysis. This continues to add support to the notion that postmaterial values are linked with greater acceptance of participatory values and behavior.

Table 4.6 Political Interest: Western Europe and U.S.

Western Europe	0	1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	30.6	25.1	24.2	23.8	18.8	13
Not very	32.1	29.9	29.2	28.4	26.3	20.6
Somewhat	28.3	33.4	33.4	34.3	36.9	39.7
Very	9.1	11.7	13.2	13.6	18	26.6
N=19922	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .086 sig. = .000			
United States	0	1	2	3	4	5
Not at all	11.3	13.2	13	8.7	10.2	7.5
Not very	33.9	27.1	28.3	24.7	17.7	17
Somewhat	41.7	46.4	45.5	49.3	43.5	39.6
Very	13.1	13.2	13.2	17.4	28.6	35.8
N=1670	x ² = .000		Somers's d = .092 sig. = .000			

Interest in politics is an important component of participatory behavior. Lacking an interest in politics almost certainly indicates lack of desire to participate in politics.

People are not likely to become engaged in an activity about which they show very little interest. Postmaterial values showed a positive relationship with level of political interest in both Western Europe and the United States. Respondents were asked to report their level of political interest in the following question.

How interested would you say you are in politics?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
9. Don't know

Table 4.6 is evidence of the expected relationship between postmaterial values and political interest. Certainly, without the participatory value of political interest there is little hope for political action. Political apathy would be problematic in the growth of a stronger form of democracy. It is political interest, in combination with voluntary and alternative political activity, that lays a foundation for increased direct participation.

Support for social movements, including the ecology, anti-nuclear, disarmament, human rights, women's, and anti-apartheid movements shows a moderately strong relationship to postmaterialist values for both Western Europe and the United States. The WVS 1990-1993 asked respondents to indicate level of support for these social movements in the following question,

There are a number of groups and movements looking for public support. For each of the following movements, which I read out, can you tell me whether you approve (strongly or somewhat) or disapprove (strongly or somewhat) of this movement? READ OUT AND CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH Please use the responses on this card!

- v290 A) Ecology movement or nature protection
- v291 B) Anti-nuclear energy movement
- v292 C) Disarmament movement
- v293 D) Human rights movement at home or abroad
- v294 E) Women's movement
- v295 F) Anti-apartheid movement

Postmaterialists' support for social movements might be indicative of values and behavior that are meant to challenge the formal institutional response to these social issues, or more generally, the formal institutional structures. This association suggests, at least, the postmaterial value orientation is associated with values and behavior that question formal institutional structures and are used to articulate interests outside the traditional party structure. This is, again, support for the notion of elite-challenging behavior by way of more direct involvement is associated with postmaterialism. It also supports the notion that postmaterialism likely brings with it resistance to intermediary political actors such as parties.

**Table 4.7 Support for Social Movements:
Western Europe and U.S.**

	Materialist	Mixed	Postmat.
Western Europe	0	1	2
Support No Movements	2.1	1.3	0.3
Support 1 Movement	2.1	1.5	0.5
Support 2 Movements	4	3.1	1.6
Support 3 Movements	8.2	6.9	4.3
Support 4 Movements	13.8	12.5	9.2
Support 5 Movements	23.6	25.2	21.6
Support 6 Movements	46.3	49.4	62.5
N=18390 $\chi^2 = .000$ Somer's d = .121 sig. = .000			
United States	0	1	2
Support No Movements	1.3	1.6	0.3
Support 1 Movement	2.2	2.1	1.1
Support 2 Movements	4.7	3.2	3.6
Support 3 Movements	7.8	9.4	6
Support 4 Movements	17.7	16.4	11.2
Support 5 Movements	21.1	22.8	21.3
Support 6 Movements	45.3	44.5	56.6
N=1501 $\chi^2 = .019$ Somer's d = .093 sig. = .000			

Postmaterialism is associated in both Western Europe and the United States with a belief that government should be more open. The WVS asked respondents,

I am going to read out some statements about the government and the economy. For each one, could you tell me how much you agree (completely, somewhat, or neither) or disagree (completely or somewhat)? Please use the responses on this card.

B) Our government should be made much more open to the public.

An open society is necessary for citizens to be able to be involved directly in the political decision-making process. Openness of government is central to consensual politics and direct participation. Citizens must have access to information that is central to making informed decisions in order to participate or to question those who are in positions of making political decisions. Belief in government openness, then, can be related to a more far reaching belief of citizen involvement in making or overseeing decisions in government.⁷⁰

Throughout the individual level analysis, the 4- and 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist index produced similar trends for Western Europe and the United States. The evidence provided above suggests that postmaterial values are linked to greater participation and increased acceptance of participatory values. Additionally, the set of values and behaviors are characteristic of advanced industrialism and are likely to increase as the relative number of Postmaterialists increase in a given society.

⁷⁰ Analysis of individual nations within Western Europe produced very interesting trends on the variable of government openness. Though government openness was clearly positively associated with postmaterial values in Britain, West Germany, and Spain, the relationship did not hold up in the Scandinavian countries. This can be explained, at least in part, by the Nordic ideal of “corruption free society.” Transparency International reports that Finland, Sweden, and Norway are among the top five countries for high levels of transparency in government and society. These nations receive high ranking because of high levels of freedom of speech, open administration, transparency in political institutions, and consensual political systems which emphasize common problem solving. Additionally, Transparency International ranks these three countries among the top ten most globalized countries which are marked by low corruption, environmental friendliness, and high ranking on the United Nations’ Human Development Report. This is all driven by what is known as the Nordic philosophy for corruption free society based on a culture of ethicality, transparency and openness, public argumentation for reasons behind decisions, collective decision structure, low hierarchal structure, and Scandinavian welfare. Therefore, the norm is so fully accepted by the whole society that postmaterialism does not discriminate for open government. [Transparency International (2004). *Corruption Surveys and Indexes*. Retrieved March 23, 2004 from <http://www.transparency.org/surveys/index.html#dpi>.]

Table 4.8 Government Openness: Western Europe and U.S.

	Materialist	Mixed	Postmat.
Western Europe	0	1	2
Disagree Completely	0.7	0.6	0.2
Disagree Somewhat	4.5	4.4	2.2
Neither	11.7	8.8	6.6
Agree Somewhat	47.3	45.9	43.7
Agree Completely	35.7	40.3	47.4
N=19956 $\chi^2 = .000$ Somer's d = .087 sig. = .000			
United States	0	1	2
Disagree Completely	1.4	1	0.2
Disagree Somewhat	8.9	6.8	4.2
Neither	15.1	8.3	6.7
Agree Somewhat	52.4	50.1	41.7
Agree Completely	22.3	33.6	47.1
N=1750 $\chi^2 = .000$ Somer's d = .170 sig. = .000			


Trends at the Societal Level

Associations at the individual level give evidence for the relationship between the postmaterial value orientation and participatory values and behaviors. Linkages, not in the sense of a formal statistical relationship, but rather as representative of a more widespread general phenomenon within a given society, are expected between the relative number of Postmaterialists and those participatory values and behaviors for which an individual level association was found. In other words, it is expected that general trends in levels of direct participation and acceptance of participatory values will follow the same general trend in the relative number of Postmaterialists. Thus, the following analysis is based on frequency distributions for Postmaterialists and values and behaviors central to participatory democracy. Understanding the connection between level of Postmaterialists and participatory attitudes and behavior at the societal level highlights Inglehart's generational replacement theory and supports my notion that

increases in levels of postmaterialism correspond to increases in participatory values and behavior.

The Materialist/Postmaterialist index is expected to show an increase in the number of Postmaterialists over time for Western Europe and the United States. As Figure 4.9 demonstrates, for Western Europe there is an increase between the 1981-1984 wave and the 1990-1993 wave and again there is a slight increase between the 1990-1993 wave and the 1995-1997 wave. The slightness of increase between the second and third wave may be explained as due in part to the short time that passed between survey periods.

Figure 4.1 Materialist/Postmaterialist Index: Western Europe and United States



Inglehart's theory suggests that cultural shifts take place over time and are based on intergenerational population replacement. The time span between the middle year of the first wave and the middle year of the second wave is approximately ten years. The time span between the middle year of the second wave and the middle year of the third wave is approximately four years. The difference in population replacement between these waves may have reduced the relative number of Postmaterialists entering the population of Western Europe. Additional explanation may be found in the political uncertainty brought on by the disintegration of communism across Europe. It is understood that Postmaterialist values emerge as a response to economic and physical security. Insecurity in these areas caused by the fall of the "iron curtain" may also be influencing the slight increase in Postmaterialists in Western Europe. I am suggesting that it is both the short time span and environmental factors that led to the slight increase in Postmaterialists between waves two and three.

Additionally, the United States shows an increase across the two available waves of data for the Materialist/Postmaterialist index. It is difficult to infer back in time the level of Materialists and Postmaterialists with only two data points. Similar patterns at the individual level and some similarities at the societal level between the United States and Western Europe are cause to believe that the general trend in the increase in relative number of Postmaterialists in the United States between 1981 and 1998 was greater than suggested by the two wave trend provided in Figure 4.1

It might be helpful to look at the increase in Postmaterialists not between waves, but rather as a general trend from wave one to wave three. From wave one to wave three there is an increase in the percentage of Postmaterialists of 6.9 percent. If this trend

continues in Western Europe, it can be expected that Postmaterialists will increase by a little over 4 percent each decade. This trend, however, may differ by country, and certainly will reach a point of marginal return meaning that all members of society are not likely to become Postmaterialist. This increase will take place to a point, but will then slow down possibly undergoing up-and-down cycles based on periodic economic and political trends. Continued time-series analysis beyond the available data is necessary to evaluate this continued trend.


The level of Postmaterialists varies significantly between the countries in the Western European subset across the three waves and between the first and third wave. Spain, Finland, and Sweden saw a decline in the relative number of Postmaterialists between the second and third wave of the WVS, but as mentioned above, when we look at the increase over time between the first and third wave, there is a general trend in all six nations. Many explanations could be given for both the initial level of Postmaterialists in each nation and for the difference in the increase across time in the level of Postmaterialists. A number of explanations provided by Inglehart include, at the heart of the matter, economic and physical security. While short-term fluctuations persist in any country, the long-term trend towards postmaterialism holds up.⁷¹

Figure 4.2 shows the three wave trends for the percent of Postmaterialists in Britain, Finland, Norway, Spain, Sweden, and West Germany. Inglehart suggested that cycles of levels of Postmaterialists would be present across time because of short-term economic and political changes, but over time we would see a general upward trend as a society became more advanced. Figure 4.2 presents trend lines between the first and third wave for the same six countries discussed above. There was an upward trend in all

⁷¹ Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*, Chapter 5.

six Western European nations, however, the increase varied greatly; the relative number of Postmaterialists in Finland increased by only .01 percent across a 15 year period, while West Germany saw a 24 percent increase in the same time period.


Figure 4.2 Materialist/Postmaterialist Index: Six Nation



While there are data limitations in the number of variables analyzed at the individual level that can be explored at the societal level, a number of clear patterns did emerge. Of continued interest and importance in this paper is the link between postmaterial values and involvement in alternative political activity. Involvement in alternative political activity is linked to an increase in Postmaterialists for Western Europe, the United States, and the six nation subset of Western European countries. The individual level association and the link at the societal level continues to add support to


the hypothesis that increases in the level of postmaterialism is positively related to participatory values and behavior.

Figure 4.3 Societal Level Trends: Western Europe



Western Europe showed societal level linkages between political interest, discussing politics, alternative political activity. The continued attachment of these indicators of participatory values and behaviors in Western Europe to postmaterial values continues to support hypotheses presented earlier. Figure 4.3 shows the trends present across three data points from WVS 2790 and WVS 6160. Belonging to politically motivated voluntary organizations was the lone variable in this phase of analysis that was not clearly linked to the increase in Postmaterialists.

Figure 4.4 Societal Level Trends: United States



The United States showed similar results to Western Europe at the societal level. Figure 4.4 illustrates the linkages between a rise in Postmaterialists and increased participatory values and behavior. Excepting alternative political activity, all the variables presented in figure 4.4 show increases in tandem with the increase in Postmaterialists. Alternative political activity, when looking at the trend between wave one and wave three shows a pattern similar to that of the increase in Postmaterialists.

The discussion of societal level linkages is significant to this paper for a number of reasons. Inglehart's theory suggests that there will be a pattern across time of an increased level of Postmaterialists in a given society. This has been shown in Figures 4.9 and 4.2. Additionally, I have argued that certain variables are linked at the individual

level to the postmaterial value orientation. The link between Inglehart's theory of generational value replacement, i.e. the long-term upward trend in relative number of Postmaterialists, and my theories of individual level linkages between the postmaterial value orientation and certain participatory values and behaviors is made at the societal level of analysis. This is certainly not my main point, but is used to simply provide additional support for my hypotheses by showing that, in fact, individual level associations materialize at the societal level.

Chapter 5: Conclusion

This thesis sought to explore the future possibility of a more participatory mode of democracy in advanced industrial democratic nations as a result of an evolutionary change in the value orientation of society. It was hypothesized that a shift towards postmaterial values in a given society would correspond to an increase in the level of direct participation and the acceptance of participatory values. Evidence presented in the previous chapter supports my hypotheses.

The problem I began with, as discussed in the second chapter, was the problem of “thin” democracy. The responsiveness of representative democracy to community or individuals needs is diminished because of the distance between the citizen and the policy making process. Certainly, advanced societies require expertise to deal with the complexities of decisions and their resultant impact, but this does not mean that citizens must remain on the outskirts of the political process. Direct democracy, in the theoretical expression of the 1960s, is not likely to emerge as a practical form of governance. However, characteristics that were important to the radical democrats of past generations have a place in the practical application of democracy.

Working with data collected over a two decade period, I found clear evidence that postmaterialism is associated with the acceptance of a set of participatory values and increased political participation. Citizens’ willingness and desire to engage in alternative political activity is crucial to a stronger form of democracy. As a result of the post-modernizing of advanced industrial democratic societies, education levels are increasing and citizens are experiencing longer periods of physical and economic security. In turn, citizens develop the skills and can access the resources necessary to be politically

educated and active. Alternative political activity, then, emerges as a real alternative to traditional state sponsored activities such as voting. Voluntary political activity increases social capital, which can be put to use in politically productive ways.

The evolutionary shift, I argued, would lay a foundation, not for a restructuring of the state, but rather for increased political activity outside the formal structures of the state. Culture theorists do not argue that revolution will change democracy, but rather generational cohort replacement will trend towards new values. Physical and economic security, Inglehart argues, opens the way for an increase in the number of Postmaterialists in a given society. The experience of advanced industrial democracies evaluated in this thesis is evidence that postmodernization increases the likelihood of direct citizen political participation and acceptance of participatory values. Evidence also indicates that political activity is likely to take place increasingly without traditional intermediary actors like political parties. The emergence of citizen attachment to social movements shows there are alternatives to the formality of the system. Voting can be seen as one among many political responsibilities. As Postmaterialists emerge in greater numbers a change will take place in the relationship between the citizen and the state. This course of events, however, must be left to the exploration of future generations of political scientists.

The evidence presented in this thesis is important in understanding the possible future course of the relationship between citizens and the state in post-modernizing societies. The shift towards postmaterialism in advanced industrial democracies is well documented and is likely to continue on its upward trend as time passes.⁷² This theory coupled with the evidence presented here suggests that a challenge to representative

⁷² Inglehart, *Silent Revolution*; Inglehart, *Culture Shift*; Inglehart, *Modernization and Postmodernization*.

democracy might begin to emerge. Citizens engaging in alternative activity and voluntary participation outside the voting booth may shake the foundation upon which democracy is built. However, representative democracy has lasted, in part, because of its responsiveness, at the policy level, to societal demands. The question for future generations remains, will calls for direct democracy alter the formal structures of the representative state or will direct democracy be absorbed within the structures of representative democracy?

Appendix 1: Question Sets for Operationalized Variables

The following question sets are taken from WVS 2790 and WVS 6160. These are the full questions and responses for each of the variables used throughout the analysis in Chapter 4. Any recoding that was carried out for the analysis is explained after each response set.

v1000 and v378 4-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Index

SPSS Coding Instructions for Materialist/Postmaterialist Values Indices

The following SPSS instructions show how these indices were created.

1. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (4-item index): [(v1000, 2790) and (v378, 6160)]

Compute v1000=2

If ((v106=1 and v107=3) or (v106=3 and v107=1)) v1000=1

If ((v106=2) and (v107=4)) or ((v106=4) and (v107=2)) v1000=3

(Range = 1 - 3; missing data=9)

This index is based on the respondent's first and second choices in the original four-item Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery. If both Materialist items are given high priority, the score is "1;" If both Postmaterialist items are given high priority, the score is "3;" If one Materialist item and one Postmaterialist item are given high priority, the score is "2." If the respondent makes only one or no choices, the result is missing data.

v1010 and v379 12-item Materialist/Postmaterialist Index

2. Materialist/Postmaterialist values (12-item index): [(v1010, 2790) and (v379, 6160)]

If (v104=3 or v105=3) v1001=1

If (v106=2 or v106=4) v1002=1

If (v107=2 or v107=4) v1003=1

If (v108=2 or v108=3) v1004=1

If (v109=2 or v109=3) v1005=1

Compute v1010=v1001+v1002+v1003+v1004+v1005

This index is based on all 12 items in the Materialist/Postmaterialist values battery; it simply sums up the total number of Postmaterialist items that were given high priority (i.e., ranked as either first or second most important in its group of four items).

Accordingly, scores range from zero (none of the five Postmaterialist items was given high priority) to five (all five of the Postmaterialist items were given high priority).

(range = 0 - 5; missing data=9)

Texts of the items on which v104 – v109 are based:

There is a lot of talk these days about what the aims of this country should be for the next ten years. On this card are listed some of the goals which different people would give top priority. Would you please say which one of these you, yourself, consider the most important? And which would be the next most important?

- A. Maintaining a high level of economic growth.
- B. Making sure this country has strong defense forces.
- C. Seeing that people have more to say about how things are done at their jobs and in their communities.
- D. Trying to make our cities and countryside more beautiful.

*If you had to choose, which one of the things on this card would you say is most important?
And which would be the next most important?*

- E. Maintaining order in the nation.
- F. Giving people more say in important government decisions.
- G. Fighting rising prices.
- H. Protecting freedom of speech.

*Here is another list. In your opinion, which one of these is most important?
And what would be the next most important?*

- I. A stable economy.
- J. Progress toward a less impersonal and more humane society.
- K. Progress toward a society in which ideas count more than money.
- L. The fight against crime.

Participatory Behavior Variables

v118-122 Alternative Political Activity (WVS 2790)

Now I'd like you to look at this card. I'm going to read out some different forms of political action that people can take, and I'd like you to tell me, for each one, whether you have actually done any of these things, whether you might do it or would never, under any circumstances, do it.

- v118 Signing a petition
- v119 Joining in boycotts
- v120 Attending lawful demonstrations
- v121 Joining unofficial strikes
- v122 Occupying buildings or factories

An index ranging from 0-5 was created by recoding the responses of having actually done the activity as “1” and the other responses as “0”. The index was then formulated by adding the “1” responses.

v28-36 Voluntary Organization Activity (WVS 2790)

Now I am going to read off a list of voluntary organizations; for each one, could you tell me whether you are an active member, an inactive member or not a member of that type of organization?

- v28 Church or religious organization
- v29 Sport or recreation organization
- v30 Art, music or educational organization
- v31 Labor union
- v32 Political party
- v33 Environmental organization
- v34 Professional association
- v35 Charitable organization
- v36 Any other voluntary organization

An index ranging from 0-9 was created by recoding the responses of active membership in these organizations as “1” and the other responses as “0”. The index was then formulated by adding the “1” responses.

v23-26, v30-33 Membership in Politically Motivated Voluntary Organization (WVS 6160)

Please look carefully at the following list of voluntary organizations and activities and say which, if any, do you belong to?

- v23 E) Political parties or groups
- v24 F) Local community action on issues like poverty, employment, housing, racial equality
- v25 G) Third world development or human rights
- v26 H) Conservation, the environment, ecology
- V 30 L) Women's groups
- V 31 M) Peace movement
- V 32 N) Animal rights
- V 33 O) Voluntary organizations concerned with health

An index ranging from 0-8 was created by recoding the responses of belonging to these organizations as “1” and the other responses as “0”. The index was then formulated by adding the “1” responses.

v37 Discussing Politics (WVS 2790)

When you get together with your friends, would you say you discuss political matters frequently, occasionally or never?

1. Frequently
2. Occasionally
3. Never
9. Don't know [Do Not Read Out]

Recoding was used to reverse the order of the numbers associated with the responses in this question so that the numbers associated with each response made theoretical sense. The response “never” was recoded as “0,” “occasionally” as “1,” and “frequently” as “2.”

Participatory Values

v241 Interest in Politics (WVS 6160)

How interested would you say you are in politics?

1. Very interested
2. Somewhat interested
3. Not very interested
4. Not at all interested
9. Don't know

Recoding was used to reverse the order of the numbers associated with the responses in this question so that the numbers associated with each response made theoretical sense. The response “not at all interested” was recoded as “0,” “not very interested” as “1,” “somewhat interested” as “2,” and “very interested” as “3.”

v290-295 Approval of Social Movements (WVS 6160)

There are a number of groups and movements looking for public support. For each of the following movements, which I read out, can you tell me whether you approve (strongly or somewhat) or disapprove (strongly or somewhat) of this movement? READ OUT AND CODE ONE ANSWER FOR EACH Please use the responses on this card!

- v290 A) Ecology movement or nature protection
- v291 B) Anti-nuclear energy movement
- v292 C) Disarmament movement
- v293 D) Human rights movement at home or abroad
- v294 E) Women's movement
- v295 F) Anti-apartheid movement

An index ranging from 0-12 was created by recoding the responses of strongly supporting these social movements as “2”, somewhat supporting them as “1”, and the other responses as “0”. The index was then formulated by adding the “1” and “2” responses.

v336 Government Openness (WVS 6160)

I am going to read out some statements about the government and the economy. For each one, could you tell me how much you agree (completely, somewhat, or neither) or disagree (completely or somewhat)? Please use the responses on this card.

B) Our government should be made much more open to the public.

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