This thesis replicates Herbert Kaufman's study of the
administrative behavior of federal bureau chiefs at the state
level. Kaufman asserted that bureau chiefs are not as
autonomous as we depicted. Their behavior is confined by the
legal, institutional, political and operational constraints.
This thesis supports Kaufman's findings--except that it's more
optimistic about the occurrence of innovative changes in
public agencies.
This study looks at six state agency heads of the State
of Virginia. Their behavior is examined from the conception
of "responsibility." Chapter One argues that responsibility
connotes two aspects of meaning: objective and subjective.
Objective responsibility is ensured through the constraints
placed on bureaucrats. Contents of these constraints are
examined in Chapter Two. The findings show that these agency
heads are behaving in ways consistent with the limits set by
the constraints.
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