Title page for ETD etd-10142005-103102


Type of Document Dissertation
Author Abdallah, Hanin I.
URN etd-10142005-103102
Title A model of the entry decision of potenial raiders into the bidding for a target firm
Degree PhD
Department Economics
Advisory Committee
Advisor Name Title
Cremer, Jacques Committee Chair
Eckel, Catherine C. Committee Member
Kats, Amoz Committee Member
Shome, Dilip K. Committee Member
Weinrich, Gerd Committee Member
Keywords
  • Consolidation and merger of corporations.
  • Tender offers (Securities)
Date of Defense 1991-08-02
Availability restricted
Abstract
This work is in the spirit of the literature on the understanding and analysis of the

different forces that shape the takeover process. We focus on the strategic interaction

among the raiders and we study their decision to enter the bidding for a target form in a

context of asymmetric information. Each raider incurs a fixed takeover sunk. cost when she

decides to enter the bidding. Therefore she wants to avoid bidding for the firm and losing

the bid to a raider with a higher valuation. We analyze the Bayesian-Nash equilibrium in

one-period, two-period and infinite period models where each raider decides whether and

in which period to enter. This decision depends on the takeover cost, the target's

reservation price and the distribution function of the raiders' valuations. We also consider

the case where one of the raiders is a large shareholder and the role of management in

maximizing the shareholders' interests.

We find that raiders delay entry into the bidding when the takeover cost or the

reservation price for the firm increase. Such an increase also implies a decrease in the

probability of a takeover. If one of the raiders is a large shareholder, he will enter the

bidding faster the bigger is the percentage of shares he owns in the target. The existence of

a large shareholder will, however, discourage other raiders from entering. The

shareholders of the target firm might benefit from an increase in the target's reservation

price but they never profit from an increase in the takeover cost.

We conclude with an empirical section that indirectly tests some of our model's

implications. The results of our empirical work indicate that raiders enter the bidding faster

when the management's reaction to the bid proves to be friendly. The premiums offered by

the raiders and the size of the target test insignificant in determining the pre-bidding period.

Finally we find that the existence of a large shareholder discourages other raiders from

entry. However, the large shareholder has on average a longer pre-bidding waiting period

than a raider with no ownership in the firm.

Files
  Filename       Size       Approximate Download Time (Hours:Minutes:Seconds) 
 
 28.8 Modem   56K Modem   ISDN (64 Kb)   ISDN (128 Kb)   Higher-speed Access 
[VT] LD5655.V856_1991.A242.pdf 5.54 Mb 00:25:38 00:13:11 00:11:32 00:05:46 00:00:29
[BTD] next to an author's name indicates that all files or directories associated with their ETD are accessible from the Virginia Tech campus network only.

Browse All Available ETDs by ( Author | Department )

dla home
etds imagebase journals news ereserve special collections
virgnia tech home contact dla university libraries

If you have questions or technical problems, please Contact DLA.