During June 15-18, 1864, the Federal Army of the Potomac launched a
series of attacks against the vital Confederate rail center of Petersburg,
Virginia. Union leaders believed that capturing Petersburg would force
the abandonment of the Rebel capital at Richmond. The assaults failed,
however, and the opposing armies settled into a ten-month siege.
This study investigated the opening battles for Petersburg on three
levels. First, the strategic dispositions and movements of the Army of
the Potomac and the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia are discussed
prior to and during the battles. Secondly, the study looks carefully at
the tactical situation on each of the four days of fighting. Thirdly,
the paper reveals the personal side of combat through the use of soldiers°
diaries, letters, and regimental histories. The thesis concludes that
Federal failure occurred because of poor Union leadership and staff work,
a strong Confederate defense, and extreme exhaustion throughout the
Northern army.
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