This paper addresses the subject of “How to Sell Wars” will be addressed, delving most into the Gulf Wars II and III (the two wars conducted by the United States and its allies against Iraq), the wars in the Balkans in the 1990s and a short examination of the deployment of German Forces in Afghanistan.

1. Why must wars be sold?

On 17 March 1813 King Frederick William III of Prussia issued his appeal “to my people.” It was a call to arms for the struggle against Napoleon, a war of liberation, “…It is the final, decisive struggle that we must endure, for the sake of our existence, our independence, our fortune. There is no way out except an honorable peace, or glorious defeat.”¹ The proclamation appeared in the newspaper, the Schlesische privilegierte Zeitung of 20 March 1813.

It was the first time that a monarch communicated with his subjects about the reasons for conducting a war. The medium of communication was a newspaper. In this document Frederick-William III deviates from the previously accepted relationship between ruler and people. He does not command, rather he appeals to the decision-making capacity of his people. He was convinced that he needed the support of his people for this war and he sought to obtain it through the arguments in his appeal.²

To be sure, this manner of “selling” a war did not immediately establish itself as a universally recognized standard. Since the middle of the 20th century, however, Western governments, when they wish to achieve political goals through a war, have given the impression to wish to gain consensus among the organs of state power on which they base their legitimacy: that is, the people and the people’s elected representatives. They seem to follow the political requirement to “justify their military interventions by reference to the world-wide fight for freedom and democracy.”³

To make a point very clearly at the beginning: This paper is neither out to determine, if the Gulf Wars involving the U.S. or the wars in the Balkans were justified from one side or another. Nor is it going to determine the question what is going to be more important: a free and independent press without censorship and governmental news-management or the protection of national security. Not that these questions are not worthy of serious consideration, but questions here go to the “how” rather than the “why”. In particular: how do political and military leaders try to obtain and maintain support for the wars they choose to wage, for whatever reason.

Using Harold Dwight Lasswell’s model of mass communications and his famous enumeration of the elements of this field of inquiry: Who (says) What (to) Whom (in) What Channel (with) What Effect, this paper focuses on the channel. What are the channels through which the message is transmitted by the political representatives? What are the organizational forms, the media techniques?

The other elements in Lasswell’s formulation seem more obvious. The senders (“who says”) are always those who have a monopoly on information and opinion-making or who are seeking this monopoly. They are usually governments. The content, or message (the “what”), always consists of the reasons why the war is legitimate and worthy of support. The receiver (“to whom”) has already been named above: the masses or, in democratic terms, the voters and their representatives. (In economic terms: the consumers of information.)
“To what effect” will not be examined here. For the wars in question it is often impossible to answer this question, because they are so recent and their long-term consequences will certainly be re-evaluated many times over the coming decades.

2. Representations of war in the light of changing media

In 1863, during the American Civil War, a reporter for the New York Times was arrested on orders from U.S. Secretary of War, Edwin M. Stanton, for not submitting an article for censorship. Some 130 years later on 20 January 1996 General Alexander Michailov, press secretary of the Russian secret service (FSB), was summarily dismissed without reason. Russian troops had fired upon a Chechenyan village with “Stalinorgans.” Michailov had had the event recorded by TV cameras and broadcast. The thus documented behavior violated official Russian policy.

These two episodes not only demonstrate that wars are media events, but also show the pressure on those in control to sell their wars as justified. This is to be accomplished with a near-total monopoly on information and by determining which opinions are authorized. Sympathies must be awakened for one’s own side. The opposing side must be discredited.

Authorization of opinions is informal and fluid. Under the new global standard for a justified war, in particular the imperative to protect human rights, the authorization of opinion deploys all available means. This leads to focused instrumentalization and manipulation of the public media.

The methods used to control public opinion—censorship, propaganda, public relations can be traced back to antiquity. By censorship it is meant “state surveillance and suppression of communication.” Propaganda is the biased information serving political power. Finally, public relations is biased information serving economic power.

Until about the middle of the 19th century, war news was communicated indirectly and with significant time delays. Since then, up to the Vietnam War, various innovations were made in the instruments and methods of information distribution:

- Illustrated reports, furnished with aerial photography
- Telegraph, telephone, the new media of film and television
- News agencies and Media-conferences
- War reporters
- News departments in governments
- No film or TV reports about own casualties
- No realistic picture of what is really going on in the field.

3. The Two U.S. Gulf Wars

3.1 Before turning to the Gulf wars, a few remarks about the wars against Vietnam, Grenada and Panama.

Analysts have disagreed about whether the U.S. lost the war in Vietnam because leaders underestimated the effects of television, but in the mean time, the tendency has been, to view this explanation as a “stab-in-the-back legend” of certain U.S. administrations and politicians.

Most analysts downplayed the impact of television on the Vietnam War, because those reports supported the pro-war voices.

With respect to the topic, how to sell wars, two conclusions seem to be possible regarding the war in Vietnam: U.S. administrations had progressively less control over information and its interpretation. The government could not exercise comprehensive control over the media. This may have been due to the specific nature of the Vietnam War, which made a comprehensive censorship impossible. Political-ideological power arguments were not able to overcome the essentially ethical reasons for ending the war, that were advanced by print media and citizens.

After the loss in Vietnam, U.S. military planners resolved not to run the risk of uncensored media reporting in any future wars. They were helped to this view by England’s behavior in the Falklands war. Twenty-nine correspondents, photographers, and technicians were organized into pools. They were placed on ships of the
Royal Navy and their reports were subjected to strict censorship. The U.S. government and military then used this new kind of information policy during the U.S. wars in Grenada (Oct.- Nov. 1983) and Panama (Dec. 1989).

3.2 In the two Gulf wars that were waged against Iraq largely under American leadership, the U.S. administrations of George H. Bush and, later, George W. Bush, crafted justifications for the wars and constructed images of the enemy that suited their ends. In order to win support for the wars, primarily among the American people but also internationally, the Bush’s respective administrations, with help from the Pentagon, manipulated the relevant flow of information.

Despite the fact that, on August 2, 1990, approximately 100,000 Iraqi troops had invaded and occupied Kuwait, it was necessary, from the American point of view, to internationalize the conflict, which could only be accomplished within the framework of the U.N. The goal was to liberate Kuwait. At the same time, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf region’s vitally important oil had to be protected against a possible Iraqi attack.

About eleven years later, President George W. Bush issued a general call to arms against international terrorism, which led to another war against Iraq. The purported justification for this war — weapons of mass destruction and Iraq’s implication in the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 — have since proved unfounded. Basically, there was sustained popular support in the U.S. for both wars. Outside the U.S. the general opinion has been much more skeptical.

In both wars the administration and the defense department demonstrated increasing ability to win and maintain control over the media. Censorship and the use of disinformation helped. The Pentagon had succeeded in establishing very efficient methods of press control and they had support from politicians. Two examples of these methods of press control, which are still being used:

Formation of pools: Selected journalists are accredited by the Defense Department, organized into a pool, transported to the region of military activity and assigned to a military press post. In theory, members of the pool are obliged to share their knowledge and reports with other representatives of the media, who do not belong to the pool. The official rationale for forming pools is that only military transport can provide safe access to the battlefield, but seats are limited. The advantage of this method is complete control of the media by means of a monopoly on transport and control of information by means of military escorts and press briefings. This includes control of images. Photo- and television journalists are taken only to selected, possibly contrived “shootings”, or they are furnished only selected images from so called “combat camera teams.” (Military combat camera teams have the same professional competence as their civilian colleagues.) They provide selected material from events to which the pool has no access. Therefore these teams provide the pool with material that is of excellent quality but that is also manipulated, material without which the media cannot operate. Basically, the military press offices also have authority over what is transmitted, since they have total control over access to electrical power and to satellite uplinks.

Speakers’ pools: Not only in wartime, but also during crises or military or political controversies, the military makes competent informant-consultants available to the media. In most cases these are former military members - no longer in service - whose lasting connections to the military and to the defense industry are not immediately apparent to the public. They are in demand by the media in proportion to their visibility and popularity. They are kept abreast of events by official sources, which provide them with exclusive information and offer them to the media as experts for conversations and interviews, both on-air and in print. The control of information is thus contrived to remain in the hands of the military.

3.3 The run-up to the war for the liberation of Kuwait saw an innovation: For the first time a public relations firm and a non-governmental organization (NGO) played a decisive role. The PR firm Hill and Knowlton (H&K) was able to place a story in the media that had Iraqi soldiers murdering babies in a Kuwaiti hospital.
H&K was assisted by an NGO by the name of “Citizens for a Free Kuwait.” This committee was supported by private contributions, but primarily by $11 million from the government of Kuwait. It used these funds to hire H&K, which had good contacts in the U.S. government and with former members of the Reagan administration. After the war the story about the incubator turned out to have been totally fabricated. But the task was accomplished: By means of successful agenda-setting, Iraq had been portrayed as repulsive and criminal, an inveterate offender of human dignity.

3.4 Compared with the Vietnam War, the methods used to represent the Gulf War as “unavoidable” show some marked innovations. The news management was stricter. It was essentially impossible for a reporter to report on the war without permission from the Pentagon. The now more refined pool system allowed an almost complete control over the media. Admittance to the pool — the only possible way to report from the scene of action — could be granted only by the Pentagon. Journalists received their information only through military press officers in military media bureaus. There was no way to assess the veracity of this information independently. The transmission of media reports could only be accomplished by means of technical equipment and broadcast channels that were controlled by the military Media Office. Media opportunities with the fighting troops often ended in the middle of nowhere, due to ostensible errors on the part of the military facilitators.

After the war, journalists’ suspicions, that they had been manipulated, were confirmed:

- The strength of Saddam Hussein’s army had been greatly exaggerated. The Iraq’s capacity for chemical warfare was not verified.10
- The U.S. army’s attack schedules had been falsely stated.
- Many U.S. weapons systems failed.
- Twenty-three percent of all allied personnel deaths and fifteen percent of non-fatal U.S. casualties were caused by “friendly fire.”11

While journalists from the national media jockeyed for a place in the pool, media people from smaller local papers and regional broadcasters, were invited by the Pentagon to spend a few days with the units to which soldiers from their regions had been assigned. These media people were naturally grateful for whatever the military offered them, because, without such assistance, they would not have been able to produce any home stories. They were ideal contacts for the military’s news managers.

Thus the war’s planners were able to portray the war as well - reasoned and acceptable - at least in the beginning. The need for media pools was accepted also. There were of course protests from journalists regarding this policy, but in the end, the national media could ill afford, not to belong to the pool, and so they went along.

Michelle Stephenson, a photo-journalist with Time, explained: “The Defense Department refined this system to such a degree that the public representation of the war was completely controlled by the government, and it functioned one hundred percent according to the government’s wishes.”12

3.5 In the third U.S.-led war against Iraq (March-May 2003), which was waged ostensibly against international terrorism and the Saddam Hussein’s weapons of mass destruction, the U.S. media were for the most part already prepared to go along with the administration and the Pentagon.

The Pentagon saw to it that journalists were “embedded” into battle units, so that they could report on the action from these privileged vantage points. This gave the impression of responding to protests against the strict censorship that was practiced in the Second Gulf War, as well as the wars in Grenada and Panama. Essentially the situation remained the same.

Direct censorship was avoided, but journalists always had to request permission to record, which the military granted according to their own criteria. This amounted to an indirect censorship. It was just as effective as the more blatant practices of the earlier wars.

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Embedding also had a side effect, as the journalists came to bond with “their” battle units and subjected themselves to a voluntary auto-censorship. Thus their objectivity was compromised. Research into the matter has shown that the reports of embedded journalists tended to lack military and political background and focused on very small parts of the war. The American war dead were not shown.

By the end of the 1990s the Pentagon had re-organized its entire PR apparatus. It produced video footage through its own camera teams (“Combat Camera”), which was then provided to the media. They gave only the official view.

So-called independent experts in the U.S. stood ready to explain the military actions without fully revealing the extent of their relationship to the military (Implementation of Speakers Pool).

U.S.-run radio stations broadcast the American position in Iraqi-accented Arabic, while transmissions from foreign stations were jammed by U.S. aircraft or had stronger signals superimposed over them on the same frequency. All of these new capabilities were then used to communicate the necessity for the second U.S.-led war against Iraq.

At the same time technological developments had transformed the reporting and management of the news: These included:
- PC and satellite technologies,
- digital image processing,
- video technologies,
- portable PCs and cameras with satellite access,
- computer graphics.

Using these new electronic tools, direct, round-the-clock coverage would have been possible.

However, since the military had total authority over all communication from the battlefield and controlled all the transmission channels, the Pentagon was able to steer the continuous reporting, toward its own ends, by choosing which stories to promote or suppress. The so-called “live reporting” always showed the waging of a “clean” war by American troops. Only CNN broadcast images of destruction at the beginning of the war. Ugly images of the dead were not allowed.

Another notable innovation in this war was the extensive use of mercenaries, or “private military companies” (PMCs) by the U.S. The deployment of these private entities, whose actions were not in the purview of international laws pertaining to war, were another feature of the U.S.’s information management. U.S. propaganda could always maintain that American troops were fighting a “clean” war. Crimes could be blamed on the PMCs. Only later did their connections to the Pentagon become known.

For the most part, the U.S. propaganda apparatus was successful, in representing the U.S. involvement in two Gulf Wars as justified, and in maintaining support for them at home. To this end, a strategy of strict, top-down information management was executed. Only after the second Iraq War and after the first phase of the third Iraq War, did sobering skepticism return, as the population and the media began to notice that they had been deceived. Rising U.S. casualties and images of scandalous treatment of Iraqi prisoners by U.S. personnel (Abu Ghraib) have contributed to this change. However, as John MacArthur has put it, “hardly anyone in a big news organization has discussed seriously the demerits of pool system, military censorship, or failure of the media owners to fight back” [against the Pentagon].

4. The wars in former Yugoslavia

After the collapse of European communism, subsidiary republics in the former Yugoslavia began to declare their independence, which they proceeded to establish either diplomatically, or simply by fighting for it. Although in 1991 most Western countries were still committed to keep Yugoslavia as a united state, the EU stated already in 1992, that the borders of the formerly subsidiary republics, were now to be considered international borders between sovereign states.

The goal of all parties to the conflicts was to win for their particular interest the support of the
Western nations — whether they were fighting for independence or trying to maintain the status quo — this could be expected to result in recognition by the international community and financial and military support. To achieve these goals all of them relied on the medium of public relations.

Although the inner workings of PR agencies are basically inaccessible to public view, foreign clients of US public relations firms must reveal the nature of their activities. According to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (FARA), anyone who represents foreign interests in the U.S., must register with the U.S. Justice Department. He must furnish information regarding the contract and the dollar value of income and expenses. In the case of public relations, the goal and the nature of the activities must be indicated.\(^\text{15}\)

An analysis of the information in the semi-annual reports of the Justice Department indicate, that all of the belligerent parties in former Yugoslavia had hired public relations firms to conduct political activities between 1991 and 2002.\(^\text{16}\) Target groups in the U.S. included international institutions (the UN, for example), political decision-makers, national and international media, and socially relevant “multipliers”.\(^\text{17}\)

Public relations firms were able to “set agendas,” that is, to get the media to take certain issues and present their side as the truth. The reporting in the media then caused target groups outside the media — politicians, think tanks, NGOs — to assume the point of view of the firms; clients, a kind of self-fulfilling prophecy.

Public Relations firms had the use of large sums of money during this time. They were successful for several reasons. They had close contacts among well-placed people in politics, business, and the military. Former high-ranking officers in the military and intelligence services, politicians and influential business representatives, often find their way to public relations firms and cash in on their insider knowledge.

Public relations firms have now far surpassed the print media in terms of personnel and financial resources; they are professional equals and globally connected. At the beginning of the 1990s there were 160,000 public relations agents in the U.S., but only 120,000 journalists.\(^\text{18}\) The editorial staffs of publications appear increasingly unable to evaluate the accuracy of in-depth reports on current issues. This is certainly the case for press releases from military organizations.

As remarked above, public relations agencies can determine issues. Ruder Finn, a U.S. agency, was able to compare the Serbs with Nazis. Such keywords, as concentration camp, genocide, holocaust, and Auschwitz — all of which characterized the Serbs as perpetrators — dominated the Western perceptions of the war in the Balkans.\(^\text{19}\)

In the information trade surrounding the Balkan conflicts, PR agencies and NGOs were tightly interwoven. These extra-governmental organizations are essentially lobbying groups that compete among each other for donations, and other contributions, and of course, for public attention. For this reason it is “in their interest to prolong catastrophes and wars.”\(^\text{20}\) Even if they view themselves as advocates for humanitarian causes, their structure, their network of contacts, and their spheres of interest are diffuse.

They are neither democratically legitimized, nor financially transparent. The fabricated story about the incubator, which was nonetheless so important for mounting the first Gulf war, was supported and propagated by the NGO “Amnesty International” for a very long time. Not until April 1991 did AI’s leadership distance itself from the story.\(^\text{21}\)

Other PR agencies and NGOs:

- exploited alleged catastrophes (mass rapes, humanitarian emergencies “MEDICAAMOUNDIALE” [a German founded NGO supporting victims of sexual violence])
- conveyed one-sided political messages (e.g. OTPOR [English: resistance, a nonpartisan civic youth movement credited for its non-violent struggle against Slobodan Milosevic])
- supported peace negotiations and organized them as well (e.g. CMI [Crisis Management Initiative; Aartisari, president of Finland]).
In some cases national states even bestowed sovereign authority on PR agencies. Agencies and NGOs — which are often government-funded — provided public moods that enabled governments to take the political and military decisions that suited them.

The intervention of NATO troops on the side of the former subsidiary republics against Serbian interests and the creation of new states in the former Yugoslavia show that the efforts of the PR agencies were successful.22

They were able to establish the legitimacy of their clients’ claims to independence, in the public mind. In many cases this went so far as achieving independence by means of war.

5. The deployment of German Forces in Afghanistan

So far the focus of this paper has been on how states try to “sell” their wars. Now I would like to take a moment to consider how the Federal Republic of Germany has staked its foreign deployments on convincing the public that German soldiers are not involved in a war.

After Reunification, German troops participated in more interventions around the world: in Africa, in Turkey, in the East Asia, and in Iran. There was no need for the German governments to “sell a war” to the public by news-management whatsoever, because the engagement of German military forces in former Yugoslavia and in Afghanistan was generally accepted and supported as “auxiliary” or “humanitarian” among the population. Despite the fact that once in a while a journalist asked publicly if these engagements were in reality wars, this was strictly denied by officials.

For example, on 4 December 2002 then Defense Minister Peter Struck explained the deployment in Afghanistan as follows: “The Security of Germany will be defended in Hindukusch as well”. However, he would not characterize this “defense” as war.

In 1994 the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic did not deny the constitutionality of such a deployment.23 To this day the impression remains that, for historical reasons, Germany believes it must avoid involvement in wars under any circumstances.

Since the founding of the Federal Republic’s armed forces in 1955, German governments have never shown unambiguous commitment to them. The information management practiced by the various German governments has operated according to a motto that sees German soldiers as “citizens in uniform” and always maintains the impression that these soldiers will never have to fight.

Although German armed forces participated in the wars in former Yugoslavia and are deployed in war in Afghanistan, to this day, neither the Defense Ministry nor any German government, has provided these soldiers with unambiguous federal guidelines regarding their legal status as combatants, including their claims to medical and economic assistance. Also, the military armaments that have been deployed to Afghanistan do not meet such technical standards, as would be necessary, in order to ensure the best possible security for the troops.

No German government has ever exercised information management on a par with that practiced by the U.S. Still, the Ministry of Defense has created a kind of informational authority for itself. The information operations of the individual German military branches are strictly regulated and, due to insufficiencies in conceptualization, personnel, and other resources, their effects appear to be negligible. By means of the monopoly on military transport, however, the Ministry has most likely already done its best to curtail opportunities for communication. The practical limitations on transport to Afghanistan have enabled the establishment of a tacit pool system. Only selected representatives of the media can participate, if they go along the official line that Germany is not involved in a war. (Journalists from regional markets are largely excluded.)

Pictorial representation of German soldiers in action is taboo. Thus the soldiers’ faces are hidden and they remain anonymous. In this way, German military information managers, have so far been able to prevent the German public from
identifying with the German troops deployed abroad.

The increasing number of German casualties however makes it impossible for any information management strategy to disguise the fact that German soldiers, too, are at war. In contrast to the PR concerns of other countries, which must find rationales for their deployments, the German government is now faced with the task of communicating to the public that their soldiers are indeed at war.

Not until Easter 2010 did the current minister of defense, zu Guttenberg, become the first to deviate from accepted usage and assert that German soldiers are engaged in a “non-international armed conflict.” He went on, to speak of “war-like conditions.”

6. The outlook

The spread of more democratic forms of government in the 20th century, the emphasis on human rights by the UN, and the rise of the mass media, have compelled countries to persuade the public — both national and international — of the righteousness of their wars.

Since the middle of the 20th century, however, these countries face an increasing risk that their rationales, under the unrelenting scrutiny of real-time reporting, will be revealed as contrived, if not completely fabricated.

To suppress this possibility, states avail themselves of information management strategies whose democratic legitimacy is dubious at best. But so far, these strategies seem, for the most part, to have been successful in limiting and channeling the media’s access to information.

However, in the context of the continuous technological modernization of communications capabilities, especially in the internet, even the power of these highly developed techniques of information management is being eroded, and governments are becoming increasingly unable to further impose censorship and maintain sovereignty over public opinion. On July 27, 2010, national papers reported on the publication of 91,000 confidential US documents about the war in Afghanistan and later also refer to a Red Cell CIA Report, how to manipulate public opinion among allied countries to support the war in Afghanistan.

Depending on their access to financial and technical means however, motivated parties outside official governments are becoming increasingly able to gain public support for political or military campaigns. In the future such ends will increasingly be pursued, by deploying hackers, who can bring down the networks of entire nations or infest them with foreign programs that globally modify or simply delete targeted websites.

Political and military leaders are trying to prepare themselves for these developments, and they are devoting ever more attention to the possibility of waging electronic wars. The significance of the traditional media would seem to diminish to the vanishing point.

In future conflicts, the global increase in waging “cyber war”, will make it very difficult for governments to maintain one-sided authoritative control of information in order to sell arguments for waging wars.

Notes

1 Cf., http://www.documentarchiv.de/nzjh/preussen/1813/an-mein-Volk_friedrichwilhelmIII-aufruf.html am 16.03.2010
3 Elter, A. 2005: Die Kriegsverkaeufer, Geschichte der US-Propaganda 1917-2005 [Elter, Kriegsverkaeufer], Frankfurt am Main, 12
In spring of 1999, Germany’s foreign and defense ministers, Joschka Fischer and Rudolf Scharping respectively, revealed a so-called “horseshoe plan,” which was claimed to prove that Serbia was pursuing a policy to drive Albanians out of Kosovo. According to the plan, it was claimed, Serbian forces were to be arrayed in a horseshoe along the Albanian border. By drawing this formation in [on itself] the Albanians were to be driven out of Kosovo. The truthfulness of this plan, which occupied the German media for weeks, was never proved. Scharping had allegedly received his information from German officers stationed as observers in the Balkans. Other indications suggest that the plan was created by U.S. intelligence operatives and found its way to Fischer and Scharping by way of various intelligence agencies. Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping was on occasion assisted by two media consultants, Nortiz Huntiger and Norbert Essing.

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