Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: MONDAY, July 9, 1990                   TAG: 9007100443
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: A6   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: 
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium

FOR AMERICA AND NATO, NEW ROLES

A year ago, NATO's reason for existence seemed obvious: to counter the military threat posed by the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies. Now the Warsaw Pact is moribund; the Soviet Union is in disarray. NATO is redefining itself.

But the triumph of capitalist democracy over communist despotism, welcome as it is, poses challenges for Americans and their policy-makers. Perhaps the biggest is to recognize that changes are occurring not only in Germany and NATO but also in the role America can play.

The key question about Germany is whether it has changed enough.

Germany's neighbors need not worry about the immediate future. For a while, prosperous West Germany will have its hands full simply absorbing penurious East Germany. It's as if a thriving firm has taken over another whose massive debts forced it into bankruptcy. In this case, it's a matter of restructuring an economy and retraining 18 million people as well as infusing the bankrupt firm with capital.

But with 80 million people, a reunified Germany easily will be the most populous nation in Europe except for the Soviet Union (or, assuming the U.S.S.R.'s disintegration into its constituent republics, European Russia). It almost certainly will be Europe's strongest power economically.

If the Nazi nightmare were not so recent, if the institutions of parliamentary democracy in West Germany had had 100 years instead of 45 to take root, and if East Germany had spent the postwar years learning democracy instead of suffering under communism, German reunification would be less worrisome.

The key question about NATO is whether it can change enough.

Now's not the time for NATO to cashier all its troops. If doubts linger about what Germany may become, surely they should linger about the potential for conflict from a Soviet empire disintegrating amid economic collapse.

Neither is it written, however, that NATO must endure forever. And in a Europe no longer under Soviet siege, NATO's basic purpose - countering the threat by in turn besieging the Soviets - increasingly looks irrelevant.

Still, there's more to NATO than military alliance. That truth became clearer than ever last week as the NATO summit took steps to lift its siege of the Soviets. Not merely military necessity but also shared democratic values bind the NATO nations. It therefore is possible to conceive of a demilitarized NATO, and to see uses for NATO beyond military necessity of the moment.

One such use is to keep Germany a partner in, rather than a threat to, the collective security of the continent. A related use is to assuage Soviet fears about Germany - and about a Europe in which the U.S.S.R. no longer is buffered by a tier of client states.

The key question about the United States is whether Americans comprehend their country's changing role.

America emerged from World War II as the globe's economic and military titan; the economy of every other industrial power was in shambles. With victory in the Cold War, however, the United States cannot unilaterally dictate terms of the peace.

For one thing, the end of the Cold War comes as an armistice favorable to the West, not unconditional surrender by the Soviets. They still have their armaments; it's in the West's interest to quell Soviet fears as a way to help ensure the weaponry doesn't fall into the wrong Soviet hands.

For another, Germany is no longer a vanquished foe that must do America's bidding. And Germany, with no fondness for remaining the preferred battlefield for East-West conflict, wants Soviet concerns allayed.

Fortunately, President Bush seems to grasp the situation.

To be sure, realism can shade into timidity. There's room to criticize administration policy for offering too little financial aid for the nascent democracies of Eastern Europe, for being too reluctant to provide Mikhail Gorbachev with the face-saving concessons that would help negate opposition to him from Soviet hard-liners.

But on its own, America cannot afford a Marshall Plan for Eastern Europe. Nor can America alone dictate NATO policy. The administration could, however, push more for arms control now, when the Soviets have a leader interested in reducing arsenals.

At the NATO summit last week, Bush seemed mostly to be playing honest broker, forging compromises between Germany and its ancient enemies. If that is a diminished role for America, it is nevertheless a useful and an honorable one.