Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: FRIDAY, July 13, 1990 TAG: 9007130689
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A-10 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE:
DATELINE: LENGTH: Medium
The Defense Department spent $2 billion on an antiaircraft gun, the Divad. The weapon was strongly attacked by some members of Congress for ineffectiveness, but not until it failed tests in 1985 was the project finally canceled, much to the Pentagon's discomfiture.
To prevent another such fiasco, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney directed a year ago that the Pentagon adopt new guidelines. These require that major projects pass strict performance tests before the government buys them.
In accord with these standards, Cheney approved a decision last fall to cancel the Airborne Self-Protection Jammer, an electronic radar-jamming device. The Air Force already had dropped out of the project because it wasn't working. But a few days later, after intense lobbying by the Navy, production contracts were awarded for the first 100 devices.
The Defense Department has already spent more than $1 billion on what is to be a $4 billion project. It is five years behind schedule. No prototype yet built has fulfilled design goals. The device has, in short, failed to pass performance tests and is supposed to be junked. And the Pentagon is going ahead with it.
"This program," says Sen. David Pryor, D-Ark., "is an example of absolutely thumbing your nose at the systems of checks and balances." He wants it canceled or, at least, delayed until flight-test results are available. What good a delay would do if the results of past tests already are being ignored is unclear.
Pentagon officials plead a great need for the jammers and say problems with them are small. They blame flawed testing methods and contend that the models work almost to perfection in laboratory simulations.
If so, that would be a breakthrough. For nearly 20 years, engineers have tried to develop electronic defense systems that could discriminate among dozens of incoming radars, pick those most threatening and then emit signals to stop or confuse air defenses. They've fallen far short. Air Force tests in 1988 and 1989 showed the present device failed even with older forms of radar.
But then the test results were fudged. An investigation by the Defense Department inspector general concluded that acquisition officials manipulated reports to minimize flaws and emphasize strengths.
"We have had growing pains in the electronic combat business, no question about that," says Duane P. Andrews, an assistant secretary of defense. "But we can fix this a lot cheaper than starting over from scratch." There's an even cheaper alternative, but the Pentagon doesn't want to hear about that.
by CNB