
                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: THURSDAY, July 26, 1990                   TAG: 9007260491
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: A-14   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: 
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium

STAR WARS STILL PIE IN THE SKY

NOT MUCH has been heard lately about the Strategic Defense Initiative. Ronald Reagan's plan for a shield against nuclear missiles has not been a priority with President Bush. But like so many other projects, once begun it has driven roots into the federal budget. It's hard to pull it loose.

Reagan's hope, voiced in a TV address in March 1983, was that scientists could render nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete." He believed technology could produce an umbrella capable of detecting launches from afar and picking the missiles off before they could reach their targets. In this way, America could rely on defense instead of on the horror of nuclear retaliation.

The idea, quickly dubbed Star Wars, was noble but fraught with problems. This was evidenced by the way SDI kept redefining itself. One day it was going to consist of an array of orbiting guardposts; the next, it would rely on "pop-up" anti-missiles shot into space at the first sign of an attack. It would use laser beams to down enemy missiles. Or it would use rail guns, capable of firing at super speeds. Truly, it seemed SDI would do wondrous things. Project directors just couldn't decide which.

The latest version calls for SDI to orbit thousands of small, self-directing rockets called "brilliant pebbles." These would sense and target enemy missiles in flight. Price tag (doubtless understated): $44 billion. SDI's managers are supposed to give the president information by early 1993 enabling him to decide on deployment.

Congress' investigative arm, the General Accounting Office, believes he will be unable to make that decision then. The office has concluded after an 11-month study that SDI has so many scientific uncertainties that its directors cannot offer Bush competent technical advice on deployment by the end of his first term. This is blamed on the project's recent redesign, insufficient testing and evaluation, and inadequate congressional funding.

The legislative branch has always been less enthusiastic about SDI than the White House and Pentagon. But "adequate" funding would more likely clarify SDI's copious liabilities than bring it closer to fruition. Many other analyses have pointed out the difficulty of realizing its shifting objectives.

A good case can be made for continued research on missile defenses - and for a limited system to guard against attacks, given the number of small nations and tinpot leaders who have or lust for The Bomb. But it doesn't take a brilliant pebble to detect a program that is too big, too complex and too costly - especially at a time of burgeoning federal deficits and a shrinking Soviet threat.

Negotiated agreements to reduce existing nuclear arsenals while avoiding development of expensive, destabilizing new weapons systems are still the best defense against the nuclear menace. SDI ought to be a prime candidate for downsizing.

by CNB