Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: WEDNESDAY, February 20, 1991                   TAG: 9102200294
SECTION: NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL                    PAGE: A-4   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: Associated Press
DATELINE: WASHINGTON                                LENGTH: Medium

WAR HAS ELECTRONIC STRUGGLE/ TO COMMUNICATIE, EAVESDROP OR JAM IS BATTLE

The White House doesn't need that contact with desert frontline troops. But the advanced technology that makes it possible is an important part of the elaborate links between U.S. commanders and their troops in the field.

In a U.S.-led ground offensive against Iraq, some of the most crucial - but least visible - contests would be for control of battlefield communications. The largely electronic struggle by each side to destroy, jam, confuse or eavesdrop on the other's field communications would be the battle within the battle.

For more than a month, in fact, the allied command has put a premium on damaging Saddam Hussein's communications system, based on a simple premise: Commanders who can't communicate can't command.

The U.S. Army's war-fighting doctrine puts great emphasis on "command and control" - the capability to pass information on the battlefield, to get orders securely from headquarters to the front lines, to direct fire at crucial moments.

To strengthen this approach, the Army has been developing a new generation of battlefield communications systems, some of which are deployed for the first time in the Persian Gulf War, and some of which are not yet ready for war.

Because commanders know that in combat they must expect - even try to anticipate - the unexpected, they can't simply issue their operations orders and sit back to watch the plan unfold. They have to adjust it almost constantly, and to do so effectively they need a timely picture of the battlefield and a reliable way of getting the amended orders to the fighting forces.

The communications challenge for the U.S. Army, in the event of a ground war against Iraq, would be especially tough because the attack would probably be fast-paced and multipronged.

Control of ground forces in the Persian Gulf would be made even more difficult by the fact that tens of thousands of allied soldiers will be fighting alongside the Americans - not all speaking the same language. These include ground forces of Britain, France, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and possibly Syria.

Today's commanders rely on an elaborate network of computers, cellular telephones, microwave radio signals, facsimile machines, message switching centers, satellites and airborne radar systems that "see" the battlefield.