Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: WEDNESDAY, February 20, 1991 TAG: 9102200605
SECTION: NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PAGE: A-1 EDITION: EVENING
SOURCE: ROBIN WRIGHT LOS ANGELES TIMES
DATELINE: WASHINGTON LENGTH: Long
But an Iraqi withdrawal that permits Saddam to survive as head of a still-powerful military machine could leave the United States and its allies with a more difficult, even more volatile situation in the Persian Gulf than it faced before the war began, according to U.S. officials, foreign envoys and Middle East specialists.
While Iraq's agreement to withdraw unconditionally before a ground war starts probably would spare hundreds or even thousands of lives, some analysts say a settlement of the kind being pressed by the Soviet Union and Iran could be even more costly in the long run.
"There's absolutely no question that Saddam's survival would make this incredibly messy, from a security standpoint, from a political standpoint, from virtually every standpoint you look at," said a leading U.S. military analyst. "Many of the nascent plans for the postwar Middle East presumed tacitly that we'd be dealing with a different government in Baghdad, maybe still Baathist, but not led by Saddam."
In this view, permitting Saddam to remain in power with significant parts of his military apparatus intact could leave the door open to potentially endless future problems - including overt or covert aggression against his vulnerable but strategically vital neighbors.
Such fears are not limited to the Bush administration. All of the mainstream European and Arab members of the coalition share the view that the survival of a well-armed government, led by Saddam, would be a destabilizing force for years to come - its potential for stirring trouble inhibited only by the serious economic problems it will face as a result of allied bombing.
"If they get a withdrawal, the Bush administration will be very embarrassed," said a ranking European envoy, discussing the flurry of diplomatic activity triggered by the Soviet Union's peace initiative over the past weekend. "If Saddam is still in power, it will be a very strange victory" for the coalition, he said.
Riad Ajami, a political economist with intimate knowledge of Iraq, agreed: "Saddam has a longer view of history than others believe. . . . He believes that he can survive today and come back another day, with more resources and more opportunities."
Ironically, the problem that the Soviet proposal poses for the allies is that it holds out the promise of fulfilling the key goal that has held the coalition together: Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait.
While the leaders of many states in the coalition, including the Arab states, would like to see Saddam removed from power, his ouster was never explicitly demanded in the U.N. resolutions.
Attempting to make it part of the allied plan now, at the risk of prolonging the conflict, could be politically divisive.
Indeed, President Bush's cool reaction to the secret Soviet peace plan in public comments Tuesday apparently reflected increasing fears in his administration that Saddam could re-emerge as a threatening powerhouse in the region and that the expensive international response to his invasion of Kuwait would have been virtually for naught.
Analysts cited these elements in the potential for an Iraqi resurgence:
Five weeks of relentless air assaults have destroyed more than 1,400 Iraqi tanks and killed untold numbers of troops, but the surviving remnant makes up an army that is still larger and better equipped than those in almost all of Iraq's neighbor nations.
The massive destruction rained down on Iraq by U.S. and British bombers may have weakened the Iraqi leadership, but Saddam's masterful manipulation of internal politics, his total control of the media and the absence of a cohesive opposition force to challenge him could keep him in power - perhaps indefinitely.
Most of the coalition's official objectives would have been achieved under the Soviet peace formula, but the survival of the ruling Arab Baath Socialist Party regime with a powerful military machine would almost certainly mean a prolonged, expensive - and potentially controversial - U.S. presence in the gulf.
The gulf crisis has spawned a new triad of power in the Arab world, centered on Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. But "Saddam-ism," the appeal to Palestinians and the region's dispossessed, could remain a radical political influence throughout the Middle East.
Iraq would, officially, have lost the war and Kuwait, but Saddam could try to undermine the conservative gulf sheikdoms and sabotage U.S. and coalition efforts to create regional stability through dirty tricks, sabotage, propaganda and terrorism.
Asked what capabilities the Iraqis would retain if the war ended Wednesday, Lt. Gen. Thomas Kelly, director of operations for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, said Tuesday: "It depends on what he gets back after this conflict is over, relative to the other states of the area. If he got everything out that he still has in the ball game, he would still be a very powerful military force."
Ironically, the biggest constraint on Iraq, if the fighting ends now, will be its crippled economy, experts said.
The combination of seven months of trade sanctions and the bombardment of the nation's infrastructure will limit Iraq's ability to produce oil, and, in turn, its capacity to rebuild. In the short term, Iraq may even have to import refined oil.
"When he initiated this adventure, Saddam had spent 10 years building an infrastructure to support a massive military force. Now his economic and support base is much reduced and it will take a long time and a lot of money from abroad to rebuild and to support the military force he had," said James Placke, a former U.S. envoy in Baghdad.
Iraq also owes an estimated $40 billion to countries ranging from the Soviet Union to Poland and Jordan as a result of its earlier, eight-year war with Iran.
"Saddam is vulnerable in three respects," said Placke. "He cannot immediately or fully . . . get back up to Iraq's oil-export potential, which he needs for foreign exchange. He's vulnerable because of indebtedness, from the past and from this war. And he's also vulnerable to export controls.
"If the world were to put its mind to it in a concerted way, given the financial leverage, it would be possible to constrain Iraq for a long time to come."
Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, following briefings in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, 10 days ago, concluded that Iraq's ability to threaten its neighbors had been knocked out "for a good long time." And a senior Department of Defense official said any peace agreement concluded before a ground war would have to include substantial economic and military sanctions that would prevent Iraq from building up its forces again, he added.
"If they sit on the border with large armored forces, even though they're out of Kuwait, that's a serious problem about which something's got to be done," the official added.
"There's still a lot of leverage over Iraq. If they get out of Kuwait but maintain a threatening posture against Kuwait, the war isn't going to continue, but there will likely be sanctions. . . . There are a lot of instruments at our disposal," he said.
At the same time, the official said "it will be much easier if Saddam Hussein's not around, much easier to imagine that kind of stable arrangement in the world where people are actually cooperating with Iraq in its own reconstruction, which would be more difficult with Saddam there."
And many analysts are skeptical about long-term prospects for sustaining effective sanctions against Iraq once the war ends. Some question whether continued sanctions would be legal under the terms of the relevant U.N. resolutions.
And even if crippled economically, they argue, Iraq would retain substantial power to make mischief.
by CNB