ROANOKE TIMES

                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: SUNDAY, February 24, 1991                   TAG: 9102250271
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: D-3   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: DONALD NUECHTERLEIN
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium


NEITHER INTERNATIONALISM NOR ISOLATIONISM

IN THE post-Cold War world in which we now live, the Soviet Union has withdrawn from its 45-year confrontation with the West, and faces political and economic disintegration.

The United States is now the undisputed leading power in the world - the only superpower. But to win the Cold War, the United States paid a heavy price in terms of its weakened infrastructure. A united Germany and Japan, the defeated powers in 1945, now rival the United States for international economic influence.

China, after a decade of movement toward modernization, turned its back on liberalism and again lives in isolation. Most African and South American countries are worse off economically than a decade ago.

Three countries - Iraq, Iran and Saudi Arabia - compete for control of the Persian Gulf oil reserves and of the world price for oil.

In view of the new world situation resulting from the Cold War's end, the United States has four alternative foreign policies that it could pursue in the 1990s:

Neo-isolationism: The United States is overburdened by economic and military commitments around the world. With the Cold War's end, neo-isolationists argue, U.S. forces should be brought home, and America should concentrate on rebuilding its economy and forging close trade links with Canada, Mexico and other Western Hemisphere countries.

Internationalism: The United States has successfully pursued an internationalist policy since 1949, internationalists say, and must continue to shape the world order favorably to U.S. interests because no other country is willing or able to do so.

Selective internationalism: Because the Soviet Union is no longer a serious threat, others contend, the United States should withdraw from most areas where it has bases and leave only small forces in Europe and the Western Pacific. Concentrate on rebuilding the U.S. economy, and use force abroad only when U.S. economic interests are seriously threatened, as in the Persian Gulf.

Withdrawal-pacifism: The United States has endangered its social and economic fabric because of its obsession with the Cold War. In this view, a fundamental change in priorities is imperative to avoid political turmoil at home. (A minority within this group opposes using military forces anywhere.)

The Persian Gulf crisis is a dramatic test of which alternative will prevail in the 1990s. George Bush's decision in August to impose sanctions on Iraq for its invasion of Kuwait reinforced internationalism as the basis of foreign policy. His decision last month, approved by Congress, to use force against Iraq showed a continuing U.S. desire to be a world policeman when world order is at stake.

The United States has three important, probably vital, interests in the gulf crisis: to protect the world's major oil reserves from domination by one country, to defend United Nations principles of non-aggression against neighbors, and to maintain a balance of power among the gulf countries.

The outlook in the Gulf War is that Iraq will be defanged militarily, regardless of whether Saddam Hussein remains in power, and that a new balance of power will be established, with Iran and Saudi Arabia making peace with each other. The United States will withdraw most of its ground forces from Saudi Arabia by the end of 1991, but will leave a large naval force in the gulf to ensure that neither Iran nor Iraq will challenge Saudi Arabia's pivotal role as principal world supplier of oil at reasonable prices.

Bush's successful policy in the Persian Gulf will give the internationalist view a needed boost during the next year, when congressional critics of his domestic policies campaign for reduced military and foreign-aid spending and for larger budgets to deal with pressing domestic problems.

If by the mid-'90s the Soviet Union continues to pose no threat to Europe and East Asia, I foresee growing pressure from the public and Congress to move American foreign policy toward either selective isolationism or neo-isolationism. This is because the financial and human costs of maintaining the president's "new world order" will be challenged by many conservatives and liberals who want to cut taxes or to divert defense spending to domestic programs.

I don't believe this country will accept neo-isolationism, because the United States is too heavily dependent on international trade and finance and on cooperative relations with many nations around the world. Nevertheless, a more detached view of the world is likely to develop here, as more Americans conclude that Europe and East Asia are rich and should take responsibility for maintaining regional security.



 by CNB