ROANOKE TIMES

                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: SUNDAY, March 10, 1991                   TAG: 9103100332
SECTION: HORIZON                    PAGE: D-1   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: By ANDREW POLLACK THE NEW YORK TIMES
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Long


WHY WE LAG OFF BATTLEFIELD IN TECHNOLOGY/

From the opening salvos of Tomahawk cruise missiles to the final desert tank battles, the performance of high-technology weapons in the Persian Gulf War led to rejoicing over Yankee ingenuity and the quality of American technology.

So some people are asking why a nation that can produce such sophisticated weapons cannot make a compact disc player and is falling behind Japan in everything from cars to computer chips.

As the Senate majority leader, George Mitchell of Maine, said in the Democrats' response to President Bush's State of the Union Message, "If we can make the best smart bomb, can't we make the best VCR?"

The answer, many technology experts say, is not necessarily.

To begin with, they say, the weapons are not necessarily that sophisticated. Nor does the effort involved in making them translate automatically into success in commercial technology.

But many people, including Mitchell, say the answer should be yes.

In addition to weaponry, the United States remains supreme in such technologies as supercomputers, software and biotechnology.

If the nation were to devote as much effort to making cars and televisions as it does to producing missiles, this camp says, it might be possible to be more competitive in those areas where it lags.

Indeed, the nation's effort in making weapons may hurt its competitiveness in other areas.

Some executives say that because of the Pentagon mentality of striving for sophisticated technology at any cost, military technology has become irrelevant to economic competitiveness.

In selling computers, television sets or automobiles, low cost and the ability to get to market quickly are as important as whiz-bang features.

Raytheon Corp., for example, which built the Patriot anti-missile system that destroyed the Iraqi Scuds, has had a tough time in the consumer marketplace with its Caloric stoves and Speed Queen washing machines and dryers.

The performance of the weapons in the Persian Gulf is likely to play a role in future debates about national priorities and how to restore competitiveness.

In a number of interviews, technology executives, analysts and military systems experts agreed on these points:

> Most weapons used in the war, including the Patriot and the Tomahawk, were developed more than 10 years ago, using technology far less sophisticated than that found in today's personal computers.

In that sense, the triumph of U.S. weaponry in the war is not so much a sign of the nation's present prowess as it is a reminder of past ability.

While the Defense Department once pioneered in developing technology that later found commercial uses, the latest technology is now generally developed for non-military applications; only later might it find its way into weapons.

Because of its loss of competitiveness in commercial technology, the United States cannot make some of its own weapons without help from other nations. A small but growing number of components and technologies in American weapons comes from foreign suppliers, in some cases because there are no longer any U.S. producers.

Before the Persian Gulf War, a movement seemed to be building in the technology business and in Congress to redirect some federal research and development spending away from purely military technology like the "Star Wars" anti-missile system and toward technologies with more civilian applications, like flat-panel monitors for use in television sets and computers.

Whether the war will derail that movement is uncertain.

For all the excitement over U.S. weaponry, it is still too early to assess precisely how well the high technology performed.

For every video clip of a smart bomb gliding into an air shaft, it is not known how many bombs went astray.

And military analysts point out that Iraq was not the most technologically sophisticated opponent.

Still, even if the technology functioned as well as its ardent supporters say, consider the cost and time involved in building those weapons.

Some $9.5 billion, for instance, has been spent on the Tomahawk cruise missile since 1972. Given such costs and time, some say, the weapons should work well.

"We're all proud of the Patriot's performance, but it costs a million dollars every time you push the button," said Jacques S. Gansler, a former Pentagon procurement official and author of "Affording Defense."

The military business, with its own goals and complex procedures, has evolved into a culture distinct from commercial business.

Companies that excel in one arena often cannot excel in the other.

Some executives and analysts go further, arguing that weapons development has actually hurt the nation's competitiveness by siphoning off research dollars and engineers that could have been developing commercial products.

While Americans developed spy satellites, Japan made video cameras and is reaping the revenues.

Just last month, for instance, executives from 11 large computer companies issued a report saying that too much federal research and development money had been spent on the military and not enough on computers.

The report said that nearly 70 percent of federal research and development money goes to the military, up from 50 percent a decade ago.

Although the federal government spends more over all on research and development than most of the other industrial powers, its non-military research and development spending is less than in the other nations, as measured by percentage of gross national product.

Military spending was once believed to contribute to the nation's overall technological ability.

The fledgling U.S. semiconductor industry got its start developing chips for the Minuteman missile in the 1960s and only later began selling to computer companies.

That is less likely to be the case now, in part, some people say, because military technology has increasingly emphasized exotic technology with few apparent commercial spinoffs, like semiconductor chips that can resist nuclear radiation.

In the case of electronics, on which "smart weapons" rely, the growing computer and consumer electronics industries have simply spurted ahead of the military as users of chips and technology leaders.

In the '60s, about 70 percent of chips went into military equipment; now only about 8 percent does. So chip companies aim their development efforts at satisfying computer companies, not the Pentagon.

Similarly, some composite materials used in weapons are "not nearly as advanced as what you could buy in a sporting goods store," said Michael Sekora, a former director of technology planning in the Pentagon.

"Defense is not a leader," said Robert Costello, chief of Pentagon procurement in the Reagan administration. "In many cases it's not even a user of the latest technology."

Indeed, an increasing problem for the Pentagon is keeping its obsolete technology in operation. Because it takes 8 to 15 years to develop a weapon, the technology is often outdated by the time the weapon is ready.

One company, Lansdale Semiconductor of Tempe, Ariz., does nothing but manufacture computer chips for the Pentagon that have long since been discontinued by the original manufacturer.

Some of these chips are in the Tomahawk and Patriot systems and in sensors on helicopters used in the gulf war, said Lansdale's president, Dale Lillard.

Unencumbered by the burdensome military procurement regulations, and spurred by competition, makers of commercial products often rush ahead.

An example of this are devices that calculate latitude and longitude by receiving signals from the Pentagon's Navstar Global Positioning System satellites.

Rockwell International Corp., under a Pentagon contract, developed a portable receiver that weighs 17 pounds and can be carried in a backpack.

But companies fiercely competing to sell receivers for use in pleasure boats offer units that weigh as little as 3 pounds and can be carried in one hand.

These units are not quite as rugged as the military versions and lack some features, like protection against jamming.

Indeed, the Pentagon is buying more commercial products to save time and money.

Therefore, the spinoffs are now going the other way: A healthy commercial industry is considered necessary for the military.

Some people say there is no problem in relying on allies for military technology; others believe the best course is to be self-sufficient.

Still, some Pentagon and industry officials have been arguing that the Pentagon should direct some research and development money to help U.S. technology companies compete in commercial markets.

Only if U.S. companies are successful in commercial markets will they be able to produce supplies for the military, these people say.

If there is a lesson from the gulf war, some executives said, it is that the United States can accomplish what it sets its mind and money to do.

If the nation determined that economic security was as important as military security, "we could catch up in the commercial arena as well," said William Spencer, chief executive of Sematech, a technology consortium in Austin, Texas, that is backed by the Pentagon and industry.

"Why can't we make a VCR when we can make a Patriot missile?" asked Clyde Prestowitz, president of the Economic Strategy Institute in Washington.

His answer: "We really care about making Patriot missiles."



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