Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: FRIDAY, March 15, 1991 TAG: 9103150802
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A/11 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: LESLIE H. GELB
DATELINE: LENGTH: Medium
It is an important and unavoidable question. But the answers reflect record levels of instant historical amnesia and analytic hogwash.
George Bush and his closest aides are the policy heroes for sure. But their triumph is decidedly personal.
Who did what and why in the gulf has more to do with individuals' gut instincts and party politics than with philosophies or Vietnam syndromes or party labels.
Bush's decision to use military power against Iraq was opposed by a bewilderingly mixed bag of radical Democrats, moderate and conservative Democrats, conservative Republicans and Republican right-wingers.
Yes, the overwhelming majority of Democrats voted to continue sanctions against Saddam Hussein, rather than go to war as Bush wanted. True, most of them were radicals and liberals.
A number, however, were like Sam Nunn and Lloyd Bentsen, conservative idols whom no one has ever accused of suffering from Vietnam-induced pacifism.
Three key and courageous supporters of Bush were Reps. Les Aspin and Stephen Solarz and Sen. Al Gore. All liberals.
Recall also that the strongest intellectual cases against going beyond sanctions were made by Republocrats like Zbigniew Brzezinski, James Schlesinger and Paul Nitze. All are staunch conservatives; all are renowned advocates of a muscular U.S. national security policy.
Remember the leading Republican and conservative lights who fought fiercely, especially in the beginning, against virtually any form of U.S. action against Saddam. Never forget Patrick Buchanan's heroic stand for Iraqi rights.
As for the team of Evans and Novak, these hard-line media mavens now say they were only being good reporters and their sources misled them. Then there was Edward Luttwak, the mother of all conservative strategists. Sadly, the list is too long to congratulate all of them.
Eight of nine recent secretaries of defense favored staying with sanctions. This group included none other than Caspar Weinberger, who cautioned: "I understand people get impatient and all, but I do not believe in rushing in and attacking early."
Two recent chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - Adm. William Crowe and Gen. David Jones - were even more reluctant to use force than Weinberger.
This unique brew of Bush critics was joined by probably 90 percent of American and European experts on Arab affairs. These experts were convinced that force would ignite fires of revolution against Arab moderates and terrorism against the United States. Their views had zero to do with conservatism or liberalism.
The picture is even muddier when behavior prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait is factored in. No one did more than the Reagan and Bush administrations to build up Saddam's legitimacy and power. And they were not alone.
The Arab moderates, the Europeans, and the Middle East experts in the State Department all turned a blind eye to Saddam's relentless push toward a modern million-man army, his use of poison gas against the Kurds, his vicious human rights abuses and his support of terrorism.
Saddam, however, made moderate noises and performed the noble task of keeping Iranian radicals busy on the battlefield. That was good enough to quiet almost all.
But not sufficient for Democratic liberals (plus a few Republican conservatives) who took the lead last year in trying to cut off the billion-dollar program of U.S. farm credits to Iraq. Democratic Rep. Dan Glickman's amendment prompted rabid opposition from Bush and most Republicans in the House. Two famous Republican tough guys, Newt Gingrich and Henry Hyde, voted to continue aid to Saddam.
Hours before Iraq stormed into Kuwait, liberals on the House Foreign Affairs Committee again tried to stop those credits, and prospective arms exports. Again, most Republicans called out "nay" on orders from the White House.
Is it possible that if Bush had favored sanctions without force, the Republican contingent in Congress would have gone along with that, too? Is it also possible that most congressional Democrats would have endorsed a war policy if a Democrat had been in the White House?
Is it not likely that the success story of the Persian Gulf has very little to do with Republicans and Democrats and almost everything to do with who is president of the United States?
by CNB