Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: SUNDAY, April 7, 1991 TAG: 9104070241
SECTION: HORIZON PAGE: D1 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: BERNARD E. TRAINOR NEW YORK TIMES
DATELINE: LENGTH: Long
If so, the threat of nuclear proliferation may increase.
The stunning allied victory in Iraq made the United States a virtual king of the military hill.
Not every smart weapon hit its target and, based on Air Force estimates, 70 percent of the dumb bombs dropped in the war missed their targets.
Nevertheless, revelations of imperfection do not diminish the magnitude of the desert victory.
Now nations throughout the world - including the Soviet Union - hold U.S. military might in awe. They perceive the United States to be unbeatable; military strategy in every country is being reviewed in this context.
The principal lesson that it is unhealthy to challenge the United States on the battlefield may not be all to the good - particularly among unstable, militaristic Third World nations. They may draw conclusions that are dangerous to international peace and security.
The success of Desert Storm may trigger a race to obtain ballistic missiles armed with warheads containing chemical, biological or - most dangerous of all - nuclear weapons.
Consider a hypothetical scenario involving the military high command of one such nation.
General X points out that the heavy investments made by his country in Soviet weaponry is money down the drain. What if they get into a regional war, he asks, and the United States intervenes on the part of their enemy?
Or what if the enemy nation is able to procure U.S. high-technology weapons?
General Y agrees: Their country is stuck with garden-variety, second-rate equipment and, moreover, relations with the United States are such that they are barred from buying any high-tech weapons.
General Z intervenes, however, and reminds his colleagues of the televised images of terrified people putting on gas masks and the panic in Tel Aviv and Saudi Arabia when Scud missiles began to fall.
He points out that notwithstanding the powerful Patriot air defense system, the Scud with its 1950s technology actually did considerable damage.
The Scuds interrupted the U.S. air campaign and diverted hundreds of bomber sorties from their primary targets - so they could go out in pursuit of the Scuds.
Furthermore, General Z reminds his fellow generals that even though the Scud was inaccurate and U.S. officials insisted it was insignificant, it caused many psychological and political problems for the allies.
General Z then asks his colleagues to turn back the clock to Aug. 2 when Saddam invaded Kuwait.
How might the United States have responded, he asks, if it had known the Iraqis had Scud missiles armed with nuclear warheads?
Would it have considered Kuwait worth the risk of war under those circumstances?
And if it did, would the Persian Gulf nations within range of those lethal missiles have agreed?
Would Saudi Arabia even have permitted Americans on its soil if it was threatened with nuclear attack?
How different the gulf crisis might have played out in that situation, he says.
It does not take much imagination to know what the generals conclude at the end of their discussion: Missiles with unconventional warheads could provide an antidote to U.S. technology.
Even if the threat failed to deter the Americans, they might reason, it could well prevent international cooperation with the United States.
And under the umbrella of a nuclear threat, less sophisticated weapons could have a place in the overall strategy.
In short, the nuclear threat could checkmate the United States.
The dangers of such a scenario are very real. Several nations have perfected the accuracy and range of Scud missiles; China and North Korea have sold improved ballistic missile technology to other nations.
As for the warheads, chemical weapons are relatively easy to manufacture in any nation with even a modest industrial capability.
While biological weapons are more difficult to fabricate, the manufacture is possible if it is made a priority by determined Third World nations.
Acquiring a nuclear warhead for a missile is considerably more difficult in the face of restrictions, protocols and treaties that exist to prevent nuclear proliferation.
But if there is an appetite to do so, it would be unwise to assume it cannot occur because the international community does not want the spread of nuclear weapons.
There is evidence that North Korea is attempting to construct a nuclear weapon. The lessons of Desert Storm may accelerate that effort.
And last autumn, in the face of the threat from Iraq and uncertainty over whether the U.S. Congress would support President Bush's hard-line policy, there were even reports that Saudi Arabia was offering billions of dollars for a nuclear device to ensure its own security.
by CNB