Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: SUNDAY, April 7, 1991 TAG: 9104090479
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: D-3 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: MARK N. KATZ
DATELINE: LENGTH: Medium
Soviet cooperation with the United States and the Western powers was, of course, crucial for authorizing the use of force against Iraq by the United Nations Security Council. Moscow, though, is no longer willing to pursue an independent foreign policy in the Middle East.
This was shown by Mikhail Gorbachev's futile diplomacy to prevent the launching of the ground war. He issued two peace proposals which called for Iraq to be exempted U.N. sanctions if it withdrew from Kuwait. But once it became clear that Baghdad would lose the ground war, Gorbachev backed down and supported coalition demands for Iraq to abide by all Security Council resolutions.
Gorbachev's flip-flop diplomacy demonstrated not only Moscow's inability to influence events in the Middle East, but more importantly, its unwillingness to pursue policies disapproved of by the West and conservative Arab states.
Nor did this happen when the reformers were still in the ascendant in Moscow. It occurred after Gorbachev had come to rely increasingly on hard-liners. Despite their rhetoric, even Soviet conservatives saw that their interests were better served by cooperating with Washington in the Middle East than by opposing it.
This is because the primary goal for Gorbachev and the conservatives is to keep the Soviet Union intact. Except for the ultraright-wing fringe, the conservatives recognize that Moscow desperately needs the West's money and good will if it is to have a chance at preventing the breakup of the U.S.S.R.
Soviet conservatives would prefer to keep Iraq as an ally, or, perhaps more accurately, a paying customer for Soviet weapons. They know, however, that Iraqi arms purchases could not make up for Western trade, aid and investment, which Moscow might lose through resuming its alliance with Baghdad now.
The same logic holds for Soviet foreign policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict. While Moscow actively worked to disrupt American-sponsored peace proposals in the past, the Soviet government no longer has an interest in doing so. Gorbachev and his conservative supporters need Western friendship too much to risk losing it through opposing America in the Middle East now.
Gorbachev still hopes to retain Soviet influence in the Middle East. But if Moscow cannot afford to pursue a foreign policy in the Middle East that opposes America's, then the Soviets cannot realistically hope to gain or even retain much influence in the region.
Moscow previously enjoyed influence in radical Arab states because it provided them with support in retaining power and pursuing anti-American foreign policies. Even the conservative Arab states could gain America's attention through playing the Soviet card: They would threaten to turn to Moscow unless Washington pursued policies more to their liking.
Now, however, there is no Soviet card for the Arabs to play. And since this is the case, the Arabs have no interest in allowing Moscow to play a large role in the region.
If it will not vigorously oppose American support for Israel, Moscow has nothing else to offer the Arabs. It cannot provide economic assistance. And after the poor showing of Iraqi-owned Soviet weaponry in this last war, the Arabs are unlikely to buy many Soviet arms, though they may be cheaper.
Gorbachev would like to see the U.S.S.R. have good relations with the West while at the same time being an influential power in the Middle East. However, Soviet influence in the Middle East can be obtained only at the price of poor relations with the United States. Gorbachev, unlike previous Soviet leaders, is unwilling to pay this price.
Mark N. Katz teaches at George Mason University's International Institute.
by CNB