by Archana Subramaniam by CNB
Roanoke Times Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc. DATE: FRIDAY, February 19, 1993 TAG: 9302190193 SECTION: VIRGINIA PAGE: A-1 EDITION: METRO SOURCE: GREG EDWARDS AND DOUGLAS PARDUE STAFF WRITERS DATELINE: NORTON LENGTH: Medium
MINE WORKERS: GAS BUILDUP NOT FEARED
The Southmountain Coal Co. Mine No. 3 mine where eight miners died in a massive explosion Dec. 7 had no formal safety or accident-prevention program, investigative interviews with mine employees and officials show.Transcripts of the interviews released Thursday by the U.S. Mine Safety and Health Administration also indicate that miners and mine officials never had any real concern about explosive methane gas. Instead, their main concern was cave-ins from an unstable mine roof.
The foot-thick pile of transcripts also reveals that miners, foremen and even mine superintendents lacked clear understanding of the mine's firefighting, evacuation and ventilation plans.
A breakdown in ventilation - the system for moving fresh air through the mine to clear out methane, other gases and dust - is believed to be the major cause for the explosive buildup of methane.
Questions by investigators indicate they suspect that a cave-in or a buildup of water in a mined-out area may have blocked the flow of fresh air long enough to allow the methane to build up. The flow of fresh air also may have been disrupted by missing control curtains in the ventilation system.
The transcripts were taken during a week of questioning last month at MSHA's office in Wise. Thirty-one miners and mine officials from Southmountain were interviewed. Transcripts were released from all but one person, who requested anonymity.
Federal and state mine inspectors say they don't expect the investigation to be completed for several months.
The transcripts raise concern about the credibility of some of the company officials who testified from jointly prepared and agreed-upon notes. Two foremen who testified with aid of the notes denied that they had discussed or prepared their testimony with anybody.
Freddie Deatherage, superintendent of Southmountain and the person responsible for health and safety at the mine, refused to comment when asked by investigators who helped him prepare his notes.
Before investigators could press him, Donnie Short, a Southmountain representative sitting in on the questioning, interrupted. He told investigators, "I sat down with them, and we got together and decided what happened, what went on, where they went, what they checked, and it was all put on here with their own words."
Among those interviewed was William "Ridley" Elkins, who identified himself as the mine consultant responsible only to mine owner William Jack Davis of Coeburn. Elkins was asked by investigators if he had ever considered instituting any type of safety or accident-prevention program at the mine, even though none is required by law. "Yes, I've thought about it," he said. When asked if he had ever begun any such program, he replied, "No sir. No sir."
Mine safety records show that Southmountain No 3. had a rate of accidents with injuries that was more than double the state and national averages.
Asked if he had any explanation for the explosion, Elkins, who has declined to comment publicly, said "I, I, I think you've got a whole lot of methane there right quick from somewhere . . ."
Nearly everyone questioned agreed that the methane level built quickly and previously had been negligible. Those interviewed said numerous routine tests for methane had not revealed any significant level of methane during the more than two years the mine had been in operation.
Short, the general mine superintendent, said he had no idea why the methane had accumulated but speculated that it had flowed into an area where a battery charger was operating, igniting the explosion.
On the day of the explosion, the men who were killed may have had no warning that methane was building up because a methane monitor they depended on had been disabled.
Donnie Mullins, the electrician in charge of maintaining the monitor, admitted in questioning that he had replaced a missing $5 special woven metal filter with an oiled rag. He said he thought the rag would be an adequate replacement because he didn't have any extra filters. He said he tested it several times to make sure it was working properly. And he said, it had worked properly for a week.
However, Leonard Daniels, a maintenance shop foreman for the company that sold the monitor, said Thursday that he believed the cloth rag would have quickly clogged with dust, preventing the monitor from reading methane.
Of major concern to the investigators were indications that some of the dead miners may have been smoking. Mine Superintendent Deatherage told investigators that he had suspected some of the miners were smoking underground. He said he tried to catch them with routine pat-downs, but never found any smoking material.
Keywords:
FATALITY