Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: SUNDAY, May 2, 1993 TAG: 9305020096
SECTION: NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PAGE: A11 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: DIANA JEAN SCHEMO THE NEW YORK TIMES
DATELINE: LENGTH: Medium
Now, with the bulk of U.S. troops home from Somalia and the Clinton administration reluctantly weighing whether to intervene in Bosnia, it seems a fair time to tally up the lessons Washington may glean from its odyssey in the Horn of Africa.
Saturday, the United Nations began financing most of the foreign presence in Somalia, where up to 5,000 U.S. troops will remain in an international contingent of 28,000.
"Much to everyone's dismay, Somalia may be characteristic of the kinds of situations that we face in the future," said Mary E. Morris, a policy analyst at the Rand Corp. in Santa Monica, Calif., who is studying the Somalia intervention for Army planners. "There aren't clear political goals stated up front."
From a distance, Somalia seemed an easy place to do some good, with few of the pitfalls surrounding other horrors beckoning for an U.S. response.
The open desertscape was matched by a relatively clear political field. Somalia's lack of a government meant an absence of credible organized opposition, and allowed the international community to virtually sidestep the issue of sovereignty.
Nor was the fighting among factions complicated by the musty historic and religious hatreds that could trigger ethnic cleansing in the Balkans.
America's intervention in Somalia can be called a success, in modest ways. Sacks of rice made it inland from the ports unassaulted. Gravediggers, once the busiest men in town, began looking for new jobs.
And the United States managed a relatively clean, quick intervention with a hand-over to United Nations forces, now armed with authority to enforce the terms of the Somali peace agreement.
But what may have seemed a blessing before intervention proved a problem later. The lack of a central government or military meant there was no authority to shore up, making a total withdrawal of U.S. forces and expertise untenable for the moment.
Americans will remain behind in important leadership posts and 20 to 30 will stay on to help negotiate the peace.
"We're not sure the United Nations can provide the structure that will allow Somalia to create its own political framework," said Morris. "Once we get out of there, six months down the line, are things going to be really better than they were before we went in?"
So simple from afar, Somalia demonstrates how intractable the problems that demand the rescue by foreign armies can be, and how impenetrable and unpredictable are the barriers of culture.
The power of the warlords waned after U.S. attacks, but organized gangs sprang up. U.S. forces found themselves carrying bats and sticks to beat off youngsters who made a sport of stealing their sunglasses and field rations.
Over 100 Somalis are thought to have been killed by foreign forces on a humanitarian mission, making some grumble that it seemed more like an occupation. Eight U.S. soldiers and nine from other countries died.
The breakdown of Somali society meant the thievery and violence weeded out in one place simply cropped up elsewhere.
Somalia also demonstrated how difficult limiting U.S. presence can be, even in a multinational context.
It was not long before U.S. troops and diplomats found themselves doing more than simply securing the delivery of food - patrolling streets at night, disarming some of the factions and shepherding a political reconciliation among the 15 rival factions.
Somalia may ultimately prove to be an anomaly with little to reveal for other engagements, like Bosnia. "The acutest suffering in Somalia has been alleviated. The Bosnian case will be much more uncertain in that respect," said Helmut Sonnenfeld, a guest scholar at the Brookings Institute in Washington. "In many ways, horrible as it was, Somalia will prove to have been a lot simpler and less bloody than the former Yugoslavia."
by CNB