Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: MONDAY, May 3, 1993 TAG: 9305030043
SECTION: NATIONAL/INTERNATIONAL PAGE: A2 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: The Washington Post
DATELINE: WASHINGTON LENGTH: Medium
The Israeli initiative got immediate support inside former President Reagan's inner circle from then-CIA Director William Casey and then from the president himself, according to Shultz.
Despite the press and congressional uproar over the scandal, and Reagan's public statements in November 1986 that dealings with Iran were over, Casey got the president and then-Vice President George Bush in December 1986 to ignore Shultz's advice and support this final, Israeli-initiated effort at secretly trading arms to gain release of U.S. hostages then held in Lebanon, according to Shultz.
Shultz's disclosure reinforces the view of some that the Israelis were the moving force behind the Iran arms sales, because they brought the first proposal to the Reagan White House in 1985.
In providing the background of this last, ill-fated effort, Shultz writes that it represented a "desperate" attempt by "those who were responsible for the operation . . . to succeed and thus to vindicate their judgment in the face of overwhelming criticism."
Although the former secretary of state has previously disclosed many of the Iran-Contra details published in his new memoir, the 1,138-page book provides some new facts on the worst scandal of the Reagan administration and illuminates the mood and infighting around the president as the Iran-Contra scandal raged.
Shultz writes that then-White House aide Patrick Buchanan, who later challenged Bush for the GOP presidential nomination, "asked the president to be named ambassador to NATO," and "the president said he liked the idea."
Noting that then-White House Chief of Staff Donald Regan had told him that "Nancy [Reagan] wanted to get Buchanan out of the White House," Shultz writes that he "was amazed that such a preposterous idea was even being considered." It never happened.
Another unusual staff proposal, according to Shultz, was Casey's suggestion during the Iran-Contra period that Zbigniew Brzezinski be named Reagan's national security adviser.
"I respected Brzezinski, but I thought that bringing back the NSC adviser from the Carter administration was a crazy idea," Shultz writes. Instead, Frank Carlucci was named.
The most enlightening new tale in the book, however, is the last effort by the Reagan White House to join the Israelis in reopening arms-for-hostages negotiations after the scandal broke.
Shultz reports that when he told Reagan he had ordered U.S. officials to stay away from the revitalized Israeli-Iranian operation, the president "was taken aback. He said nothing, but I could sense that my action had riled him."
Bush, who over the years has portrayed himself as a passive observer and adviser to Reagan during the Iran-Contra affair, is described by Shultz as being more active in this final effort.
As Casey was restarting the CIA side of the operation, Bush talked to a key CIA operative "to confirm" that the agency was to continue secretly trying to arrange an arms-for-hostages deal with the Tehran regime, according to the former secretary of state.
"The CIA and the National Security Council staff, with the apparent support of President Reagan and Vice President Bush, were proceeding just as though nothing had happened," Shultz writes. "Congress was being misled . . . a month and a half after the revelation first appeared."
by CNB