Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: TUESDAY, May 4, 1993 TAG: 9305040468
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A5 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: MARK E. RUSH
DATELINE: LENGTH: Medium
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of America's concern for the carnage in the Balkans is our inability to decide whether or not we should play the role of the world's policeman. Sadly, it seems, we, like Hamlet, have one awfully hard time trying to decide our course of action.
I heard perhaps the best manifestation of the American inability to resolve our role in world affairs proffered a few weeks ago at Washington and Lee University by Oliver North.
On the one hand, he argued, he saw no point getting involved in a foreign conflict which would necessarily bog us down a la Vietnam. A few sentences later, however, he managed to justify our role in places like the Persian Gulf because we can't afford to have modern-day Hitlers running around.
So when does a Bosnian mess turn into a problem of Nazi proportions?
Our inability as a nation to decide on our international role springs in no small part from our founding and our history. For roughly half the nation's existence, we lived in a "splendid isolation" thanks to our being surrounded by two large oceans. As well, George Washington, in his farewell address, warned his successors to avoid involvement in foreign conflicts. Yet after World War II, we found ourselves thrust into the center of the world's stage without ever having given much thought to what we would do once we occupied such a position.
Inasmuch as there is a certain part of the American psyche which is hellbent on staying out of foreign conflicts (we entered World War II not for the sake of Europe but because the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor helped turn a European war into a domestic issue), there is another part of our psyche that permits us to enter such conflicts - when it seems we can win.
Therefore, we don't want to go into Bosnia because it might turn into another Vietnam. However, if we could go into Bosnia under more favorable circumstances, then it might be as appealing as our foray into Grenada or Iraq, in which case we might relish our determinative role as much as we do our role in two world wars. On the other hand, our entry into other conflicts such as this failed miserably despite our high hopes - in which case our Grenada or Iraq might quickly turn into a Beirut or a Bay of Pigs: To be or not to be?
I suggest that the safest path for America to pursue might begin with a period of introspection: What are our limits?
Despite our being deemed a "superpower," the past 40 years have indicated that superpowerdom does not permit us to exercise our will freely throughout the world. For the most part, superpowerdom seems to ensure that no one is likely to attack us.
The nature of international affairs simply does not permit the effective projection of power on a global scale by anyone - superpower or not. The costs of success are simply too high.
Proof positive is that Saddam Hussein still sits atop Iraq while George Bush, who won the war, went on to lose the ensuing election.
Furthermore, American fondness for the use of force to achieve policy goals is questionable. For example, we don't as a rule permit the use of force domestically - and when we do, the results are mixed at best. For every successful use of force in, say, desegregating the schools in Little Rock or Montgomery, there is a haunting memory of failed uses of force at Kent State, more recently at a new spot on the map known as "near Waco, Texas," and every day on our city streets.
If we can't use force effectively at home, what leads us to conclude that we can use it to put an end to centuries-old, tribal infighting that even a half-century of Soviet occupation drove underground but obviously did not squelch?
There are no superlatives strong enough to describe adequately the horror of the situation in what used to be Yugoslavia. Nonetheless, the gravity of the Bosnian conflict does not in and of itself ensure that American military involvement would be effective or successful.
Twenty-five years ago, we learned painfully that the sort of air-strike strategy that President Clinton has been considering is ineffective in putting an end to military conflicts: Wars are won (and lost) on the ground.
Ironically, he - the first president to experience the possibility (and avoid the reality) of going to Vietnam - is now considering involvement in a foreign conflict of similar complexity. If diplomacy cannot put an end to hostilities, perhaps we should accept the limits of our "superpower" status and simply let history take its course in the Balkans.
\ AUTHOR Mark E. Rush is assistant professor of politics at Washington and Lee University.
by CNB