ROANOKE TIMES

                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: WEDNESDAY, June 2, 1993                   TAG: 9306020272
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: A-7   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: DON E. CASH and SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium


SHADOW GOVERNMENTS

THE END OF President Clinton's first 100 days triggered an outpouring of articles identifying deficiencies in the administration's strategy and tactics and providing advice on what should be done, as well as an admission by the president that his staff had to be better organized.

A critical but little-discussed message made evident by the first 100 days is that the nation has a problem with its political structure. If one can view a new U.S. administration as a new government, then 100 days-plus after taking office, this one has a very large gap in its makeup. While the various departmental secretaries are in place, many of the officials at the next level down - the ones who link the president's Cabinet to the day-to-day operations of government - are missing.

As political parties have declined and prenomination campaigns lengthened, candidates for office have come to rely on pickup teams of youngsters who can afford the time because their real careers have not started.

If these young people win the lottery - that is, pick a candidate who wins and they show off well in the campaign process - they may wind up in the White House. As a result, policy is partially formulated and pushed by hard-working, enthusiastic but inexperienced people from the presidential campaign, who at times exhibit the arrogance of power in their dealing with Congress and the media.

In truth, no U.S. president under the existing structure could be expected to have the right kind of team at the end of 100 days, or perhaps even at the end of a year.

American presidents frequently spend the two to three years before their election concentrating on winning the party nomination, and then plunging into the frenetic campaign to win in November. Little time or energy is devoted to formulating effective policy, let alone putting together a government.

Once presidents do pull a name out of the multitudes vying for political office that meets both policy and political litmus tests, the individual selected must be subjected to clearances by the FBI and an increasingly contentious set of interest groups. Meanwhile, presidents must approve a budget; deal with big questions such as health care; attend to crises in places like Russia, the Balkans and Waco; and wage a permanent campaign with the public and Congress to get programs through.

It is not surprising this context makes for something less than a smooth transition from one government to another. Nor is it surprising that a new government committed to taking significant initiatives might not offer carefully thought-through, skillfully executed programs. Americans can look with some envy at the shadow governments that opposition parties put together in many parliamentary democracies.

Surely we must find some way to fit U.S. governmental structure with the changing reality it must manage. We must cut back on the number of political appointees, making much more use of civil servants in high policy positions, as Canadian, Australian and many European governments do.

One structural change might be for the party out of power to nominate its candidates for president and vice president two years in advance of the next election. This should be done in a context of major campaign reform.

The change should establish that the official campaign is restricted to three months before the election. Campaign funding would need to be carefully constrained. These proposals are not Utopian. The German opposition party designates its nominee for chancellor years before the election, and he need not be a member of the parliament.

Under these circumstances, it would be expected that candidates of the party out of power would try to develop the equivalent of a shadow government. Obviously, there must be major limitations on such an effort since some of the most qualified would not be free to devote extensive, or even any, time to partisan politics.

Conversely, the logic and activities of the campaign would subsequently bring others to the forefront for key appointments. The opposition presidential nominee could appoint policy commissions to bring in detailed plans for health care or any other subject. The objective would be for the party out of power to develop a programmatic agenda and a team of people with the knowledge and time to think through policy positions and strategies, making for a smooth transition.

Using this system, we might be able to have a government in harmony with our Constitution and consistent with the contemporary social, economic and technological reality.

Don E. Cash and Seymour Martin Lipset are professors at the Institute of Public Policy at George Mason University.

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