Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: MONDAY, June 28, 1993 TAG: 9309010259
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A5 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: RAKIYA OMAAR
DATELINE: LENGTH: Long
For Somalis, the hunt for Aidid is wrought with irony. When U.S. envoy Robert Oakley arrived in Mogadishu in December, he embraced Aidid and rival warlord Ali Mahdi in a public ceremony to which he failed to invite Somalia's civic leadership. He called the warlords Somalia's leaders, legitimizing their murderous stranglehold on the country.
While no one denies the importance of bringing the warlords into a political process, such high-profile diplomacy has not facilitated political reconciliation. Ultimately, Somalia's wounds are self-inflicted - the legacy of brutal dictatorship and the warlords' predations. But the international response has been slow, politically naive, and flawed from the outset.
Operation Restore Hope - the largest deployment of American troops in Africa - was meant to save 2 million Somalis from imminent starvation. It was a momentous opportunity to put American leadership, resources, and good will behind a politically informed relief plan. Instead, the Bush administration did not consult Somalis and failed to gather the most elementary intelligence about the nature of the famine, the war, Somali society, or regional politics.
A sober, independent assessment late last year would have revealed that the famine-affected areas were well on their way to recovery. A good harvest was expected, making large-scale food aid redundant soon after the new year. Malnutrition was confined to areas where fighting continued and to remote villages unreachable by military convoys.
At the time, critics pointed out that hunger and food diversions were the result of political developments. Solutions would have to be political as well: disarmament, reconciliation, and a long-term commitment toward civil and economic reconstruction. Unfortunately, informed debate in the United States became impossible in the atmosphere of moral panic and missionary zeal.
President Clinton is now eager to claim success for the end of the famine. The credit, however, belongs entirely to an excellent rainfall, the tenacity of Somali farmers, and the help of a few committed relief agencies that arrived before the media circus.
The media are obsessed with the dramatic spectacle of Marines moving bulk food. But the disruptions that accompanied the arrival of the Marines claimed a thousand lives or more. Perhaps only a comparable number were saved by the extra food.
Meanwhile, the country's biggest killer - epidemic disease - is being neglected. Food aid is even delaying the recovery of agriculture by pricing farmers out of the market. Insecurity has increased dramatically - more relief workers, Somali and foreign, have been killed since December than throughout 1992.
Politically, the emphasis has been on securing quick agreements without the necessary preparations. The peace accords concluded in March were hailed as a breakthrough, but represent business as usual for the warring factions. The warlords have been publicly rehabilitated as politicians working toward an electoral process. However, they still have access to a formidable array of weapons.
The most promising long-term strategy for undermining the power of the warlords is to assist key civic groups, such as elders, religious leaders, women, humanitarian workers, professionals and traders. But these groups have remained marginal to the peace process, their counsel unheeded.
Now the U.N. peacekeepers have become a strike force. The rationale for the all-out assault against Aidid is disarmament - the single most important reason why Somalis welcomed intervention. They saw it as the only protection against another manmade famine and the prelude to reconciliation and reconstruction.
But U.S. reluctance to disarm destroyed the chances for a coherent and effective national plan. Prompted by the death of the first Marine in January, there have been sporadic efforts at disarmament intended largely for the cameras. But the prerequisites for a national policy of disarmament - enforcing the arms embargo, negotiating arms reductions, establishing a neutral police force, and rebuilding the judicial system - were never thought through.
Operation Restore Hope was a great photo opportunity for George Bush. But for Clinton, the dazzling firepower - reminiscent of Bush at his most popular - will not deflect criticism of his bungling of the Balkan conflict.
The prevailing emotion among Somalis is anxiety, as the political chaos is aggravated by the sense of lost opportunities. Whether the United Nations now targets other warlords, seeks new alliances among Aidid's competitors, or even allows them to exploit the vacuum, it is sowing the seeds of future conflicts in Somalia.
As for Operation Restore Hope, the humanitarian balance sheet remains to be assessed. It is far from certain that it will come out positive.
\ Rakiya Omaar, a Somali, is co-director of the London-based human-rights organization African Rights. He wrote this article for the Progressive Media Project.
Knight-Ridder/Tribune
by CNB