ROANOKE TIMES

                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: WEDNESDAY, January 19, 1994                   TAG: 9401200316
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: A9   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: THOMAS G. BLOMBERG
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Long


BOOT CAMPS: YET ANOTHER 'QUICK FIX' TOO QUICK TO FIX

AMERICANS are now embracing a new wave in crime control - boot camps. Underlying this concept is a broadly held belief that the best way to control crime is to get tough.

The problem is that getting tough on crime is expensive. Boot camps offer a compromise because they are intended to provide less costly but still tough alternatives to the most costly crime-control measure of incarceration. In effect, boot camps can be seen as a response to the growing public outcry and demand for simultaneous protection from both crime and higher taxes.

Yet will boot camps and various other get-tough efforts on crime control be successful? Based upon my 25 years of studying crime and my direct experience from working in a number of community and institutional programs designed to control crime, I am not optimistic.

If we consider this country's crime-control experiences, there emerges a pattern that can be characterized as reform without change, guided by one myth and corresponding quick fix after another.

Colonial Americans' crime-control practices were based on religious influences. They employed banishment, shaming and numerous corporal punishments. The goal was not to reform criminals but to respond to crime in a way consistent with their religious beliefs.

In the very early 1800s, this religion-guided crime control gave way to attempts to deter criminals by apprehension and swift and sure adjudication. The underlying idea was that crime could be deterred if the punishment outweighed any gains or pleasure resulting from crime.

In 1830, Americans discovered institutions as the new crime-control strategy. The belief was that taking criminals out of bad environments and placing them in well-organized institutional environments called prisons would equip offenders with a new ``spiritual coat of armor'' that Once the offender was returned to the unchanged city environment, the ``spiritual coat of armor'' would deflect the temptations of crime.

By 1850, Americans found that prisons were not fulfilling their people-changing function because released offenders were returning to prison. This pattern of repeat criminal behavior or recidivism led to further reforms based upon additional ideas or myths. These reforms included youth reformatories to get at offenders earlier and earlier, and probation and parole to enable more individual offender treatment.

Throughout this century, we have continued to expand, differentiate and refine various crime-control efforts by substantially expanding our prisons while simultaneously moving toward greater community-based control aimed not just at young and adult criminal offenders but at their communities and families as well.

These 20th-century crime-control efforts have been guided by an idea that blurs punishment and treatment but always focuses upon the individual offender. We appear indeed to be moving toward a future society that several criminologists have termed a ``minimum-security society'' in which more and more of the base population will become subject to some form of state control.

This ``minimum-security society'' notion is well-illustrated by electronic-surveillance measures that are increasingly being used by law enforcement and corrections. Using laser technology, law enforcement can determine conversations in a high-rise building from the street below through window deflections. Using satellites, correction agencies can monitor the movements of offenders in the community 24 hours a day. Yet, the question remains, will all of these get-tough and new surveillance technologies effectively control crime? The answer remains no.

As a society we must approach crime as we are beginning to approach health care. To focus only on the symptoms, namely the offender, or in the case of health, the disease, is to ignore the causes. While we do not know the precise causes of crime or the precise causes of many diseases including the common cold, cancer, HIV or AIDS, we do know a variety of contributing factors.

In the case of health care, we have seen numerous efforts aimed at prevention that are guided by knowledge of these contributing factors (i.e., diet, exercise, blood screening, sexual behavior, etc.). Why not approach crime in the same manner? Specifically, the current health-care reform by the Clinton administration does not focus merely on surgery.

We know that most criminal behavior is related to unemployment, broken homes, poor education, illiteracy, slum residence, early pregnancy and drugs. Further, we know that these factors contribute to a general sense of helplessness and hopelessness. How many successful or well-employed citizens do you know who have robbed a store or committed a violent act?

These factors, then, that contribute to hopelessness are indeed at the base of many crimes. Until they are addressed, crime will continue to be a major disease afflicting our society. We must recognize this and then proceed accordingly.

Boot camps are targeted at chronic delinquent youth who typically are economically disadvantaged. Yet, research shows that this delinquent group is least likely to benefit from boot camps. In short, what these particular youths learn in these type of programs turns out to be of little use once they return to their neighborhoods.

However, it has been shown that job-focused programs do work for many economically disadvantaged delinquents. On the other hand, boot camps and similar programs often work for some middle-class delinquents.

The point is that what works best varies with different groups of youths. All of this is of little news to parents who have raised several children - what works for one child simply will not work for a younger or older brother or sister.

The first step then is not to grasp another simple illusion (get-tough) and corresponding quick fix (boot camps). We have been doing that for centuries and it has not worked. We must recognize what we know and do not know. We must approach new crime-control programs carefully until we can determine what they can and cannot do, and for whom.

We can effectively confront crime if our crime-control policies are not guided by these periodic illusions of knowledge and quick-fix solutions but instead by actual program experiences and results.

Why not approach crime-control policy like each of us approaches our family, career, elective surgery and other important decision-making? We assess pros, cons, strengths, weaknesses, costs and benefits before we make our decisions. Do our public policies deserve less care and consideration?

\ Thomas G. Blomberg is a professor in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice at Florida State University. He wrote this article for the Tallahassee Democrat.

Knight-Ridder News Service



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