Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: SUNDAY, October 30, 1994                   TAG: 9412240014
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: G3   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: JORGE CASTANEDA
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium

HAITI

North of the Rio Grande, the pros and cons of the military landing have been centered on the usual question: Does it serve U.S. national interests? In Latin America, broader themes come to the fore. The traditional Latin perspective is resolutely anti-interventionist. It views any foreign interference in the domestic affairs of a nation, above all by the United States, as intrinsically illegitimate, deeply pernicious and inevitably contrary to the interests and aspirations of Latin America.

The motivations - economic benefit, geopolitical imperatives, ideological crusades - as well as the historical record of U.S. interventionism, ranging from Mexico in 1847 to Grenada in 1983, all counsel opposition and skepticism. Even the best of intentions - usually absent - set the worst of precedents.

This approach has led most in Latin America, including the governments of Mexico and Brazil, to oppose the administration's methods in Haiti. But if one views the affair from a different vantage point, even a red-blooded anti-interventionist like me can reach another conclusion.

Even before the operation began, it could be seen from the Latin point of view as acceptable, even beneficial, if four basic conditions were met. The key element, of course, was to consider the alternative: Without such intervention, the disintegration of Haitian society seemed unavoidable.

The four conditions for a U.S. invasion to be acceptable were: that Lt. Gen. Raoul Cedras and the other military leaders leave office and the country; that President Jean-Bertrand Aristide return to Haiti, to the presidency and to power; that the violence exercised by the government and military against the people of Haiti subside; and that U.S. troops withdraw promptly.

Not even the most rabid ``anti-imperialist'' faction in Latin America today can claim that these conditions are not being fulfilled much more expeditiously than most would have expected.

The general's departure took place on schedule. It could have been otherwise, or with greater obstacles and complications. Many doubted that Cedras and his cohorts would actually depart Haiti; yet they did.

Similarly, Aristide returned, and on the agreed-upon date, without the conditions, delays or impediments that could have been expected, given the animosity between the former left-wing priest and parts of the U.S. intelligence and policy-making communities.

The end of the violence against the people of Haiti is the foremost justification for the U.S. occupation. The number of dead, wounded, tortured or maimed would not have been reduced under any conceivable scenario other than a forced removal of the brutal dictatorship that unseated Aristide more than three years ago.

There is, of course, no guarantee that the violence will come to an end, or that Aristide or the U.S. military contingent will be able to deter it. But there are undoubtedly greater possibilities for terminating the repression and bloodletting absent the forces that overthrew Aristide. At least under Aristide, the victims will regain their dignity and lose the despair that they have lived with since 1991.

Finally, there is the issue of when the United States will withdraw. This is where American conservatives, Latin American anti-interventionists and people of good sense everywhere converge. The troops must leave soon, either because U.S. domestic public opinion will force them to, or because there is danger in overstaying their welcome, or because the principle of a short-lived occupation is essential for maintaining the virtue of the whole enterprise.

Aristide cannot stand indefinitely on the base secured by the U.S. invasion. He won an election overwhelmingly, was overthrown and now has been returned. The postman - Haitian or otherwise - seldom rings more than twice.

Outside interference has been a scourge for Latin America since time immemorial. This time, it will not be for Haiti - if the two remaining conditions are met.

Having this intervention proceed as it has and acknowledging its usefulness are signs of the times: the end of the Cold War, an intelligent U.S. administration and a different perspective from Latin America.

Jorge Castaneda is a graduate professor of political science at the National Autonomous University of Mexico in Mexico City.

Los Angeles Times