Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: THURSDAY, August 31, 1995 TAG: 9508310012
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A-13 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: STANLEY KOBER
DATELINE: LENGTH: Long
The American respondent, former NATO Cmdr. Gen. Andrew Goodpaster, replied that the Russian media needed to do more to inform the people that the differences between Russia and the United States are only in the details. USA Institute director Sergei Rogov ticked off a list of five substantive reasons, most notably the failure of the West to accept Russia as a full member in any of its institutions.
The contrast between American complacency and Russian irritation could not have been more striking. Afterward, I asked Rogov whether he had been trying to warn the Americans that they are not taking the growing tensions seriously enough, and he confirmed my impression. Later, a Russian friend expressed her frustration that Americans respond dismissively whenever Russians complain about the many difficulties they are confronting.
Such warnings should be taken seriously. The pro-American sentiment that burst forth a few years ago is dissipating. Indeed, an alarming number of Russians now believe their economic problems are the result of Western policies designed to weaken their country.
Recent developments "have rekindled an anti-Americanism and anti-Western feeling that had essentially disappeared by 1991," insists Georgy Arbatov, the former head of the USA Institute. "The poverty and humiliation caused by shock therapy are the genesis of rising nationalism and neoimperialism."
Unfortunately, Western policymakers routinely dismiss such warnings. Three arguments are frequently made for a sanguine attitude. The first is that too much has changed for Russia to go back to communism. That may be correct, but communism is only one form of totalitarianism, and history on this point is not reassuring.
If the existence of a market economy and a middle class precludes the emergence of an authoritarian political system, Nazi Germany should never have supplanted the Weimar Republic. Russia appears ripe for the development of a nationalistic totalitarianism.
The second argument is that even if Russia does return to authoritarianism, it is too weak to constitute a serious threat. The inept performance of the Russian military in Chechnya supports that argument in the short term, but history shows that conditions can change rapidly. Although Germany in 1933 was militarily insignificant, a few years later its armies stunned the world. And who in 1941 predicted the speed with which the Soviet Union and the United States would come to dominate the world's military affairs?
Even modestly reconstituted Russian military power could present a threat to Europe - especially given the drawdown of West European forces. And, of course, Russia still possesses a vast nuclear arsenal.
Which leads to the third argument, that nuclear weapons are not usable, so we do not need to take that potential Russian threat seriously. This notion is especially curious given the very effective use of nuclear weapons against Japan in World War II.
Nor should we be lulled into complacency by the apparent effectiveness of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War. The Soviet leadership was confrontational and expansionist, but it was not reckless. We cannot assume the same rationality on the part of Russia's extreme nationalists. The antics of Vladimir Zhirinovsky have attracted considerable attention, but he is not alone. Former Gen. Alexander Lebed, now a candidate for the Russian presidency, has fumed that "World War III would start" if NATO expanded.
Although it is tempting to dismiss such comments as hyperbole, that could be a fatal error. The history of war is a litany of miscalculations, and the outline of a terrible miscalculation is now taking shape. U.S. leaders assume that Russia should yield on issue after issue because it is weak and Russian leaders understand that their country cannot possibly prevail in a confrontation with the West. But if the ultranationalists come to power, they may well refuse to yield as a matter of principle.
Indeed, we are already seeing the first signs of that intransigence even among more moderate types. "Russia may meet NATO's advance eastward with its own advance westward," warns Alexander Konovalov of the USA Institute.
The West would be wise to heed such caution signals. Russians are understandably offended when Americans minimize their difficulties, dismiss their objections and use condescending or disingenuous arguments. For example, it is unrealistic to expect the Russians to believe us when we insist that an expanded NATO is not directed against them. What would be our reaction if we had disbanded NATO, seen our country fragment, and then the Soviet Union told us it wanted to incorporate Canada into the Warsaw Pact?
Former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev contended that both sides won when the Cold War ended, since neither side benefited from the prolonged adversarial relationship. But if the end of the Cold War translates into American triumphalism accompanied by Russian suffering and humiliation, we should not be surprised if the Russians turn to politicians who repudiate pro-Western policies.
We should not assume the Cold War can never return. And if it does, we may discover that an ultranationalist Russian leadership is even more dangerous and confrontational than the communists were.
Stanley Kober is a research fellow in foreign policy studies at the Cato Institute.
by CNB