ROANOKE TIMES
Copyright (c) 1996, Roanoke Times
DATE: Sunday, May 19, 1996 TAG: 9605170016
SECTION: HORIZON PAGE: 1 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: ALEXANDER HAIG SPECIAL TO THE WASHINGTON POST
Until recently, we had been through two rounds of revisionism about who won the Cold War and, more important, how it was won. The first round belonged to the conservatives who argued that American toughness and the Reagan military buildup, especially Star Wars, wore out the Soviet Union. Then as the American people recoiled from the tensions of the Cold War world, the liberals regained their voices, arguing that confrontations and military strength did not work after all and that the Reagan buildup actually prolonged an otherwise failing Soviet empire by threatening war while we wasted billions better applied to U.S. social needs. Both assertions are simplistic and wrong.
Now comes a third round as the virtues of the neoconservatives are extolled for seeking victory over the Soviets instead of mere containment. The ``neocons,'' who were mostly Cold War Democrats affronted by their party's lurch to the left, deserve their share of the credit. Still it seems a stretch to believe that Ronald Reagan or his principal national security officials at State, Defense or the National Security Council needed tutoring from the neoconservatives on how best to conduct the Cold War. It is also wrongheaded to suggest its peaceful outcome was the product of such a brief span of history.
As a veteran of both hot and cold wars against the Soviets and their allies, I rejoiced in the disappearance of the Soviet Union. But, there was reason to wonder about just how much we had to do with it. The fact remains that we did not storm the trenches. The enemy suddenly rose up and left, and the Soviet Union was no more. Few in Washington and even fewer in Moscow expected that.
The collapse came not so much from Western action as from internal contradictions in the Soviet model of Marxism/Leninism. The strains on the system were no secret; as Supreme Commander of NATO I spoke about them in the mid-'70s when Soviet military power seemed at its height. Compared with Western economies, the Soviet system could produce guns but less and less butter, and more and more Russians knew it. Containment of Soviet expansionism, whether pursued effectively by a Ronald Reagan or less effectively by a Jimmy Carter, was at best an important and timely catalyst rather than the central cause of the Soviet demise. Further, the West also owes a debt to Mikhail Gorbachev, not because of his tilt toward democracy but because while he struggled to preserve Marxism through reform, he did not resort to force to preserve the collapsing empire.
We also owe it to ourselves to recognize that Russian admiration of our economic system was never the equivalent of a wholesale conversion to Western democratic values. At first, the slogans coming from Moscow suggested Russia's rebirth as a democratic, free-market country. President Clinton wished that Russia would ultimately become a new ``democratic partner.'' But we know now that our values did not triumph; there is no real democracy in Russia today, the war in Chechnya continues, there could even be a return of the neo-communists by popular choice. Persistent efforts continue to reinstitute Moscow's control of the Commonwealth of Independent States. The rule of law, individual rights and all the rest we associate with a democratic society have yet to be built in Russia. Achieving these central objectives will not be helped by ignoring Russian violations of law in Chechnya or elsewhere. Such tactics have and continue to discourage and discredit the dwindling advocates of true reform in Russia. Nor will these objectives be helped by an unwillingness to meet our commitments for NATO's expansion in a credible way and within a certain time.
Clearly, confusion about who won the Cold War and why continues to hamper the development of sound policies in Europe and elsewhere. Reagan made his mark, as did many of his predecessors, by reviving American confidence in the rightness of our cause. His military buildup offset the long-sought Soviet bid to upset the balance of power. Various Reagan diplomatic policies helped to ``recontain'' a Soviet Union that was dangerously unopposed in the late '70s. This is the stuff of history. But what should concern us and the presidential candidates today is the sense of complacency about the world and Russia that flows from the assumption of ``victory'' as well as who should get the credit and why. Our policy toward Russia should no longer presume that democracy is inevitable, that Russia is a partner for peace and security or even that a free-market society will emerge.
The Soviet Union lost the Cold War and disappeared to be replaced increasingly by corrupt nationalisms. The West did not witness a triumph of democratic values. The struggle for excellence in values continues. Complacency on this score combined with misreading the cause of the Soviet collapse may jeopardize our essential ability to influence global events - and may yet lose us the peace.
Alexander Haig, a former NATO supreme commander, was secretary of state from Jan. 21, 1981 to June 24, 1982.
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