ROANOKE TIMES
Copyright (c) 1996, Roanoke Times
DATE: Saturday, May 25, 1996 TAG: 9605290003
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A-11 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: STEPHEN J. KONIG
I WAS somewhat surprised to find a commentary by David Nova (``Legal tampering with personhood," May 2), public-affairs director for Planned Parenthood, discussing the issue of the personhood of the fetus. Unfortunately for him, the logic of his positions only serves to refute his conclusions.
He attempts to assert that extending the legal definition of personhood to the fetus would be fraught with problems. I suppose for those favoring unrestricted abortion on demand, it most certainly would.
Yet the movement to extend legal personhood to the fetus, epitomized by legislation introduced in this year's General Assembly by Sen. Mark Earley, R-Chesapeake, recognizes a salient point, one which Nova passed right over: There's no philosophical justification for restricting personhood to children after birth.
Why is it necessary to consider the philosophical justifications for our reasons in defining personhood? It's necessary because unless we have a careful and precise justification, one that stands up to logical and rational scrutiny, then the law is merely stating a societal preference for who is and who is not a person. When this happens, a dangerous temptation to redefine what constitutes a legal person arises. This is a strong temptation, particularly when society might wish to disenfranchise or enslave those it hates or dislikes - or those who are too troublesome or burdensome.
Such was exactly the case in the United States before the Civil War. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself, in Dred Scott vs. Sandford, ruled that slavery couldn't be outlawed or restricted by Congress because blacks weren't legal persons. Such was the only possible conclusion if one wanted to permit slavery, since one cannot generally deprive a legal person of the right to life or liberty. How convenient and easy it was for proponents of legalized slavery to simply redefine personhood to exclude blacks!
Similarly, how convenient it is for proponents of unrestricted abortion that we can simply redefine personhood to exclude the fetus. Perhaps proponents of legalized euthanasia can use a similar tactic to achieve their goals by simply redefining personhood to exclude anyone over the age of 65.
To avoid such a trap, the legal definition of personhood cannot be arbitrarily granted or taken away at the whim of society. The basis for the definition must be precise, uniform and specific. To arbitrarily decide that fetuses aren't persons will not do because it offers no compelling justification for the determination. Society might just as well say that blacks, Jews or women aren't persons - all things that it has done at one time or another.
Nova is on target when he states that we cannot extend personhood merely to human life; if we did, then a single cell would be considered a legal person. But his suggestions for defining a person have significant problems. He says, "Personhood connotes qualities distinctly human: to think, feel, love, relate, commit, empathize, aspire, and communicate." Unfortunately, some of the qualities aren't distinctly human, and others don't manifest themselves until many years after birth. These definitions would either go too far by removing the status of person from infants and small children. Or they wouldn't go far enough in that they would allow us to grant legal personhood to many types of animals as well as humans.
Consider the ability to think. If we exclude basic types of thinking, such as the ability to learn from experiences, and restrict ourselves to a higher level of thinking (e.g., rational thought), then infants and small children would be excluded. If we don't limit ourselves in such a way, then we would need to usher in just about all types of mammals as legal persons. Similarly, infants and small children are generally not capable of commitment, having aspirations or being able to empathize. And many other types of mammals are capable of love, relating to other beings and communicating.
Clearly, his suggestions will not do. On what basis, then, should society define personhood? As the foregoing suggests, we need a definition that encompasses only human life and not animal life. Furthermore, it cannot be arbitrary - society cannot just wish personhood away because it causes too many problems or complications.
The only possible resolution to this dilemma was actually first proposed by Aristotle thousands of years ago. According to him, a being that was truly human (i.e., a person) was someone who possessed the ability to engage in rational thought or possessed the potential to engage in rational thought. This definition for legal personhood seems to be the only one that fits the requirements. It clearly excludes other types of mammals since they don't have the ability to engage in rational thought.
On the other hand, it would not exclude infants or small children before the age of reason because they clearly possess the potential to engage in rational thought. And it avoids the problem of single-cell personhood, because a single cell (excepting the zygote) by itself is incapable of developing into anything other than a single cell, and will never attain the ability to engage in rational thought.
Unfortunately for Nova, however, such a definition would also include fetuses because a fetus, if allowed to develop naturally, would eventually grow up to become an adult with the ability to engage in rational thought.
We need a definition that isn't capricious or fanciful, but one that stands up to rational scrutiny and is philosophically consistent. I'm sure Nova will be disappointed to realize that the only possible definition would effectively prohibit the raison d'etre of Planned Parenthood: abortion.
Stephen J. Konig of Roanoke is a software engineer.
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