ROANOKE TIMES 
                      Copyright (c) 1997, Roanoke Times

DATE: Sunday, January 19, 1997               TAG: 9701210021
SECTION: EDITORIAL                PAGE: 3    EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: CHARLES S. ROBB


AMERICA MUST BE READY FOR TWO DESERT STORMS

THE PENTAGON, with a panel of independent experts about to follow, is reviewing national military strategy. The critical issue is the matter of how many major regional conflicts the United States should be able to fight at one time.

The last important review, in 1993, recommended that we be able to fight two simultaneously - each on the order of the Persian Gulf War or a Korean peninsula conflict. But that review did not anticipate the additional burdens placed on our military in the past few years by international peace operations. Nor did it fully anticipate today's fiscal constraints: Over the next decade, our forces might require well over $100 billion beyond what is envisioned in defense budget plans. We already may have downsized to the point that we could not fight two Desert Storms at the same time.

Many on Capitol Hill and some in senior positions at the Pentagon want to shrink the military to a more affordable ``one major regional conflict plus peacekeeping'' force. I believe that would be a fundamental mistake. We live in an era in which potential opponents - including countries we have not yet envisioned as adversaries - have or will have the mobility and firepower to exploit a U.S. diversion in another theater. If the United States is engaging North Korea and has limited additional forces on hand, who is to deter the Iraqis from moving south again, or the Iranians from consummating their designs on the Persian Gulf, or the Bosnian peace from dissolving?

With such a force, an American president would be constrained from employing force in one theater because of the knowledge that another region might ignite as a result. In terms of manpower, ground divisions, ships and fighter wings, we already have cut our force structure by roughly one-third. In the context of conventional forces, this would put the United States into marginal superpower status and invite an arms buildup by some economically potent and militarily ambitious nation.

Those who would cut our military in this way argue that a rogue nation in a second region would be deterred by the knowledge that the United States would be able to fight and win in the first major regional conflict and then swing its forces to the second region. But would we send forces into the Middle East in the first place knowing that we could not reinforce Korea? Many anticipate that the Korean peninsula standoff will be resolved, peacefully or otherwise, within a decade. But do we start cutting forces before then?

And what if the war in the first region is not the expected short conflict of one to six months? Even our current force would be hard-pressed to field the troops necessary to support a battle in a second theater if we were fighting a prolonged battle in the first one.

A force that can handle two major regional conflicts can be funded in several ways. More can be done to cut excess infrastructure and support. The Defense Science Board estimated last summer that we could save $30 billion a year - more than enough to pay for the second conflict capability - by cutting excess bases, eliminating service redundancies and instituting management reforms at the Pentagon.

Next, we have to speed development of new military technologies that promise to deliver more lethal weapons for less cost and to allow us to get by with fewer weapon systems.

Finally, we have to explore different ways to maintain and mobilize our forces. We now maintain a large, ready active force for the two conflicts and day-to-day peace operations. But we could ``stand down'' our forces slated for the second conflict, keeping them at a lower state of readiness, without undue risks.

Whatever we do, we must avoid the illusory solution of disengaging from the world by abandoning peace operations. Such operations have expanded substantially in recent years but they still add less than 2 percent to our defense budget. Insofar as they can prevent the tens of thousands of deaths and the hundreds of billions of dollars associated with major regional wars, these operations are a wise investment.

Charles S. Robb, a Democrat, represents Virginia in the U.S. Senate.

- The Washington Post


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