The Virginian-Pilot
                             THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT 
              Copyright (c) 1994, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: Friday, September 9, 1994              TAG: 9409090625
SECTION: FRONT                    PAGE: A2   EDITION: FINAL 
SOURCE: THE WASHINGTON POST 
                                             LENGTH: Medium:   53 lines

DETAILS OF THE SHOOTINGS

From interviews and from electronic data tapes aboard the AWACS, investigators compiled a detailed chronology of the period leading up to the shootdown:

Around 9:22 a.m. local time on April 14: The two Black Hawks take off from Diyarbakir in Turkey, en route to Zakhu. Already airborne, the AWACS establish radar and radio contact with the helicopters. The AWACS determines that at least two channels on devices known as IFF - meaning Identification Friend or Foe - are working on the helicopters.

10:54 a.m.: The helicopters leave Zakhu, contact the AWACS, and start flying toward Irbil. At 11:11 a.m., the helicopters fly into mountainous terrain and fall off the AWACS radar screen.

11:20 a.m.: The F-15 pilots, flying out of Incirlik Air Base in Turkey, enter northern Iraq and notify the AWACS. Two minutes later, the radar on the lead F-15 locks on to the helicopters, then 40 miles away. He queries the helicopters' IFF equipment. But the IFF devices on the helicopters are transmitting a signal used for Turkish, not Iraqi, airspace. The F-15s tell AWACS of the radar contact and get a ``clean there'' response, meaning that the AWACS radar does not show anything in that location.

11:25 a.m.: The Black Hawks' IFF signals begin appearing on the AWACS radarscope. But no one on the AWACS tells the F-15 pilots of the new information.

11:28 a.m.: The lead F-15 pilot makes a ``visual pass'' of the helicopters, flying 1,000 feet to the left and 500 feet above them. He mistakenly identifies them as Russian-made Hinds of the sort Iraq flies.

The lead pilot asks the second F-15 pilot, his ``wingman,'' to also make a visual ID. The wingman can not make a visual ID, but calls out ``Tally 2'' on the radio, which the lead pilot takes as the required confirmation.

11:30 a.m.: The lead F-15 again tries unsuccessfully to query the helicopters on IFF equipment. When he gets no response, he fires a missile. The second F-15 fires moments later.

Not until 45 minutes after the missiles were fired, Andrus said, did the crew members of the still-airborne AWACS plane first learn something might be amiss when they were asked to locate the Black Hawks. It took several hours to confirm the accidental shooting. By then the F-15 pilots had long since returned to Incirlik.

KEYWORDS: U.S. AIRFORCE FRIENDLY FIRE ACCIDENT HELICOPTER HOMICIDE

by CNB