The Virginian-Pilot
                             THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT 
              Copyright (c) 1994, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: Saturday, November 26, 1994            TAG: 9411260058
SECTION: FRONT                    PAGE: A6   EDITION: FINAL 
SOURCE: STAFF REPORT 
                                             LENGTH: Long  :  137 lines

IF WE WANT TO HAVE AIR FORCE SUBSUMED WE COULD PROBABLY MAKE THAT HAPPEN

Rear Adm. Thomas A. Lynch, a former aircraft carrier battle group commander who most recently served as superintendent of the U.S. Naval Academy, is the Navy's liaison to a commission charged with eliminating overlap among the armed services as they scale down in the wake of the Cold War. Staff writer Dale Eisman visited Lynch this week. Here are excerpts of the interview:

Q. Among the 26 issues the commission has identified for study, which present the greatest challenge to the Navy?

A. Some of the issues that are most near and dear to us (involve) presence - overseas presence. For instance, we've had those from other services and others who have said that bombers from Barksdale (AFB in Louisiana) or having a GI on the ground or a missionary in country - that's presence. That's true.

But when we're talking about presence in a military sense, we're talking about credible combat power in the region, knowing the environment, knowing the people, interoperability with our allies and being there very timely, very responsive. That's presence.

And that's what the Navy and Marine Corps have been doing. That's what we're all about since the days of the Barbary pirates. So that's very important to us - to make sure that that is articulated properly.

Q. Is the commission looking at all at how the Navy provides presence? You know, for example, that Gen. McPeak has argued that you don't necessarily need as many aircraft carriers as we have.

A. It's nice to be able to say a bomber at Barksdale is going to be able to scare the pants off any despot or dictator around the world. But I think common sense and reality tell you that's not the case.

And (bombers) don't come cheap either. I don't know what it costs, but I read in the paper it costs like $1.5 million to have three or four bombers to fly from the United States 27-30 hours to drop four or five bombs. That costs an awful lot of money.

If you want to add that up, the maintenance of all those planes, base protection, the cost of living for all the people on the base, the flight hours and everything else. All of a sudden, you say, ``I'm getting a pretty good deal with the Navy and Marine Corps outfit.''

Not to say that we don't need our bombers. We are complementary to one another.

Q. Our presence in the Mediterranean, the Adriatic, hasn't deterred conflict in Bosnia. Presence in the Persian Gulf didn't deter Saddam Hussein in 1990. Do we need to take another look at how valuable the whole idea of presence is to stopping these dictators?

A. You're looking at isolated examples. . . . Look at the things that have been accomplished. . . . A lot of the coalition that went into Desert Storm to resolve things to our satisfaction was a coalition that was built up over the years because we are there working with the Moroccans, the Tunisians, the Bangladeshi and the Indians and the French and the Germans. . . .

In the summer of 1990, when Saddam went from Iraq to Kuwait, I was in the Eisenhower battle group. And we moved the Eisenhower battle group into the Red Sea. I was there on station on the 8th of August. Within 24 hours of the tasking, we had the bombers airborne, combat air patrol, fully prepared to go 700 miles to the Kuwait-Saudi border, if Saddam would have continued south from Kuwait into Saudi Arabia.

(The carrier) Independence, in the Gulf of Oman, had done the same thing. Now, I would submit to you that Hussein and his generals got together and they said, ``We better wait and see how this thing settles out.''

A case can be made that it stopped him from going into Saudi Arabia. It gave us six months to marshal our forces.

Q. A big area of concern in this roles and missions discussion is the future of Marine tactical aviation. Given that the Navy and Marines are always acting as a team, why does each member of the team need its own air force?

A. Well, first of all, I don't think there is a concern for Marine tactical aviation. There are some from outside that would like to say, ``Why have four air forces?'' But again, if you understand the uniqueness and the capabilities and what each air force brings to the battlefield of the future, then you understand why we have four air forces, why it's important that the Army has .

And that tactical air is integrated with Navy aircraft. And the Air Force, they've got a role to play. Once they get the bases ashore established, they can provide air superiority, providing strategic bombing is a role that they do and do very, very well.

Q. The Air Force has offered to get out of the close air support business (protecting troops on the ground). And to leave that to you folks and the Army helos and the Marines. Given that the Army is unlikely to go into battle without Navy forces nearby offshore, why not let the Navy and the Marine Corps provide close air support?

A. Because it is fundamentally an Air Force responsibility that they should not shirk from. Just like we consider our close air support to the Marine Corps a fundamental Navy responsibility. . .

It's dirty, it's nasty, it's hard to do. . . . And I will grant you that if I were the Air Force, I probably would not want that mission. . . . But if the Air Force is not providing close air support for the Army, then why have an Air Force?

If we want to have the Air Force subsumed within the Navy - well, we could probably make that happen to accommodate 'em.

Q. Has the Navy been able to identify any redundancies that you think we don't need, that we probably ought to get rid of?

A. At this point in time, many of them are just in discussion. To answer your question specifically - no. . . . We think that we are an innovative organization. And we think we are protecting the taxpayer.

We've got to be as cost-effective as we can. There are some things, some radical surgery that could come about that could change the way we do business. But this is basically all in the discussion stage and working in the issue groups right now.

Q. Adm. Boorda has outlined theater ballistic missile defense as a major goal for the Navy in this process. Why do we need it? Almost anywhere we're likely to encounter ballistic missile attack, aren't there friends of ours on the ground?

A. (Missile defense) is a necessity for the Navy. We have got to have that. We can't do our job in the future without it. If we're willing to rely on those in the Middle East or in Europe or the Far East or anywhere else, to provide the defenses for our military personnel at a critical time, history has shown us that that's something that we do at our own peril.

It's critically important to us and to the Army. We see a need. We have the launchers there (on Aegis cruisers), we have the missiles there. We're going to have tests in a couple of months. We're there. ILLUSTRATION: Color photo

``We've got to be cost-effective.''

Interview: Rear Adm. Thomas A. Lynch, the Navy's liaison to a

commission charged with eliminating overlap among the services,

discusses changes facing the military

[Appeared on Page A1.]

ASSOCIATED PRESS photo

Rear Adm. Thomas A. Lynch is shown at the U.S. Naval Academy in

Annapolis, Md., in January.

KEYWORDS: U.S. NAVY INTERVIEW

by CNB