THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1996, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Monday, July 15, 1996 TAG: 9607130084
SECTION: BUSINESS WEEKLY PAGE: 04 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: OPINION
SOURCE: BY JAMES L. GEORGE, SPECIAL TO BUSINESS WEEKLY
LENGTH: 86 lines
Before the recent Taiwan Straits and Liberian incidents fade too far from memory, it bears repeating that, once again, whenever there is a crisis, the first question is always, ``where are the carriers and the Navy?''
It bears repeating since there is probably going to be a budget fight in the next few years between the Navy and the Air Force over the crisis response mission. And no area has more to gain - or lose - than Tidewater. If no more aircraft carriers are built, the Norfolk Naval Base will shrink and Newport News Shipbuilding could well go out of business.
These two crises, therefore, deserve more than just a passing glance since they illustrate the flexibility of the Navy versus the limitations of Air Force air power.
When the Cold War ended, all the services issued new policy statements, but none was more bold than the Air Force's Global Reach-Global Power. The policy's main thrust was that the Air Force could conduct ``presence'' missions. Although these missions had always been considered a classic naval role, the Air Force pointed to its capability and cited flyovers during crises, chiefly in Korea.
Most naval analysts dismissed this as post-Cold War sophistry, pointing out there was a big difference between a few minutes, even seconds, flyover and naval presence that could last days, weeks, even months.
Then, last year the Air Force issued another paper that even bombers based in the United States had ``virtual presence'' since they could be easily deployed. While this elicited snickers from the Navy, it found great sympathy on Capitol Hill.
Congress added money last fall for more expensive, stealthy B-2 bombers even though the Pentagon had said 20 was enough. U.S. Rep. John R. Kasich, R-Ohio, the Budget Committee chairman, was very blunt. He said increased spending for Air Force B-2s would come out of future funding for Navy aircraft carriers.
The funding issue was eventually dropped, but the matter has hardly ended. It'seven gotten caught up in presidential politics since the B-2s are built in voter-rich California. President Clinton recently authorized the refurbishing of a prototype test B-2 into an operational plane while the Republicans are still promising more.
In short, the bomber versus carrier debate is far from over and for that reason these two crises deserves a second glance.
Only carriers could have been used in that sensitive China-Taiwan situation. Although the United States supports the ``one-China'' policy, it also supports Taiwan and a peaceful resolution of the issue. This policy has become known as ``strategic ambiguity.''
Bombers are not ambiguous. Can you imagine, as the Air Force has suggested, the alarm bells that would have gone off in Beijing if a flight of bombers had been detected on Chinese radar attempting a ``flyover?''
Stealthy B-2s might not have shown up on Chinese radar, but then that defeats the purpose of a flyover. Moving bombers closer to China was an option but would also have been considered provocative and time consuming.
And, where would you land them? Even though the United States has two good friends and allies in the area - South Korea and Japan - would they have accepted American bombers targeted for China?
On the other hand, two carriers were able to move uninhibited by base restrictions, and although the Chinese did not like it, there was little they could do in international waters. The point was made, ``strategic ambiguity'' was maintained, and the carriers have moved in and on.
In the Liberian case, which is probably more typical of post-Cold War crises, once again, bombers would have been useless. Does anyone really think that Liberian street gangs made up of gun-toting teenagers would have been scared off by the ``virtual'' presence or even a few minutes flyover of bombers? Instead, a self-sustaining Navy amphibious task force has been able to lie off the Liberian coast for not minutes but weeks. Another option, of course, is more overseas bases, but as the recent bombing in Saudi Arabia illustrates, that opens Americans to terrorists' attacks. There are no such worries with off-shore naval forces.
Most national security affairs observers predict another major military downsizing next year no matter who is elected president. One of the main issues will be the whole question of crisis response.
While the Air Force has done a superb job articulating new policies for never seen scenarios, as the recent Taiwan and Liberian crises will illustrate, whenever there is a real crisis, the question is still the same - ``where are the carriers and the Navy?''
The Navy, Tidewater and its Congressional delegation had better start raising those questions before it's too late. MEMO: James L. George, an adjunct fellow with the Hudson Institute, is
author of The U.S. Navy in the 1990s: Alternatives for Action. by CNB