THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1996, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Tuesday, July 16, 1996 TAG: 9607160006
SECTION: FRONT PAGE: A14 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: Editorial
LENGTH: 58 lines
There's new evidence that the United States and its Saudi ``allies'' aren't singing off the same page.
In the aftermath of the Dhahran bombing, the Saudis are resisting a request that the FBI play a significant part in the investigation. And the Saudis are reluctant to permit American personnel to relocate to more-secure housing.
It is tempting to conclude the Saudis are not our friends and to move our personnel out of harm's way. Unfortunately, we can't afford that luxury.
In fact, a huge cultural gulf separates us from the Saudis. On the question of Israel alone we are miles apart. And the reverberations of the Persian Gulf war continue when Arabs lined up with the West against other Arabs.
But it needs to be remembered that we aren't in the Middle East to be friends with the Saudis but to protect access to the region's oil. In the short term, that means we are going to have to continue a marriage of convenience with the Saudis. That entails dealing with an uncooperative regime.
The Saudis are under pressure from democratic reformers and fundamentalist reactionaries. The presence of Americans in the feudal kingdom is a provocation to some political and religious elements. The Saudis must rely on us for security, even as our presence makes them more insecure.
There's no easy answer for that paradox. But if the Saudi fear of appearing too cozy with the United States or subordinate to it puts our troops at risk, alternative arrangements must be made.
If the Saudis want us to protect their oil, and ultimately their throne, we must insist they cooperate with our reasonable efforts to protect our personnel. If, on the other hand, the Saudis decide the greater risk is in having a substantial American contingent in their country, we need to have alternative bases prepared. In fact, negotiations have been pursued with others in the region.
There's also a case to be made for more equitably sharing the burden of defending access to oil with others who depend on it, from Japan to Western Europe.
Some critics of our policy claim much of the ado is about nothing: The oil weapon is a mirage. Yes, an anti-western regime could cut off the flow of oil, but it'd also be cutting off the flow of petrodollars in the other direction. In fact, no regime in the region can afford to shut off the spigot.
That would be a persuasive argument if men always behaved for rational, economic motives. But the Persian Gulf war, the Iran-Iraq bloodbath, the Iranian revolution and the destruction of Lebanon have amply demonstrated that forces counter to economic self-interest often take over and create havoc.
While our arrangements with the Saudis are far from ideal, it is for the time being the best we've been able to contrive. We need to to try to sustain it while doing all we can to protect our troops.
But we should also be attending to our own self-interest in other ways. If we are put in danger by our dependence on Middle Eastern oil, we need to renew lapsed efforts to reduce that dependence.
If there's a chance of unacceptable risk on the ground in Saudi Arabia, we need to have alternatives in peace. Thanks to the Navy, it is possible to maintain a robust presence without relying exclusively on land bases. by CNB