THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1996, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Wednesday, November 6, 1996 TAG: 9611050417
SECTION: MILITARY NEWS PAGE: A24 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: Analysis
SOURCE: BY JACK DORSEY, STAFF WRITER
LENGTH: 117 lines
It occurs daily on city streets, particularly in stop-and-go rush hour traffic: one car rear-ends another.
But on the high seas?
How does such a crash happen between two of the nation's smartest warships, both of them bristling with radar and lookouts and radio links?
That's what a Navy admiral is trying to find out in his investigation of the Oct. 14 rear-end collision between the 1,092-foot carrier Theodore Roosevelt and the 567-foot, Florida-based cruiser Leyte Gulf.
It happened in the dead of night, in relatively calm seas 100 miles off the North Carolina shore, as the Leyte Gulf, a Ticonderoga-class Aegis cruiser, steamed behind the Norfolk-based carrier as ``plane guard,'' or rescue ship, for aircraft operating off the Roosevelt's flight deck.
So far, the Navy estimates it will cost as much as $9 million to repair the Roosevelt's gashed stern and another $2 million to repair the Leyte Gulf's crumpled bow. Both ships should be ready for duty by the time they leave on a six-month cruise at the end of November.
An investigation by Rear Adm. Michael G. Mullen, commander of Cruiser/Destroyer Group 2 in Norfolk, is expected to be completed soon, and likely will name who was responsible.
A safety investigation, designed to make certain such an accident never happens again, may take several weeks to complete. Additional months may pass before that report is released to the public.
In the meantime, the Navy declines to release details of the accident, including what each ship's crew was doing at the time.
Some veteran ship drivers say they have never heard of an accident quite like this one.
That's not to say that collisions are unusual: There are dozens of cases of ships colliding, and of vessels hitting barges, bridges and piers.
Collisions galore have been attributed to bad weather, others to mechanical failures in steering or propulsion. Ships have sideswiped one another while refueling under way, a dangerous maneuver even in the best of weather.
Still others have involved human error or just poor seamanship - often the price for a sailor's failure to carry out orders, or confusion during fast-paced deck operations.
One unlucky submarine based in Norfolk - the Jacksonville - has suffered three collisions in its 14-year career, all in generally the same waters off the mouth of the Chesapeake Bay. The sub hit a container ship, a freighter and a barge. In each case, the ship's leadership - different in each accident - was censured.
But the circumstances surrounding last month's accident - and the size of the Roosevelt - set it apart.
Normally a ship serving as plane guard operates 1,000 to 4,000 yards off the carrier's stern.
The Leyte Gulf got quite a bit closer, slicing into the carrier's fantail and shearing away a Phalanx close-in weapons system cannon and much of the steel wedge on which it was mounted. It took out part of a jet engine test station and a boarding platform. The cruiser's nose was peeled as if by a can opener, and its main anchor well was heavily dented.
Some have suggested that the TR was conducting engineering drills at the time, simulating propulsion plant failures. Called Basic Engineering Casualty Control Exercises, the drills also can include an order to reverse engines. Some call that a ``crash back'' maneuver.
That's not something that often happens on the interstate. As one veteran sailor of surface ships said shortly after the collision: ``You don't expect an airport you are following to back up on you.''
The Navy won't say whether the TR was stopped or moving in reverse. Neither will it confirm the ships were operating in radio silence. One carrier-based officer said the TR made its intentions known to the Leyte Gulf by radio. A surface ship officer maintained no such report was made.
Others argue that should have made no difference.
``I don't care how many gadgets you've got aboard, it still amounts to people paying attention,'' said one veteran.
Indeed, a Navy ship has plenty of on-board insurance that it won't run into another vessel.
Expensive radar with redundant features that can pick out a tiny sailboat miles away are part of every Navy ship's hardware. So are radios, flashing lights, semaphore and lookouts on the bridge.
Below decks, in the combat information center - what's called the nerve center of the ship - are teams that plot every move, distance and bearing of not only their own vessel, but also those of any other ship within several miles.
On the bridge, other teams do the same thing.
``We're always plotting our position on the bridge and in combat,'' said one naval officer. ``That is why you have combat as the backup to the bridge:; to check solutions, courses and speed. They are our cross-check.''
If, for example, the ship detects a course of an approaching ship that seems out of character, the combat information center can be called on verify what is happening.
It could be, said one retired master chief petty officer, a veteran of 25 years aboard surface ships and carriers, that the CIC was shut down.
``We've done it on occasion,'' he said, ``especially after a long, tiring exercise when nothing much was planned for the night. At that time of the morning (3 a.m.) I imagine the captain had turned in, and things had settled down pretty much.''
When the captain leaves the bridge, he leaves both standing and written orders, putting the bridge team on notice to wake him if another vessel comes within a specified distance of his ship. He's to be called if there is any sudden deviation from the routine.
If the ships were steaming in formation, with no significant mission ahead, they most likely were operating at 10 to 15 knots, meaning they were covering 340 to 508 yards per minute.
At those speeds, the Leyte Gulf had between 2 and 12 minutes to react to any change in the carrier's movement. Its variable-pitch screws can reverse thrust almost immediately and stop the 567-foot ship in less than twice its length, even from full speed.
But it appears from the extent of the damage that the cruiser never saw the bigger ship's stern until it had become part of it.
If it had happened on a highway, the ticket would have read: ``Following too close.''
Or, if the TR was backing up: Reckless driving. ILLUSTRATION: Associated Press photo
Repairing damage from the Oct. 14 rear-end collision between the
cruiser Leyte Gulf, shown here, and the carrier Theodore Roosevelt
may cost the Navy as much as $11 million.
KEYWORDS: COLLISION AT SEA by CNB