THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1997, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Wednesday, January 1, 1997 TAG: 9612310021
SECTION: FRONT PAGE: A16 EDITION: FINAL
TYPE: Opinion
SOURCE: By STEVE YETIV
LENGTH: 73 lines
Ever since Saddam Hussein emerged from the 1991 Persian Gulf War personally unscathed, world attention has focused on how long he can remain in power. The recent near-assassination of his brutal, capricious son Uday has brought this question back to the fore.
Who shot Uday? And what does this mean for Saddam's own power position? While the jury is still out on the Uday hit, the record shows that Saddam knows how to rule by the gun, despite his many adversaries who would as soon hang him by his toes.
The assassination attempt on his son is significant. Saddam has transferred much power to Uday, who is now a political extension of his father. Evidently, father and son have put their past problems behind them - Uday once killed Saddam's food taster with a club.
Nowadays, if you attack Uday, you attack Saddam. Most people in the Middle East understand that, especially Uday's attackers. Since Uday is protected by overlapping security forces that also protect Saddam, the Uday hit may reflect some problems within Saddam's security forces.
At the same time, this is hardly the first direct or indirect challenge to Saddam. In March 1995, Saddam faced a coup attempt by the Albuminr tribe of the Dulaym clan, the first coup attempt from within Saddam's traditional Sunni Muslim base of power. An air force general from this clan was involved in orchestrating the challenge to Saddam's rule. He was executed. The Dulaym clan may be avenging his execution, an act that may have involved Uday, by attacking the younger Hussein.
In August 1995, Saddam faced more family problems. His son-in-law defected to Jordan, signaling problems in his inner circle. Uday had begun to usurp their high-level authority, thus perhaps contributing to their defection. The hit on Uday may also be retribution for the murder of the defectors and parts of their family upon their return from Jordan to Iraq. They expected and were promised amnesty by Saddam, but got bullets instead.
In August 1996, Saddam put two family members under house arrest, faced more defections by military officers, and, reportedly, narrowly escaped an assassination attempt himself. The Uday hit may have even come from within the ranks of Saddam's al-Takriti family.
Saddam's internal problems in August 1996 were no doubt related to his action against the Kurds in northern Iraq. Sensing a challenge to his power, he took action. In September, Iraqi forces crushed the Iranian supported Patriotic Union Kurdistan, kicked the CIA out of Iraq, and re-established Iraqi control in northern Iraq. Iraq's ongoing rivalry with Iran, reflected in northern Iraq, may also be related to the Uday hit. Uday implied as much on Iraqi TV, appearing in something akin to a big white robe. But this may be his effort to divert attention from internal problems, and to focus it on arch-enemy Iran.
Saddam has responded to internal threats with successful, bloody purges. In response to the Uday hit, Saddam is arresting suspected individuals. In the process, he is dealing his real and imagined adversaries a general blow, and sending a chilling message to would-be assassins. You die if you try.
The Uday whodunnit mystery may never be solved. If it's an inside job from within Saddam's security forces or family, this could create problems for Saddam or Uday in the future. A Dulaym clan hit is also problematic because it reflects a further fracturing of Saddam's traditional Sunni Muslim base of support. If Iran did it, that's best for Saddam and company because it doesn't reflect internal problems and could help Saddam divert attention from Iraq's domestic ills.
However, irrespective of who did it, Saddam has proved quite able in the past of responding to such challenges. If Saddam is on the run so to speak, sleeping in more beds on different nights than members of the world's oldest profession, then his adversaries are in a full, panicked gallop. That is his advantage. He is meaner, better organized and more treacherous than they. And he still appears in control of Iraq's propaganda and security machinery. More than the death of his son is needed to undermine that power. MEMO: Steve Yetiv is a political science professor at Old Dominion
University.