DATE: Tuesday, September 30, 1997           TAG: 9709300001

SECTION: LOCAL                   PAGE: B8   EDITION: FINAL 

TYPE: Opinion 

SOURCE: BY STEVE YETIV 

                                            LENGTH:   95 lines

ANOTHER VIEW - SALVAGING MIDEAST PEACE: TIME FOR CHANGE

It's time for a big change in the U.S. approach toward the Middle East peace process. So far, it has been piecemeal, aimed at achieving small-step achievements in the hope that this could build trust and lead to bigger successes. But this approach has failed.

In the wake of Secretary Albright's trip to the region, the Clinton administration should consider formulating in earnest a comprehensive peace plan. Such a plan could lay out, although not too specifically, elements of a final settlement for Palestinians and Israelis and other interested parties.

The rationale for such a shift in approach is fourfold.

First, the small-step approach gives terrorists time to derail the slow-moving peace process. Thus, they can actually reverse small-step successes before they add up to real, enduring progress. We have witnessed this time and again and most recently with the tragic triple bombing in Jerusalem. The peace process is not altogether elastic; it does have a breaking point.

Second, in a region where conspiracy theories are popular and trust evanescent, failure to see at least the contours and benefits of a final agreement make both sides reluctant to make compromises. Why, after all, should leaders expose themselves to their own extremists if the final deal is a no-go? Why take chances if minimal demands will ultimately be rejected or neglected?

Third, even a comprehensive approach will include small steps as a supplement. Yet mistrust over the nature of any final settlement hinders cooperation. Some idea of what a final agreement will include can increase trust by creating confidence that minimal demands will be met, thus making small steps within the context of a comprehensive approach easier to realize.

Fourth, and most important, the logic of the famous Rubiks Cube helps explain the difficulties of peacemaking and the benefits of trying a holistic approach. View, if you will, the Middle East as a Rubiks Cube with the traditional nine squares to a side. The cube cannot easily be solved if only side (country, group) is toyed with in neglect of the others, or in the absence of a recognized, common purpose. A good Rubiks Cube player eventually tackles all or most sides, while seeing each as part of the whole.

What in reality we are faced with in the Mideast is a Rubiks Cube with 64 squares to a side. Consider the Israeli-Palestinian front as only one part of the larger cube. The cube turns in confounding ways. Numerous forces are at play in Israel, the West and the Arab world, which affect and are affected by developments such as the Hebron accord, terrorism and Jewish settlements.

In Israel, each political faction has its own views. The Labor Party is willing to negotiate in accordance with U.N. Resolution 242. Labor accepts the exchange of lands won by Israel in the 1967 Six Day War, for real peace, and views Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as foot-dragging on peace.

Likud, wary of territorial compromise, nonetheless toys with Resolution 242, while viewing Labor as too soft on the Arabs. As a result of the Hebron accord, some rightist elements in Likud dug in against any potential future concessions by Netanyahu.

On the extremes, the peace parties and Peace Now have become increasingly disgruntled with Likud and, to some extent, Labor. They tend to blame Israel for being hardlined and Jewish settlers, be they in Hebron or Jerusalem for minority intransigence; many are viewed by the Israeli right as more pro-Arab than the Arabs.

Meanwhile, ``fundamentalists'' view territorial compromise, such as on Hebron or Jerusalem, as betraying Jewish history. Many feel that God's redemption of the Jews is impossible if this takes place. Their electoral base and political power have increased, and their position is bolstered by every act of terror.

On the Palestinian side, core elements of PLO Chairman Yasser Arafat's Fatah party sporadically appear amenable to a land for peace deal. However, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) and other factions continue to claim that in addition to Israel, the world Zionist movement and international imperialism (read, Uncle Sam) are its enemies. It wants Israel destroyed altogether and sees Jewish settlements as an existential threat. Some smaller PLO factions still rally around their Arab state patrons. And Hamas, outside the PLO, appears ever more wedded to undermining the peace process either by suicide terror or political means, depending on the particular faction.

Almost any solution to an issue will appeal to certain sides and offend others. The Rubiks Cube turns. A solution amenable to Likud will alienate part of Labor, the far Jewish left and some Palestinian groups and Arab countries. A solution appealing to Labor may defy Likudniks and Jewish fundamentalists; one amenable to Fatah may be dismissed by some Likudniks, the PLFP, Hamas, Iran and Libya. Such dynamics not only make it difficult to reach agreement, because leaders face exposed flanks, but also to make it stick. When you satisfy one side, you can anger and motivate others.

The Rubiks Cube analogy tells us something: At the core, the cube requires that one see how each side relates to the other and to the bigger cube. A comprehensive approach, which sits well with aspects of both the Muslim and Jewish cultural and philosophical tradition, can create this effect. And now is as good a time as any to try to initiate it. I t's time for a big change in the U.S. approach toward the Middle East peace process. So far, it has been piecemeal, aimed at achieving small-step achievements in the hope that this could build trust and lead to bigger successes. But this approach has failed. MEMO: Steve Yetiv is political science professor and associate

director of international studies at Old Dominion University and a

research affiliate at Harvard's Center for Middle Eastern Studies.

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