DATE: Saturday, November 15, 1997           TAG: 9711140016

SECTION: LOCAL                   PAGE: B8   EDITION: FINAL 

TYPE: Editorial 

                                            LENGTH:   70 lines

PENTAGON REFORM: STREAMLINING NEEDED NOW WE'VE HEARD THIS TUNE BEFORE, BUT IT'S TIME FOR CONGRESS TO SING ALONG

The Clinton administration's Defense Reform Initiative proposes to streamline the Department of Defense. Seems as if we've heard this kind of talk before. This time, the proposal includes trendy business buzzwords like re-engineering and privatization, but the proof will be in the performance.

There's nothing wrong with the goal of doing more with less and saving $6 billion a year in infrastructure and overhead that can go into weapons procurement. But skepticism is justified. Even Defense Secretary William S. Cohen admits these promises have often been made before, but the Pentagon bureaucracy has proved impervious and Congress' will has been weak.

The centerpiece of the proposal is two more rounds of base closings in 2001 and 2005. Previous BRAC efforts have been a success, and the next two rounds would be designed to save $1.4 billion a year each. Cohen points out that the defense budget has been reduced 40 percent and personnel will have been cut 36 percent by 2003, but previous rounds of base closings have only cut infrastructure 21 percent. More must be done. These lopsided numbers suggest bone is being cut while fat is being spared.

Unfortunately, Congress rejected an earlier attempt to schedule needed base closings and may be no more inclined to do so now. There is fear by many who have dodged the base-closing bullet up till now that their turn could be coming, and the need to preserve local pork can outweigh national security. All four local congressmen oppose further BRAC rounds, for instance. Yet the Navy is fully behind more base cuts in order to buy more advanced weapons.

The same downsizing logic applies to staff. Cohen calls for reducing his own office staff by 33 percent, for cuts in Defense agencies of 21 percent and so on. But the Pentagon's civilian bureaucracy numbers 1 million men, so the proposed 30,000 cut is only 3 percent. It doesn't begin to penetrate to middle management levels. This is hardly downsizing on a massive scale even if it takes place. And past experience suggests jobs cut one place have a way of popping up elsewhere for little net saving.

Seeking to more functions that aren't part of the military's core mission is also a reasonable goal. Cohen wants to open 34,000 jobs in areas like data processing to outside bidders. If, as Cohen insists, the dual goals of ``significant savings and increased readiness'' can be achieved, well and good. But readiness is paramount, and false economies must be guarded against. If inexpensive uniformed labor is replaced with more expensive civilian labor, savings could be illusory and the possibilities of corruption could increase when outside bidders get involved.

Cohen's re-engineering plans also include a move to paperless systems, adoption of best practices, improved support and logistics. Sounds fine, but replacing the military's ``just in case'' mind-set with the ``just in time'' orientation of modern business can be taken too far.

If bumpers for Toyotas don't arrive in time, nothing is lost but profits. If food, ammo or other essential supplies don't arrive just in time, lives, battles and liberty are at stake. That's one reason for the military's belt and suspenders ethos. That said, some movement toward more streamlined logistics and reduced stockpiles is in order.

Finally, the plan calls for consolidating various operations and envisions more training and development to enhance the role of the National Guard and Reserve in domestic emergency situations. This will be a hard-fought battle. There's a palpable tension between Guard/Reserve and the regular Army.

Guard proponents say the system allows the country to retain a lot of potential power at minimal cost. Critics say, in a time of finite budgets, most resources should go to regular troops. Guard and Reserve quality can be uneven. The units are often more important as pork for local districts than as elements of national defense. We side with the critics. Guard and Reserve units may not be the best use of limited funds.

Overall, the country should hope Cohen succeeds. In particular, additional base closings are needed to redirect funds from obsolete missions to modern weapons. Those with the best interests of the military at heart, rather than parochial self-interest, must get aboard and back the plan.

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